
We Trip The Light
FANTASTIC

CULTURAL POLITICS in the Third World

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Acknowledgements

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

After years of neglect and abandon, obscured by the weighty shadows of structures and rational choices, culture is once again making a comeback in political science. While in certain academic circles it is still taboo to talk of the possible importance of culture – whose study many social scientists continue to consider as "unscientific" – a growing number of scholars have begun to take a second look at the long neglected phenomenon. The end of the Cold War and the demise of communism, which effectively put an end to at least one field of study within political science, have given added impetus to the rediscovery of culture as a respectable subject of study, effectively creating a whole new subdiscipline for political scientists. Today, the role of culture in politics is being studied from a variety of angles and perspectives. Scholars such as Larry Diamond have focused much of their attention on political culture, first celebrated by Almond and Verba more than 30 years ago, looking specifically at its role in undermining authoritarian states and ushering in democratic rule.[1] As Chapter 6 demonstrates, other students of civil society have been equally attentive to the role and significance of political culture. Benjamin Barber, meanwhile, has analyzed the cultural as well as political consequences of the conflict between consumerist capitalism versus religious and tribal

fundamentalism in shaping international relations.[2] Edward Said has used culture to deconstruct Orientalism, itself based almost entirely on examination of cultural traits and characteristics,[3] and Samuel Huntington, whose earlier writings overlooked culture almost completely, has, perhaps more than anyone else, resorted to culture to give expression to the emerging field of cultural geography.[4]

This book does not aim to offer a new or radically different interpretation of the ongoing debate over cultural geography. Nor does it seek to present a universal theory of what Third World countries have done or ought to do as they navigate the political, economic and sociocultural traumas of development. Instead, it tries to place culture in its proper political perspective in the Third World. In most recent political science publications, culture is either completely ignored or is deified, considered either as an epiphenomenon best left for second-rate scholars to dwell on or an explain-all panacea whose overlooking means one's academic credentials are suspect. While not seeking to put a definitive end to this debate, this book tries to present a more balanced view of the proper role that culture plays within and in relation to politics. Culture and politics are innately intertwined, the book claims, but neither is overwhelming and overpowering of the other. Cultures and civilizations are not clashing; politicians and diplomats may be. Simple political crafting in the form of policy-making or institution building does not "fix" things; cultural forces may also need to be grappled with. These arguments are developed theoretically in Chapters 2 and 3, and then applied to political culture, cultural articulation and democratization and in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 respectively.

Chapter 2 examines the debate over the larger role of culture in determining new global politics and civilizational realignments. Chapter 3 concentrates on domestic politics, exploring the specific place of culture in relation to other phenomena in conceptualizing and examining Third World politics. Chapter 4 looks at the continued usefulness of political culture as a distinguishing phenomenon throughout the globe in general and within the Third World in particular. Drawing the book's focus still narrower, Chapters 5 and 6 focus on two recent and/or ongoing political developments whose appearance, evolution and success cannot be made

possible without the profound involvement of cultural dynamics. The first is the evolution of what may be called "the politics of being", focusing on how issues touching on one's sense of identity effect the state. This is discussed in Chapter 5. The second development, discussed in Chapter 6, is the appearance and consolidation of democracy in the last decade or so. I have chosen these two topics for these chapters because they tend to represent the structuralist/ culturalist extremes of recent scholarship in political science. Almost all discussions of the articulations and expressions of culture – in both the West as well as in the Third World – down-play any importance that politics in general and state initiatives in particular may have. Chapter 5 highlights the inter-connected nature of both, focusing on the mutual influences that the state and culture exert on one another. Similarly, an overwhelming majority of scholars writing on democratization have either minimized the importance of such cultural forces as civil society, or, alternatively, have emphasized its significance at the expense of other, equally important dynamics. Thus democratization provides a most fertile area of analysis in which to articulate the nature and degree of the relationship between culture and politics. I have deliberately chosen to bring the book's main discussion to a close with a treatment of democratization in order to highlight the interconnected nature of political endeavours with cultural forces and dynamics. The conclusion draws on the previous chapters to reiterate the book's main thesis concerning the interplay of culture and politics in the Third World.

In its own way, each of the following chapters is designed to highlight the inseparability of culture and politics. This is not to maintain, however, that all politics is culturally determined, as Professor Samuel Huntington has done. There is a fine relationship between the two, the subtleties of which are highlighted in Chapter 2. Culture is important to politics, I maintain, but it needs to be put in a proper perspective and looked at within a broader context within which a number of forces interact and mutually influence one another. These forces are discussed in Chapter 3. The chapter maintains that the study of comparative politics in general and Third World politics in particular requires the adoption of a far more holistic approach than hitherto popular, one that takes into account not

only political dynamics but those related to the economy, society and culture, and even history as well. It examines the various paradigmatic approaches that scholars have recently chosen in conceptualizing the Third World and concludes by offering an alternative perspective for analysis. Existing paradigms in comparative politics have proven unsatisfactory in taking into account the important contributions made to politics by the very elements that constitute it. A new comparative paradigm is needed, one which would pay attention not only to the mutual interactions of state and societal institutions but also to political culture and to other non-institutional, situational predicaments in which political systems find themselves. The various state-society power relations found across the globe have generally given rise to political systems that are either democratic, democratizing or non-democratic. In each of these polities, the various elements of politics – state, society, political culture and predicaments – have a different relationship with one another, in turn reinforcing and sustaining that particular pattern of political rule.

Chapter 5 examines the question of state intervention, or lack thereof, into culture. Some states are by nature more culturally interventionist (and sensitive) than others. The chapter proposes a typology of the states that is likely to be found in the Third World and examines the likelihood that each may intervene in the cultural realm. Moreover, the chapter looks at social and cultural dynamics that are likely, with varying degrees of intensity, to impact the agendas and operations of the state.

Chapter 6 concentrates on the role that civil society plays in democratic transitions. The chapter maintains that not all of the new democracies are equally democratic. Ultimately, the degree to which a political system is genuinely democratic rests not on its political characteristics but more on the depth and maturity of the civil society on which it is based and on which it relies. The notion of civil society itself needs to be distinguished from that of civil society organization, only a combination of the latter making up the former. In so far as democratic outcomes are concerned, the timing of the evolution and precise role of civil society could potentially be far more important than the politics of negotiations, the characteristics of institutional democratic

consolidation, and the outcome of post-transition elections. In cases where civil society initially takes a back seat to political and institutional dynamics that bring about democratization, the outcome could potentially be a quasi-democratic system if the victors of the transition process are not genuinely committed to the ideals of representative democracy. But where civil society emerges first and compels social actors to actively seek after democratic goals, the incoming democratic polity tends to be far more representative of the broader strata of society. It is, in other words, a viable democracy.

With the dramatic events of the past decade or so have come new uncertainties over the precise definition of the "Third World".[5] No longer is it simply enough to look at the economic and industrial predicaments of a country, or the nature of its political system, to determine the category to which it belongs. In fact, the world has changed so much so rapidly that the very designation "Third World" appears anachronistic and in serious need of being reworded. I have to admit that I have used the label here with some trepidation and wish a better substitute had been developed. "Developing countries" is equally unsatisfying, as some of its current usage is motivated more by political correctness rather than any academic merits. I have therefore decided to continue using the label "Third World" throughout this book, hopeful that the current generation of students and readers still remember the regions for which the label was originally devised.

Alas, the world has changed, and so with it the usage of the term "Third World" here. In using the label Third World, I wish to include all countries belonging to Africa, Asia (except for Japan), and Latin America. I have tried to include as many diverse examples as possible from each of these continents, although the discussion of democratization in Chapter 6 also draws examples from East and Central Europe, where many of the political and cultural forces at work were similar to those in Latin America.

Naturally, any study of the sort undertaken here has to suffer (or benefit) from a certain level of generality. The aim here is not to cover the multiple areas of cultural politics in every country or even every region of the Third World, but rather to highlight some of the more

important features in this area of investigation that the countries of the Third World tend to have in common. In writing this book, I have sought to paint a general picture of the inter-relationship between politics and culture in the Third World. Filling in the details, or applying the overall frameworks proposed here to specific cases, can be much better done by area and country specialists.

Notes

1. See, among others, Almond and Verba 1963 and Diamond 1994.
2. Barber 1995.
3. Said 1979, 1993.
4. Perhaps best representative of Huntington's non-cultural analyses is his seminal work on political development, *Political Order in Changing Societies,* 1968. In the opposite extreme, his works on cultural geography are his article, "The clash of civilizations?", 1993: 22–49, and his book by the same title, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,* 1996. For more on this see Chapter 2.
5. See, for example, Berger, 1994: 257–75, Kamrava 1993: 703–16, and Manor 1991.

CHAPTER TWO

Cultural Politics in the New World Order

The new face of international politics is shaped not so much by military and ideological competition but by inherently conflictual characteristics within fundamentally different civilizations and cultural fault lines.[1] In fact, "for the first time in centuries, the West may face serious threats from other, non-Western cultures as the next century unfolds."[2] In some ways, the future is already here, as a protracted clash of civilizations is pitting the Judeo-Christian West against an Islamic civilization whose "crescent-shaped . . . bloc, from the bulge of Africa to central Asia, has bloody borders."[3] But Islam is neither unique nor alone in its opposition to Western values and civilization. Japanese, Hindu, Sinic (i.e. Chinese/ Confucian), African, and Eastern Orthodox cultures also embody values that stand in sharp contrast to the Western ideals of Christianity, rule of law, social pluralism, political democracy, individualism, and the separation of church and state.[4]"The dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness."[5] In the coming clash – whether violent or relatively calm, sudden or gradual – the West is certain to emerge victorious because of the very values that form its core and in reaction to which the conflict erupted in the first place. Western values are, after all, universal and "will ultimately become widespread."[6] The above paragraph, in broad strokes and without doing justice to the many

subtleties that mark the arguments of those quoted in it, sums up one of the most pervasive lines of reasoning in Western academic circles since the end of the Cold War. Such arguments have spawned others of similar caliber, in turn provoking sharp and varied reactions from a host of critics and detractors.[7] My purpose in this chapter is not necessarily to join in a debate that has already been exhaustively analyzed in numerous books and journal articles. Instead, I wish to draw on the insights offered by proponents and critics of the increasingly prevalent field of "cultural geography" to highlight some of the basic dilemmas and dynamics that are at work in the cultural politics of the non-Western world. For obvious reasons arising from the nature of this book, my main concern is not so much with the challenges to the West and its values per se, a task for which the self-appointed defenders of the Western tradition are much better suited.[8] Rather, I wish to focus on the politics of cultural geography *within* the Third World, or, more specifically, on the nature and consequences of interactions between national and extra-national cultural values within Third World countries.

In the main, the central thesis of the present chapter is as follows: In so far as each Third World country is concerned, it has to contend with two overlapping and inter-related yet distinct cultures, one domestic and indigenous, the other global and extra-national. In itself, culture, whether global or indigenous, has two facets or, better put, subcultures. Material or scientific culture, derived from those aspects of life related to machines and other industrial inventions, contrasts with adaptive, or normative, culture, which is based on and primarily derived from customs, habits, patterns of socialization, and other individual or collective endeavours dealing with the human psyche. In both global and domestic cultures, the material and adaptive subcultures intersect and interact. Since the West has been the primary originator of science and industry since the Industrial Revolution, domestic and global material subcultures converge into one, although the former often lags behind the latter. Does this then mean that global culture eventually overwhelms and subsumes domestic culture? Or, put more bluntly, is global – i. e. Western – culture universal?

My answer, in typically noncommittal academic fashion, is "not

necessarily". There are two elements to consider here. First, domestically, each adaptive culture is often bifurcated, divided with varying degrees of intensity into the authentic and the altered, the "traditional" and the "modern".[9] Although the "modern" aspects of a culture may have far more prevalence and currency in a nation as compared with more traditional cultural elements, the latter do not always fade away and often retain a strong hold among certain segments of the population, at times even manifesting themselves in violent forms. Religion, often the most traditional of cultural elements, provides a ready example of the continued hold of tradition on cultures. Witness the growing incidents of Jewish fundamentalism in Israel, Muslim fundamentalism in the Arab world and Iran, Hindu fundamentalism in India, and even right-wing activism by religious fundamentalists and the militia movement in the United States.

Moreover, in almost all Third World countries, there is a second factor to consider: the role that the state assumes in relation to culture. All states, whether they want to or not, influence and in some ways shape popular culture.[10] Some states, however, take a far more active role not only in patronizing but also protecting what they consider to be essential elements of cultural identity. Extreme examples include Khomeini's Iran and today's Saudi Arabia, although these two cases, especially Saudi Arabia, bespeak more of cultural paranoia than anything else. In large measure, therefore, the vitality of an indigenous culture, the popular currency of its more authentic versus less traditional aspects, and its overall synthesis with or rejection of global culture depend on what the state does and on its social, cultural and political agendas.

For reasons that vary from case-to-case, some states have elaborate, pointed socio-cultural agendas while others do not. Most sub-Saharan African states strive to forge national unity under the rubric of ethno-tribal hegemony (Burundi, Rwanda, the Sudan, Uganda), multi-ethnicity and cultural pluralism (Nigeria and South Africa), or even an often thinly veiled "national" character (Liberia, Kenya, Zaire, Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, and most Francophone states of West Africa).[11] In the Middle East, apart from Islamic Iran and Saudi Arabia, most states have to play a delicate cultural balancing act, juggling between the demands of the non-traditional and the more traditional

strata of society.[12] As the "modern" supporters of the late Shah of Iran testify, not all states succeed in this difficult acrobatic. Most East Asian, Latin American and Caribbean states have cast their cultural lot firmly with the West, viewing such an orientation as a natural corollary of their projects of economic and political modernity. *MTV Latino* and the Tokyo Disneyland serve purposes that are more profound than mere entertainment.

Southeast Asia is not too different, especially in so far as Taiwan and the Philippines are concerned, although the Chinese, Indonesian, and Malaysian states are more interested in facilitating rapid capitalist expansion rather than popularizing democratic norms at home and projecting a democratic image abroad.[13] In South Asia, the Indian and Sri Lankan states have sought to unify highly heterogenous national entities, while the Pakistani state, with questionable conviction and extreme unevenness, has talked of implementing an Islamizing project throughout the country. Finally, most Central Asian states, less than a decade old, are still trying to discover what their cultural orientation is or ought to be: Russian, Turkic, Islamic, Middle Eastern, Eurasian, etc.?[14] For now at least, few in Central Asia would endorse Professor Huntington's thesis that they belong squarely to the "Islamic" civilization.

Culture, then, is a varied and nuanced phenomenon. It is not a maker or breaker of "civilizational fault lines", nor is it a unified, universal phenomenon which, in a single form, emanates from the West and eventually overtakes and overwhelms its lesser, local varieties. There are two cultures, local and global, and each has its own adaptive and material sub-components. How deeply cultures converge or differ from one part of the globe to another is as much a product of scientific advancement and know-how as it is a result of state policies and agendas. There is no cultural universalism, no impending clash. What determines where we go culturally, who we identify with more closely and with whom we have less in common, our symbols, our tastes and preferences, all depend on the politics of culture, on how those in power indirectly influence or perhaps directly package and sell domestic and imported cultural products.

With the Cold War gone, it is only natural for us to want to find another neat category to which we belong politically and culturally, and the more superior our category the better. We had had the label "new world order" for some time, but no one was sure what that order was. There was no satisfactory matrix for ordering the globe anew. Is the globe now comprised of two worlds – "us and them" – or an unclassifiable collection of nearly 184 states, or sheer chaos, or perfect harmony?[15] Huntington and others have found culture to be the answer.[16] "In the post-Cold War world", Huntington maintains, "states increasingly define their interests in civilizational terms. They cooperate with and ally themselves with states with similar or common culture and are more often in conflict with countries of different culture."[17] Culture is, no doubt, an important element in influencing domestic politics and regional and international alignments. It is not, however, the phenomenon that overwhelms and/or determines politics, whether domestic or international. In so far as domestic or international politics are concerned, forces much more complicated than culture alone, or even its much larger manifestation of civilization, are at work. No one can deny the existence and importance of cultural differences between Europe and the Middle East and of similarities within each. But to argue that these differences represent an impetus for clash and conflict, that they are the parameters of a new reordering of the globe, the findings of the new discipline of cultural geography, is to be culturally reductionist while not even doing justice to the intricacies of culture itself.

Analytical Concepts

Before proceeding further, I need to clarify some of the basic concepts I have used in constructing my arguments and in the pages to come. They include culture, politics, cultural politics, global culture and domestic culture. Each of these concepts, of course, is rich and pregnant with meanings, contexts and perspectives, the full treatment of which is beyond the scope of the task at hand. Rather than *defining* these concepts as they have been treated in the social sciences, I merely wish

to clarify my specific usage of them in the context of the arguments forwarded here. More thorough treatments, needless to say, are readily available elsewhere.[18]

My usage of the concept of culture here is informed by the definitions forwarded by Edward Burnett Tylor and Clifford Geertz. Tylor's definition, one of the earliest, in 1903, is also perhaps one of the most comprehensive. Culture, he maintained, "is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."[19] Clifford Geertz proposed a similar definition in the 1960s, although *symbols* were of primary importance. According to Geertz, culture "denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life."[20] Envisioned as such, culture becomes far more encompassing of human endeavours and activities than some scholars in the humanities would have us believe. Edward Said, for example, conceives of culture in rather narrow terms as "a concept that includes a refining and elevating element, each society's reservoir of the best that has been known and thought".[21] For Said culture is autonomous. It is "all those practices, like the arts of description, communication, and representation, that have relative autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose principle aims is pleasure."[22]

Not only does culture go beyond simply providing aesthetic pleasure, it is not a stand-alone phenomenon either. Human endeavours are innately intertwined. As eloquently and insistently as disciplinary purists may proclaim, there are margins within each discipline, especially each field of human activity, that overlap with and even complement and reinforce other disciplines. State policies, to take one example of what belongs to the domain of *politics,* can and often do influence the formulation and expression of public preferences and prejudices (*culture*), which in turn shape elite or mass purchasing habits (*economics*). This flow of influence can go from any direction within

and between these and other related disciplines, and the possibilities of mutual interaction, interference and influence are limitless.

One of the main criticisms that can be levelled against latter-day culturalists is their near complete neglect of other, non-cultural forces in shaping the general contours of domestic and international politics. In their zeal to amend and refine – one might say "humanize" – the mechanical, frequently mathematical, interpretations of structuralists, today's culturalists have taken a good idea but deified it beyond analytical utility. Culture, no doubt, is an important element in political conduct. But it is *one* of the elements at work. Not every major initiative of the Saudi or Iranian governments has its roots in the Islamic civilization, or is designed to somehow further civilizational objectives, or is intended as a posture against another competing civilization. Neither are, for that matter, the initiatives of the German, French, Italian or even the American governments motivated overwhelmingly by cultural and/or civilizational considerations. "In the new world", Huntington claims, "cultural identity is the central factor shaping a country's associations and antagonisms . . . [It] defines the state's place in world politics, its friends, and its enemies."[23] This line of thinking is culturally reductionist, ignoring the influence and weight of such other forces as economics, institutional factors, balance of power considerations, and power configurations within the domestic polity, to name a few. State policies are often shaped by domestic constituent concerns, even in non-democracies, by inter-elite competition within the state, by the forces of economic competition and feasibility, by intelligence data and strategic planning, and, sometimes, even by rational choices. Policy preferences, diplomatic alliances and rivalry between neighbors are as often products of non-civilizational dynamics as they are likely to be rooted in them.

Also central to the argument here is the distinction within culture between material (or scientific) culture and adaptive (or valuative) culture. This distinction was originally proposed by William Ogburn in the 1920s and 1930s, who formulated a hypothesis of cultural lag – and thus social change – based on the differences in the time it takes for each of the two subcultures to appear and gain hold.[24] Material culture is comprised of the norms and values that are associated with material goods, whereas

adaptive culture comes from existing customs, values and habits that are, at least initially, independent of material goods. This dichotomy *within* each culture has been largely ignored by the recent theorists of cultural politics, who see the phenomenon as largely monolithic and internally cohesive. Huntington does, nevertheless, distinguish between Westernization and modernization, although not in the terms spelled out here.[25]

In the present century, the West's near complete monopoly over scientific achievements, astonishing advancements in science and industry in general, the dawn of the computer age and the development of the information super-highway in specific, and the increasing prevalence of consumerism throughout non-Western countries have had particular implications for the Third World. In fact, one of the central cultural dilemmas within the Third World has been to reconcile the often vastly different norms of material culture as compared with those of adaptive culture. Because of its contemporary genesis and almost constant regeneration as a predominantly Western phenomenon, material culture is often readily associated with the West, at the peak of which sits the highly affluent United States. The West has its own cultural dichotomy into adaptive and material cultures, and through the projection of power, the export of its cultural products, its advanced domestic and international media, and its material and economic affluence, has been able to package its combined material and adaptive cultures into one "global" culture. For the peoples of the Third World, the dilemma is to reconcile this global culture – a euphemism for Western culture – with their own "domestic" culture, which in turn has its own differing material and adaptive cultures.

It is here that politics in general and cultural politics in particular come into play. The cultural dynamics described above do not occur in a vacuum and are subject to varying economic, social and political influences. The connection between politics and culture becomes particularly apparent when we take a macro view of the former: *politics is comprised of developments occurring within the state, within society, and between state and society.* These connections are more thoroughly spelled out in Chapter 3, but it should be clear at this point that since

culture constitutes a society's shared symbols, expressions and values, it has an intimate connection with politics. Cultural politics, therefore, at least in its broad usage here, deals with the political dimensions of culture, or, more specifically, with the influence and role of culture within politics. Culture, the next chapter argues, is an important element in politics, but it is only *one* of the elements that make up and shape political endeavors. For now, I am interested in exploring the varieties that culture may assume within Third World societies.

Cultural Politics at Home and Abroad

The general outlines of the argument I wish to forward should by now be clear. At the risk of repetitiveness, this section elaborates on the argument more fully, a broad schematic of which appears in Figure 2.1.



Figure 2.1. The global context of cultural politics in the Third World

Let us begin with discussing the causes and effects of the pervasiveness of Western culture. The designation of Western culture as "global" is neither accidental nor merely a fanciful wish by conservative Western academics. In recent decades, Western culture has indeed become more pervasive, more and more global, as advances in information technology and electronic media have transcended political boundaries, geographic distance and cultural obstacles. Throughout the world, Western and American cultural products have found their way into the depths of once impenetrable, remote cultures and societies. In the Third World, the global pervasion of Western and especially American cultural influence goes beyond drinking Coca Cola, eating Big Macs, listening to Madonna, dancing to Michael Jackson, watching *Baywatch,* rooting for the Dallas Cowboys, or wearing Michael Jordan t-shirts. Satellite television, CNN, MTV, glossy magazines (even domestic ones), and other mediums for cultural diffusion have created for many of the peoples of the Third World a fantasyland in the West, a place whose ways ought to be emulated, values ought to be adopted, life ought to be had. After all, who would not want to live the glamorous life that Hollywood endlessly portrays of itself? That Hollywood and Hollywood-like projections of life in the West are rarely accurate matters little to teenagers in Harare, to the 20- and 30-something crowd in Tbilisi, the middle-aged in Calcutta, and the elderly in Rabat. Life in the West *has got to be* glamorous, easier, better. Soft power – cultural attraction – and co-optive power – getting people to want what you want – concepts articulated by Joseph Nye, are for real.[26] Television sets, satellites, electronic mail, fax machines and computers, all constantly advanced and upgraded in the West, only add to the potency of these new types and sources of power.

But domestic, national cultures have not simply vanished, nor is there any indication that their obliteration is only a matter of time. In a compelling recent study, Benjamin Barber has pointed to clashes not only between cultures but, more importantly, within them. In *Jihad vs. McWorld,* Barber argues that a dialectical relationship has ensued between the forces of global capitalism on the one hand and particularistic identities on the other.[27] Many countries, both within and outside the West, exhibit both characteristics, often within the same person. One can always find zealot

purists using imported inventions to further their cause.[28]

Endorsing the gist of Barber's thesis, I wish to take his arguments a couple of steps further in relation to the Third World. As in all cultures, domestic or national cultures within the Third World can be divided into the material and the adaptive halves. In all developing countries, material culture is hostage to – or reinforced by, depending on one's perspective – the imperative to industrialize. Industrialization – unsuccessful and vastly uneven as it has often been – has, nevertheless, brought with it consumerist attitudes and a wide variety of consumer items such as appliances and television sets. In the popular eye, material culture is perceived as inherently Western since material progress is, correctly, associated with the West. Even the most ardent of nationalists prefer Western labels to domestic brand names, frequently unaware that their American TV set and VCR were probably assembled in Mexico or Brazil. Material culture in the Third World, therefore, is often a distant, far less affluent reflection of Western material culture.

Many of the political scientists who have belatedly discovered culture make the mistake of talking about it in whole terms, as if it were a single phenomenon or entity with clear parameters and boundaries, containing a consistent and readily identifiable set of features and characteristics. Here is Western culture, they maintain, and there, distinctly different from it, stand other cultures. This is, at best, a gross oversimplification, ignoring the many conflicting, often contradictory facets *within* a culture. Culture is made up of symbols and values and is, ultimately, a product of human emotions, thoughts and expressions. Just as human thoughts and emotions are not always consistent, neither are the values and norms to which they give rise. Who has not seen an otherwise pious Muslim sneak a peak at an attractive woman, a "cultured" Frenchman privately rant against North African immigrants, a liberal Bostonian expose prejudiced views when others are not around? Hypocrisy aside, these are the conflicting facets within one's own value system, those norms through which we see the world in shades that often change color on us from one minute to the next, sometimes even simultaneously.

Equally important is the realization, also overlooked lately, that cultural values change over time, sometimes rapidly and sometimes slowly. Some

cultural values hardly ever change. Culture is inherently dynamic and changeable, subject to influences from the outside and innovations inside itself.[29] In the West, political and historic developments have done much to change the currency and strength of specific cultural values today as compared with a 100 or even 50 years ago. Democratic equality for everyone, it is worth remembering, has not always been a cherished value in the West.[30] In the Third World, the rapid pace of social change and economic development, both of which are frequently skewed and highly uneven, coupled with tenuous and often impermanent political systems, have made some cultural values particularly transient. Of course, not every symbol and value is bound to go in and out of fashion, many being deeply imbedded in the psyche of the individual and the larger nation of which he or she is a part. But there are numerous values and norms, especially those that are imported or somehow have shallow roots in local customs and traditions, that take hold among the people only at the most superficial level and, sooner or later, fall out of vogue as rapidly as they had become popular. The artistic and expressive aspects of culture – the arts, music, literature – as well as popular values regarding politics – what, in the next chapter, is defined as "political culture" – are especially susceptible to such shifts and changes in fortune.

Recognizing the changeability and conflicting nature of cultural values is especially important when looking at adaptive cultures in the Third World. At the broadest level, adaptive cultures within the Third World can be divided into the two general clusters of traditional and non-traditional. These two designations, it is important to note, are based on popular *perceptions* rather than on intrinsic qualities inherent to the values themselves. As cultures are changeable and dynamic, the values considered as non-traditional sometime ago may be viewed as traditional today and, in certain cases, even vice versa. The increasing popularity of so-called New Age religions in both the West and the non-Western world is a case in point. Since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, they have been embraced by an increasing number of individuals, who only a few years earlier rejected religion as archaic and an opiate of the masses. A general global rediscovery of nationalism – in the former Yugoslavia with the tragic consequences of ethnic cleansing and in Burundi and Rwanda leading to

genocide – also points to the growing prevalence of largely traditional values in the face of supposed global interdependence and internationalism.

"Traditional" values are generally considered to be the pure essence of the national culture, rooted in sources of identity with which the bulk of the population – the often mythical, politically constructed "nation" – can relate most intimately and primordially. Thus the pillars and foundations of traditional culture often include race, religion, ethno-tribal identity, the national language and other primordial sources of identity. It is around one or more of these fundamental cultural pillars that traditional values begin to cluster, evolving an entire framework of their own that seek to continually reassert the validity of the *essence* of one's identity, an essence of identity as much as possible free of the corrupting influences of time, space, geography, outsiders and whatever else that is alien. Traditional cultural values have at their core, therefore, a reversion to an ideal previous state of existence when one's identity was not corrupted by influences inimical to the original intent of the project of nationhood.

That the assertion of traditional cultural values has often been a catalyst for political violence is hardly in doubt. Violent groups as varied as the militia movement in the United States, zealot Muslim fundamentalists in the Middle East, Jewish settler vigilantes in Israel, Hindu extremists in India, neo-Nazi skinheads in Europe, and the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda all have one thing in common: they are interested in the restoration and purification of some specific aspect of what they consider to be their true identity from supposedly corrupting, even hostile influences. These are extreme and non-representative examples, however, and, in contradistinction to what Barber implies, not every reassertion of traditional identity takes the form of a violent struggle, a *jihad.* In countless subtle ways every day, people reaffirm their traditional identity and cultural values through acts that are for the most part mundane and subconscious: the choice of a particular word to use, a novel to read, an outfit to wear, a music to listen to.

Within each country, traditional and non-traditional values form part of the same cultural continuum. Each national culture has two poles around which values cluster, one traditional the other non-traditional. Individuals

often simultaneously adhere to values from both of the poles. The extreme images of jean-wearing Muslim fundamentalists and "democratic", gun-totting Israeli settlers come to mind. Rarely, in fact, does one person belong squarely in one cultural category and demonstrates no trace of influence from the other pole.

As traditional values go to the heart of one's primordial identity, they tend to be deeply resonant and cannot be easily cast aside. Often they are unknowingly masked, lurking just beneath the surface in the realm of the subconscious. I, for example, was born in Iran and lived there until the age of 15. Ever since then, for nearly 20 years, I have spent most of my time in the United State except for a brief stint in England. I have neither consciously tried to hold on to my Iranianness, nor particularly sought to become American, nor for that matter did I try to become a Brit. But on occasion I have discovered that I am as much of an Iranian as I am an American, as much a Brit (with apologies to my British friends) as either Iranian or American. The experience of living in each place has given me values from all three, and no matter how much time passes or where I may ultimately end up spending my retirement, I will retain, unwittingly and without trying, some of what was bestowed on me in Iran.[31]

My experience of traversing cultural worlds may be extreme (although any expatriate could readily identify with it), but it does parallel the traversing of value systems within the same culture. Through the course of socialization we acquire certain norms and values, among which, over time, we distinguish between the traditional and the non-traditional. No matter how deliberately we might try to be one or the other – and most of us do *not* deliberately try – we can never completely escape the influence of the pole from which we seek to be the furthest.

Insofar as the other pole of adaptive culture is concerned, it is best described as "non-traditional" rather than as "modern", a term which can be value-laden and judgmental. It is not really clear what "modern" means: is something that is modern more reasonable? Is it a product of European Enlightenment? Is it better and somehow superior to its non-modern variant? Conventional (Western) scholarship has defined modernity in terms of "industrial production, advanced division of labor, international exchanges, and a rationalized life world".[32] But academic definitions and

popular perceptions are often two different things. This incongruity is often magnified when popular perceptions are those of the peoples of the Third World, who often get their exposure to and understanding of what is supposedly modern through fragmentary and distorted images from the media and from Western cultural products. Moreover, as history has demonstrated, the quest for cultural modernity, however defined, has not always brought with it greater degrees of rational superiority. As I shall argue presently, to the popular eye non-traditional values are in fact often perceived as "modern" or "Western". But in reality these values do not always come from the West nor, despite the perceptions attached to them, are they somehow of a higher order. Sometimes non-traditional values are unrecognizable mutations of traditional values. At other times they are alien and are imported wholesale from abroad. Whatever they may be, people are drawn to them because of diffusionary influences, or social change, or because of their own inventiveness and curiosity.

The distinction between non-traditional and Western cultural values is a fine and often fluid one. Non-traditional values are those that deliberately differ from traditional ones. Unlike Western values, they may or may not have originated in the West. More often, they are shaped and influenced by perceptions of what Western values might be. Adhering to non-traditional values means being more receptive to outside cultural influences, and, as argued above, these deep cultural influences from the West come not just through underground cables and telephone wires, but, more ominously for some, rain down from the skies through satellite transmissions. In essence, non-traditional values feed into and reinforce the intrusion of Western values and norms. To be non-traditional, therefore, is often popularly seen as synonymous with being Westernized.

Having said all this, it needs to be noted that acting Western, dressing in Western garb, listening to Western music, watching Western movies, or even speaking a Western language do not automatically result in adopting and internalizing Western values. Ultimately, the outcome is cultural hybridization, being neither traditional nor non-traditional, neither Western nor anti-Western. The term "hybridization" has its pluses as well as minuses. On the plus side, it accurately conveys the state of Third World culture as fluid, dynamic and changeable. On the minus side, it

gives the impression of being caught in an inbetween state, suspended between the two ideals of tradition on the one hand and modernity/ Westernization on the other, while not fully enjoying the offerings of either. It is true that the individual in the Third World is a conscious consumer and articulator of cultural values. Except for the youth, most of whom are too young to openly admit being troubled by the contradictory cultural forces that surround them, most people in the Third World find themselves constantly choosing between values that are either traditional in genesis and orientation, are non-traditional, or are made-up of some hybrid combination of both. But this is what culture is; culture enables people to choose from among symbols and values. Within any given social setting, the individual is bombarded with a variety of values, symbols and modes of expression, some of which come from within and are more familiar and some of which come from the outside and are less familiar. The choices the individual makes, and the collectivity of choices that others in his or her society make, make up the culture of that society.

In a sense, from a political perspective it makes no more sense to speak of a "national" culture than it does to speak of a "global" culture. Each culture has a core, a center that makes it unique and different from other cultures. At the national level, there are certain values and symbols that are held in common by the citizenry: values derived from a common past and a shared heritage; symbols articulated and expressed through the same linguistic medium; a common folklore; a set of values propagated by the political system, etc. But every culture also has outer edges, margins whose values and symbols overlap with those of other cultures, complement them or differ from them only marginally, where symbolic and valuative communication across cultural boundaries is the easiest. In today's electronically interconnected world, few national citizenries have escaped the international overlapping of values and symbols. In many Third World countries, cultural purists decry the erosion of national values and the encroachment of what they see as Western cultural hegemony. At the same time, latter-day culturalists in the West advocate looking at the world through the prism of a cultural geography in which a righteous West stands against the rest. The truth of the matter falls somewhere in-between. National cultures are not about to be vanished, are not at war with

themselves as Barber maintains, nor, as Huntington claims, are they in search of alliance blocs in support of or opposition to Western culture.

The precise connection between culture and politics is even more complicated. Culture helps articulate personal and societal identity – itself a task of tremendous complexity – but it alone does not articulate politics. In fact, it is at best only one of the elements that go into constructing politics. Political leaders, themselves coming from specific cultural backgrounds, operate within and seek to further particular sets of values and cultural agendas. But to maintain that the larger framework within which they operate is informed overwhelmingly (or even largely) by culture is to overlook other potentially important forces such as economics, domestic and international politics, personal ambitions, and other similar dynamics with little or no cultural content. Huntington incorrectly assumes that in the new world order everything political must necessarily be motivated by culture. But culture's interactions with politics need to be contextualized. The precise nature and degree of interaction between state initiatives and cultural forces depend on the agendas and priorities of state leaders, the sources of legitimacy they seek to manipulate and to promote, the strength and vitality or the mutability of supposedly traditional values, and the historical and economic place of the country in relation to its own past and to other countries. To put it simply, "cultural politics" has no single or universal direction or nature. Sometimes culture and politics interact heavily and deeply influence one another, at other times they do not. There are other variables to also consider.

Conclusion

Social scientists and students of the Third World have for too long been preoccupied with classifying Third World culture as either traditional or modern, rational or steeped in superstition, open or closed. Classifying the cultures of the developing world started long before Huntington saw them in warring terms.[33] There is, perhaps, some merit in such classifications. But if we are to really understand what Third World cultures are about, we have to go beyond mere classifications, not all of which are

always accurate anyway. Instead, we need to look at the array of values that are available for the inhabitants of the Third World to choose from; the level of congruence between those values and local conditions, customs, and habits; and the position of the state towards those values. Culture – in the Third World and elsewhere, but especially in the Third World – needs to be viewed in the context of domestic as well as international politics. Huntington and others talk of culture as if it is *the* force that determines the political orientations and initiatives of leaders around the world. While political leaders themselves operate within a certain cultural context, the instruments of power to which they have access – be they hard power or soft power – can also be used to influence the direction of culture, its receptivity to other values, and its propagation abroad and at home. Those in power can go so far as to use patronage to encourage or stifle cultural creativity, even of specific values within the culture.

Ultimately, the question comes down to determining what force or forces form the underlying dynamic that drive politics within and between nations. The post-Cold War answer that points to culture and civilizations, while insightful, is not altogether correct. As this chapter has demonstrated, culture is not a uni-dimensional phenomenon and needs to be examined within the larger context of the forces that influence and interact with it. What are the specific political forces that act on culture? Exactly what do we mean by politics? What are the mutual interactions between the state, society, economy, international influences and culture? These questions are explored and answered in the next chapter.

Notes

1 Huntington, 1993: 25.
2 Lind, 1991: 47.
3 Huntington, op. cit.: 34.
4 Huntington, 1996a: 69–71.
5 Ibid., 183.
6 Fuller, 1995: 147. Huntington disagrees with this assertion and claims that

while Western civilization does have "universalist pretensions", it is not universal. Rather, he claims, it is merely unique. Huntington, 1996a: 20–1.

7 In addition to the articles cited above see Bartley 1993: 155–18 and O'Brien 1992: 3–10. For counter arguments see Ajami 1993: 2–9; Binyan 1993: 19–21; Kirkpatrick 1993: 22–6; Mahbubani 1993: 10–14; O'Hagan 1995: 19–38 and Rubenstein and Crocker 1994: 113–28.

8 On this score Huntington has the following advice:

> The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics. S. Huntington 1996a: 20–1.

9 I recognize these terms are broad, loaded with all sorts of connotations, and, especially for anthropologists, entirely unsatisfactory. However, for the purposes here, they adequately convey the meanings intended.

10 This argument is more fully developed below, in Chapter 3.

11 Young 1982: 88–92.

12 Barakat 1993: 274.

13 Chan 1993: 86-8.

14 Olcott 1996: 24–37.

15 Huntington 1996a: 31–5.

16 Ironically, Professor Huntington's earlier writings have been decidedly free of cultural analysis, one would say to their disadvantage. See, for example, *Political Order in Changing Societies,* 1968. In an article published in the 1980s, he wrote:

> Cultural explanations are . . . often imprecise or tautological or both, at the extreme coming down to a more sophisticated rendering of "the French are like that"! On the other hand, cultural explanations are also unsatisfying for a social scientist because they run counter to the social scientist's proclivity to generalize. They do not explain consequences in terms of relationships among universal variables such as rates of economic growth,

social mobilization, political participation, and civil violence. They tend, instead, to speak in particulars peculiar to specific cultural entities. Huntington in M. Weiner and S. Huntington (eds) 1987: 23.

17 Huntington 1996a: 34.

18 By far the most thorough and thoughtful discussion (even if by now outdated) of these and other concepts in the social sciences can be found in the multi-volume *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Crowell Collier & Macmillan, 1968). Other, more narrow, discussions can be found in Giddens 1982 for sociological concepts; Kamrava 1996 for concepts in political science; and Todaro 1997 for economic concepts.

19 Quoted in Langness 1987: 21.

20 Geertz 1973: 89.

21 Said 1993: xiii.

22 Ibid. xii.

23 Huntington 1996a: 125.

24 According to Ogburn, material culture may change more rapidly, thus resulting in a culture lag and requiring cultural readjustment. See Ogburn 1922.

25 Huntington 1996a: 78.

26 Nye 1990: 188.

27 Barber 1995: 6–7.

28 Ibid. 4–5.

29 Griswald 1994: 60–1.

30 A thorough and detailed chronicle of the evolution of Western values as articulated by political theorists can be found in Ebenstein 1951.

31 This is not to say that in Iran I was necessarily brought up with traditional values in the conservative sense. But I was exposed to Iranian values first, and so for me they are more primordial than the values I encountered later in life in the US and in England. Thus in the context of my life and for others in the same boat, Iranian values on the whole are seen as "traditional" compared to those of our adopted countries.

32 Griswald 1994: 110. For the most part, our understanding of modernity is shaped today by the writings of German political theorists such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, and Max Weber, all of whom took modernity to

mean greater rationalization of life. All three, of course, came to different conclusions concerning its precise nature and consequences. Marx saw modernity in economic terms as man's growing mastery of nature and modes of production. Nietzsche saw it in moral terms, whereby man increasingly looses his creativity. Weber saw modernity in political terms, as the growing bureaucratization of state power. See Love 1986; and, Max Weber 1968. A more contemporary, sociologically grounded definition of modernity is offered by Giddens. "In a very general sense," he maintains, it refers

> to the institutions and modes of behavior established first of all in post-feudal Europe, but which in the twentieth century increasingly have become world-historical in their impact. 'Modernity' can be understood as roughly equivalent to 'the industrialized world', so long as it can be recognized that industrialism is not its only institutional dimension . . . A second dimension is capitalism . . . (Giddens 1991: 15).

Finally, for a discussion of the social-psychological elements of modernity see Banuazizi 1987: 290–1 in M. Weiner and S. Huntington (eds), 290-1.

33 See, for example, Lerner 1958 and, Rostow 1961.

CHAPTER THREE

Conceptualizing Third World Politics

Comparative and Third World studies have undergone significant paradigmatic changes in recent years, ranging from the ideologically laden poles of the dependency and modernization approaches of the 1970s to the somewhat more neutral neo-statist perspective of the 1980s. Concurrent with this shift in analytical focus has been a zealous rediscovery of culture and its relevance, indeed at times inseparability, to political analysis.[1] Chapter 2 examined the rediscovery of culture and posited some general points concerning the overall nature and functions of culture, its role in articulating symbols and sources of identity, and its relationship with domestic and/or international politics. Building up on these arguments, this chapter will contextualize culture – i.e., place it within the right political, economic and social context – and, in so doing, propose a conceptual framework for the study of Third World politics. Culture alone, the last chapter concluded, does not determine politics; it does so in conjunction with a variety of other dynamics. This chapter examines these dynamics and how they interact in order to produce "politics".

In constructing the arguments to follow, I take the "state-in-society" paradigm in comparative politics as a point of departure.[2] So far, the proponents of this paradigm have gone the furthest in presenting a balanced, carefully nuanced framework for political analysis that takes into account the mutual interactions of state and societal dynamics,

including culture (albeit only indirectly). But their focus needs to be sharpened, as there are several crucial areas of analysis that they have either completely ignored or have under-emphasized. To adequately understand politics in the Third World – as well as elsewhere now that the "Third World" as such does not exist any longer[3] – analysis must go beyond the states and society and their mutual social and political interactions. There are four additional elements that must also be considered. They include culture in general and political culture in specific; political economy, especially in relation to the economic causes and effects of the state–society interaction; international influences, both overt and subtle, diplomatic and political and otherwise; and the gray area of uncertainty and unpredictability that is the inevitable outcome of historical accidents, individual initiatives and unintended consequences. The role of culture in politics, the chapter will demonstrate, can be neither ignored nor over-emphasized. Instead, it needs to be analyzed within a holistic approach to politics that balances its influence with those of state initiatives, societal factors, economics, international influences and accidental occurrences. Before elaborating on the parameters of this approach, some of the main premises of the state-in-society paradigm need to be highlighted.

The State-in-Society Approach

In the past few years, a number of scholars have tried to devise an explanatory paradigm for political analysis in general and Third World studies in particular in order to address some of the glaring shortcomings of the dependency, modernization, and neo-statist approaches. Enunciated in detail in only a handful of publications,[4] the new approach places the focus of analysis on state–society interactions. The approach's most systemic treatment is found in *State Power and Social Forces,* one of whose editors is Joel Migdal.[5] In a book published in 1988, Migdal had elaborated on the need to examine states and societies in tandem. "The model suggested here," he argued,

> depicts society as a melange of social organizations than the di-

> chotomous structure that practically all past models of macrolevel change have used (e.g., center–periphery, modern–traditional, great tradition–little tradition) . . . In this melange, the state has been one organization among many. These organizations – states, ethnic groups, the institutions of particular social classes, villages, and any others enforcing rules of the game – singly or in tandem with one another, have offered individuals the components for survival strategies . . .[6]

Later on, in refining their arguments concerning the precise nature of the state's interactions with society, Migdal and his collaborators maintained that states are often constrained in their autonomy when it comes to dealing with society. Therefore, the relative weaknesses and strengths of the two entities must be sized up.[7] Analysis also need to be "disaggregated", requiring the examiner to go beyond the surface tops of both state and society and to look at the more subtle gives-and-takes of state–society interactions. One must further realize that "social forces, like states, are contingent on specific empirical conditions", meaning that "the political action and influence of a social group are not wholly predictable from the relative position of that group within the social structure."[8] "The political behavior of social groups," in other words, "tends to be context-specific."[9] Lastly, states and social forces may be "mutually empowering" and, in fact, seldom assume overtly hostile postures toward one another.[10] "The ability of any social force, including the state," Migdal argues,

> to develop the cohesion and garner the material and symbolic resources to project a meaningful presence at the society-wide level depends on its performance in more circumscribed arenas. In those arenas, it must dominate successfully enough (close to total transformation or, at least, incorporation of existing social forces) so as to be able to generate resources for application in other arena struggles and, ultimately, the society as a whole. Whether any social force, from social classes to the state, will succeed as the basis for integrated domination is far from a fore-

gone conclusion.[11]

The analytical merits of this latest perspective seem quite impressive and the approach appears, at least initially, to have filled the gaps left by the previous paradigms. Significantly, the approach points to the common denominator that all political systems in one way or another share, namely, the manner in which states and societies interrelate. Politics may be, and often is, influenced by a variety of factors and forces, but its simple essence is the relationships that exist between those in power with the people they seek to govern. At its core, politics is made up of a series of interactions that occur within the state, and within society, and between the state and society.[12]

Similarly, the new framework appears to be by and large value-free, reeking with neither the conservatism of modernization theory nor the radicalism of the dependency approach.[13] It simply points to a number of structural and functional characteristics that it sees as responsible for bestowing on national politics their unique characteristics.[14] It also makes sense of the confusing array of political oddities that have appeared since the demise of the Cold War.[15] States and societies may be "weak" or "strong" compared to each other, and their respective strengths and capabilities determine the nature and manner of their mutual interactions.[16]

Nevertheless, upon closer scrutiny, it becomes clear that the above approach also overlooks some of the basic premises of politics. It is unclear, for example, whether such factors as political and/or economic performance play any roles in shaping state–society relations, or in bestowing people with specific perceptions about themselves or their larger polity. In other words, does culture play any role in determining the nature of state–society relations? Also, what about the economy? The economic agendas of the state, or of social actors, and the various consequences of the economic activities of both state and society (e.g., industrialization, consumerism, rising standards of living, etc.) have significant bearings on both domestic and international politics. Such economic factors cannot be ignored in any analytical formulations about the very nature of politics.

It is also relevant to ask whether there is not an underlying assumption

of political and historical determinism in the state-in-society approach that points to a gradual evolution of political systems from one type to another. Can all of politics be explained through the mechanical interactions of state and society, or does the involvement of human agency introduce an inherent element of uncertainty into it? Social and political *actors,* we must remember, are *people* and *individuals* who do not always behave and react as expected. Thus to assume that there are immutable "political laws" that provide an analytical explanation for everything is, at best, optimistic. By nature, politics contains an element of randomness, one that is often overlooked by political scientists. Some of the proponents of the state-in-society approach have touched on this issue, though only briefly and not from the same angle proposed in this chapter. "Political behavior and the power capacities of social groups are contingent, at least in part" one has claimed.[17] But there are instances, as rare as they may be, when politics is more than just "contingent" and is outright random. Any approach to politics must take the possibility of this randomness into account.

In short, the state-in-society approach needs certain refinements and modifications. There are a number of features to this paradigm that make it an attractive framework for political analysis. But, as the preceding pages demonstrate, some clarifications of its core principles are definitely needed. The next section looks at the various components of politics and proposes a conceptual framework, with culture as one of its primary elements, which outlines the possible interactions of each of these components in shaping and influencing the domestic and international politics of a country.

A Sharper Focus

In understanding and conceptualizing the political characteristics and dynamics of a polity, focus must be on six distinct and yet highly entwined plains of analysis. They include the state; society; political culture; political economy; extra-national influences and forces; and random occurrences. This call for a multi-disciplinary paradigm is unlikely to be welcomed by purists. However, it is difficult to arrive at any

comprehensive and accurate understanding of comparative politics in general, and of Third World politics in specific, without examining the combined effects of all of these seemingly disparate fields. States do not operate in a vacuum. They operate in relation to other states as well as with their own and other societies. These interactions are facilitated – and take place within the context of – existing national and political cultures. State and social actors each have their own social standing, political priorities and cultural peculiarities. One of the elements that shapes and determines these characteristics is the economy. Thus the economic axiom of state–society interactions cannot be ignored. Also important are the extra-national influences bearing on states and societies that emanate from other governments, from multinational agencies such as the IMF or the World Bank, or are the result of larger movements that transcend across national boundaries and local cultures (e.g., democratization, religious fundamentalism, cultural diffusion, etc.). Finally, there is a built-in element of uncertainty involved, a degree of chance based on such varied factors as historical accidents or the circumstances and opportunities that crop up and happen to be exploited by enterprising individuals. To accurately conceptualize the underpinning dynamics of a political system, therefore, attention must be focused on all six of the areas outlined above and on the ways in which they combine to give a political system its unique and individual characteristics.

State

The state has not only long been a focus of scholarly attention, but it has also been perceived as the ultimate institution responsible for bestowing on a system its essential political characteristics.[18] When, for a brief interlude in the 1960s and the 1970s, the importance of the state was thought to have been eclipsed by those of society and of a larger "system", "neo-statists" stepped up to the plate and asked for the state to be promptly brought "back in".[19]

There is, clearly, a danger in overstretching the importance of the state at the expense of other equally pivotal political forces. Nevertheless, the analyst cannot ignore that center within the body politic which embodies a monopoly over official sources of power, to use Weber's

simple definition of the state.[20] The position of the neo-statists is straightforward: within any given political system, there is a group of institutions and actors with officially-endowed powers, and there are those who are largely recipients of this power. These institutions and groups may or may not act in concert with the rest of the polity; may foster a relationship with society that is conflictual or consensual; and may rely on varying degrees of subjective legitimacy versus objective force in order to maintain their position *vis-à-vis* the rest of the system.[21] In one way or another, the role of the state cannot be overlooked or be seen as part of a larger systemic whole in the sense that the "systems approach" claims.[22] Exactly what roles states play within a given polity may differ considerably from one case to another. Some states may maximize their own powers in order to carry out far-reaching social and economic changes throughout their societies, as most communist and bureaucratic-authoritarian states tried to do in Eastern Europe and in Latin America respectively.[23] Others may facilitate the formation of a number of groups that seek to further their own corporate interests under a larger democratic rubric, as is common among the corporatist states found in northern Europe.[24] Still other states may relegate themselves to a largely regulative role, as most liberal democracies do, in order to ensure that the routinized flow of societal input into the political process is not interrupted.[25]

The discussion of the state in the above paragraph may be cursory, but it is sufficient to reveal the crucial points that analyses of comparative and Third World politics must entail. First and foremost, the analyst must determine exactly what role the state intrinsically – rather than episodically – plays in relation to the rest of the body politic. Is the state simply performing a regulative function (as in democracies), or is it trying to implement societal and/or economic changes (as in bureaucratic–authoritarian cases)? Is it fostering cooperation among contenting corporate groups (e.g., in northern Europe), or is it ramming its own agendas through irrespective of the priorities that society may have? Does the state simply exist in a predatory capacity (as in Zaire), or does it sustain itself through the inclusion of mobilized masses into its own institutions (as in Iran and Cuba)? Once this overall role is determined, attention must focus on the institutions through which the

state seeks to carry out its functions and agendas. Of what are each of these institutions made; how do they operate; what are their capabilities; do they tend to rely more on force or on a sense of legitimacy to operate; are they based on and in turn follow a specific doctrinal blueprint – socialism, for example – or have they evolved in response to prevailing past and present circumstances; and so on?

With these questions answered, the level of analysis must then be taken one step further by looking into the ramifications of the workings of each of the state's institutions. States operate at two levels. At one level, they operate amongst one another, as compellingly and convincingly argued by the dependency approach. At another level, they operate in relation to society. Naturally, this state–society interaction has several consequences, some of which may be political, some social and/or cultural, and still others that may be economic. The analyst must examine not only the ways in which states operate, but, equally importantly, the larger affects of this operation on such diverse facets of life as politics, economics, culture and society. Put differently, both the structures and the functions of the state need to be analyzed.

The role and importance of the state is all the greater given its special position in the world system and in relation to its own society. Whether older or newer, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or non-ideological, most of the states in the Third World have been crafted in relatively recent historical time periods: most contemporary states of the Middle East came about between the 1920s (Turkey and Iran) and the 1940s and the 1950s (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Egypt); in South and Southeast Asia from the 1940s to the 1960s (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka); and almost all of Africa since the 1960s and the 1970s (Zimbabwe, Djibouti, Eritrea and South Africa being among the latest). Compared to most states in Europe and North America, these and many of the other states in the Third World are relatively younger, having come about not so much through evolutionary, historical processes but often as a result of deliberate and rather sudden political crafting. Consequently, these states have assumed a special posture toward their societies, often feeling less constrained by the forces of tradition and heritage, being more zealous in their promotion of various domestic and/or international agendas, and much more directly

and purposefully involved in their national economies than their know-how or capabilities allow. Put differently, the Third World state has occupied a special place in relation to other states and its own society by the very virtue of being "Third World".[26] These are states for whom maintaining political power is often a crusade and a struggle, not a byproduct of historical evolution and maturation.[27] These are also states that strive to affect purposeful and calculated change in their societies, often fighting the forces of history and tradition. That some are swept aside by the very forces they engender – as happened most dramatically in China, Ethiopia and Iran, among others – only demonstrates the ineptitude of the state's stewards and the inherent dangers that they face. Now that democracy is once again in vogue and when politicians are clamouring to be labelled as "democrats", the task of the Third World state is all the more difficult: how to survive if one is not democratic? If one is in fact a democrat, how to maintain the many delicate, fragile equilibriums on which such a system relies? In looking at the Third World, the state must be an even more focal point of analysis than might otherwise be the case.

Society

The above discussion implies that society is always on the receiving end of the state's powers, an implication which is both inadvertent and not universally valid. There are instances, as in communist and bureaucratic–authoritarian cases, in which society's powers have been emasculated to the point of making social actors and institutions merely passive recipient of the state's powers and agendas. In these cases, the political powers of the state are often based either entirely on brute force or on a combination of force and psychological manipulation. Society is either forced into institutional submission, or, as the circumstances and capabilities of the state may dictate, is fooled into it (in which case often an "inclusionary" polity results). Often a combination of state coercion and societal apathy result in the maintenance in power of an otherwise institutionally weak and unpopular regime. Military dictatorships rarely rely on much more than brute force to stay in power, as any victim of Argentina's "dirty war" can remind us. But there are those politicians who seek to enhance their repressive rule through personality cults or

other populist mechanisms. The penalties for non-conformity are likely to be terribly stiff in both cases. Whereas in exclusionary cases the state simply excludes society from the political process through repression, in inclusionary polities it represses but at the same time includes and co-opts large blocs of society within itself. In either case society is something for the state to reckon with. Which one dominates the other, and at what particular historical moment this domination takes place, varies from case to case. In fact, there are as many strong societies and weak states as there are strong states and weak societies, and there may even be cases in which neither the state nor society can effectively interact with one another over a reasonable period of time (witness the demise of political regimes in Somalia, Ethiopia, Liberia, the Sudan, Rwanda and Angola).[28]

The above discussion is not to imply that society's political significance can only be summed up in the context of its overt, direct relations with the state. What happens within society itself can also have considerable political significance in itself. Various groups or institutions in society may jockey for position among themselves for greater societal power and privilege, as, for example, religionist and secularist activists are currently doing in many countries of the Middle East.[29] There are also complex webs of social interaction that give society its overall character and a sense of individuality. In some political systems, there may be a large gap between the cultural dispositions of society and the institutional configurations of the state. Again, examples from the Middle East come to mind.[30] In these cases, society may have non-political priorities and agendas of its own that greatly determine the state's behavior toward it in both the long and the short runs. These characteristics, not all of which may at first seem politically relevant, in turn combine to influence the manner in which state and society relate and interact with one another.

Of course, there is a point in social analysis at which the examiner must draw the line; not everything that happens in society – a certain type of dance that becomes popular, for example – has some sort of intrinsic political relevance. It is exactly this deciphering of the political relevance of various social phenomena that is the political scientist's main challenge. Nevertheless, while not everything that happens in

society is politically important or relevant, a lot of it is. The task is to decide which social phenomena, institutions and forces are politically relevant and which ones are not.

In comparative political analysis, society must be examined not in only relation to the state but also as an entity in itself, one whose constituent institutions are politically relevant both on their own and when they come into contact with state institutions. Society needs to be viewed neither as a passive recipient of state power, although in some cases it may be, nor as its holistic extension, which some of the proponents of the systems approach claim it to be.[31] Analyzing society is not, therefore, radically different from analyzing the state. The central features to consider are simple enough: what are the institutions that make up society and what is the political relevance of each of them? What is the exact nature of the interactions, both at an institutional as well as a functional level, that takes place between society and the state? Societies are by nature changeable. Which ones and how much of these changes are state-initiated, or endogenously initiated, and what is their overall and more specific political consequences? In what instances and under what circumstances are societies politically passive in respect to the state, cooperative, or become rebellious? When and how does a society mold its state, or state mold its society, or the two remain oblivious of each other, or develop a routinized, consensual and equal pattern of interaction?

These questions are not meant to be definitive points around which analysis must revolve. Rather, they are intended to present general guidelines to consider in looking at social institutions, their possible political relevance, its institutions, or the other relevant characteristics that they may have. Of particular importance are the nature and operations of various social institutions; the routinized patterns in which these social institutions interact within themselves and with the institutions of the state; the underlying reasons for and ramifications of processes of social change; the causes and effects of society-wide dislocations; the nature, extent and consequences of social cleavages along ethnic, religious, class and gender lines[32] and the less pronounced, more subtle changes that take place in society's relations with the state over time.

Again, societies that exist in the Third World by nature require special attention. Third World societies change rapidly. Moreover, sometimes they may be subdued by an authoritarian state, while at other times they may become highly volatile and rebellious. At times they are so fragmented as to paralyze any power attempting to govern over them (Lebanon of the 1970s, Yugoslavia of the late 1980s, and Burundi and Rwanda of the 1990s), and in other occasions they may act as cohesive units. At times they may be taken in by the rhetoric and propaganda of the regime in power (Peron's Argentina), and at other times they may develop into civil society and become vehicles for democratization (in East and Central Europe in the 1980s). Because of the changeability of their relations with the state over relatively short time periods, the potential political significance of Third World societies is all the more pronounced as compared to those in Western Europe and North Africa.

As before, the features mentioned here are meant to be general pointers of where to look rather than a definitive list of analytical dos and don'ts. Nevertheless, no matter how scant this list may be in relation to a particular setting, two inescapable factors become immediately clear. First, society is by nature an important ingredient of politics and must be included – or at least considered – in macrolevel comparative political analyses. Second, there is more to society than a mechanical collection of institutions, individual actors, and groups who interact among themselves and between themselves and the state. There is an additional normative context, the political culture, that also influences the ways in which state and society relate to one another. In short, political analysis must go beyond the simple, objective circumstances of society and must take into account its subjective, cultural dispositions and priorities as well.

Political Culture

One of the important areas that the state-in-society approach has not *explicitly* taken into account is political culture, although there have been implicit assumptions about its relevance in some of the studies utilizing the perspective.[33] As mentioned earlier, this lack of attention is part of a rather long tradition in political science in which culture in general and political culture in particular have not been taken seriously.[34]

For political scientists, culture has often been a slippery phenomenon, more a by-product of larger political developments than a determining force by itself. Depending on their field of expertise, area specialists are also likely to ascribe different degrees of political significance to culture. For example, culture has long been an inseparable feature of Middle Eastern politics, especially since the 1960s, whereas it played little or no role in the bureaucratic–authoritarian regimes of Latin America or in their collapse.[35] Clearly, an expert on the Middle East will have a much harder time ignoring the region's cultural influences on politics than a Latin American expert would.[36]

In my advocacy of the importance of culture to political analysis, I propose a middle line. Insofar as politics is concerned, I maintain, culture is not always a stand-alone phenomenon: it can neither make nor break politics by itself. In fact, politics being the art of the possible, culture is often molded and shaped by the powers of the state. Nevertheless, culture does form an overall framework within which communities and societies formulate their symbols, thoughts and actions, interact with one another, and form opinions toward those in power. Therefore, all macrolevel political analyses that concern state–society relations must necessarily consider the overall valuative context within which societies operate – namely, their cultures. Particularly, attention must be paid to a polity's political culture, which is comprised of cultural norms and values that specifically govern state–society interactions.

In non-democracies, there are often sharp differences between the public manifestations of political culture ("regime orientations") and the real, private feelings that people have about politics ("political orientations").[37] Making such a distinction is not always easily possible in non-democracies, as the absence of open political forums and such mechanisms as elections make it all but impossible to quantify or empirically analyze popular political perceptions. It is no accident that the celebrated book the *Civic Culture* was based on largely empirical observations in a number of democracies.[38] Nonetheless, the analyst must see whether there is indeed a distinction between regime and political orientations, and, if so, where the centers of gravity of each of the poles lie. This entails an investigation of the various other phenomena that give rise to political culture, some of which may be

unique to a particular country (a traumatic, historical experience such as a totalitarian interlude or a revolution, for instance), and some of which are found more universally (childhood socialization, education, political experience, etc.). Once the overall features of the political culture have been identified, the task must be to find out which one of these features complement and which ones contradict the normative premises on which a political system is based. From here, one can examine the possible causal relationships that may exist between facets of the political culture on the one hand and the overall nexus between state and society on the other. Is the regime in power in sync with the prevailing political culture of the masses? If not, is it being undermined as a result? Is the regime attempting to carve out a political culture of its own, or is it slave to the cultural dispositions of the people who will settle for nothing less than the full gratification of their political ideals and beliefs?

But culture does not always have to be overtly political for it to be politically relevant. There are many subtle and pronounced aspects of culture that can have great political significance without being in any way political. The neo-Confucian element in Southeast Asian cultures, for example, has long resulted in a remarkable degree of political stability and cohesion in such countries as Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan.[39] In the Middle East, cults of personality have similarly benefited from Islam's tendency to glorify the individual.[40] Moreover, a pervasive spirit of social and cultural inequality, running rampant despite Islam's pretensions to egalitarianism, is largely responsible for the maintenance of highly corrupt monarchical institutions throughout the Arabian peninsula.[41] Reverence for elders in Africa goes a long way in accounting for the political longevity of figures such as Leopold Senghore, Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere, although that is not to minimize their acumen at manipulating other political and cultural forces.[42] And, in Latin America, who could deny the political importance of the *caudillo* mentality, especially given the military's intense political tenure in the 1960s and the 1970s?[43] Cultures in all forms and everywhere provide the norms and values, customs and habits, symbols and means of expression, according to which people think, behave and live their lives. Some of these norms and values are consciously picked up and manipulated by politicians who seek to enhance their popular appeal

and legitimacy, while others provide more subtle emotional and psychological links between political actors and the ordinary masses. Therefore, it is not always easy to determine where popular culture ends and political culture begins, but both can have significant overt or more subtle political ramifications.

Political Economy

Political economy is another area that the state-in-society approach overlooks but needs to consider more closely. More specifically, analysis needs to focus on the economic ramifications of state–society interactions, as well as the larger economic context within which these interactions take place. This is not, of course, a theme that the comparative literature has overlooked entirely.[44] In fact, Rueschemeyer and Evans, two of the original proponents of "bringing the state back in", argued persuasively in the early 1980s that in order to "undertake effective interventions" in the economic realm, "the state must constitute a bureaucratic apparatus with sufficient corporate coherence" while "retaining a certain degree of autonomy from the dominant interests in a capitalist society" to be able to pursue a consistent policy.[45] In a later collaborative work, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens argued that state power is only one of "three clusters of power" – along with class power and transnational structures of power – that may result in the emergence or demise of democracy in the process of capitalist development.[46] Ultimately, the question that comparative analysis must answer in this regard is how much economic power and/or autonomy do the state and society have in relation to one another, and how their economic power capabilities effect their respective agendas and their interactions.

State and social actors compete, at times violently, for access to and control over various economic resources. These contests may occur at a variety of levels, from the top, national level – where the state tries to regulate the overall economic picture – to highly local levels, where state agencies or officials interact economically with individuals and other social actors. The nature and outcome of such contests largely determine the degree to which state and society can act autonomously from each other and, in turn, influence one another. The number of possible

scenarios is rather limited: an affluent society (in comparison to the state) and a largely regulative state; a state that has successfully overwhelmed the economic resources of society and now controls most market forces; and a state that tries but is not fully successful at overwhelming the economic resources of social actors and the market competition between them. These scenarios are often better known by their corresponding labels: advanced capitalist economies; socialist economies; and mixed economies, respectively.

In the first scenario, social actors have acquired considerable control over economic resources. This degree of societal affluence, itself the result of a historical progression of market forces, is made possible and maintained through economic competition among the social actors, and the best the state can do is to play a largely regulative role in the economic agendas of the various social actors. In his insightful treatment of the subject, Barrington Moore has shown how in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe the bourgeoisie, through its increasing economic might and autonomy, was able to press demands upon states that at the time were only just becoming aware of the importance of market forces.[47] What evolved, most purely in the young United States, was raw and savage capitalism, fuelled by its two quintessential elements: the incentive and the opportunity to compete. But as the hard lessens of the 1930s were to demonstrate, capitalism can run into serious problems if left completely to its own, and successive capitalist-run societies saw the intervention of the state into various economic fields. Some states in Europe went overboard, to the point of becoming fascist and corporatist (Germany, Italy and Spain), only to be dramatically altered later.[48] Others (Britain, the US, Switzerland and Scandinavian countries) gave themselves extensive regulative powers within the economy and sought to fill the economic voids that capitalism would not attend to on its own (social security or unemployment benefits, for example).[49] In essence, capitalism in these countries has surpassed and overcome its brutish phase and, in comparison with its development elsewhere, has currently reached a certain level of maturity. The economic interactions between the state and society take place within the context of advanced capitalism, though they still revolve around the basic question of economic autonomy: social actors want as much autonomy as possible

in order to let market forces yield the highest results, while the state seeks to ensure that the proper areas of the economy remain regulated.

This is not a scenario that is applicable to the advanced capitalist nations of Europe and North America alone. The same thing has occurred in East Asia and Latin America, although under decidedly different historical auspices. Here the state initially assumed an overarching, bureaucratic–authoritarian format, excluding the popular classes from both the political and economic processes but instead promoting "patterns of capital accumulation strongly biased in favor of large, oligololistic units of private capital and some state institutions".[50] At times out of necessity and at other times because it simply wanted to, the state embarked on ambitious processes of economic and infrastructural development, a task at which it was initially somewhat successful.[51] But these experiments in state-sponsored capitalism often had peculiar results. The authoritarian state was always careful not to give too much autonomy to social actors, seeking to ensure that economic liberalism did not necessarily translate into political liberalism. At the same time, it revelled in laying the economic and infrastructural foundations for further capitalist development.

In itself, there is nothing particularly damning in the pursuit of authoritarian capitalism. What often dooms authoritarian capitalism is the way in which it goes about its business. In East Asia (Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong) and in Chile, where Pinochet's army rule was a one-man show and the Chicago Boys ran the economy, the armed forces as a corporate unit largely stayed out of economic affairs, allowing considerable policy-making discretion to civilian economists.[52] But elsewhere in Latin America – especially in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay – colonels and generals suddenly became economic policy-makers, and in the span of a decade or so ran their countries' economies to the ground.[53] But by the time authoritarianism collapsed in Latin America in the 1980s, it had already left behind a capitalist legacy and an infrastructure (though very poorly managed under the military) that was second only to that of the newly industrialized economies of East Asia. At present, therefore, the economic interactions of state and society in East Asia and Latin America (especially in South America) revolve around largely the same set of premises as those in other advanced capitalist

cases: the degree of economic autonomy of the social actors versus the regulative reaches of the state.

The same fate has befallen the formerly socialist economies of Eastern and Central Europe, although in their case it is much more difficult to disentangle the many, intrusive control mechanisms that the state once imposed on social actors. In the socialist scheme of things, the state, advertising itself as the dictatorship of the proletariat, sought to "guide" society through historical stages – i.e., overwhelm and control it – by directly owning, in theory at least, all sources of economic production. It thus devised a comprehensive ideological blueprint and a highly penetrative bureaucratic apparatus, not to mention a uniquely efficient police force, in its self-proclaimed march toward eventual "liberation", economic and otherwise. The whole point of the venture, or at least its inadvertent outcome if not its purposeful goal, was to minimize any potential areas of autonomy that society might develop *vis-à-vis* the state, especially in the economic sphere, to which particular ideological significance was attached. In such a scenario, therefore, the economics of state–society interactions, as in other areas, were singularly one-sided, controlled, dominated and overwhelmed by the state.

Any doubts about the extent of the state's economic shadow over society were allayed *after* the dismantling of the socialist state, when despite the state's unceremonious collapse, the economic legacies it had fostered for over seven decades still linger on.[54] The lingering economic legacy of the socialist experiment is as pervasive in East and Central Europe today as the foundations of capitalism were in South America after the demise of authoritarianism there a few years earlier. Reconstituting the economic aspects of the state–society relationship – by transforming the state's economic role into a largely regulative one, giving autonomy to market forces, etc. – is no easy feat, especially given the overarching nature of socialist rule. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to take note of the new trajectory of political economy in formerly socialist countries.

The final scenario involves mixed economies, those odd and often confused cases where, theoretically at least, control over economic resources is divided between the public and private sectors. In these mixed economies, found in most Third World countries – especially in

the Middle East and Africa – the state seeks to foster market economies while still retaining control over most major sources of production.[55] In Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, when most of the region's countries also had mixed economies, the state often sponsored joint industrial ventures with foreign and domestic investors (called parastatals) in an attempt to ease some of its own burden for economic growth and development.[56] Nevertheless, by their very nature states with mixed economies are highly constrained in their economic and political maneuverability. On the one hand, the state must cater to and placate the consumerist yearnings of the middle classes who, if left economically unhappy, are quick to blame the state for their deteriorating circumstances. On the other hand, the state is often beholden to special interest elite groups whose investments help support the backbone of the domestic economy. There is also the stigma attached to too close an identification with foreign investors, few of whom, even in the neoliberal environment of the 1980s and 1990s, would find favor with Third World intellectuals and most other members of the educated classes.

Added to these are further structural limitations that states with mixed economies face. Unlike socialist states, mixed economy states do not have a coherent and comprehensive ideological blueprint for the economy. Instead, their overall economic programs often derive from a mixture of some planning, catering to this or that elite group, and, at times, joint ventures with various multinational corporations. The state also lacks the necessary resources to fully and thoroughly carry out its economic agendas, with the eventual results often falling far short of their intended goals. This hybrid form of economics, which may be best described as one of state socialism and societal capitalism, is rampant in the Middle East and, though to a somewhat lesser extent, in Africa.

All mixed economies invariably give rise to an expansive and highly active informal sector, and any visitor to the Third World will be immediately struck by the vibrancy of a thriving street economy. But, in the Middle East especially, there is a sizeable portion of the formal economy that continues to operate outside of the government's purview. In fact, much of the formal economy in the Middle East – especially that involving the exchange of goods and services among non-governmental actors – retains an astounding level of informality and, therefore,

autonomy from state regulations and other forms of government interference. This widespread informality of the formal economy has much to do with the phenomenon of "bazaar economy". The bazaaris, many of whose economic activities fall outside of the formal sphere and are rarely ever regulated by the state, engage in capitalism *par excellence,* subject at most to unofficial rules and conventions formulated by their own guilds and associations.[57] Despite the seemingly small scale of their operations, most bazaari merchants are often inordinately wealthy, so much so that some can at times corner the entire market on a particular product (say, onions or tires), and by so doing significantly influence a commodity's supply and price throughout their city or even the entire country. In turn, the raw and unregulated capitalism in which the bazaaris engage has a multitude of facets and dimensions, spilling over into other informal and at times even formal economic spheres. The state, meanwhile, is often largely powerless in dealing with the bazaaris as it has neither the resources nor the political will to break their considerable economic might. What results, therefore, is a savage capitalism operating at the societal level side-by-side with a timid socialism at the national level espoused by the state.

The situation in Sub-Saharan African countries is somewhat different. By and large – with such exceptions as in Kenya and Zanzibar, and to lesser extent Ghana and Ethiopia – an independent, politically autonomous merchant class has not developed in black Africa. Some classes do exercise a measure of autonomy from the state: the merchant communities (Bamilke) in Cameroon, the ubiquitous "contractors" in Nigeria, and the *magendo* (people in the upper end of the economic scale who are a "mirror image of the informal sector at the lower end") in Uganda, Ghana, and Zaire.[58] But there is nothing similar to the Middle Eastern bazaar economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the many, bustling open-air markets that are a consistent feature of Africa's urban landscape do not afford opportunities for an economically and politically affluent merchant class as such to grow.

In many African and non-African examples, nevertheless, society does exercise some autonomy from the state, at times in fact to the point of making the country as a national unit dysfunctional. But this autonomy is due to factors that are largely non-economic. In Western Europe,

societal autonomy grew out of persistent demands for political space by various social actors. In South America and East Europe, society gained autonomy (although in places the process continues to face obstacles) after the rolling back of states that had previously sought to overwhelm and subdue it. In the Middle East, in cases where autonomy from the state does exist, it is the prerogative of a distinct social class (the bazaaris) and its successive layers of clients, in relation to which the state is often ineffective and almost a non-factor. In post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa, however, class factors have been less important than other systemic economic and sociocultural dynamics. Often, they tend to result from inherent institutional weaknesses by the state on the one hand and society's multiple fractures (along ethnic, linguistic, cultural and at times racial lines) on the other hand. In short, a major obstacle faced by African states is incapacity (or timidity) in relation to society. Moreover, the prevalence of a stagnant "semicapitalism" in much of the continent has greatly hampered the ability of either the state or society on its own to successfully meet the challenges of development.[59] As a result, the economic nexus between state and society remains small and relatively insignificant. In most of today's Sub-Saharan Africa, therefore, with the notable exception of South Africa, where the maintenance of apartheid entailed significant economic advantages for the white minority,[60] political economy is not playing as influential a role in state–society relations as have such non-economic factors as ethnic and cultural heterogeneity. In Migdal's terms, most African societies may be considered "strong" compared to the states which rule over them. However, this strength is not based on the social actors' greater access to economic resources. Rather it has more to do with the state's inability to tackle the challenges it faces from a deeply divided society.

International Influences

Neither the inner workings of the state nor those of society, nor even their mutual interactions, occur within a vacuum. As inevitable, at times even reluctant actors within the regional, international, and even global community, states and societies cannot escape the variety of extra-national influences that come from beyond their own borders. The sociologist Anthony Giddens goes so far as to maintain that the very

socio-economic structure of contemporary capitalism inheres "globalization", which, he claims, comes about as a result of the "transformation of space and time". More specifically, globalization refers to "action at distance", whose intensification in recent years is due to the "emergence of means of instantaneous global communication and mass transportation".[61]

> Our day-to-day activities are increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the world. Conversely, local lifestyle habits have become globally consequential. Thus my decision to buy a certain item of clothing has implications not only for the international division of labour but for the earth's ecosystem.[62]

Receptivity to influences from abroad and the ability or willingness to in turn generate such influences depend on a number of factors. Most notably, they include a country's position within and posture toward the larger international community; its ability or desire to project "hard" and/or "soft" power abroad; the extent to which social and cultural change have enhanced a society's attitudes toward outside influences;[63] and the nature and extent of political and societal means (state policies, electronic and printed media, satellites and computers, etc.) through which these exogenous influences are filtered, packaged and disseminated throughout society. In Iran, for example, the government jams satellite television transmissions in a losing battle to keep out the corrupting influences of Western norms from Iranian living rooms. In Tunisia, e-mail is not available due to political considerations. In China, private fax machines are banned because of their subversive potentalities. There are countless such modern-day Hermit Kingdoms, each battling integration for fear of loss of cultural identity or, more truthfully, political power.

Four general categories of extra-national influences that act on states and societies can be distinguished. They include the forces of international economics; transnational cultural movements or shared identities; international regimes, rules and agreements that regulate some

aspects of state behavior; and diplomatic and/or military pressures exerted by another country, directly or indirectly, designed to influence a specific aspect of domestic politics. These categories are not mutually exclusive of each other and often do, in fact, overlap. When in 1990 Iraq violated international laws and conventions by invading Kuwait, both the Iraqi and Kuwait states were subject to military and diplomatic influences from the so-called Allied forces. International economics and military force have often gone hand-in-hand. The forces of international economics have changed the political landscape of countless countries, at times completely, ever since the dawn of international commerce. The Opium War, the colonization of Africa, the adventures of the United Fruit Company in Central America, the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile, and the "liberation" of oil-rich Kuwait from Iraq (but not of oil-poor Bosnia from Serbian ethnic cleansing) are only some of the more dramatic examples of the power of international economics. More subtle influences abound in the international system. One of the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet bloc, for example, can be attributed to the cumulative effects of the costs of its economic and military competition with the West. In recent years, several states in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa have been encouraged (some might say pressured) by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to undertake economic stabilization and structural adjustment programs designed to improve public sector efficiency and the productivity of public sector investments, liberalizing trade and domestic investment policies, and reforming the institutional arrangements that support the readjustment process.[64] As a consequence of these policies, the domestic powers and role of many Third World states have been somewhat curtailed, the bureaucracy reformed, and the overall size and capacity of the state reduced. Eager to embark on economic liberalization programs, post-transition democracies are especially likely to implement reform plans, some of the more notable of which include those launched in Poland (Balcerowics plan), Brazil (Plano Collar), Argentina (under Menem), and Peru (under Fujimori).[65]

Transnational cultural movements and/or shared identities that transcend national boundaries can also significantly influence domestic politics. The appearance of political Islam throughout the Middle East beginning in the late 1970s is the most dramatic example of such a

phenomenon: an Islamic revolution was launched, won and consolidated in Iran after 1979; the very foundations of almost all Gulf monarchies was shaken by Islamist oppositionists (e.g., the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979); President Sadat was assassinated by Islamist activists in Egypt in October 1981; Islam became a force to reckon with in Lebanon throughout the 1980s; Algeria was plunged into a bloody civil war by its military and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) beginning in 1992; fanatical purists called the Taliban captured power in war-torn Afghanistan in 1996; and, earlier that same year, even the virulently secular Turkey elected an Islamist prime minister (Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Party).[66] While in each case domestic social and political forces were at work, the cross-national spread, diffusion and reinforcement of values were also of great importance.[67] Even more dramatic has been the persistence of cross-national ethnic identities throughout Africa, often with devastating consequences for the nation-state and its inhabitants. From the very start, one might argue, the currency of extra-national ethno-tribal identities doomed the nationalist project in Africa.[68]

The Uncertainty Principle

The last area of analysis to consider in conceptualizing about politics is what a number of theorists have called "contingency", or, alternatively, what may also be called randomness. Long part of some historically-grounded political analyses, contingency points to the existence of those element whose genesis and causes are not always empirically explicable; they are not quantifiable; and they are almost impossible to predict. As a factor of analysis, contingency (randomness) is elusive and evasive, a shadowy area where the best we can do is to offer educated guesses and recognize our limitations in precise, tangible, "scientific" measurement and reasoning. This is more than the "contingence" factor which some proponents of the state-in-society approach have mentioned (though not elaborated on).[69] Instead, this is an area in social analysis where a measure of randomness is both possible and probable, where something akin to "the uncertainty principle" of quantum mechanics prevails. In the life of every country – whether in its politics or its history, its society or its economy – there is a certain amount of unpredictability,

a number of accidental or unintended occurrences that have little or nothing to do with the national, political or historical "norm" of that country. Sometimes things can happen that have no causal relationship to political, economic or socio-cultural forces that exist in a particular society. All political systems and societies operate according to sets of rules and guidelines that can pretty much be accurately grasped and analyzed. But, by nature, they also contain an element of uncertainty, when developments arise based on no rules or conventions, when society or politics assume directions that no-one expected, when culture develops norms few thought possible, when history takes turns few ever imagined.

We must, of course, be careful not to stretch the boundaries of this accidentalism beyond reasonable limits. There are very broad and general limits beyond which random occurrences are not possible. Nevertheless, there is a general framework within which not every occurrence or development is predictable. To assume, for example, that China might tomorrow suddenly become democratic is unreasonable; but no-one could scientifically account for Chairman Mao's political antics after the success of Chinese communists in 1949 (not the least of which were the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution). In *A Brief History of Time,* Stephen Hawking offers a layman's definition of quantum mechanics that seems to fit this model perfectly:

> In general, quantum mechanics does not predict a single definite result from an observation. Instead, it predicts a number of different possible outcomes and tells us how likely each of these is. That is to say, if one made the same measurement on a large number of similar systems, each of which started off in the same way, one would find that the result of the measurement would be A in a certain number of cases, B in a different number, and so on. One would predict the approximate number of times that the result would be A or B, but one could not predict the specific result of an individual measurement. Quantum mechanics therefore introduces an unavoidable element of unpredictability or randomness into science.[70]

The uncertainty principle can be caused by any one of four interrelated and complementary factors: circumstances and opportunities; historical accidents; unintended consequences; and personal initiatives. Unforeseen circumstances and random occurrences – the element of chance – can potentially play a crucial role in the uncertainty principle. Circumstances and opportunities often arise that, if properly situated or exploited, may significantly change the political life or social direction of a given country. The circumstances in which a country finds itself can potentially, and often in fact do, have an important bearing on its politics and society. These circumstances may be due to accidental factors that initially have nothing to do with the country itself. The tragic example of the link between the Holocaust and Palestinian politics may better illustrate the point. Who could rationally explain Hitler's crusade to annihilate the Jews? There is no single social, political or historical explanation for the Holocaust; the man was simply a pathological murderer. One can rationalize about the causes of the Holocaust, but the reason as to why it was carried out, and why it was carried out the way that it was, ultimately rests with Hitler himself. Some other political leader might have carried out the same murderous crusade, but most probably he would have either avoided it altogether or at least done it differently.[71] That some six million Jews perished and countless others were displaced throughout the globe was simply a matter of unfortunate chance, but still chance nonetheless.

But this poor luck on the part of the European Jewry has dramatically altered the life, politics, and society of not only Jews but also Palestinians in a way they could not have possibly fathomed before 1947. The irrational actions of a man in distant Europe, resulting in the misfortunes of millions of people, influenced life in Palestine in a way that indigenous Palestinian factors had little to do with. The unpredictable element of chance, or in this case horrendous misfortune, has played – or in the inter-war period did play – a determining role in the nature of Palestinian (and of course Israeli) politics, society and economics. Hitler's madness alone is not responsible for every aspect of Palestinian life or politics since 1947, but the coincidental connection between the two is more formidable than may at first appear to be the case.

Closely related to the randomness of circumstances and opportunities

that are thrust upon a country are the role of historical accidents. Especially in the contemporary era, rarely has an accidental historical act or a random discovery changed or fundamentally altered the political life of an entire country. Yet a credible argument could be made that the appearance of the Age of Revolution in Europe, and particularly of industrialization in England, was quite accidental and that such Asian countries as China or Japan were initially better situated to be the birthplaces of technological innovation and advancement.[72] As Henry Steele Commager reminds us, "we must avoid assuming that history is a kind of chess game with every gambit logical and planned."[73] But, he warns, we must also avoid "the other extreme, that of ascribing everything to accident or luck; we must avoid giving too much prominence to untidiness and disorder".[74] "Though accidents often change the pace or the pattern of history," he maintains,

> they rarely change it in any fundamental way. For the sophisticated historian remembers what is, after all, the common sense of the matter, that there are always enough accidents to go around, and that accidents tend to cancel out . . . It is premature and almost perverse to assign too much importance to what we determine the accidents of history.[75]

Commager's points are quite significant, but he goes too far in his warning. Likening history to a football game, he maintains that "a particular fumble rarely changes the course of a game, or of a season of games".[76] But that is precisely where he is wrong. A fumble by itself may not change a game, but an accidental injury resulting in the loss of a first-rate player might (witness the declining fortunes of the Los Angeles Lakers basketball team after the loss of Ervin "Magic" Johnson to AIDS). History may not change because of an army commander's sneeze somewhere, but that army commander's death, or military brilliance or incompetence in a particular campaign can indeed impact not only the direction of history but also the lives of those influenced by it. The mental instability of King George III, no doubt, for example, greatly influenced his choice of responses to the rebellious colonies in

the Americas, as did the Shah of Iran's struggle with cancer in his attempts to save his collapsing dynasty in the fateful days of 1978 and 1979.[77] Accidents do matter. Political history is not made up of random accidents only. There are times, however, when accidents and other elements that are matters of pure chance weigh in heavily in determining a particular political outcome.

Similarly unpredictable are the important roles played by personal initiative and human agency. At whatever level of "the political" one looks – be it the state or society, political economy or political history – there is the undeniable constant of human thought and action, men and women who, either individually or collectively, are either the benefactors, or initiators, or recipients of political power. Even when political ideology, or custom and convention, heavily constrain the range of options open to human free will, there is still a degree if not of independence but of variance that one person's thoughts and actions have from another's. How that initiative impacts politics – how the fluidity of human individuality results in a certain political outcome that would have been different had someone else been involved – that is where the uncertainty of politics lies, where no analysis, no matter how concrete, can adequately account for or predict a particular outcome with exact precision.

Politics becomes especially problematic when a person decides to "make history", when a Bonaparte attains power, a Khomeini tries to cling on to it, an Idi Amin enters the scene, or a Gorbachev worries about how future Russians will remember him. In such instances, politics becomes erratic, highly personalized and unpredictable. It has few or no set patterns, no over-arching guiding principles other than what the political leader thinks is prudent for the moment and at the time. This is not to imply, of course, that the unpredictability of individual initiative is something to consider only in political systems or eras when powerful personalities overshadow institutions and principles. The likes of Atatürk and Mao do have an easier time in taking politics (and with it history) into their own hands and shaping it in ways they like; and some have even been successful in such endeavors. But even within the institutional limitations that Western political systems impose on their politicians, there is still much room

for individual creativity, initiative and uniqueness of impact. One does not have to be a vain Lyndon Johnson or a British Iron Lady to put a unique stamp on politics. The many big and small decisions that are made by such uninspiring Western politicians as Presidents Carter, Bush, and Clinton in the US, Prime Minister Major in Britain, and Japan's many short-tenured prime ministers, all are in their own way unique. These decisions would most probably be different, even if only slightly, if they were made by someone else. The lowest common denominator of politics is human thought and action, and very seldom are the thoughts and actions of two people identical. In fact, when it comes to politics, particularly when the stakes are high, people's thoughts and actions tend to differ especially widely.

Analytical Applications

The analytical utility of the approach laid out above becomes apparent when it is applied to the various political, economic, and social and cultural phenomenon that, in totality and in connection with one another, constitute politics. Politics is a multi-faceted realm in which a number of forces, disparate and often initially unrelated, combine to determine the nature and behaviors of state and social actors in themselves and in relation to one another. In one way or another, previous approaches to comparative politics have failed to provide proper and sufficient analytical guidelines that would take all such diverse components into account. For its part, although it is far more thorough than those preceding it, the state-in-society perspective fails to leave room for accidental occurrences or to take into account factors related to political economy and political culture.

The approach being proposed here, filling some of the void left behind by previous paradigms, casts an analytical net that, for now at least, appears wide enough to take into account the many forces and phenomena that make up politics. It also retains an internal logical consistency that enables us to point to the causal connections that may exist in seemingly unconnected political domains. This is a holistic view of politics in which six areas of analysis have been highlighted: state;

society; political culture; political economy; international influences; and random occurrences. The inner- and inter-workings of each one of these six areas form the blueprint which comparative analysis needs to follow. This larger model can then be applied to look at a specific political phenomenon or event from a comparative perspective. The analyst must determine which one of the six areas best explains the characteristics and underlying causes of his or her particular subject of investigation; which other areas were directly or indirectly involved or effected, and how that specific phenomenon, which might have occurred in only one area, impacts the larger picture. Table 3.1 contains a number of phenomena that may be important and inseparable aspects of a particular political scenario.

Each of these phenomena may belong primarily in one of the six areas. By nature, however, many political phenomena traverse the original area from which they were generated: political development, for example, may be initiated by the state but also influences society and culture, and involves elements of political economy as well. If the analyst's job is to study political development in a given country, he or she needs to determine what state factors were involved (e.g., institutions and other policy-making mechanisms, intents and consequences, etc.), and how, if at all, such other areas as the political economy or political culture came into play or were influenced. This is not to imply that comparative political analysis has to always remain at the macrolevel. Microlevel analysis of specific aspects of a particular phenomenon is possible under the same rubric, though the scope is much narrower and, naturally, more specialized. Instead of the larger processes and consequences involved in political development, for example, analysis would only focus on the highly specialized factors that are pertinent to the investigation. Nevertheless, the analyst must stay mindful of the fact that although a very specific phenomenon is being studied (in this case a particular facet of political development), there are other forces and factors that *may potentially* be of significance to the subject of investigation as well.

Table 3.1 Area of analytical focus in explaining various political phenomena

State	
fluctuations in degree of autonomy	internal paralysis
political institutionalization	democratization from above
political development	policy-making and implementation
palace and military coups	international relations, wars
trade disputes	
Society	
social change	cleavages/cohesion
urbanization	middle class growth in size and economic power
political mobilization	population growth and shifts
interest groups and political parties	
Political culture	
chasm into political and regime orientations	hero worship
apathy and/or cynicism	patriarchical tendencies
zero-sum nature	civil society
Political economy	
industrialization	economic nuances (inflation/recession)
consumerism	foreign and domestic investment levels
dependence	foreign market orientation/export-led growth
interdependence	foreign aid
expansion of labour-intensive industry	infrastructural growth
proletarization	government social security net
International influences	
international regimes	diplomatic and/or military initiatives
international economics	transnational cultural movements
cross-national shared identities	
Uncertainty principle	
historical accidents	individual initiatives
unintended consequences	

Conclusion

Building on the state-in-society approach to comparative politics, this chapter has sought to take the level of analysis one step further by proposing a more holistic perspective. To examine politics in general and Third World politics in particular, it argues, analysis must focus not only on the state and society but also on the additional areas of political culture, political economy, international influences and "the uncertainty principle". As the general umbrella under which popular norms and

values toward political objects are formulated, political culture plays a decisive role in influencing a society's interactions with the state and, in turn, the degree of success or failure a state may have in carrying out its social agendas. Similarly important is political economy, in particular the economic contexts and ramifications of the interactions that take place between the state and society. States and societies operate in a global arena where other states and societies operate and where extra-national influences from economic centers and cultural movements, multinational agencies and international regimes abound.

Lastly, attention has been drawn to a certain amount of built-in unpredictability in politics, a degree of deliberate uncertainty based more on the laws of probabilities and accidental occurrences than on any tangibly predictable phenomena based on the laws of politics, society or economics. Politics is not in any sense mysterious or magical; it is not a discipline whose study and examination is a matter of pure speculation or abstract philosophizing. Rather, it is not always wholly quantifiable or reducible to immutable mechanical laws and regulations. We must acknowledge that due to the involvement of humans in it – humans which by nature retain a degree of uniqueness and individuality – politics can potentially result in outcomes that are not always precisely predictable. Even culture – and cultural analysis – do not provide concrete rules for political conduct and/or analysis. In political analysis, as with physics, the best we can do is to present ourselves with a range of possible options and speculate about their potential outcomes.

As the above analysis demonstrates, examining and conceptualizing politics in the Third World and elsewhere is a more complicated venture than previously assumed. Surely this chapter has not put a definitive end to the ongoing debate, but it has presented a modified methodology for the various areas of analysis where attempts at political conceptualization must focus. The assertions made here enjoy neither the elegant simplicity of the modernization perspective nor the compelling convictions of the dependency approach. Neither, I think, do they have the straight forward logic of structuralism or the loud and supportive, at times violent, rhetoric to which culturalists point for validation. Politics is presented here as a messy, complicated, at times accidental and unpredictable web into which may enter a number of non-

political forces and considerations. But that, as unfortunate as it may be, is precisely what politics is. As our understanding of comparative global politics becomes more thorough and sophisticated, so must we accordingly modify our perceptions and presuppositions of what *politics* is and how we must go about understanding it. It is only logical to conclude, then, that progressively greater levels of analytical and conceptual sophistication – and hopefully simplicity – are to be expected in the future.

Notes

1 Samuel Huntington first introduced his interpretations of cultural geography in 'The goals of development', Weiner and Huntington (eds) 1987: 3–32. He later elaborated in these views in the much more provocative, celebrated article 'The clash of civilizations', 1993: 22–49, later to be expanded into the book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,* 1996. See Chapter 2.

2 Migdal, Kohli and Shue 1994: 1.

3 See, for example, Berger 1994: 257–75; Kamrava 1993: 703–16 and Manor 1991.

4 Although the approach informs the underlying premise of a number of case-studies dealing with comparative politics, its theoretical parameters have been explicitly outlined in only a few publications. See, for example, Migdal 1988; Kamrava 1996 and Migdal et al. 1994.

5 For a brief critique of *States Power and Social Forces* see Robert Jackson's review in *American Political Science Review.* June 1995: 520–1.

6 Migdal 1988: 28–9.

7 Migdal (1994). 'Introduction: Developing a State-in-Society Perspective', in *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World,* Migdal et al. (eds), 3, 1994.

8 Ibid.

9 Kohli and Shue, 'State power and social forces: On political contention and accommodation in the Third World', Migdal et al. (eds), 1994: 319.

10 Migdal et al. (1994) Ibid: 3.

11 Migdal, 'The state in society: An approach to struggles for domination',

in Migdal et al. (eds), 1994: 30.

12 Kamrava 1996: 2–3.

13 The dependency-modernization debate has been extensively treated in a number of publications. See, for example, Kevin Clements 1980; Chilcote and Johnson (eds) 1983; and Higgot 1983.

14 Migdal et al. 1994: 9.

15 Kamrava 1996: 81.

16 Migdal 1988: 40.

17 Migdal et al. 1994: 3.

18 Dearlove 1989: 521.

19 Skocpol in Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (eds), 1985: 3–37.

20 Giddens 1991: 156.

21 Kamrava 1996: 43–4.

22 See, for example, Almond and Powell 1992: 4–6.

23 White et al. 1987: 20.

24 Peters 1991: 171–2.

25 Loewenberg and Patterson in Cantori and Ziegler (eds) 1988: 280.

26 Huntington 1968: 196.

27 Ibid.

28 These instances arise when there are multiple and competing centers of authority in both the state and society which cannot effectively establish their dominance over one another. Consequently, a broken state tries to govern a deeply fractured society, with a multi-authority polity being the outcome. For more on this see Kamrava 1993: 708–10.

29 In Egypt, for example, there is a not-too-subtle competition among religious and secular professors over which group becomes more dominant on university campuses and in particular departments. Personal interview, Professor Kamal El-Menouphi, Associate Dean of the College of Politics and Economics, Cairo University, Cairo, 2 June 1996.

30 Harik in Salame 1987: 24.

31 Easton 1965: 24–5.

32 A discussion of social divisions, both in themselves and in terms of their cultural consequences, is more elaborate than the scope of this chapter allows. For more see Chapter 5.

33 Migdal alludes to political culture when discussing civil society, which he claims to assume "the existence of a normative consensus or hegemony

of fundamental ideas among social forces . . . this consensus represents a prevailing moral or social order" Migdal, "The State in Society". See Migdal, Kohli and Shue (eds) (1994), pp. 7–34.

34 Gradually, many scholars have come to believe that there was indeed some merit in cultural factors and that they can potentially serve as important forces in politics. Theda Skocpol, for example, who was once one of the main figures in the neo-statist current, later modified some of her original arguments to make room for culture. See, Skocpol 1982: 265–83. Huntington has also slowly but surely moved from a non-cultural extreme to an opposing extreme in which he sees the globe as a collection of distinct cultural entities divided along various "civilizational fault lines". That Huntington has taken a good idea and stretched beyond its reasonable utility is discussed in Chapter 2.

35 This is not to say that examinations of Latin American culture and its political significance do not exist. For two sample studies looking at the significance of political culture in Latin America see Booth and Seligson in Diamond (ed.) 1994: 99–130; and Wiarda (ed.) 1992: 1–22.

36 M. Kamrava and F. Mora. 'Civil society in comparative perspective: Lessons from Latin America and the Middle East', *Third World Quarterly* **19**(5), (1998).

37 Kamrava 1993: 144–5.

38 Almond and Verba 1963.

39 Vogel 1991: 92–3.

40 Bill and Springborg 1994: 160–2.

41 Sharabi 1988: 9.

42 Bayart 1993: 174–5.

43 Finer 1988: 214–15.

44 Economy is not given any systematic treatment in *State Power and Social Forces,* although the concluding chapter touches upon it in passing (Migdal et al. 1994, pp. 300–1). Other relevant discussions are found in Rueschemeyer and Evans in Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (eds) 1984.

45 Rueschemeyer and Evans 1984: 68.

46 Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992: 269.

47 Moore 1966: 415.

48 For a discussion of the natures of and relationship between corporatism

and fascism in inter-War Europe see Kedward 1971: 207–19.

49 Laybourn 1995: 222; Pedersen 1993: 290–1.

50 O'Donnell 1988: 32.

51 Foley 1995: 20.

52 Valdés 1989.

53 Foley 1995: 21.

54 Pereira, Maravall and Przewoski 1993: 132–3.

55 Todaro 1997: 34–5. The mixed (or statist) economies found in parts of the Third World today are not very different from the mercantilism that Europe witnessed in the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries.

56 Wiarda 1995: 112–16.

57 Geertz et al. 1979: 123–264.

58 Young 1982: 86.

59 Gadzey 1995: 89. Gadzey attributes Africa's semicapitalism to two factors: the colonial commodity export trade; and the fact that "the total external focus of the trade deprived it of the normal forward and backward linkages necessary to make commodity trade an adequate lead-off sector for the complete capitalization of the larger subsistence economy".

60 Lewis 1990: 17–18.

61 Giddens 1994: 4.

62 Ibid: p. 5.

63 Giddens calls this "social reflexivity". Globalization, he claims, transforms tradition. Individuals must therefore "become used to filtering all sorts of information relevant to their life situations and routinely act on the basis of that filtering process." Ibid: 6.

64 Todaro 1997: 524.

65 Przeworski 1991: 165.

66 In the Middle East, a favorite national pastime is to blame a neighboring country for domestic political difficulties. In Turkey and Algeria, for example, most secularists are convinced that the activities of the (now banned) Welfare Party and the FIS are financed by Iran and Saudi Arabia. In Egypt, Sudan is seen as the main culprit behind the rise of domestic terrorism, and so on. When another Muslim country does not fit into the conspiracy theory, Israel is always a sure bet. In Iran, meanwhile, pro-monarchists are convinced that the United States installed Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic in power.

67 See Ayubi 1991.
68 Davidson 1992: 185–6.
69 Migdal et al. 1994: 3.
70 Hawking 1988: 55–6.
71 The argument that the responsibility for the Holocaust rests primarily with Hitler is not universally accepted. For more on this debate see Marrus 1987, especially pp. 1–30.
72 See the arguments made in Needham 1976: xxv–xxvi. A brief overview of the historical roots of the differences between China and the West may be found in Xiaojun 1989: 34–7.
73 Commager 1966: 86.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid: 87.
76 Ibid.
77 Pahlavi 1980: 19; Schmucker 1865: 204–5.

CHAPTER FOUR

Political Culture in the Third World

While political culture may be used as *one* of the crucial tools for conceptualizing politics *within* Third World countries, it can be just as beneficial in differentiating Third World polities from each other and from other, non-Third World political systems. More specifically, at a time when economic and political differences no longer adequately describe global categories and classifications – whither the "three worlds" of politics? – political culture continues to provide a useful matrix for the distinction and categorization of the Third World as compared with the "other". In a pure sense, there may no longer exist a "Third World"; indeed, one wonders if such a thing ever really existed. However, as the following pages demonstrate, there is still a group of polities, as diverse and disparate as they may be, whose political cultures share certain common characteristics that continue to enable us to classify them as belonging to one category. These commonalities in political culture result in the continuity of the phenomenon if not the label "Third World".

In its broadest sense, political culture in the Third World may be divided into the three general categories of parochial, subject, and participant, each of which denote the extent and nature of popular perceptions toward politics. These three categories were first devised in the 1960s by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba in their pioneering study of political culture.[1] The following pages will build on this

trichotomy, examining the direct relationship that each type of political culture has with the prevailing political systems found in the Third World. In fairness to Almond and Verba, it must be stated at the outset that the analysis which follows has borrowed more of their labels and general concepts rather than the specific notions behind those concepts and ideas. Both the reasoning and the thesis of what is to come are thus different from those of the two mentioned scholars. This I say in order to absolve them from my line of reasoning and to point to the analytical license I have taken with the terminology they extensively used in their earlier writings on political culture. Whether or not Almond and Verba agree with the conclusions I will draw in the following pages, I have based my discussion of the overall variations within political culture on the trichotomy that they offered more than three decades ago. It needs also be mentioned, especially for those unfamiliar with the work in question, that the analytical distinctions made by Almond and Verba are only a blip in their massive and indepth study of political culture and hardly a major thesis of their work. I have, nevertheless, taken a point that Almond and Verba seem to be making in passing and developed a series of analytical propositions around it.

The central thesis of this chapter is that each of these three different types of political culture represents stages in the political evolution of nations – both politically and, more importantly, in terms of national cohesion – from the least evolved to the most complex. Put differently, each political culture predominates the life of a nation-state in its various stages of evolution from a loosely-articulated socio-political community to increasingly more complex and self-conscious political entities. This is not to imply that such an evolutionary progression in the political functions and institutions of societies is inevitable or in any sense culturally desirable. In fact, a number of diverse factors and dynamics may, and often do, mitigate against radical and sudden changes in institutional and other systemic arrangements. Norms and values often change at an even slower pace, and political culture changes tend to be particularly infrequent and gradual. Nevertheless, such institutional and cultural transformations do take place, in turn entailing more fundamental and all-encompassing changes in the body politic.

While this chapter examines all three forms of political culture, its particular emphasis will be on the two that are most prevalent, namely subject and participant ones. Parochial political cultures deal with small and highly restricted political universes in which the body politic is neither terribly evolved nor necessarily even aware of its constitution as a political unit. Both subject and participant political cultures, on the other hand, are part and parcel of contemporary political systems of different kinds, having become integral features of the modern state system. Subject political culture are essentially non-democratic and tend to be directly doctored and controlled by the state. They are, in essence, cultural directives handed down and imposed on society from the top, often coercively but at times through non-coercive, duplicitous ways. Participant political cultures, in contrast, are democratic, having accordingly evolved rules of the political game over which most strata of society are in agreement. It is to the detailed examination of these types of political culture and their relations with the larger body politic that the present chapter turns.

Political Culture and International Classifications

When looking at the globe around us, we are struck by a simple dichotomy of prevailing political cultures. There is a group of countries in which there is broad agreement over the nature, form, and limits of the political game. In these countries, the state and the cultural premises on which it rests have had enough historical longevity behind them, at least in relation to society, for the values attached to it to have been accepted and internalized by the masses of people. Also, the social changes occurring in these countries are no longer of a type that would significantly alter the core political values over which a popular consensus has historically evolved. In other words, although there may be subtle nuances and changes within the overall polity, these changes have little or no bearing on the precise formulations of the political culture. The political culture, in fact, has developed an independent and autonomous life for itself which, instead of being slave to the two, keeps both the state and society in check. This is the type of political culture found in Western Europe, North America, Japan,

New Zealand and Australia, where any deviation from the dominant political culture (the rise of skinheads in Europe or militia groups in the US, for example) is cause for much alarm and consternation. Not only is there near-complete social acceptance of the body politic in these countries, the values and norms attached to them are by and large internalized by the population. The nature and rules of the political game are accepted and agreed upon without challenge, and disagreements revolve not around the general definition of politics but over what is *good* politics. Thus even if the Japanese or the Italians cannot decide over a Prime Minister, they are unanimous in their support of the overall system which the PM represents.

The fact that most, though not all, of these countries happen to be in the Western hemisphere is more than simply coincidental. The West has been home to relatively old states residing over similarly old societies. This is not to assert, as is often wrongly done, that it was in the West that nationalism as a phenomenon first developed.[2] Nationalism, in its simplest form, represents attachment to and love of a motherland that is often, but by no means always, represented through loyalty and devotion to the state. In this sense, the ancient imperial systems of China and Persia are far more likely candidates as the initial birthplaces of nationalism than the countries of the European continent, where the modern state grew comparatively much later. It is undeniable, however, that insofar as the contemporary era is concerned, it has been in Europe and the rest of the "Western" world that there has been the most continuous and uninterrupted process of political rulership. In other words, as a modern invention, the "state", with all its elaborate institutional differentiations, is decidedly Western In genesis, having attained the height of maturity earlier in the West than in anywhere else.[3] A snapshot of history highlights some of the flashpoints of this maturation process in the modern era: when non-Western states were resting on their historical laurels and relishing in past glory, those in the West began evolving and flourishing well beyond their own borders. Colonialism and neo-colonialism only strengthened the Western state and further weakened non-Western political entities. During and after the Second World War, as many states in the West were forced to reconstitute themselves, those elsewhere had to start from scratch.

Although many Western states had to reestablish their ties with society completely anew following WWII, those in the non-Western world had a much harder sell; they had to sell to their societies the whole concept of the "state", the very reason for their existence, with which the masses had lost familiarity and emotional attachment after centuries of direct colonial rule or indirect neo-colonial submission. Western societies were far more familiar with the state as an entity, a state that had always been their own and not someone else's. More importantly, they were now determined to get it right and not repeat the disasters of the war. Here we see the birth of the first unified, cohesive political cultures, quite deliberate and thought-out at first, but gradually, through socialization via schools and other means, internalized and part of the national subconscious.

The experiences of the West contrasted markedly with those of the non-Western world, hence giving rise to a completely different brand of political culture there. In today's non-Western world one finds countries that embody either changing societies but static states, changing states but societies in which change is now largely politically inconsequential, or changing states and changing societies. In any event, because one or both of the social and political spheres of these countries are changing (or have only recently stopped to change), their political cultures also lack consistency and permanence. These are the countries once readily labeled as "Third World", for which a new designation is needed today. By nature, changes in the state are not everlasting, and sooner or later states are likely to settle into a political routine of their own. This is precisely what happened in the 1980s to most parts of the former Second and Third Worlds, with significant political changes eventually resulting in a rouinized, albeit completely different, set of political institutions and formats. But a termination of political change is not by itself sufficient to usher in a new and permanent political culture. Political culture needs time to mature and to become popularly internalized as part of the political routine of people. It needs to develop popularly-accepted norms and givens, and the mass internalization of such political norms, especially in transformations of historic proportions, does not occur overnight. Significant and historical political changes took place in the 1980s in

parts of Latin America and in Eastern Europe, the full domestic and international ripple effects of which are yet to be manifested. It is inaccurate or at best shortsighted to assume that simply because these changes have resulted in seemingly permanent, new political arrangements, their accompanying political cultures must have also assumed their final overall form. Institutions change much faster and more readily than do people's values. It takes far more than a new set of political arrangements for people to genuinely agree over the very nature of politics. What happened in Eastern Europe and Latin America in the 1980s went beyond mere institutional rearrangements; it involved a complete redefinition of "the political" and a new way of perceiving of and going about politics. A new political culture was ushered in. But for a new, popularly accepted and socially resonant political culture to take hold, it takes time, political crafting, and, perhaps most importantly, a shared belief by a significant segment of the population that they have common vested interests in the political process. Even if Eastern Europe and Latin America have recently gone democratic, their respective political cultures have yet to meet the various criteria required of them if they are to become permanent. So long as the system has not proven itself over time, and as long as radically different political norms and principles that challenge the whole legitimacy of the system can find receptive ears among the larger populace, the newly-formed states of Eastern Europe and Latin America, democratic as they may be, are far from resilient and socially resonant.

Democratization appears as the single most crucial criterion for a political culture's permanence. To begin with, in addition to time and proven performance, a democratic polity is the only way to forge a common, nationally cohesive political culture. The two ingredients of time and democratic performance are indeed pivotal determinants of a resonant political culture, one in which there are no differences between or within "political" and "regime orientations". It is no accident that all of the countries in which there is unanimous agreement over the general contours of political culture happen to be long-established democracies. The new democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin America may be further along the road to developing a commonly accepted political culture, but they are not quite there yet. Through

the mechanisms of democracy, they can foster a popular, deeply-held sense of belonging and a vested interest in the workings of the system and influencing its performance. But populist regimes can do this too and often do so far more intensely and effectively. What populist regimes do not have, however, is permanence, and their attempts at inclusion are often soon exposed as the political gimmicks that they are. Thus performance alone is an insufficient criterion for permanence. A system's distributive efficacy must be proven over enough of a length of time for it to bestow on its subjects an internalized, unmanipulated sense of acceptance and belonging. No matter how captivating a leader's charisma may be, or how emotionally manipulative his ideology, or effective his populist institutions, he still cannot mobilize popular support and emotional loyalty indefinitely. Some people may be fooled all the time, and all people may be fooled some of the time, but not everyone can be fooled all of the time. Only by routinized, uncoerced and unmanipulated participation in the political process over time will the people develop an internalized acceptance of the political system. Fostering cultural and emotional ties between the state and society is a unique characteristic of democracy which no other system has been able to replicate with quite the same degree of effectiveness.

We may be no closer to a satisfactory definition of the "Third World" at this point than we were at the start of the chapter, but, hopefully, we have a new understanding of the analytical premises which the concept is supposed to signify. The Third World may no longer exist *per se,* but its historic and political legacies continue to shape and define the new set of states and societies found around the globe. In the traditional sense of the term, the label "Third World" can no longer be considered as valid because of the disappearance of the Second World on the one hand and the vast political and economic discrepancies of non-Western countries on the other hand. Nevertheless, despite these significant developments, countries of the former Third World still have one significant functional element in common: their political cultures. In the non-Western world, i.e., former Third World, political cultures tend to be tenuous, impermanent, fragmented, and, even if recently democratized, still without social resonance. Whatever their specific

features may be, the political cultures of these countries set them apart from those customarily called Western. How we classify these new political entities is largely a matter of semantics. It is, nonetheless, a reality that the political cultures of some countries with "older" states are more unanimously accepted and thus more cohesive than those of others, whose states happen not to be as old.

Political Culture and the Third World Polity

On a purely political plane, therefore, irrespective of diplomacy, economics or industrial development, we seem to have entered a two-folded era of national politics. On one side exist countries that have long settled on their political cultures and their societies agree over exactly what to expect of and demand from the state. There is in these countries unanimous and time-hallowed agreement over what politics means and entails. Politics is thus by and large *predictable* and routine, resting on a well-established set of principles and guidelines that are widely respected and observed, often in fact subconsciously and without much fanfare. One the other side, however, are countries that have either only recently settled on a democratic political culture, which they hope to have accepted nationally, or are still debating over exactly what the very essence of politics ought to be. For this group politics has no unanimous meaning, no single definition over which there is national consensus or even widespread agreement. Some groups within the polity define politics as a means to get control over others and to simply govern them, while others see it as a domain of activity for only the wicked and the vain. Still others may view politics as an instrument of liberation, whether from the tyranny of political oppression, or economic injustice, or societal ignorance. However it might be defined, a national understanding of politics has yet to emerge and gain widespread hold. In a nutshell, politics is at best *unpredictable.* It is to this latter group that the former states of the Soviet bloc and the new democracies of Latin America belong, as do also such politically and economically diverse countries as Afghanistan and South Africa, Bangladesh and Zimbabwe. Whether the latest wave of democratization will eventually shrink the size of this group remains to be seen, as does adopting an adequate label for describing them.

Parochial Political Cultures

Within the larger predictable/unpredictable dichotomy of politics laid out above, three specific kinds of political cultures may be found. They include parochial, subject and participant political cultures. Parochial political cultures are the least evolved, often comprised of a series of straight-forward, basic political concepts that have evolved in response to political circumstances that are void of high degrees of institutional complexity and role differentiation. As Almond and Verba put it, a parochial political culture is one in which there are no specialized political roles (e.g., leadership, headmanship, etc.), and political orientations toward these roles are the same as religious and social ones.[4] "In this kind of polity", they maintain,

> the specialized agencies of central government might hardly touch the consciousness of townsmen, villagers, and tribesmen. Their orientations would tend to be unspecialized political–economic–religious ones, congruently related to the similarly unspecialized structures and operations of their tribal, religious, and local communities.[5]

Increasingly rarified in the modern world, parochial political cultures are most commonly found in tribal societies or religious communities in which a number of political roles and functions are performed by occupants of the same institution. The tribal chief or the religious leader, for example, is often at once the embodiment of executive, legislative and judicial powers within himself, and simultaneously performs a multitude of other social, economic, cultural and political functions. He is at once the Leader, the Protector, the Provider, the Teacher and the Commander. In sum, he is the state – or whatever of it there is – and more. The original community of believers (*umma*) that Islam sought to establish at the time of Prophet Muhammad is the best example, perhaps the only one of its type, of a polity with a purely parochial political culture.[6] Almond and Verba mention the possibility that, in a number of respects at least, the Ottoman empire may also have been based on a parochial political culture.[7]

In the sense defined here, therefore, parochial political culture may be seen as the precursor to and the most basic and necessary ingredient of national identity. It is not quite national identity yet, although it does lay its needed embryo by focusing otherwise inchoate and disparate political sentiments on one set of institutions, premises and leaders. In parochial political cultures a sense of national membership in the same political community – being members of the same nation – has not fully evolved yet. The population's understanding of the body politic is at best limited to the most elementary symbols of nationhood. A truly national political spirit has not yet matured enough to enable people to formulate sentiments and opinions about political symbols and institutions besides those with which they have immediate and direct contact. Consequently, parochial political cultures cannot be readily found in modern nation-states of the type inundating the globe now. They may, however, at best constitute fringe tribal or radical religious elements within larger national identities that have, for one reason or another, by and large escaped national integration. In a number of African polities, for example, while there is a larger, nation-wide political culture, tribal communities may be found in which self-contained, parochial political cultures still dominate. Even if there is a political system with a semblance of life and modernity, the penetrative reaches of the state have largely failed to emasculate other smaller, less inclusive political cultures that revolve around more narrowly-defined political bodies. Thus the efforts of the state at inculcating political values of its own among the various strata of society may be undermined by the perseverance of more parochial, less "national" norms, loyalties and allegiances.

Subject Political Cultures

If the most apt description of a parochial political culture is that it is "non-national", that of a subject political culture is its intrinsically "non-democratic" nature. In these political cultures, there is a one-way, downward flow of influence from the political top to the social base, and society's norms and values toward the larger body politic are at best passive and at worst nonexistent.[8] A subject political culture,

therefore, is one in which internal, self-evolving and self-reinforcing mechanisms that make people think politically are either constantly suppressed by the state or have not yet meaningfully emerged. People are political "subjects" rather than "citizens", and the underlying premise of political norms and values is one of leaving them to the "higher ups". The individual person is consequently robbed of the ability to think and conceptualize politically on his or her own, and independent thinking is subliminally discouraged and blatantly suppressed. Society as a whole, therefore, views itself as subject to the greater political wisdom of the state. Virtually all post-revolutionary political cultures, in which the revolution's victors assume the role of founding fathers and do not welcome dissenting opinion from the masses, are of the type being discussed here, as were the political cultures of literally all former Soviet bloc countries. Whether passively or actively, social actors are turned into subjects of the political system, robbed of any opportunity to freely take part in the political process or to formulate sentiments about it.

This subject syndrome is reinforced in two ways, one based on the efforts of the state and another through a series of internal dynamics within society itself. On the one hand, the trumpets of the state constantly remind the masses of the dangers and fallacies of unsolicited ideological and practical initiatives. Government propagandists are always busy at work exalting the superior virtues of the official Path and the innate negativism of unofficial ones. The official mechanisms of political socialization, from manipulating school textbooks all the way to the inculcation of etatist beliefs, are in full swing, buttressed on and reinforced by the muscle and teeth of the police and the official party. It is, after all, a repressive state that is spewing out ideological rhetoric, and challenging its agendas is not without its risks. The individual is reduced to a political subject, therefore, and self-subjectification is often the most prudent survival strategy to adopt. Adopting other alternatives, if available at all, would most probably entail significant dangers.

But apart from the frightening prospects of questioning the state's cultural legitimacy, subject political cultures are often sustained by a built-in sense of apathy and cynicism on the part of their very recipients.

In polities in which there is a repressive political system, one in which the state lives in a highly contrived cultural world of its own, there is often – though not always – a general sense of succumbing to the political realities that exist. If politics is so repressive and patently false, and if by avoiding it much of life would be normal (or at least as normal as it gets), then why bother with it? If life is, as Vaclav Havel so compellingly put it in reference to the former Soviet bloc, "living within a lie",[9] why not play along and leave the politicians and their corrupt games to themselves? This apathy and passive compliance runs deeper than simple political opportunism may dictate; it gradually becomes part and parcel of the subject political culture itself. In fact, political passivity often becomes a cornerstone of the socialization process, especially that of the young, with most people learning from an early age to leave unto Caesar what is Caesar's and to go about their own business quietly. The population gradually develops internal justifications for staying out of politics or even for being pliant subjects of the state. The self-sustaining psychology of subjectification is often as powerful as are the fears of deviating from it.

Whatever the supporting foundations of a subject political culture may be, it is often likely to assume one of two forms. Frequently, such political cultures are politically neutralized, their spirits knocked out by the repressive hammers of the state. This occurs in instances where exclusionary authoritarianism reigns supreme and political repression is a daily fact of life. The state wants nothing less than its total divorce and exclusion from society, ceaselessly striving to keep its contacts with social strata and institutions to only the necessary minimum. This, in fact, is the state's primary *modus operandi,* as any popular input into the system is viewed with extreme suspicion and skepticism. Thus the political culture that the state seeks to propagate, and which society has no choice but to adopt and abide by, becomes a politically dispirited enterprise in which few forms of political input of any type are welcomed and encouraged. The penultimate example of these political cultures could be found in Latin America in the 1970s and the 1980s, and in parts of the Middle East today, where bureaucratic–authoritarian and other repressive states allow for little political thinking or input of any kind by the people.

In contrast to the politically neutralized type discussed above, a second type of subject political culture is one that is politically incorporated into the system. This is the political culture most commonly found in populist settings, in which there is an intimate fusion between the ideological and rhetorical enunciations of the regime and the popular aspirations of the masses. The people in this case are not excluded from the political process but are instead made an integral part of it. Once again, post-revolutionary systems, which are often compelled to keep the momentum of the revolution going long after the guns have fallen silent, are among the most representative types of systems with subject political cultures that are populist and inclusionary. In these and other similar cases, the regime survives not by exclusion but rather by inclusion; in fact, it thrives in its powers through including the masses within itself. Within this context, there is a close affinity between the political beliefs of the people and the agendas of the state, with the two, in fact, reinforcing and feeding off of each other. What the people want is what the state does, and what the state does is what the people want. This sounds eerily close to what the ideals of democracy are meant to stand for: popular will; mass empowerment; states and societies happily complementing one another, etc. But, despite all appearances, the reality of the situation is far less flowery, and it is precisely this deceptive similarity to democracy on which populist, inclusionary systems and the political cultures they foster bank. The peasant, the lumpenproletariat, or even the middle class which has long been prevented from voicing even the most mundane political expression is likely to view these mass demonstrations as the ultimate form of democratic self-expression. An air of democracy permeates the whole system, and "people power" seems to be the dominant rule of the game.[10]

But this is not democracy – only an aberration of it. The rules of the democratic game will be discussed in Chapter 6. Suffice it to say here that there is much more to democracy than the dynamics that underlie populism. Democracy involves self-restraint, compromise, civil society and institutional channels of regularized input into the system (parties, parliaments and so forth). But populism has none of these elements, or at least does not have them over long periods of time. In populist

settings, the individual is not an autonomous political entity but rather an otherwise insignificant mole in a larger mass of humanity. Alone, the person counts for nothing or very close to it, and even if he or she were to count as something it would not be through the power of the ballot box. Populism robs the person of his or her individuality – much the same way as authoritarianism devoids one of spirit – and submerges one's individual identity under the awesome weight of the crowd. But there is more. Not only is the individual not an autonomous entity anymore, he or she is still subject to greater powers that be. Orchestrating the entire populist choreography is the maestro of the state, shrewdly calling every move and manipulating every danceable emotion. Only approved moves are allowed, each carefully picked and officially sanctioned. This is not democracy but instead manipulation; not freedom but deception; not liberty but puppeteering. The masses are just that: masses. They are not citizens, nor are they, despite what they may be led to believe, participants in an authentically democratic game. They are subjects. They are pawns in a drama aptly devised and manipulated by the populist state, a drama that is far too complex for the authoritarian state and far too sinister for the democratic one.

This manipulation occurs most blatantly through the political culture. There may be talk of mass empowerment and the rights of the people, but there is also talk of, often reverence for, The Cause. The masses pour into the street not necessarily to safeguard democracy – the intricacies of which they seldom understand – but often because The Leader asked them to or because they saw The Cause better served this way. The people's political norms and values may be slightly more complex and evolved in such populist instances than they tend to be in authoritarian cases, but they are still manipulated by and are subject to the dictums of the state. The essence of these values is still non-democratic, no matter how democratic the gloss through which they are popularly represented (and presented) may be.

Here is where the dilemma of determining the exact contours of subject political cultures is most pronounced. How is one to determine popular political perceptions in authoritarian settings, where people are more likely to let prudence speak rather than reveal their real political values? Is one not running the risk of serious hazard if one were to

reveal his or her genuine sentiments toward the dictator in, say, the Southern Cone countries of the 1970s or in much of the Middle East today? That most Iraqis pour into the streets yelling off the top of their lungs how wonderful Saddam is hardly attests to the man's popularity. It is here where empirical and quantitative analyses on political culture come up either completely empty handed or are at best misdirected and misinformed. Seldom do authoritarian regimes sponsor referendums and elections, and when there are elections they are seldom any indicator of what the people are thinking and wanting. Thus the observer must make a distinction between "regime orientations" and "political orientations", between the political culture that is enunciated and expressed for the sake of political convenience and that which is genuine and unadulterated. This is not a distinction that exists in democratic, participatory political cultures, for there is little need to conceal one's true political feelings and wants. But it does, nevertheless, form an incredibly sharp and discernible schism in those political cultures that operate in non-democratic, authoritarian settings.

Political and Regime Orientations

Regime orientations usually have two particular elements. Often times, they have as their cornerstone a cult of personality of the leader, an elaborate and intertwined set of networks which reinforce the gloriousness of the person of the leader and the wonderful accomplishments of his reign. Extreme examples of personality cults are most commonly found in post-revolutionary regimes, where the New Order's founding fathers often assume themselves to be the entire nation's new father as well. Atatürk, Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Kim Il Sung, Castro, Saddam, Qaddafi and Khomeini are some of the more notable examples of leaders with their own cults, as are such lesser deities as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and Gemal Abdul Nasser. But, in so far as political culture is concerned, inculcating a leader's personality cult involves more subtlety than simply propping up larger-than-life statutes and portraits on every city square. The leaders mentioned above did pretend to be larger than life and were in fact thought of as prophets and gods by most of their subject (even though in hindsight the subjects would probably deny they ever thought so). But most

contemporary authoritarian leaders go about inculcating personality cults of their own somewhat more subtly, relying less on their portraits than on their accomplishments, pretending to be less manipulative and more persuasive. Thus the leader's personality cult is projected less blatantly and with more finesse, less dogmatically and more institutionally. Frequently, as in the Middle East, the leader's personality cult relies heavily on ingrained cultural premises that are more palatable to public tastes and prejudices and ripple through the system and resonate through much of the polity.[11]

An even more prevalent element of regime orientation is the official ideology of the state. Every regime has an ideology that is meant to explain its universal Truths and show the Path for its stewards and subjects alike. It is only on rare occasions where there are no "isms" that guide, whether in theory or in actual practice, the conduct of the state. Some regimes, of course, are more preoccupied with advertising their ideological legitimacy than are others, and, as happens so frequently with such ideological states, the particular *ism* that is meant to legitimate the state often becomes an unassailable political platform. Even those regimes that can find little justification for their tenure in office, such as former Latin American and contemporary African military juntas that grab power more out of greed and self-preservation than anything else, often devise ideological umbrellas – usually shades of nationalism – in hopes of lending some credence to their hold on power. Within this context, most authoritarian regimes tend to fall into one of two categories: they are either dogmatically ideological, treating their newly-found *ism* as if it is the best religion the heavens ever offered; or they are virulently non-ideological, making little or no effort at propagating their own doctrine but at the same time ensuring that no others are propagated either. In either case, non-democratic states tend to quickly develop a peculiarly violent allergy to non-official ideologies. This becomes important when considering the nature of most contending political orientations, in which competing ideologies seek to shatter and destroy the religion of the state.

Whereas regime orientations are those political values and precepts advertised by and tied to the state, the extent of the popular acceptance of which are always necessarily suspect, political orientations are made-

up of people's more general attitudes toward the larger field of politics and political institutions. Put differently, regime orientations are often deliberately fabricated. They are fabricated by the state in order to advertise to and inculcate specific notions in society; and they are fabricated by the people in order to make it look as if they are buying into the state's religion. Political orientations, however, are far less deliberate and politically doctored, much more genuine and less adulterated. They are made-up of what the people really think, which, in dictatorships at least, can seldom be accurately measured. Nevertheless, the gap between popular, regime and political orientations in authoritarian settings is often astounding. What the average Iraqi in the streets of Baghdad has to say about President Hussein is likely to be very different from what he or she will say at home or outside of Iraq.

At the same time, the answer to such a question is likely to differ according to the answerer's level of political literacy. Someone without much exposure to and understanding of politics is likely to have political values and perceptions that are markedly different from those of another person with intimate knowledge of or sharp views toward political personalities and practices. Simply put, there are often tremendous differences between the political cultures of the masses *per se* and that of the more educated, intellectual stratums of society. By virtue of being members of the intelligentsia, persons belonging to such a stratum are bound to have political views and perceptions that differ in nature and intensity from those of the rest of the population. Particularly in the Third World, intellectuals are often opinion-makers and cultural brokers. This, at least, along with others, is meant to be the social and cultural roles that Third World intellectuals play. In reality, however, most often operate in isolated ivory towers of their own making, and many are often convinced that they are somehow more sophisticated and thus better than the rest of their society. This self-ascribed elitism only reinforces the distinctiveness of the intelligentsia, both in other spheres of life as well as in their political culture.

In their political culture orientations, Third World literati elites are likely to have one of the two broad dispositions. Frequently, they are

zealous believers in an ideological alternative to the *ism* of the regime, another way of looking at the world that remedies the political ills of the present and provides an overarching, all-embracing blueprint for a future utopia to come. This is an ideology that goes head-on against the official orthodoxy. This, for many intellectuals, is the answer they had long searched for, an *ism* of their own that is as universally valid as any religion, as much a provider of the Truth as anything else they had once falsely believed in. This is their truth, the world according to them, a foolproof logic with no holes and only absolutes. A mere few years ago, it used to be socialism that ruled the intellectual wavelengths of the Third World, some variation of the Marxian ideal that went beyond a damning indictment of the present and offered an opportunity out of oppression and misery. Some of the more sophisticated of Third World intellectuals went beyond simple Marxism–Leninism or its other orthodox mutations (e.g., Maoism) and became fervent believers in dependency theory.[12] "If we could only get rid of the colonialists," they reason. Western political domination, economic neo-colonialism, and cultural imperialism were seen as the root causes of the sorry predicament of the Third World in general and their own country in particular. Some, especially in the 1960s, advocated Third Worldism. Others called for outright revolution, and still others, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, urged their compatriots to "return to the self". Embrace the authenticity of your own culture and society, they implored, and stop mimicking the West blindly. Thus in the 1980s and the 1990s, Islam has become for the Middle East what Negritude was for Africa from the 1950s to the 1970s.

These Third World voices are echoed by expatriate scholars from various Third World countries who have taken up residence in the West. Although generally less doctrinaire and thus more convincing, the immigrant intellectuals' arguments tend to be marked by just as much conviction. Edward Said has compellingly drawn connections between culture and imperialism.[13] Hisham Sharabi[14] and Halim Barakat,[15] colleagues at Georgetown University, respectively blame the West for distorted societal change in the Middle East and offer remedies for curing it. Hamza Alavi has traced colonial machinations in the Indian sub-continent.[16] Ali Mazrui has done the same for Africa.[17]

Exploring the intellectual currents of the Third World reveals an interesting dichotomy. On the one hand is a fervently ideological strand that is as unbending and uncompromising as any ideology dictatorial governments may put forth. This is the double edged sword of the *ism,* which on the one side presents the official world of politicians and leaders and on the other side that of thinkers and intellectuals. It is an ideological sword whose very zeal and fervor makes it undemocratic. These are intellectuals seldom interested in reasoned discourse, the very stifling environment in which they discovered their Truths having made them dismissive of the Truths of others. They are more believers rather than proponents, prophets rather than sympathizers. On the other hand, there are intellectuals tired of their own self-righteousness, aware that their Truth may not be the only one around. These are the intellectuals found nowadays most commonly in Latin America and Eastern Europe, many of whom once belonged to the earlier category. These are intellectuals who may still be as ideological as ever before. But they have, for a variety of reasons, come to make room for the ideology of others. Many, especially in Latin America, have had their *ism* days and have now moved passed it, either disillusioned that their utopia never panned out or having simply grown tired of their own rhetoric and dogma.[18] Others, as in East Europe, went head-to-head with the ideology of the regime and eventually triumphed.[19]

Two primary sets of reasons account for this spirit of compromise: those having grown out of strategic, political necessity; and those emerging from and resting on the cushion of civil society. When a political culture is buttressed on civil society, it ceases to be subject and becomes participant. In these political cultures, the predominant political norms and values that society has are democratic. This thesis will be explored more fully below and in Chapter 6. There are, however, political cultures that are also marked by a high degree of elite democratic consensus but are not supported by civil society. These are democratic political cultures that intellectuals and other elites (religious, ethnic, political, etc.) have come to adopt out of political necessity or strategic convenience but which, contrary to the wishes of the elite, do not have great resonance through society. This type of

political culture is most commonly found in multi-ethnic countries (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Lebanon) as well as those in which the democracy of the elite seldom extends to the rest of society (the Caribbean and Central America). In these instances, the democratic arrangements and principles that political and intellectual elites have come to adopt have little resonance and meaning for the rest of the population, and the social basis of the ensuing democratic system rests largely on the continued cooperation of the elite rather than on a socially-based democratic imperative. There might, in essence, be a democratic political culture at the elite level which keeps a lid on the non-democratic beliefs of the rest of the population, but the political cultures of the masses as a whole tend to be fragmented, discontinuous and often non-democratic. The people are still treated, and view themselves, as subjects, if not to the machinations of the regime anymore, to the alliances and agendas of the elite. The political culture has at best a democratic flavor but lacks democratic substance. This is the most noticeable feature of quasi-democratic political systems, which have all the trappings of democracy but not its social and cultural requisites. Regardless of the institutional strength of the political system itself, the popular legitimacy of the system tends to be extremely fragile and elite-dependent. In Lebanon in the 1970s, the breakdown of consensus among the elite tore the very political fabrics of the Lebanese nation apart. In India, the legitimacy of the country's political culture rests heavily with the Hindu's continued political domination of the system, and in literally every Central American country there are large sectors of the population that have little connection, emotional or otherwise, with the ostensibly democratic state.[20]

There are, of course, numerous examples of genuinely democratic "consociational" systems, in which elites have struck not only multi-ethnic political associations but have done so with the successful support of democratic political cultures.[21] Belgium and Switzerland are prime examples of such countries. However, in these European examples, mass-based democratic political cultures were fostered not so much as a direct result of elite alliances – although that certainly was a tremendous help – but more as a by-product of a convergence of various other social, economic, historical and political dynamics.

For democracy to have resonance and meaning, it must have roots within society, a genuine conviction that, for all its flaws and imperfections, it is a system better than the rest. This is not a conviction that the masses develop, or one that the elite can talk them into, overnight. Political crafting helps, as does elite consensus, but neither is by itself enough. Developing a democratic political culture takes time; it is a matter of cultural change, and not every change does a democratic culture make.

Participant Political Cultures

Almond and Verba define participant political cultures as those in which the public takes an activist political role. It is one in which the "individual members of the . . . polity may be favorably or unfavorably oriented to the various classes of political objects. They tend to be oriented toward an 'activist' role of the self in the polity, though their feelings and evaluations of such a role may vary from acceptance to rejection."[22] According to this definition, political cultures as diverse as those found in democracies and in revolutionary polities are both part of the same, participant category. Revolutionary political cultures, however, are often highly antithetical to the spirit and practices of democracy.[23] In fact, revolutions are often a product of and in turn foster a subject political culture. Cracks appear in the power instruments of a leader with little or no popular legitimacy. The people, whose political aspirations have long been suppressed and lain dormant, find themselves faced with a unique opportunity to become politically expressive. But the enthusiasm of the moment leaves little room for reasoned discourse, the pent-up pressures of political repression exploding into uncompromising, bombastic rhetoric. Politics in general and political culture in specific continue to remain the zero sum games that they were before, but now under new and radical, revolutionary auspices. Whatever type of a political culture this might be, democratic it certainly is not.

My conception of participant political culture is markedly different from that of Almond and Verba. I see participant political cultures as those found exclusively in democratic systems – systems in which

citizens could, if they so desired, participate in the political process, or form opinions about political objects, on their own volition and with the least possible amount of manipulation or coercion from the state or other outside influences. At the core of participant political cultures is a strong sense of societal autonomy to think about or to participate in the political system. The crucial axiom here is a built-in, cultural norm that considers politics an inherently free, untainted venture; I can, if I want to, think about politics or take part in it without others telling me what to think or what to do. The individual, of course, lives and operates in a larger social and cultural milieu that shapes and influences his or her norms and perceptions, political ones included. Thus this sense that thinking about politics and political activity are open and free goes beyond the individual and has a larger, societal scope. In this respect, the relationship between political culture of the individual and the larger society becomes symbiotic; the individual considers politics free and open to participation because that is what he was socialized into thinking, and society considers politics free because it sees individuals participate and/or think about it freely.

This is not to imply that in participant political cultures people are inherently political. To the contrary, the very possibility of open participation often prompts individuals to take politics for granted, thus tending to reduce their levels of political input and participation. Voter apathy is a common phenomenon in the liberal democracies of the West, especially when it comes to local and regional politics. Even in Belgium, where compulsory voting is mandated by the law, voter turn-outs have been consistently below 100 per cent. There are times in all democracies when the electorate may become particularly excited about a specific issue or a candidate. By and large, however, the luster of politics often fades over time because of the very freedoms that are attached to it.

Voter apathy is not a problem in a political culture that has only recently become participant, where freedom had to be fought for and the memories of subjugation, actual or metaphoric, are still vivid and alive. The change-over, a product of simultaneous changes in the institutional make-up of the body politic, is a time of considerable excitement, of discovering democracy and becoming democratic. The moment is considered historic by those living in it, and they are not

about to take for granted their newly won liberties in thought and in action. Chapter 6 labels these polities as "self-conscious democracies", maintaining that their citizens initially feel a heavy burden of responsibility in maintaining the democratic integrity of the system. Voting becomes more than just a civic responsibility. It becomes a calculated move aimed at constructing a new, democratic polity and a supporting political culture. Thinking about politics becomes more commonplace than would ordinarily be the case, although concern with the more mundane realities of life – food, shelter, employment, etc. – still predominate.

Participant political cultures are likely to have four specific characteristics. First and foremost, they have at their core a civil society.[24] The initial birth of civil society may be due to negative sentiments toward an unresponsive, authoritarian state. But once it is born there need not be a negative, reactive imperative for civil society to maintain itself. *If it succeeds politically,* civil society develops such institutional components as representative bodies and political parties that both regulate and guarantee its maintenance over time. In other words, civil society becomes institutionalized. Civil society organizations turn into or become closely affiliated with political parties, and parties compete for seats in the parliament or prized offices in the executive. Before long, the organizations that once operated clandestinely and with few set procedures become highly procedural, perhaps even hierarchical and bureaucratized. Surely, with routinization some of the blunt edge is taken off, and the vibrancy of associational life and the boldness of civil society organizations begin to taper off. But then democracy has become institutionalized, and free participation in or thinking about politics has been guaranteed.

The second feature of participant political cultures is a high degree of loyalty to the political system on the part of the citizenry. This loyalty is first sustained by civil society and then by the various nexuses, both institutional and subjective, that develop between the state and society. Even if the political elite come mainly from wealthier backgrounds, the average citizen can still identify with the political system, with its personalities and symbols, its policies and its overall premises. Citizens consider the system as legitimate, not because

politicians keep harping on their own legitimacy – which they do anyway – but because there is a sense that the opportunity for political participation is there and that people can choose their political preferences freely. This is reinforced by a general consensus over the "rules of the game", there not being the sharp disagreements over basic political principles that form the core of the state's legitimacy. There is widespread consensus over the definition, essence and contours of politics and over how to go about participating in the political game.

Social resonance is a third feature of participant political cultures, closely linked to and reinforced by widespread citizen loyalty to the system. Social resonance develops when democracy has moved beyond elite bargaining and has become deepened or consolidated. To one degree or another, all democracies are essentially elitist. *Demos,* the people, are not as actively involved in the operations of the system as the original theorists of the system would have us believe.[25] Nevertheless, in some systems there is greater popular identification with the democratic system than in others. Participant political cultures are not found in those democracies that are variously described as "hollow", "elitist", or for the privileged. In these cases the *potential* for participation is there, but the actual participation itself is either nonexistent or, if and when it does take place, it is under the auspices and in support of pre-existing, neo-feudal relations in society. In participant political cultures, the essence and spirit of democracy resonate through society, or at least through a majority of its urban components.

Lastly, participant political cultures have a strong middle-class component. The relationship between democracy and the middle class has been treated extensively elsewhere and there is no point in reconstructing the argument here.[26] I will only reiterate the following basic points here: Democracy requires a sufficient level of affluence. At the least, the individual needs to have adequate food, shelter and employment security not to constantly worry about what it takes to live. Once basic economic security needs are met, the individual can then devote attention to securing political liberties. The thesis that misery breeds revolt, for decades the slogan of Marxists everywhere, has long been discredited. It is actually those with a full stomach who

tend to rebel, often wanting more in material or political terms.[27] Those too far up the economic ladder are also unlikely to seek after democracy in large numbers, for their privileged economic position is often closely tied to their clientalistic ties with the political elite. More than anything else, the political stability of the conservative monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula depends on their ability to placate their societies through economic largess. All of this is not to imply, of course, that the middle classes by nature seek after democracy and that the lower or upper classes never do. What is important is that the middle classes are in a better position to sustain democracy, and that one of the luxuries that their relative economic affluence affords them is to participate and to think about politics if they so desire.

Conclusion

This chapter highlights the role of political culture in the Third World. Borrowing labels first introduced by Almond and Verba, I maintain that three different types of political culture are possible – parochial, subject and participant – each of which are found in and in turn support a particular type of political formation. In simplest of terms, subject and participant political cultures, the types most common in today's state system, are found in non-democratic and democratic polities respectively. Subject political cultures may gradually develop participant features and eventually become catalysts for societal democratization, but participant political cultures are less likely to revert back to the subject variety. What is likely to happen in participant political cultures is a general sense of political apathy, especially with the passage of time, when democratic liberties begin to be taken for granted. Nevertheless, by then the norms of democracy are too deeply entrenched for the danger of democratic reversal to be a real possibility. Only when democracy has not been socially and culturally deepened and consolidated, and when its political institutions are at best flimsy and fragile, is there a real possibility for reversal.

As it must be obvious by now, political culture is itself a product of larger interactions between the state on the one hand and culture on the other. Not every state–culture interaction results in political culture.

Especially in the Third World, this relationship is nuanced, multi-faceted, and often determinative of the characters of both the state and culture. It is to the exploration of this relationship that the next chapter turns.

Notes

1 Almond and Verba 1963: 17–19.

2 See, for example, Hobsbawm 1992. Greenfeld's assertions, though different in emphasis, are largely representative of the arguments of this group of scholars. "At a certain point in history," she claims,

> to be precise, in early sixteenth century England – the word "nation" in its conciliar meaning of "an elite" was applied to the population of the country and made anonymous with the word "people." *This semantic transformation signaled the emergence of the first nation in the world, in the sense in which the word is understood today, and launched the era of nationalism.* (Emphasis original)

See also Greenfeld 1992: 6.

3 Chirot 1994: 16.

4 Almond and Verba 1963: 17.

5 Ibid.: 18.

6 Rodinson 1980: 215–47.

7 Almond and Verba 1963: 18.

8 Ibid.: 19.

9 Havel "The Power of the Powerless", in Havel et al. 1985: 30–1.

10 See Chapter 5.

11 Harik 1987: 23–4.

12 Martz and Myers 1992: 266–71.

13 Said 1978; 1993.

14 Sharabi 1988.

15 Barakat 1993.

16 See, for example, Alavi 1988: 64–111.

17 Mazrui 1993.

18 Puryear 1994: 49–53.

19 A useful, documentary account of intellectual activity in the former Czechoslovakia may be found in Human Rights Watch, 1989.
20 Wiarda 1995: 96–7.
21 Lijphart 1990: 76–7.
22 Almond and Verba 1963: 19.
23 Kamrava 1992: 112–13.
24 Chapter 6 discusses civil society in considerable detail and I will therefore keep the discussion of the concept and the phenomenon it represents to a minimum.
25 Sartori 1987: 21–5.
26 See Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992.
27 Gurr 1970: 13.

CHAPTER FIVE

The State and the State of Culture

States have long tried to shape and influence the norms and values of societies over which they rule. And, for just about as long, political scientists and sociologists have been trying to make sense of the ensuing cultural consequences and state–society relationships. Invariably, the state's meddling into cultural matters is motivated by political considerations, by attempts to transform the prevailing culture and with it the country's place in history and in the global community, or simply by a desire to strengthen existing norms and symbols for the sake of culture itself. In their efforts, states resort to a variety of subtle and blatant manipulations of culture, often, in fact, creating a specific cabinet portfolio as the Ministry of Culture in order to formulate and/or implement cultural policies. This is particularly true in Third World countries, where the basis of state legitimacy is often tenuous and tied directly to the state's ability to manipulate and perpetuate those cultural values that support its policies and agendas.[1] Due to social change and other diffusionary influences, however, the cultural values that are left on their own change rather rapidly, thus adding urgency to the state's need to manipulate them and influence their spread and currency in society as much as possible.

This chapter will explore the nature of state–culture interactions from the perspectives of both culture and the state. More specifically, it looks at why certain states tend to be culturally more interventionist

than others. In answering this question, I break down the different types of states into the main institutions that comprise them to see how some of the institutions must, out of necessity, interact with or manipulate cultural norms and symbols in order to function properly. A second question is the inverse of the first one: how do cultural norms and expressions influence politics in general and state policies in particular? Within the last decade or two, certain new cultural phenomena have developed in the Third World that directly touch on the individual's sense of being and personal identity. While almost always in existence, most of these cultural concerns and questions have only recently come to the fore in many Third World countries, most having been previously eclipsed by more fundamental concerns such as national identity, sovereignty and statehood, economic survival and the like. A new "politics of being" is emerging in many parts of the Third World, itself a consequence of the larger phenomena of modernity. It is with a study of this new political form that the chapter ends.

State Types and Cultural Intervention

States can be divided into six general categories based on the nature of the institutions that comprise them and on the types of relationships they develop with the various social forces. Needless to say, these are ideal types, distinguishable easily on paper but not so easily in the real world of politics, where shades of gray too often cloud the social scientist's proclivity to see things in black and white. Of the six categories, three are broadly democratic, in which the parameters of state power are curtailed by actual or nominal constraints imposed by autonomous social classes, or by the constitution, or by both. They include viable democracies, quasi-democracies, and delegative democracies, the genesis of each of which is explored in the next chapter. A fourth type of state pretends to be democratic but fails to live up to the title even in pretenses, as the very core of the regime and the principles on which it is based make it an inclusionary, populist system.[2] At the opposite end of the scale are authoritarian, exclusionary states, often dominated and run by the military, which neither welcome

nor even orchestrate political participation and, instead, simply prefer their subjects to become apolitical *en masse*. Finally, there are a host of unclassifiable, hybrid states, fitting into none of the neat categories mentioned above and yet partly belonging to all of them. These states are often democratic in some respects, thoroughly authoritarian in others, and in-between the two poles in others. By and large, the evolving mode of state–society interactions is generally non-democratic, but some of the state's authoritarian powers are constrained by the constitution or by convention. Iran, Singapore, Russia and Malaysia are among the most notable states in this category.

As the next chapter explores the nature of each of the democratic categories more fully, I will keep my comments here cursory. Viable democracies are states in whose running society plays a meaningful, consistent role. An overwhelming majority of social actors consider the state to be legitimate since they regularly influence the outcome of state actions and policies through the election of policy-makers, executives and other state functionaries. This democracy is *real,* rooted in a democratic political culture, upheld by a liberal democratic constitution, and built on an entrenched tradition of societal autonomy.[3] This type of democracy has emerged in parts of the Third World and the former Second World as a result of the last wave of democratization. Examples include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Chile and South Africa, where vibrant democracies have emerged out of the tumultuous transformations of the 1980s and seem to have become, for the foreseeable future at least, irreversibly consolidated. Quasi-democratic states are more elitist and less directly susceptible to pressures from the popular classes, operating instead through the conduit of a parliament that serves first the interests of a dominant political elite and only then those of the constituents they claim to represent.[4] On paper and in outward appearance, quasi-democracies have all the features of a genuinely democratic state: a liberal democratic constitution, regular elections, vibrant party politics, etc. But in reality, society's autonomy does not extend to most of the classes below the wealthy and affluent. Viable democracies have a strong middle class component, a middle class which is itself a sizeable

segment of the large society. In contrast, quasi-democracies have a strong elite component, found in societies where social divisions and bifurcations tend to run deep and where the middle classes have not yet gained a predominant position in urban society. Relying on their social prestige and economic affluence, and frequently resorting to the clientalistic networks they head, the wealthy get elected and re-elected to political office, soon part of a cyclical game of dancing chairs in which they routinely swap offices with elites of a different camp. In the meanwhile, democracy gets sacrificed. Examples of quasi-democracies include India, Turkey, Lebanon, Kenya, Tanzania, Venezuela and most democracies in Central America (especially El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama).

If viable democracies are for the many and quasi-democracies are for the few, delegative democracies are for even fewer. In fact, they are often embodied in one man. Delegative democracies are those in which the protection and integrity of democracy are delegated to one man (no women have been in the position yet), where the importance of every other institution of democracy – the parliament, political parties, electoral procedures, etc. – pales in comparison to that of the presidency. This label was first introduced by Guillermo O'Donnell, who argued that "delegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of power relations and a constitutionally limited term of office."[5] These types of states are most likely to develop in post-democratization cases where neither the norms nor the institutions of democracy have been firmly consolidated, where social and economic difficulties push the country to the brink of crisis, and where there has long been a strong tradition of statism and personalism. Peru under Fujimori and Argentina under Menem present the most glaring examples of delegative democracies, as do to a lesser extent the Philippines, Ecuador, South Korea and, increasingly, Brazil.[6]

Populist, inclusionary states are non-democracies with the greatest democratic pretensions. These states are dictatorships whose very legitimacy is based on a continuous inflow of highly orchestrated, controlled shows of mass support for the institutions of power. Politics

in these states often occurs at the street level, is summed up in catchy slogans and phrases, carried through clenched fists and massive outpourings of public devotion, and embodied through a beloved leader whose daily affirmations of public freedom and liberty are masks for repression and the exclusion of dissenters. Life becomes deeply politicized, and few political domains remain outside of state influence.[7] This is how almost all post-revolutionary states behave – the Castros, the Qaddafis, and the Khomeinis, who promise freedom but have little patience for non-conformists, invite political participation but only through the state party, damn the foreign enemy but see a domestic spy in every corner. Cries for social justice, economic equity and national unity become the main banners of the state.[8] The state's leadership, which is often invariably charismatic, is thus most sensitive to cultural nuances, and thus most manipulative of them.[9] For them, culture and the arts become deeply political, as there are few areas of human expression with which they are not preoccupied.

Authoritarian, exclusionary states are similarly dictatorial, but they want nothing to do with mass participation of any kind. These states may take the form of sultanistic regimes, in which a monarch distances himself from the pulse of society and invites nothing but the most superficial forms of political participation – often in the form of public adulation. Alternatively, they appear as military dictatorships, and justify the institution of severe political repression on grounds of imminent dangers to national security and public safety. Sultanistic states do manipulate cultural values and symbols in their efforts to bolster their claims of historic and cultural legitimacy. But they do so often only indirectly, through patronizing and encouraging revisionist history that sees the king as the bearer of a long, historical tradition, by making the kingship seem as if it is an integral part of the national heritage, by cultivating an image of continuity and congruence.[10] "Linked to the past; looking to the future" is a favorite motto in such places as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. That the ensuing political system is firmly rooted in the past and bears little resemblance to anything modern is a contradiction so far not acute enough not to be smoothed by petrodollars. Not having petrodollars of their own, Kings Hussein of

Jordan and Hassan of Morocco are trying to make their states look politically more modern, though their modest efforts at political liberalization are for now far from meaningful.[11] The Shah of Iran, the two kings remember, did not liberalize at all and paid with his throne.

Military dictatorships are also exclusionary, often having paramilitary and police forces of deadly effectiveness, though they differ from sultanistic states in their attitudes – or, more accurately, lack thereof – toward culture. For sultanistic states culture is an important, implicit part of the political equation; the king symbolizes the cultural tradition of the nation. However, military dictatorships are often completely oblivious toward cultural values and symbols.[12] Army soldiers know the language of weapons, the politics of the barrack, the realities of the fight. To them, the stuff of politics is hard, real, concrete. "What is culture, after all," they reason, "but the fanciful wishes of misguided intellectuals who got us into the mess that now requires the military's emergency intervention?" Apart from a few ambitious colonels in Africa, therefore, whose records are at best spotty and by no means worthy of bragging (Mengistu of Ethiopia and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana), most President Generals stay away from meddling in cultural affairs and prefer to concentrate instead on ridding the country of its enemies and facilitating economic growth. The many coup leaders of Latin America of the 1960s and the 1970s come to mind, for whom the only cultural values worth considering or manipulating were those of nationalism and Christianity, both of which were the mainstays of the status quo.[13] For the most part, however, they took a hands-off approach to culture.

Finally, there is a group of states in the Third World that do not fit into any of the convenient categories above. Islamic Iran, for example, is both highly authoritarian and yet in some respects surprisingly democratic. Syria under Assad is both inclusionary and authoritarian–exclusionary. Thailand is somewhat sultanistic, also embodying taints of parliamentarianism and a powerful military.[14] Malaysia is the same. Most subSaharan African states also defy classification, often exhibiting a variety of contradictory features such as parliamentary politics, personalism, guerrilla warfare and militarism. Nigeria represents one of the more tragic of such cases, as do the even less fortunate

Table 5.1 State typologies and institutions

	Presidency	*Parliament*	*Bureaucracy*	*Dominant Party*	*Dominant Leader*	*Armed Forces*	*Political Convention*
Viable Democracy	Powers checked by other institutions	Powerful; active	Non-political	At least two, often more	Historic memory	Non-political	Pact and heritage
Quasi-Democratic	Symbolic; often found in parliamentary systems	Powerful; elitist	Clientalistic; often ridden with corruption	Often two; both centrist	Dominant elites, sometimes oligarchs	Non-political, often recently depoliticized	Implicit understanding
Delegative Democracy	All powerful	Marginalized; overshadowed by presidency	Loyal to president and often doctrinaire	Marginalized, tool of president	Living symbol of democracy and embodies system	Non-politicized; supportive of president	The savior-hero
Populist inclusionry	Charismatic;	Forum for elite inclusion and patronage	Doctrinaire; Loyal	Forum for political inclusion of masses	Charismatic Founding father	Doctrinaire; Loyal to leader	Forged through revolution; "people power"
Authoritarian exclusionary	All powerful	Suspended or marginalized	Loyal; Non-ideological	Often non-existent; if existing, often a front for the military	"Modern"; Military man	Acting as the executive; coup a possibility	Military savior of national security
Hybrid (dictatorial) systems	Limited to political minority	Limited to political minority	Massive; inert, inefficient, and often corrupt	Limited to President and a supportive minority	Central to system (for life)	Society depoliticized; force to reckon with	History distorted to support state claims of legitimacy

countries of Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly known as Zaire) and Rwanda. While the examples drawn from Africa represent broken countries ravaged by civil war or military intervention, most of the so-called hybrid states of the Third World are largely dictatorial, where a single leader dominates the political landscape and portrays himself as the symbolic embodiment of the national good, the savior of the people, everybody's benefactor. In the African heat, Mabuto's leopard-skin cap was not for protection from the elements. Nor was it a fashion statement (or at least one hopes it was not). It was meant to perpetuate a myth, one of bravery and survivability, that reminded everyone of the leader's fearlessness and ability to ride out adversity. Alas, as history records, the cap's magic was not to be.

Once we break down the structural make-up of each of these ideal state types, we can better examine the specific institutions through which they interact with culture. The nature and functions of some of the main institutions of each state type outlined above is presented in Table 5.1. In each of the state types in the Third World one can often find an executive presidency; a parliament; a bureaucracy; one or more dominant political parties; a dominant leader who is either alive and in power or whose memory is central to the state's legitimacy; the armed forces; and some type of political convention or understanding on which the larger system is based. Different states use different institutions in different ways and degrees to impact on or interact with cultural norms and symbols. Table 5.1 contains data that go beyond the scope of the discussion here. In the following section, I will only highlight those areas that are germane to the points being discussed here.

Viable, Quasi and Delegative Democracies

In viable democracies, the relationship between the state and cultural norms and principles shifts direction from one side to another. Initially, upon the establishment of the new system, democracy is a new phenomenon and the norms, practices, symbols and values attached to it are not quite prevalent among urban social actors. Thus political leaders, by example or by deliberate actions and pronouncements, often

set out to carve out new cultural norms, or at least to shape existing ones, in ways that support the new polity. Gradually, however, when democratic norms become entrenched and the democratic system is consolidated, cultural norms develop a life and momentum of their own, increasingly making sure that political leaders do not step beyond the bounds that society and cultural values have come to set for them.[15] The flow of influence shifts: initially from state to culture, and then steadily from culture to the state. This is a result of the growing autonomy of society and the concomitant rolling back of state functions in relation to the economy, intrusion into private lives and other areas of socio-cultural activity. The state, in fact, does not have any institutions whose implicit or explicit function it is to influence cultural norms. Instead, through its diplomacy abroad and its economic policies at home, the state merely plays up the desirability of democracy, the prestige of joining the rest of the politically "advanced" and "developed" states of the West. If any cultural values are promoted, they are done so subtly and are apt to be those enshrined in the agreement that made the transition to democracy possible: continued popular respect for certain institutions of the old regime (e.g., the armed forces); the inviolability of election results; the sanctity of the constitution, etc. By and large, however, the state takes a hands-off approach toward cultural values, giving priority instead to the forces of market economics which, it hopes, in turn will foster values that are supportive of liberal democracy.

The situation in quasi-democracies is only slightly different. In these states, democracy often appears as a result of the military turning power over to civilian elites and intellectuals before there was a popular groundswell of demands for, much less understanding of, a democratic system. Put differently, quasi-democracies are likely to come about when political democratization is neither accompanied nor followed by socio-cultural democratization. The new, ostensibly democratic elites in turn resort to their existing clientalistic ties to maintain their hold on their newly acquired, democratically-flavored powers, represented in the form of parliamentary seats, position within the party or even the cabinet, or other similar posts. Thus such instruments of state power as the parliament, the bureaucracy, and political parties become further vehicles for the maintenance of positions of privilege. Democracy becomes frozen; patronage perpetuates clientalistic values;

and the state has neither the resources nor the wherewithal to alter the ensuing arrangements. Again, there are no specific institutions or spoken or unspoken campaigns by the state to influence the various aspect of culture; things are fine the way they are. Liberal democracy is to be praised, especially in broad abstract. Social cleavages and clientalist ties are to remain intact, glossed over by the magical panacea of democracy and market economics.

Delegative democracies have comparatively more at stake in cultural norms and values. The all-powerful presidency embodies and symbolizes the system. The parliament, the political party, and even the constitution are all of secondary importance compared to him. More importantly, the president is the man of the people, not their revolutionary hero but the Caesar they elected. It is because of him that the country's democracy operates, and when he is gone the system depends as much on his successor. By nature, therefore, the presidency cannot help but to be a direct product of cultural norms. The institution reflects dominant cultural values and, in turn, reinforces them. When the president delivers, he only adds credence to personalism. When he does not, he is voted out of office and another elected hero is sought. Thus in delegative democracies the presidency itself becomes the central means of nexus between the state and culture, the main political articulator and propagator of popular norms and values within society. Few can deny that Latin American *caudilloismo* lives on today in the person of Alberto Fujimori, the Peruvian president, who with rolled up sleeves pretended to have personally orchestrated the release of diplomat hostages at the Japanese ambassador's compound in Lima in 1997.[16] Fujimori is as much a conscious articulator of Peruvian cultural values as he is a product of them.

The Non-Democracies

Generally, states' interactions with and manipulations of cultural values increase as their level of democracy decreases. This is particularly true of populist, sultanistic (exclusionary), and hybrid non-democratic states, each of which set out deliberately to manipulate, revise, reinterpret and incorporate certain cultural norms and values in ways that would further their political goals. Populist regimes are especially

flagrant in their machinations of culture, as they cultivate and demand loyalty to the person of the leader and his cause. Charisma being by nature impermanent and unreliable as a source of sustained power over the long run, the charismatic leader must somehow devise ways of making himself and his cause indispensable to the project of nationhood. Some inclusionary states go about doing this by always searching for enemies, foreign or domestic, real or imagined. The citizens of Kuwait and the author Salman Rushdie had this unfortunate fate in common, and this fate alone, when both found themselves at the receiving ends of the wrath of inclusionary states in search of new enemies with little chance of resistance. Miles away and worlds apart, Fidel Castro does pretty much the same thing with the United States, though for him a real war would be unadvisable and mere bombastic rhetoric does the job anyway.

In their efforts to endlessly rally the masses from one emotionally-laden project to another, inclusionary states usually resort to two means, one institutional the other cultural.[17] Institutionally, they create forums for the inclusion of the populace into the political process, mediums for giving a semblance of formal recognition and validity to participants in the street politics of the informal arena. These institutions include the parliament (often called People's Assembly), the official party, local and neighborhood committees, and other similar forums through which the leader's charisma and the sanctity of his cause are filtered down to the mass of devout (and compulsory) followers.[18] Culturally, the state capitalizes on and magnifies those social values that are most resonant among the people and also serve its own interests most expeditiously. Of these, patriotic values and symbols always rank high, as do those associated with religion, local beliefs and customs. Ultimately, the state seeks to complement its institutional links with society by cultivating deep emotional ties with the popular classes, and, in so doing, cultivates and nurtures cultural values that hit a responsive chord among the people.[19] It is more than accidental that populist charismatic leaders throughout the Third World, both contemporary and past, cultivate followers from previously disenfranchised classes most eager to partake in the political process: Juan Peron had his *descomisado* followers, Kwame Nkrumah had Youth

Pioneers, Mao the Red Guards, and Khomeini the *mustazafan.*

In sultanistic regimes, the manipulation of cultural values and symbols is nearly as overt and blatant as in populist cases. For a monarchy, above all else, legitimacy is the key – and only then reliance on various means of coercion – and having legitimacy means being accepted as part of the norm, both political and cultural. Thus the monarch has to present himself as the natural extension of national tradition. The state, therefore, constantly plays up its congruity with cultural values that are supposed to have historical resonance. Of course, being loved because of benevolence or feared because of intolerance do not hurt. But popular acceptance goes further than either money or sword or the two of them combined. Throughout the Arabian Peninsula, for example, a good deal of every sheikhdom's domestic efforts are spent playing up the connections between the monarchy on the one hand and tribalism and Islam on the other, the former being a natural extension of the latter two, and presenting the king himself as the head of a nationwide tribal chieftaincy.[20] In every sultanistic state the monarchy seeks to manipulate those cultural values that are most resonant among its own population. In Iran, the late Shah viewed the country's pre-Islamic heritage as popular – erroneously, as it turned out – and emphasized his own connections with the Persia of old, of Cyrus and Xerxes, of Zarathushtra and imperial glory. In Morocco, the king has long held the title of *Amir al-Mu'menin,* Commander of the Faithful. In Saudi Arabia in the mid-1980s, with the zealously religious Iran breathing down his neck, King Fahd added the title "Custodian of Islam's Holiest Mosques" to his name.[21] Even Colonel Bokassa, later Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Empire, tried to present himself as his people's "good father".[22] Of course, in all of these cases, those who dare question the state's interpretation of culture are repressively cast aside. In today's Third World, sultans are ultimately autocrats, culturally enlightened (and manipulative) as most are.

As mentioned earlier, most military-based, exclusionary states have little patience with or concern for culture. There were, nevertheless, a few Marxist colonels who came to power in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s and tried, half-heartedly and without much success, to make indigenous cultural values consistent with scientific materialism.

Exactly what that meant no one quite knew, including the chief scientific materialist himself, but they tried nevertheless. Some of the more notable crop of African Marxist leaders included Siyad Barre of Somalia, Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, and Marian Ngoubi of Congo. Although for these African leaders the cultural symbols that needed the greatest manipulation were those linked to their own tribe and/ or ethnic group, for other military presidents it is the values and symbols of patriotism and national aggrandizement that need careful attendance.[23] Argentina's invasion of the Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands) might have been a military blunder by General Galtieri, the coup leader at the time of the invasion in April 1982, but it was an astute move in manipulating domestic cultural norms. For a few brief weeks, the Argentines forgave their military for all that it had done, including ruining the economy and banishing some 10,000 of their young.

Other authoritarian states, hybrids of one form or another, are, on the whole, less interested in cultural manipulation and engineering than in securing their base of power and enriching their pockets. Within a few years of having secured power, the states headed in Guinea by Ahmed Sékou Touré and in the Philippines by Ferdinand Marcos, both of whom started their political careers as populists, had turned into plunderous kleptocracies interested in little other than theft of the public purse. A similar fate befell the former Zaire under Mabuto, Mali under Mousa Taoré, and, increasingly, Indonesia under Suharto. Despite their vastly different institutional arrangements and historical predicaments, the one agenda all of these states have in common is their attempt to depoliticize society at all costs. Culture is fine so long as it has nothing to do with politics. Or, if it does, it needs to concur with the cultural interpretations of the state. The fine arts, architecture, abstract philosophy, romanticized studies of the distant past – these aspects of culture are all permissible to dwell in so long as they do not infringe on the state's legitimacy. The little cultural interpretation in which the state itself engages could more aptly be described as historical revisionism, for the state's goal is to emphasize the glorious place of the present leader in connection to the country's larger history. This is not too different from what occurs in sultanistic states and

their attempts to emphasize the sultan's legitimacy, except that in other authoritarian cases the state is less zealous in its interests in culture. As much of a thief as he might be, a king needs to at least pretend to have duties other than plundering. Out of necessity he has to at least demonstrate a semblance of cultural congruity with what his subjects feel and want, but he must not seem to be a dictator, especially one who came to power through force and who needs force to stay in power.

If we apply the above framework to various regions of the Third World, we find the highest concentration of states that manipulate cultural values in the Middle East, followed by those in sub-Saharan Africa, and finally in Latin America and East Asia (Table 5.2). The Middle East contains almost all of the Third World's remaining sultanistic states – those in the Arabian Peninsula, in Jordan, and in Morocco – with the other notable kingdoms being scattered around in Lesotho and Swaziland in southern Africa, Brunei, Bhutan and Thailand in Asia, and Tonga and Tuvalu in the South Pacific.[24] Additionally, the Middle East has seen – and continues to see – the rise of a number of inclusionary, populist states, some of which have had more resilience than others. Of this group the most vitriolic have been Nasserist Egypt, the Algeria of Ben Bella and Boumediene, Qaddafi's Libya, Assad's Syria, Khomeini's Iran and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. That these polities are so readily identifiable with individual personalities demonstrates the degree to which they must, by their very nature, contend with and manipulate cultural values and symbols.

Next come the sub-Saharan states of Africa, where the winds of democratic change in the early 1990s have failed so far to usher in a meaningful and lasting wave of democratization across the continent.[25] Old habits die hard, and those of military men die even harder. From Nigeria and Niger to Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, Benin, Gabon, the Central African Republic, Zambia, Namibia and Madagascar, not to mention the bloodbath that has become of Algeria, hopes for democratic openings at the turn of the decade have turned into resignation – if not despair – brought on by the re-emergence of old political patterns and practices. These and other African states try to impose their own cultural values on society – those praising the grandeur of the state, the awesome wisdom of the ruler, the inviolability

Table 5.2 State functions in selected Third World regions

	Sub-Saharan Africa	Latin America	East Asia	Middle East
Moblilization in support of state projects intense; episodic	Ideological, often under rubric of personality cult of leader, thus	Overt mobilization minimal, except during elections	Overt mobilization minimal	Ideological; revolving around leader's personality cult; intense
Coercion to enforce political compliance	Arbitrary, unevenly applied	With democratization lessand less uneven, though still arbitrary for the lower classes	Consistent and evenly-applied	Uneven and arbitrarily applied
Taxation for state revenues	Often indirect and hidden; uneven and arbitrary	Direct and overt, and often seems high, but evasion among the rich is widespread	Direct and overt; differences from one country to another	Most state revenues are through indirect fees and hidden taxes
Regulation of commerce and industry	State often incapable of effectively enforcing outside of major cities	The state increasingly rolling back and becoming more regulative rather than controlling	State deeply involved in and cooperates with privately-owned industrial concerns	States often seek to regulate most commercial activities, but are seldom fully successful
Punishment of political opponents	Harsh; elites enjoying clientalist ties often exempt; there's usually broad definition of "treason"	Increasingly formalized and subject to formal procedures, though "street justice" and abuse against the poor is prevalent	Harsh; increasingly formalized and codified	Harsh, maltreatment of opponents widespread
Protection from hostile fores within and without	Often not fully successful, specially outside of major urban areas; borders often porous	Effective and successful, owing to lack of international adversaries and end of guerrilla-inspired civil wars	Very effective and successful, owing to paucity of regional enemies and organized domestic opponents	Moderately effective though regional adversaries and domestic opponents are widespread
Provision of goods and services	Seldom fully successful; often good in the cities, especially the capital	Moderately successful, especially for the middle and upper classes, though lower classes often neglected	Very successful, with affluence on the rise	Moderately successful, especially in the cities; often ideologically driven
Proceduralism and degree of formalism	Largely absent, with state ruling arbitrarily, except in isolated cases (South Africa)	Rapidly increasing in light of growing democratization, especially in the Southern Cone (as opposed to Central America)	Highly procedural and bureaucratized, though not necessarily democratic	State preoccupied with procedures, though the proper procedures are seldom observed due to cumbrous and stifling nature
Cultural manipulation of norms and symbols	The state often campaigns to instill national symbols and values	Patriotic symbols permeate politics and political life, as do the virtues of political "modernity" and democracy	Subtle but effectively promoted by the state, though not as part of a deliberate campaign	State constantly propagating national and political symbols to enhance legitimacy of leader

of the nation-state – unaware of the ensuing consequences that are often laughable and at times quite tragic.[26] Thus the state spreads around as many political symbols as it can, though its innate institutional and economic weakness does not really allow it to do as much cultural engineering as it would like. Gone are such forceful personalities as Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghore and Jomo Kenyata, who could fire up a crowd with passionate speeches and sell their vision of the future to as yet unjaded masses. Today's African state is in a much more precarious cultural and institutional position than it was at the dawn of independence in the 1960s.

In Latin America the state's posture toward culture has changed concurrent with the consolidation of democracy, especially in the continent's Southern Cone. Previously, under the rubric of bureaucratic–authoritarianism, the state was interested in little more than the promotion of patriotic symbols that supported its perpetual concern with national security and the destruction of domestic enemies. As in most other democracies, those in Latin America have taken a hands-off, *laissez faire* approach to culture, limiting themselves to occasional praises for the nation's democracy as they would like to interpret it. Latin Americans still tend to be highly nationalistic and proud of their national heritage, but there is also an increasing sense that such cultural virtues as moderation and tolerance – central virtues of democracy – are desirable and indeed necessary. These values have become especially prevalent among intellectual circles, though their spread among the popular classes is harder to detect.[27] There is an undeniable trend, nevertheless, that upholds some of the key values associated with liberal democracy. But democracy does not necessarily mean social justice, especially in societies with deep economic, socio-cultural or ethnic divisions. Throughout Central America, the underprivileged position of the indigenous peoples has changed little, while most of the urban oligarchs have found their way into political parties and elected office. In the Southern Cone, the poor in the hinterlands and in urban slums have seen few benefits of any kind in the new democratic era – neither economic nor political, neither social nor cultural – while having lost the moral support of the Liberation

Theology of the 1980s.[28]

In East Asia, a direct connection between the state and culture is equally difficult to detect. In South Korea, the newly democratic state is still trying to figure out exactly what democracy is, having yet to develop a consistent policy to deal with continuous student riots and political scandals. In China, the chasm between state and society appears to grow with the spread of capitalist market economics out of the main coastal areas and deeper into the country's interior, although theoretically at least the state maintains its doctrinal approaches to the peasantry, the proletariat, intellectuals, and the urban bourgeoisie.[29] Whether Hong Kong's rejoining to China will put a complete end to Beijing's pretenses of seeking a proletariat utopia remains to be seen. There is no denying, however, that in the last decade or so the Chinese state has become far less interventionist in relation to Chinese society than at anytime since 1949. In Taiwan, meanwhile, the state actively propagates the threat posed by Mainland China, though apart from keeping patriotism high it does little to overly meddle into cultural affairs. Overall, therefore, states in East Asia do little to directly manipulate or reinterpret cultural values and symbols for their own political purposes. The state's connection with culture remains subtle and indirect, though seldom incongruent. This congruence largely explains the absence of widespread political instability in the region in the face of the far-reaching social and economic changes that have accompanied rapid industrialization.[30]

The Politics of Being

The question of "what am I?", often deeply personal and profoundly moving, can be just as troubling for the state as it is for the individual when it is asked by a significant portion of the urban population. Exactly what percentage constitutes "significant" is difficult to tell, for psychic and emotional difficulties do not, by nature, lend themselves to being quantified. Nevertheless, despite the inherent elusiveness and intangibility of the phenomenon, the state cannot help but be influenced by widespread psychological unease and

uncertainty over questions of national and/or individual identity. Alas, the discovery of the self is not always on top of one's declared agenda, and the state – whether those controlling it now or those vying for its control – is seldom ever concerned with attending to the psychic dilemmas of the citizenry. While the quest for identity does influence politics – however broadly politics may be defined – the political consequences of identity search are rarely cataclysmic, revolutionary or even immediately apparent. Instead, what may simply and broadly be defined as the "politics of being" often assumes a much more subtle form. It also hardly ever gets the limelight on its own, its significance frequently overshadowed by more tangible political issues and struggles. "What am I?" is not a question of national security. It is not a question over who gets to be the leader and who gets led. Neither is it a question whose answer would put food on the table (unless, of course, you happen to be a Muslim living in Serbia). Yet it does get asked, albeit often silently, and its very asking bespeaks an identity dilemma running rampant through the societies of the Third World. This section looks at the politics of being in Third World countries, highlighting some of its major features and main consequences.

"Politics of being" develops when the psychological and cultural search for identity assumes political forms and consequences. While culturally inspired movements for self-actualization – the Islamist movement in the Middle East or tribally-rooted rebellions in sub-Saharan Africa, for example – are products and manifestations of politics of being, the phenomenon often assumes more subtle and discreet forms. More specifically, politics of being is a result of discrepancies between the cultural agendas and frameworks of the state and those of society. Every state has a cultural agenda that it pursues, a cultural prism through which it sees itself and which influences its general policy outlook. For the sake of convenience, we can call this the "state culture", i.e. those values and symbols that guide the state's internal operations, its agendas and priorities, its inner logic.[31] At the same time, every society has its own cultural framework – the common thread that runs through its people and binds their symbols and values together. Every society has a certain

cultural core, what was earlier described as "national culture", the amalgam – and in multi-ethnic societies amalgams – of values and symbols that are produced out of a synthesis of the interplay of "traditional" and "modern" values, scientific and adaptive cultures, indigenous and imported symbols. "National culture" and "state culture" have a mutual, interactive relationship. Each exists and operates on its own, and yet each interacts and influences the other.

State culture is motivated by the political agendas, ambitions and priorities of those in charge of the state. Overtime, this culture of the state develops a momentum and inertia of its own, an internal logic that maintains, reinforces and perpetuates it over time and across the span of the reigns of different leaders as long as the essential principles on which the state is based remain the same. The state, in other words, develops an internal culture of its own. The existence, intensity and nature of politics of being depends on the relationship between state culture and national culture.

The culture that the state develops for its own inner-workings and the culture of society are rarely ever identical. Although there is usually a general congruence between the two, seldom ever is there a perfect congruence between the cultural dispositions of the state and those of society. There are two main reasons for this. First, as argued in Chapter 2 and so far here, it is extremely hard, if not altogether impossible, to determine exactly what a "national culture" is, what values and symbols it is made of, and what the nature and degree of their intensity among the general population is. If culture's amorphous and intangible nature makes it difficult to study academically, it is even harder to gauge and determine it in the real world of politics. Secondly, as shown above, few states make it a priority to go specifically after culture, to manipulate and play into it (i.e., inclusionary states), and even then such polities do not last forever. Indeed in inclusionary states there often is a perfect congruence between the culture of the state and the culture of society. But this congruence lasts only as long as the state's inclusionary policies do, most of which are likely to lose steam sooner or later.

Thus there are always some built-in differences – even a degree

of friction – between the culture of the state and the culture of society. What matters is how acute these differences are. Culture, as already mentioned, is ultimately a matter of identity, its source and basis. When the cultures of the state and society differ sharply, the individual is faced with two different identities. National cultures are often divided and conflicted within themselves, and differences with the culture of the state add yet another level of contradiction and incongruence to an already contested conception of identity. As if the question of "what am I?" wasn't already puzzling enough, especially in the Third World, now there is the additional cultural inertia of the state with which to also contend. In short, politics of being develops when three conditions are met: when the search for cultural identity, whether in the direction of modernity or authenticity, goes beyond the individual or groups of individuals and engulfs a significant portion of the population; when there is an increasing lack of congruence between the cultural dispositions of the ordinary people and those of the state apparatus and its stewards; and when the ensuing incongruities between the cultures of the state and the people result in political consequences.

Politics of being assumes particularly acute forms and consequences in divided societies in which an ethno-racial minority or an oligarchical class has control of the state and isolates itself from the cultural values and symbols of the majority of the population. El Salvador before and during its civil war, Nicaragua under the Somozas, Rhodesia, Rwanda, Burundi and apartheid South Africa all did or continue to belong to this category.[32] Living in a world of their own, the elite stewards of these states are all too often dismissive, uncaring and even unaware of what people outside of their own narrow caste think and want. They have a conception of politics and of political identity that has little or nothing in common with the average man's conceptions of things political and otherwise. It would be erroneous to say that this vast and unbridgeable cultural chasm between state and society is the dominant reason for the appearance of revolutions and other similar movements in all of the cases cited above. Nevertheless, it did provide much of the impetus and tinder for the eruption of revolutionary sentiments.

Conclusion

All states, even the most culturally aloof, must invariably contend with the forces produced by, influenced or motivated by culture. The relationship between the two is often complex and paradoxical, multi-layered and multi-faceted. Different states adopt different postures toward the culture of their people, and, by the same token, different societies assume different cultural relationships with the state. In both cases, what is of primary importance is the context and circumstances within which state and society articulate and project their cultural dispositions internally and in relationship to one another. Culture, I once again reiterate, is not an independent phenomenon. While it does have its own intrinsic qualities and characteristics, its political significance and posture, both in relation to society and the state, depend greatly on the predicaments in which it finds itself. States influence culture, and culture influences the state. That much is certain. What is far less certain is the precise nature of this influence, which depends in large measure on phenomena to which culture is related but is distinct from. Such phenomena may include economics, historical predicaments, leadership goals and priorities, influences from abroad, and the like.

Nevertheless, insofar as political developments are concerned, their overall nature and characteristics cannot help but be influenced by culture in general and its specific manifestations in particular. It is to this examination of the dynamic relationship between culture and the state in a given political development that the next chapter turns. I have chosen democratization as the focus of analysis since it has become not just a subject of academic celebration of late, but, more importantly, an increasingly prevalent phenomenon within the Third World. Moreover, democratization represents one of those crucial processes in which the intervention of cultural forces, and their interaction with the forces of the state, can dramatically influence its outcome. Culture and the state, this chapter demonstrated, may assume a number of different relationships. The next chapter applies this proposition to a specific political process, namely democratization.

Notes

1 Of approximately 164 non-Western countries and independent territories, a total of 120 (or 71.5 per cent) have separate cabinet ministries specifically set aside for cultural affairs. In Western countries, the percentage is only slightly lower. Of the 23 Western countries, including Russia and Japan, 15 (or 65 per cent) have separate ministries of culture. Data collected from Central Intelligence Agency 1997.

2 I realize that some of the basic concepts employed here – regime, system, state, etc. – are used rather loosely and need greater clarification. See Lawson 1993: 183–205.

3 Kumar 1993: 385.

4 Peeler 1985: 41.

5 O'Donnell 1994: 59.

6 Ibid.: 56.

7 Hernandez and Dilla 1992: 33.

8 Chazan 1994: 76.

9 Womack 1987: 485–6.

10 Gause 1994: 26.

11 See Kamrava 1998.

12 Skocpol and Goodwin 1989: 496.

13 Levine 1992:183–4 and Smith 1982: 287.

14 Paribatra 1993: 879–93.

15 Di Palma 1990: 144–5.

16 Dealy 1992: 58. See also Calvert 1989: 83–4.

17 Spinard 1991: 297.

18 Aguirre 1984: 549.

19 Ibid.: 560.

20 Gause 1994: 25.

21 In Arabic the title is *Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharafayn.*

22 Bayart 1993: 174.

23 Huneeus 1990: 343.

24 Another important state with a monarch is Malaysia, although the position of monarchy rotates among nine regional heads of state every fivhe years and political power rests effectively with the prime minister.

25 Lancaster 1991–2: 148–65.
26 Mbembe 1991: 166–82.
27 Puryear 1994: 162.
28 Mainwaring 1995: 145–9. According to Mainwaring, Chile so far has a relatively good record of alleviating poverty under democracy.
29 Moody, Jr. 1995: 209–15.
30 In South Korea, it is often said, taking part in student riots is more a rite of passage for students into adulthood rather than the result of brewing revolutionary sentiments.
31 What is labeled here as "state culture" should not be confused with "political culture", which denotes the general values and perceptions that social actors (i.e. people) have of the political system. For more on political culture in the Third World see Kamrava 1993a, Chapter 5.
32 Huntington 1989: 68.

CHAPTER SIX

Culture and Democratization

The outcomes of the recent wave of democratization cannot all be considered as equally democratic, some of the new regimes being truer to the spirit of the phenomenon than others. These differences are due to a variety of reasons, ranging from past experiences with democracy to the nature and intents of the actors involved, and the structural and institutional limitations and/or opportunities within which they operate. While each of these differentiating factors is in itself highly important, culture in general and civil society specifically play a far more significant role in determining the overall character of the post-democratization polity. This crucial role of civil society has often been overlooked by the literature on democratization, especially insofar as the nature of democratic consolidation is concerned. Despite the unprecedented proliferation of studies on democratization in recent years, there is little consensus in the current literature about the exact role of civil society both before and after the transition to democracy. Much of the democratization literature has either focused on the role of civil society *before* the actual transition from the non-democratic state was set into motion, or it has overplayed the importance of political crafting and institutional consolidation in the post-transition phase.[1] Overlooked in the process has been the pivotal role that civil society and, more specifically, civil society organizations can play in shaping the exact nature of the post-transition, democratic state.

This chapter examines the role and ramifications of civil society's emergence before and after democratic transitions. It argues that the more truly representative, viable democracies that have emerged out of the recent transitions must by nature have a strong social and cultural footing among the social actors who were active in the transition. However, less representative, more restricted quasi- and delegative democracies are less culturally grounded and are more dependent on intra- and interelite political pacts rather than sociocultural imperatives for democratic maintenance.

Democratic transitions are set into motion due to the workings of two general sets of dynamics that could broadly be classified as either structural or cultural. All democratic transitions involve structural transformations, for without such changes the actual institutional mechanics of democracy – ranging from inter-elite pacts to constitutional guarantees – would not come about.[2] In such instances, democratization is often initiated from above and is set into motion, at least initially, as a direct result of changes and developments that are indigenous to the state. Economic paralysis or political malaise result in state breakdown, or at best profound weakness, and compel old political elites to open up the political process and to accommodate other contending elites.[3] When the transition is complete, the new elites face the arduous task of democratic consolidation, chief among which are politically hazardous neo-liberal economic reforms that almost all newly-democratic states decide to undertake soon after assuming power.[4] But sacrificed in the process is the popularization of democratic norms and ideals among the larger population, made all the more difficult under worsening economic conditions, declining real wages, and removal of many of the previous state's social security networks.[5] Most post-democratic political elites are simply too preoccupied with institutional and economic concerns to pay sufficient attention to the popular norms that are beginning to get hold in their country's new, post-transition political culture or to worry about the larger population's cultural dispositions toward democracy. The cultural popularization of democracy is all the more important given that in post-transition countries democracy has become a political and economic reality and is no longer an abstract, sought-after ideal. Because of this very neglect, many of the democratic states that have recently

appeared in the Third World face crises of social and cultural legitimacy and, as demonstrated most starkly in Fujimori's Peru and to a lesser extent in Turkey, remain susceptible to demagogic, populist and at times outright anti-democratic movements.

Exceptions do exist, and such democracies as those found in Brazil, Chile and South Korea (as well as in Greece, Portugal and Spain) all seem to enjoy high levels of cultural consolidation despite having come about as a result of pacted negotiations among elites. In all of these cases, democracy was initiated from above, at the level of the state, but, sooner in some cases and later in others, it appears to have become culturally accepted and popularized among the various social strata.

For whatever reason, however, democratic elites do not always actively try to or succeed in consolidating democracy culturally. The ensuing democratic system often ends up being comprised of largely isolated, elite groups whose main interests lie in securing their own positions within the new institutions of the democratic system (especially in the parliament, or in their own political party) rather than representing their constituents. This has taken place in many of the ostensibly democratic countries of the Third World, both old and new: Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Madagascar in Africa, to name a few; Costa Rica, Colombia, Panama, Peru, Nicaragua and Venezuela in Latin America; Taiwan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan in South and Southeast Asia; and Lebanon and Turkey in the Middle East.[6] Democratic transitions from above, in short, face the *potential* (rather than inherent) danger of resulting in elitist, quasi- or delegative democratic polities that have all the institutional and structural trappings of democracy but lack a strong cultural component that would give them resonance among the different strata of society.

Not all democratic transitions are initiated from above, however, and there are some that come about as a result of societal pressures in general and civil society agitations in particular. In such cases, the incoming democratic system cannot help but to have a strong cultural component, enjoys comparatively higher levels of popular legitimacy, and, from the start, should be more representative of the broader strata of society. In these transition types, the impulse to democratize begins not within the state but with non-state actors, some of whom ask specifically for

democratic rights while others may have demands that are limited to particular issues. In either case, in the pre-democratization era certain societal actors begin to demand greater space and political autonomy, many of whom over time cluster into organized or semi-organized grassroots movements and turn into civil society organizations.[7] If these civil society organizations, which by definition must operate democratically internally, begin to collectively demand and succeed in bringing about a democratic polity, they themselves in turn become the societal and cultural cushions on which the new system rests. In a way, the new democratic polity is already culturally consolidated *before* the actual democratic transition takes place, for, otherwise, civil society organizations could not have gained enough support and momentum to force the authoritarian state to agree to democratic concessions. Now that broadly-based, increasingly popular civil society organizations have finally succeeded in bringing about a democratic polity, they are not about to take their newly-won liberties for granted or to allow democratic rights to be practiced primarily by specific elite groups. They seek to actively participate in the political process in order to ensure the democratic and representational integrity of the system.

Civil society-driven, viable democracies are comparatively rare, but they have come about in recent years in Poland, Hungary and most notably South Africa. These democratic systems are not only more truly representative of broader strata of society but are, in fact, highly self-conscious. Eventually, such democratic systems may over time begin to be taken for granted by their citizens, as most long-established democracies often are. But in the years immediately following the democratic transition they are far more vibrant than quasi- and delegative democracies could ever hope to become, a vibrancy maintained by their very youth and popular legitimacy. In viable democracies, membership levels in political parties tend to continue to increase, voter turn-outs are relatively high, elections – both national as well as regional and local ones – are often hotly contested and taken very seriously, the media is free and by-and-large vigilant, and, frequently, a growing plethora of issue-driven grassroots organizations spring up and help facilitate increasing levels of popular political input.

Civil Society in Comparative Perspective

The concept of civil society has gained increasing currency in much of the recent literature on democratic transitions.[8] Despite much scholarly advance on the subject, a clear distinction has yet to be drawn between the two concepts of "civil society" and "civil society organization". While inextricably linked, the two phenomena are distinct. In fact, civil society organizations, once they emerge, become permanent or semi-permanent features of the social landscape, whereas civil society may emerge immediately before and during the democratization process and later die out once the transition is over.

Civil society organizations are a part and subcomponent of the larger civil society. A civil society organization could be any politically autonomous and independent group that can articulate and further a corporate identity as well as a specific agenda. In itself, such an organization may or may not be democratically-inclined, although its very existence does to a certain extent bode well for democracy as it necessitates at least some rolling back of the powers of the state. Religious societies, ethnic and/or tribal confederacies and women's groups are representatives of this type of civil society organization. On its own, a civil society organization – which may be found in any social setting – does not necessarily result in the increasing prevalence of demands for political space and representation among social actors. It simply has a corporate identity which it seeks to further. But when this civil society organization is one of a number of other, similar organizations that also begin to emerge within society, its social and political resonance becomes all the more pronounced.

The simultaneous emergence and/or operations of civil society organizations is likely to result in two concurrent outcomes: on the one hand, a self-sustaining and self-perpetuating momentum develops within society that makes it want to safeguard and maintain its newly-won sense of autonomy from the state; on the other hand, the state finds itself increasingly on the defensive, and, if it is sufficiently vulnerable, will be forced into giving democratic concessions to society. Why and how civil society organizations emerge and operate is context-specific and a result of developments within society itself or because of its relations

with the state, or both. In either case, a politically-charged and politically-laden sense of civicism overtakes a majority of social actors, which in turn compels them, among other things, to purposefully seek democratic liberties and demand representational privileges. This is civil society, which is in turn the linchpin of a viable democracy.

Civil Society's Birth and Routinization

The most apparent manifestations of civil society, as mentioned, are such pressure groups as Mothers of Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, the Solidarity in Poland, grassroots neighbourhood organizations known as *poblaciones* in Chile, the Movement of the Friends of the Neighborhood in Brazil (in Nova Iguaca), and the New Forum in the former East Germany. These organizations may be diverse in their intents and compositions; in fact they may have nothing in common insofar as their stated purposes and agendas are concerned. But they all have one crucial common denominator: they are pressure groups pressing the state for greater autonomy and political space – *they demand democracy.* Social and political autonomy by such a self-organized group is of critical importance, but it is not enough. If we were to stop here, backgammon players in the teahouses of the Middle East or every beer lover in Poland and former Czechoslovakia would have to be considered as progenitors of civil society. They are not. Neither is civil society made up of just any group that manages to exert pressure on the state for political cooperation or even space. Had this been the case, most corporatist institutions pressing demands on the state – labour or the Catholic church in Latin America in the 1960s and the 1970s – would also have to be considered as components of civil society, and that is not always the case. Civil society gives rise to a very specific type of organization, one that is *social* in its genesis and composition but is *political* in its agendas and initiatives.[9]

Here, then, is the crucial difference between a *civil society organization* and *civil society*: a civil society organization is an autonomous, agenda-driven forum or group which presses the state on some specific ground. Its focus is narrow, concentrated on only one or two issues that it considers important. Its genesis lies in the perception by a group of concerned individuals that the state does not care or cannot

attend to the issue that concerns them (e.g., the environment, conditions of the neighborhood, the injustices committed against the poor, etc.). Consequently, they mobilize into a grassroots organization that is often informal, at least at the beginning, but has a specific goal. If this civil society organization operates by itself or is weak and inarticulate, its impact and significance, both within society and for the state, is likely to be minimal. However, if a civil society organization becomes internally coherent, articulate and powerful, or if it operates alongside a number of other civil society organizations, each pressing the state for some concession, then society begins to develop a sense of civic consciousness, and, more importantly, a cultural awareness of its potential political powers. This is *civil society.* Civil society, then, forms when one strong civil society organization (the Solidarity in Poland), or a number of civil society organizations (the church and intellectual organizations in Chile) appear more or less simultaneously and begin to exert pressures on the state. These pressures mean autonomy for society, and, within the right institutional framework, societal autonomy means democracy. If this civil society develops sufficient strength to push a weak, authoritarian state to the brink, the incoming democratic system inherits a strong social and cultural basis. Civil society, in other words, if successful, gives rise to a viable, culturally-grounded democracy.

A civil society organization is an organization that is formed out of the independent, autonomous initiatives of politically concerned individuals. These social actors are united by a common concern, often rallying around a specific issue (greater political space or less literary censorship). But irrespective of their specificities, if their demands on the state are met, that would either directly or indirectly result in a greater opening up of the political process. Ernest Gellner has argued that civil society is first and foremost a liberator from the tyranny of social and cultural rituals more than anything else.[10] In addition to its social and cultural ramifications, civil society has a more pointed political function and agenda as well. Knowingly or unknowingly, civil society organizations are agents and proponents of democratization and the cumulative effects of their pressures on the state, at a particular moment of regime crisis, are too much to bear for political leaders with exhausted legitimacies and few other non-coercive means of governance.

As earlier argued, transition to a viable democracy can be greatly facilitated by the prior existence of civil society, but civil society may not always usher in a democratic transition. The state may put up an effective fight and hang on to the reins of power. A viable democracy necessitates civil society, but civil society in itself does not necessarily mean democratization. To have democratic consequences, civil society organizations must embark on democratizing themselves and the larger social and political environments within which they operate. Often with halted steps and at times with full force and determination, these soldiers of democracy march on, *and if successful,* they bring about a democratic revolution, one that may be either negotiated or may be as cataclysmic as any other revolutionary episode. The point to bear in mind here is the chronological order in which civil society and democratization take place: there are first social pressures for democratic openings; these pressures crystalize in the formation of civil society organizations that are democratic in nature and democratizing in pursuit; if these groups coalesce or on their own mount a political challenge that the state cannot fend off, then a successful process of democratization takes place. Once democratization has taken place, there is a more hospitable environment for even further civil society groups to take form and evolve.

How does civil society come about? A number of reinforcing and complementary social and political forces need to be simultaneously present for civil society and groups representing it to emerge. A praetorian political system is a most essential prerequisite, for democratic yearnings must at first be formulated and in turn frustrated in an authoritarian setting for groups to look to alternative, non-state agencies for political expression. More specifically, the praetorian state and the larger society must operate in two different, mutually alien cultural realms. The average person must feel not just disenchanted with the state; he or she must feel completely detached from and in fact disgusted with it. There are no norms or values attached to the state with which he or she can identify, and there is a stark contrast between his or her innermost cultural orientations and whatever it is that the state stands for. Examples would be states that seem to operate in a world of their own, detached from the cultural contexts of their societies, apparently unaware of or insensitive to social and cultural nuances emanating from below. Within

such a context, civil society organizations offer alternative, non-official, and therefore seemingly untainted forums and organizational alternatives through which social actors could mobilize and express their concerns toward specific issues or toward politics in general.[11] With the exception of Tito's somewhat charismatic rule in Yugoslavia, former communist states in East and Central Europe fit this model perfectly, as do the many bureaucratic–authoritarian regimes that dotted Latin America in the 1960s and the 1970s. If society is at its core religious, the state is either aggressively secular or is, in fact, deliberately anti-religious; if industrialization has not progressed to the point of overwhelming agrarian life, the state pretends to be industrially advanced and highly modernized; if society wants to be left alone and be subject to its own internal dynamics, the state seeks to penetrate and change it; if society wants to express itself politically and to participate in the system, the state subdues and controls it. At every turn, the state and society diverge and differ from one another. Nothing binds them but animosity and distrust – no political cultures that could be manipulated by politicians and bought by the people, no half-hearted democracies that could placate demands for real participation, no charismatic leaders who would find devotees among the masses.

But this is only the political half of the equation, an equation based on a clash of perspectives on the part of the state and those who see it as at best apathetic and at worst adversarial to their hopes and aspirations. The political roadblocks erected by the state compel these individuals to form civil society organizations of their own in an attempt to both replace some of the specific functions of the state and to provide themselves with channels of political expression. Who exactly are these individuals who come together and form civil society organizations? What social and cultural imperatives prompt them to do so? The answers lie in the particular formation of social forces that the state is seeking to subdue. The pivotal role of intellectuals in the flowering of civil society has already been discussed at great length elsewhere.[12] Intellectuals alone are not enough, however, as every society has its own literati elite no matter how minuscule and socially vacuous they may be. If civil society is to develop, the intellectual elite must have three particular characteristics. First and foremost, it must be committed to the principles

and practices of democracy to the point of having internalized them. Simple rhetoric and heroism does not a democratic intellectual make; he or she must be both a believer and a practitioner of democracy in everything from relating to those at work to family members or others with different viewpoints. Equally important is the social resonance of intellectuals, both in terms of the message they have and their accessibility to the rest of society. Elite intellectuals, in other words, can no longer be so *elite* in their social standing and the learned plains on which they dwell. They must have drawn themselves close enough to the population to at least be heard and understood by them, even if not necessarily followed. Lastly, these intellectuals must give themselves an institutional forum, no matter how informal, through which they could meet and circulate ideas, solidify their links with one or more social classes, and bear direct or indirect pressures on the state. These institutional forums may range from *ad hoc* clubs and syndicates (e.g., a writers' association or the Civic Forum) to full-blown grass-roots organizations (CEBs) and political parties (Solidarity).

The resonance of civil society's intellectual progenitors itself requires certain necessary social preconditions, chief among which are the existence of a nationally uniform cultural milieu and a spirit of tolerance. To begin with, there must exist a national culture that is homogeneous and not be made up of smaller cultural sub-units that may at best overlap but continue to retain distinctive qualities in such core areas as communication, rituals, status and the like. There is in such a society a "standardization of idiom", where "communication occurs, if not with man as such, then at any rate with man-as-standard-specimen-of-a-codified-culture".[13] Civil society requires cultural uniformity on a national level, where people are bound not by segmentary, exclusivist institutions that differentiate, but by associations that are unsanctified, instrumental, revocable and yet effective.[14]

Uniform national cultural homogeneity is important, but again not enough. In addition, civil society requires a near-total psychological transformation, both of the individual on a personal level and of the larger collective whole – be it a syndicate, a political party, or an entire nation – to which he or she belongs. Communicating through the same idiom that is free of ritualized sub-contexts is an essential prerequisite of forming voluntary associations and groups. Thus members of the

same national entity who come from different parts of the country, have different accents and prefer particular kinds of food, may join together to form an association in which the goals of the association are far more binding on them than any of their specific idiosyncracies. In countries with at least a semblance of a national culture, this is how most workers', teachers', merchants', writers' and other types of syndicate organizations are formed and operate.

But taking part in a syndicate organization alone, while quite important, is an insufficient indication of a burgeoning civil society. What must take place is an internalization of democratic norms and mores on an emotional, personal level. What must happen is first a democratization of the self, and then selves, and from there on and on to the larger community, until a critical mass of like-minded, democratic aspirants begin to exert pressure on the state. If a syndicate, or a group of syndicates, were to simply press their own narrowly-defined demands upon the state, the state might easily co-opt them into itself or placate their demands with minor adjustments to its policies. At most, it might reorient its agendas and institutions to better fit an emerging corporatist arrangement.[15] But if there is an element of corporatism in civil society, it must be decidedly democratic: groups and organizations that are self-democratizing and democratizing of the larger polity, if successful, force the state to also become democratic.

Here the contest becomes political. Civil society presses democratic demands on the state and its various institutions, and much of the outcome of the transition depends on the precise manner in which these state institutions react to pressures from below. In this respect, the politically-grounded analyses of Huntington and Giuseppe Di Palma have much to offer, especially insofar as the role of the military is concerned.[16] The state and its various institutional arms must be vulnerable enough to democratic pressures from below for a viable democratic transition to take place. State actors must have already been weakened and thus eager to compromise with the opposition – the actual reasons for their weakness and vulnerability may differ from case to case.[17] Moreover, the different auxiliary institutions on which the office-holders' powers are directly or indirectly based (the military, the official political party, the bureaucracy, etc.) must also be willing to negotiate away some of

their present privileges. The paralysis of the state need not necessarily be complete for a viable democratic transition to occur, but it must be sufficiently extensive to compel those in power to come to the bargaining table. The situation in pseudo-democratic transitions is often quite different, as seldom are all state institutions sufficiently weakened to go along with a fully open democratization process. In some instances, state institutions, especially the military, demand extensive guarantees in the post-transition era and exert considerable influence afterward (Turkey, Peru, Venezuela and the Philippines).[18] But transition processes do not always succeed, even partially, and in these cases the powers and intentions of state actors have proven critical. In such instances, elements within the state are unwilling to yield to any democratic opening and thus seek to abort the democratization process altogether.

Examples from successful, partial and aborted democratic transitions illustrate the point better. In most of the former communist states of Eastern Europe, in the mid- and late-1980s such crucial arms of the state as the communist party and the bureaucracy were in a state of near paralysis, if not fully paralyzed already, but the army still maintained many of its coercive capabilities and had not undergone the extensive atrophy of the other two institutions. Nevertheless, when the democratic transition process gathered steam and began threatening the very existence of the communist state, the army did not, and in some instances could not, intervene in the political process.[19] This sequence of events is markedly different from what took place in Algeria in the early 1990s, when the country witnessed a bloody reversal of a democratization process that had started in the late 1980s.[20] As President Chadli Bendjedid inaugurated the country's ostensibly liberal democratic constitution of 1989 and promised open parliamentary elections, the military begrudgingly looked on as its once-extensive powers were greatly reduced and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), whom the military considered "anti-democratic", gained in strength. When the FIS won a majority of seats in the 1992 parliamentary elections, the military dully stepped it, removed Bendjedid from power, annulled the elections, and reasserted itself as the dominant institution of the state. The military had neither been weakened enough nor was it willing to face the uncertain possibilities of a fully democratic transition.[21]

Between these two extremes of a viable transition and an aborted one falls the Turkish case. The Turkish army has always considered itself as the ultimate guardian of the Turkish Republic and the protector of the legacy of the country's modern founder, Kemal Atatürk.[22] Consistent with this self-ascribed mission, the army launched a coup in 1980 in reaction to what it saw as the inability of civilian politicians to maintain domestic order, in turn handing power over to elected officials in 1983. As this was a controlled transition, initiated and directed from above, in today's Turkey the military continues to retain extensive powers, and there are severe limits imposed on the country's democratic system.[23] The overall flavor and nature of Turkey's political system, at best a pseudo-democracy, is very different from the viable democratic systems of Poland and Hungary, both of which were largely the results of pressure from below.

Does civil society ever end or die out? Developments in post-communist Poland, where civil society was at one point on the most solid footing, are most instructive. Within three to five years after the democratic transition there, some of the civil society organizations that were once the primary engines of the country's new democracy had begun a steady decline in popular legitimacy and social resonance. The Solidarity and the Catholic church were especially effected, having lost much of the unparalleled popularity that they had acquired at the height of the democratization process in 1989 and 1990. By December 1995, Poles had elected an ex-communist as their new president.[24] What does this say about civil society's resonance and its relationship with democratization? These events demonstrate not necessarily the demise of civil society but rather the institutionalization and routinization of civil society organizations. In today's Poland as in most other post-communist countries, no longer are civil society organizations operating in a non-democratic environment, where they have to constantly guard against possible state encroachment. They can now take their operations and their very existence for granted, gradually, therefore, losing the defensive zeal which marked their earlier years. In fact, once the democratic polity has been established and the threat of authoritarian reversal appears remote, most civil society organizations (the church, intellectual groups, etc.) begin to look like any other social institution.

Poland is a classic case of a country in which *civil society* has ceased to exist but *civil society organizations* continue to operate. Unlike the heyday of the communist collapse, Polish society today is neither actively nor self-consciously democratizing itself – as Anthony Giddens would maintain, most Poles would these days consider themselves to have gone beyond the phase of "emancipatory politics" and to have entered the era of "life politics".[25] But the institutional residues of civil society are still there, and, although not as feverishly active now as they once were, could again kick into action if need be (i.e., if their individual members deem their political activism and defense of representative democracy as necessary). In fact, seeing as to how such organizations once served as powerful vehicles for the establishment and Institutionalization of a democratic polity by incorporating social actors into themselves, they now have an easier time in mobilizing the population in defense of specific corporate interests or larger democratic goals.

Thus the relationship between civil society organizations and civil society is cyclical: civil society organizations may combine to give rise to civil society; given the right political environment, civil society may usher in a democratic polity; once a democracy is established, civil society tends to peter out although civil society organizations continue to operate, albeit in a more routinized and less feverishly defensive form; if the newly-established democratic system faces serious threats to its existence, the existing civil society organizations, conceivably reinforced by new ones, could once again mobilize social actors in defense of the political system and reactivate the civil society that had become dormant. So long as the political system is democratic and allows autonomous, self-organization on the part of society, the cycle could repeat itself indefinitely.

The Political Sociology of Democratic Transitions

Most of the recent English language literature on democratization has focused on the political variables involved both before and after the actual process of democratic transformation takes place. This is

particularly true of American political scientists writing on the topic, for most European and especially British scholars tend to be more receptive to the idea of social and cultural as well as political analysis.[26] Nevertheless, few if any of the published works on the subject have yet drawn a systemic parallel between the socio-cultural emergence of civil society and the political institutionalization of democratic regimes. Examining the two phenomena of democracy and democratization, I maintain, needs to have a sharper cultural and sociological focus. Concurrent with political analysis, attention must be paid to the exact juncture in which civil society appears and the precise role that it plays. In some democratization processes, civil society either does not initially play a determining role and emerges only later on, or it does not appear at all even well into the life of the supposedly democratic country.

Examples from Southern Europe are most instructive in this respect. In Greece, Portugal and Spain during the mid-1970s, when each country witnessed a democratic transition, civil society was only nascent at the time of the change-over and was caught largely off guard by the collapse of the old order and its reconstitution into a democratic one.[27] Today, however, by most accounts democracy appears to be on a solid social and cultural footing in each of these countries and is built on a strong foundation of civil society.[28] Turkey, on the other hand, is an exception, for while the political transformation there into a democratic system has long been completed, a similar, compatible social and cultural change has not yet taken place.[29] Civil society, in other words, has not evolved yet and does not appear to be in the offing anytime soon.[30] Thus the Turkish political system is at best quasi-democratic and is, in fact, highly susceptible to populist and demagogic movements from below.[31] This is not, however, what has happened in most of the democratic transitions of Eastern Europe and South America. There are instances where civil society appears first and eventually leads to democratic political change. In such countries as Poland, Hungary, former Czechoslovakia and South Africa (and one may even include Chile and Brazil), civil society organizations preceded, sometimes by a good many number of years, the actual political transformation of authoritarian structures into democratic ones. From the start, therefore, the ensuing political system in each of these countries started out as a viable democracy, sustained

not just by democratic institutions but by a democratized and democratizing society as well.

As mentioned earlier, democratic transitions that result in viable democracies must necessarily have a social component and are often brought about as a result of pressures exerted on the state by various autonomously-organized social groups. In such instances, the pre-democratic state and its society have very little or absolutely no cultural links that bind them together, their interrelations being based largely or exclusively on coercion on the part of the state and submission by society. The state, therefore, is praetorian *par excellence,* having practically no popular ideological legitimacy, instead relying overwhelmingly on a mammoth bureaucracy and a brutal police force to stay in power. This was particularly the case in the former fascist or neo-fascist states of Southern Europe, the bureaucratic–authoritarian states of Latin America, and communist ones in East and Central Europe.[32] Most contemporary African and Middle East states, however, have managed to devise a variety of cultural, uninstitutionalized means to both solidify and complement their institutional ties with society. In Africa, most nominally democratic regimes, and even some overtly authoritarian ones, have allowed just enough political space to contending social forces to blunt their potentially disruptive nature, although not always successfully.[33] A vast majority of Middle Eastern states have, however, been highly erudite at placating social opposition by playing up (and into) whatever culturally resonant forces that happen to dictate popular norms and values: they adopt religion and make it official (hence *Islam rasmi,* "official Islam"), the leader becomes a father to the nation and relies on a patriarchical cult of personality, government nepotism becomes a normal method of co-option into the system, etc.[34]

In addition to political dynamics, society also experiences its own nuances in transitions to democracy. Lack of viable cultural and functional links with the state prompts social actors to look to themselves for providing organizational alternatives to those official agencies of the government which they perceive as useless, corrupt, coercive and manipulated. These are, most frequently, members of the middle classes who, although a direct product of praetorian economic policies, cannot

nevertheless be absorbed or co-opted by the state. Through social change and economic development, these middle class professionals have reached a comparatively high level of education and affluence. But this very elevated social status makes them all the more alienated from the state, which they can only view in an adversarial light. Thus they form politically autonomous groups and organizations that are not only independent of the state but also, even if only indirectly, are meant to replace some of the specific cultural and functional operations of the state. Whereas the state does not allow open expression of political thought, for example, these organizations provide a forum for exactly that (e.g., the Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia).[35] While the state may ridicule or suppress religion, some of these organizations may be devoted to spreading religious gospel and other teachings (e.g., Base Ecclesiastical Communities in Latin America).[36] While the state's glorification of the workers may be hollow propaganda, such groups may be trying to actually do something to enhance work conditions and wages (the Solidarity in Poland).[37] These organizations are the building-blocks of civil society: they are autonomous, self-organized and political in consequence if not in original intent. But they must also have an additional characteristic: they must be democratic in their internal workings as well as in their larger political goals. In itself, forming a politically autonomous syndicate organization is no indication of a burgeoning democratic civil society. Most states can easily dismantle or co-opt such organizations through repression or corporatist modifications. A civil society organization must have overtly democratic goals, no matter how specific or narrowly defined those goals might be, and press the state for a general opening up of the political process rather than simply asking that particular demands be met. Civil society formations may come perilously close to corporatist ones; they cannot, having at all times to retain subtle as well as overt taints of democracy. This is not a minor feat, for it involves not only democratically-committed intellectuals but, more importantly, an internal, psychic transformation of the authoritarian self into a democratic one.[38] Democratic intellectuals must establish links of their own with the larger population to give popular purchase to their ideals – they must sell the idea of democracy to the people – and that is neither easy nor, under authoritarian

circumstances, always possible.

How a democratic political culture comes about and civil society flourishes varies in each specific case. There are some universals, however. To begin with, there must exist a democratically-committed core of intellectuals. Not every university student or professor is an intellectual, and not every intellectual is a democrat.[39] In the Third World, in fact, it is only recently that a number of intellectuals have become dismayed with the more prevalent ideological strands of communism, socialism, nationalism or some other "ism" and have embraced the tenets of democracy.[40] Also, it is one thing to call oneself democratic, but it is quite another to be a true democrat. Additionally, democratic intellectuals must sell the idea of democracy to the popular classes and there needs to be a genuine, popular imperative for a democratic political system. Often times, ironically, the most brutal authoritarian dictatorships are the best catalysts for the growth of popular democratic yearnings among the masses. The insanity of Nazism in Germany, the horrors of fascism in Southern Europe and of bureaucratic–authoritarianism in South America, and the fallacies of life under communism in East Europe all were instrumental in instilling in the average person in each place a fundamental yearning for democracy. Democracy becomes culturally popular when all the other *isms,* especially those with a penchant for bombastic self-glorification, exhaust themselves and fail to provide the salvation they promise. Again, not every authoritarian system drives its citizens in the opposite extreme and makes democrats out of them. Few systems, in fact, exhaust all of their legitimacy in the way those mentioned above did. Most of the non-democratic political systems found around the world today are successful in at least one or two of the functions that give them some legitimacy. Some effectively manipulate certain popular sentiments (nationalism is a favorite); others are economically successful enough to keep the middle classes preoccupied or content; and still others give in just enough to placate potential opposition activists. Most, meanwhile, retain enough of their powers and capabilities not to take seriously pressures for democratization.

Phases in Democratization

It is only logical that a transition to democratic rule involves different phases, and that in each phase a different set of factors and dynamics is at work. Transition phases are, of course, often overlapping and the nuances involved in one phase often spill over into the next. Nevertheless, especially given the determining influence that the timing of civil society's emergence plays, it is important to distinguish between the characteristics of one transition phase and another. In cases where the democratic impulse emanates from below, social actors begin to agitate, not just for political space but specifically for democratic liberties. They either begin to organize themselves into previously non-existent organizations which are specifically set up to further their demands (the Solidarity in Poland), or begin reorienting the nature and the message of existing organizations to formulate and express their agendas (the church in both Latin America and East Europe). As with most spontaneous revolutions,[41] their demands, meeting with increasingly more receptive ears in society, begin to snowball and the state is gradually confronted with a serious political crisis it cannot easily contain. Soon negotiations are the only option left open to the political elite, resulting in an actual transfer of power through elections, followed by the institutional consolidation of the new order via the inauguration of a constitution, appointment of new policy-makers and bureaucrats, and the like. The important point to keep in mind is that this type of society-initiated democratization was brought about as a result of the workings of civil society, which in turn set into motion a host of political dynamics that culminated in the replacement of the old order with a new, democratic one. Thus social actors, the politically most important of whom are the primary components of civil society, have a vested interest in maintaining the essence and integrity of the new system. It is precisely for this reason that the incoming democratic regime is a genuinely democratic, viable one.

But the phases involved in democratic transitions from above, and the precise chronology of when each event occurs, is quite different (Table 6.1). In such instances, state actors are first faced with some unsettling development that is often of their own doing, an indigenously-initiated turmoil with which they cannot effectively deal. Their inability to deal with their difficulties is compounded by the untenable institutional and structural predicaments that such regimes often force themselves

into, so much so that soon a situation of paralysis and dysfunctionality, at first quite internal to the state, evolves. The structural weaknesses of the state are in turn exploited by various social actors who seize the opportunity to press their specific demands on the state, demands that may or may not be democratic. Negotiations ensue, and a *controlled* process of transition is set into motion.[42] The controlled nature of the transition assures the involved parties that the incoming order will not be too severe in its prosecution of those formerly in power. But the negotiations have always had an air of democracy about them, and all the parties gather around the negotiating table with claims of acting in democracy's interests. Thus the outcome of the negotiations is ostensibly democratic, complete with elections, a liberal democratic constitution, and all the other necessary trappings. But there was no popular, mass element involved in these negotiations (no electrician-cum-national hero), no struggle *per se,* no grand rethinking of national priorities and cultural dispositions. It was the elite who negotiated, and it was the elite who won out, both those belonging to the government's side and those claiming to represent the masses. The system they usher in as a result of their efforts cannot help but to be elitist, even if it is democratic. Such a system is most probably a quasi-democracy, a quintessentially elitist political system wrapped in a thin democratic veneer, or a delegative democracy, in which one person, an elected tsar, personifies the new era.

Table 6.1 Phases in democratic transitions

	Transition from below	*Transition from above*
Catalyst:	Civil society shake-up	Internal political turmoil
Process:	Crisis Negotiation and transition Institutional Consolidation	Crisis Negotiation and transition Institutional Consolidation
Most likely outcome:	Viable democracy	Pseudo- or delegative democracy

Social Actors and Democratization

Slight differences and/or overlappings notwithstanding, four general sets of actors are involved in practically every democratic transition. What differs from one case to another, and what eventually determines the nature and overall direction of the transition, is the exact point in the transition process at which each actor becomes involved, and the cultural as well as institutional ties each has with a larger constituency it claims to represent. The four actors are intellectuals, who at first act as representatives of the larger society; specific political actors from the state; various other state institutions, whose influence may not be direct but is nevertheless consequential; and social institutions, on whose behalf intellectuals claim to be acting. In one form or another, each of these actors are found in almost every transition process (Table 6.2).

The ties that intellectuals have with the rest of society are an important determinant of the precise nature of a democratic transition. In transitions that are brought about as a result of pressure from below, where intellectuals have spearheaded an increasingly popular social movement to overturn the dictatorial state, intellectuals possess unusually strong ties to the rest of society. These ties, more than anything else, are cultural and valuative; the intellectuals' call for political democracy has real and tangible meaning for the rest of the social classes they address. The intellectuals are, put differently, operating within a civil society, where their calls for democracy are occurring simultaneous with a democratically hospitable social and cultural transformation of society as well. *Ad hoc,* unofficial groups spring up at the grass-roots level – the New Forum in the former East Germany, Solidarity in Poland, Mothers of Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, Base Ecclesiastical Communities (CEBs) throughout Latin America – and make the abstract ideal of democracy a tangible, or at least reachable, reality at the local level. As the Solidarity and the "Beer Drinkers' Party" in Poland show, some of these grassroots movements go on to become actual political parties in the democratic era. It is this crucial axiom of civil society that turns successful democratic transitions initiated from below into viable democracies. At a time when intellectuals are pressing for democratic openings, society is also undergoing its own democratic transformation of sorts, and the two

Table 6.2 Nature and chronological involvement of transition actors

Viable democratic transitions		
intellectuals	→	grassroots movements and political parties political
actors	→	weakened, eager to compromise
state institutions	→	(military, political parties, etc.) willing to negotiate
social institutions	→	(religion, family, etc.) democratizing and/or democratized
Pseudo-democratic and delegative transitions		
political actors	→	compelled to reform
intellectuals	→	seeking democracy; weak ties to the masses
state institutions	→	retain many privileges and non-democratic traits
social institutions	→	not always fully democratized

complement and reinforce one another. The emerging democratic system cannot help but to have a strong social and cultural component.

If the widespread prevalence of democratic ideals are important before and during the transition process, they are all the more so after democracy has been politically institutionalized, especially in cases where the non-democratic state itself took the lead in handing over power. The tenets of political culture, democratic or otherwise, do not emerge on their own and independently and are contingent on several variables. These variables include political economy, the choices and capabilities of the new political elite, political history and degree of past experience with democracy, and such other contingent factors as political geography and transnational cultural forces. A political system acquires widespread and resonant popular legitimacy when it delivers on the promises for which it stands and keeps up with the political and economic expectations of the politically relevant classes. The pursuit of neo-liberal market reforms – necessitated by the ruinous results of years of import-substitution industrialization or state-led capitalist policies – often greatly jeopardize the legitimacy of the newly-democratic states.[43] Many of the new democracies of South America have brought with them real declines in standards of living for most lower and middle classes, have removed former protectionist barriers that helped insulate small and medium-sized industries from international competition, and have completely washed their hands of any policies aimed at helping the burgeoning armies of the poor and the indigent.[44] In the long run, the

successful implementation of anti-inflationary measures and steady improvements in economic output and growth may restore popular confidence in the system and help expedite the popularization of democratic ideals. This has evidently happened in Brazil and Chile, where the overall economic picture has improved and the democratic state has withstood several challenges from within and without. In the short run, however, the *Fujimorismo* phenomenon is a real possibility not only in Peru (where it is an actual reality) but also in places like Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and most countries of Central America.[45] The fragile economies of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine pose similar fundamental challenges to the cultural consolidation of democratic norms in the post-Soviet era in each of these new republics.[46] But further west, in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and to a lesser extent Bulgaria, the steady pouring in of Western investments and financial assistance have reinforced popular desires not only to be anti-communist but to become more like the West European cousins.

This relates directly to the transnational influence of political norms and values. In today's world, or at least in the non-Muslim world where religion is not being politically used as an all-encompassing source of identity, most people consider it fashionable to be called democrats. Even in places where real and meaningful democracy has yet to be consolidated, as in parts of Eastern Europe and Latin America, political leaders and policy-makers strive to portray a national image of affluence and democracy on par with Western Europe. Soft power seems to have had its most compelling effect in the global currency of democratic norms and ideals.[47] This is frequently reinforced by romanticized images of an indigenous democratic golden age that once existed and by the living memories of an authoritarian nightmare that was reality only a few years ago.

Domestic political performance is an equally consequential legitimizing agent, as corruption and nepotism can not only threaten the legitimacy of the new holders of power but make the public question the wisdom of the entire political system. Similarly, the strategic choices that elites make in the post-transition era about how responsive to remain to grassroots pressures from below and how much of a democratic role model to present themselves to the rest of society are crucially important in the overall

perceptions of the population toward the larger, democratic system. Are the elites more interested in maintaining power or in upholding democratic principles if the two come into conflict? Are they willing to abide by the rules of the democratic game or are they not above resorting to some of the dirty tricks for which the old elite was infamous? All of these are areas from which the larger population can take its cue and in turn internalize, or at least be influenced by, the norms that seem to govern the political behavior of those in power.

Conclusion

The cultural consolidation of democracy in post-transition democracies is one of the major areas where future research needs to explore further. Although few of the structural, political and economic aspects of democratic transitions remain unexplored, the social and cultural dynamics at work in pre- and post-transition democratic polities have been largely overlooked by the major theorists in the field. Examining the choices that elites and actors make, or systemic economic successes and failures, or class and international forces all tell us much about some of the most important aspects of the possibilities for democratic opening and/or reversal. But such perspectives overlook the equally significant contributions that norms and cultural values make in compelling social actors to seek after and act on their democratic ideals, and, if they succeed in getting rid of the nondemocratic state, to either hold on to those ideals and popularize them or to abandon them altogether.

This chapter has argued that cultural forces are an important component of the transition to democracy, either before the actual transition process is set into motion, or after the transition is complete, or in both phases. A successful democratic transition does not simply end with careful and nonviolent negotiations, even if state institutions are genuine in their intent to relinquish power to groups having emerged from grassroots movements. That merely signals the end of the *transition* process. It does not signify the continued operation and integrity of a representative, democratic polity. It is fully conceivable for a democratic transition to take place and for previously authoritarian political

structures to become democratic. But such a transition process in itself does not give currency to the spirit of democracy among all social actors or even among only those who are charged with articulating society's larger demands (intellectuals). A democratic political culture – conditioned by the political and economic performance of the new elite, historical considerations, and elite choices – must evolve and complement the political and institutional characteristics of the new system. Without such a popular, cultural base for the legitimacy of the new state, the incoming system is likely to be semi-democratic at best. A true, viable democracy is as culturally grounded as it is politically free and representative.

Notes

1 See, for example, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (eds) 1990: 1–37; Shin 1994: 135–70; Diamond 1993: 1–33.
2 Zhang 1994: 108–9.
3 Di Palma 1990: 35.
4 Przeworski 1991: 136.
5 Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 158–9.
6 Ake 1993: 75.
7 Pérez-Diaz 1995: 103.
8 See, for example, Budge and McKay (eds) 1994; Gellner 1994; Hall 1995; Tester 1992, to mention only a few books on the topic.
9 Pérez-Diaz 1995: 83.
10 Gellner 1994: 103.
11 Kamrava 1996: 162.
12 Ibid.: 164.
13 Gellner 1994: 105.
14 Ibid.: 101. Gellner's arguments in this regard are much more thorough and complex than can be done justice to in the context of the present chapter. Briefly, Gellner considers the development of a modern, homogeneous culture as a natural by-product of the emergence of "the modular man", someone who is changeable, unbound to uncompromising, non-rationalized rituals and traditions, adaptable in outlook and social

functions to the changing realities of social desires and political roadblocks. For more see, ibid.: 97–108, especially 99–101.

15 Fascist Italy and bureaucratic–authoritarian Latin America remind us that, unlike present-day Germany, corporatism is not always democratic.

16 See especially Huntington 1991: 110–74; and Di Palma 1990: 103–4.

17 Huntington 1991: 124.

18 Welch 1993: 85.

19 For a brief survey of the revolutions of 1989 see Mason 1992: 54–67.

20 Brown 1989: 387–404.

21 As of this writing in early 1996, Algeria has been plunged into a costly civil war, with scores having been killed by FIS commandos and in clashes between government soldiers and FIS supporters.

22 Kedouri 1992: 140–2, 147–8.

23 Seddon 1993: 11.

24 "President Elect Aleksander Kwasniewksi", *Donosy.* No. 1707 (Monday, November 20, 1995), p. 1.

25 Giddens 1991: 209–10.

26 Compare, for example such books by British authors as Budge and McKay (eds) 1994; Gellner 1994 and Hall (ed.) 1995 with Americans like Dahl 1989; Di Palma 1990 and Huntington 1991.

27 See O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (eds) 1986).

28 Schmitter 1986: 9.

29 Sunar and Sayari 1986: 186.

30 In Eastern Europe, Rumania and Albania are also in the same predicament after their respective democratic transitions. See Brown 1991: 199–220; 221–45.

31 For more on this point see Cakir 1994.

32 White, Gardner and Schopflin 1987: 20–1.

33 See Bayart 1993: 242–52.

34 Harik 1987: 22–3.

35 Mason 1992: 37.

36 Levine 1988: 253.

37 Michta 1994: 12.

38 Pérez-Diaz 1995: 82.

39 Kamrava 1993: 160–3.

40 Ibid.: 162.

41 Kamrava 1992: 27–8.
42 Huntington 1991: 124–5.
43 Przeworski 1991: 136.
44 Mainwaring 1995: 145.
45 Karen Remmer argues the opposite, maintaining that "Latin America is not merely experiencing another episode in a cycle of democratic and authoritarian alterations, but has instead entered a distinctive historical phase in which broad electoral participation and respect for oppositional rights have become widespread and relatively durable features of the political landscape". See Remmer "Democratization in Latin America", in Slater, Schutz and Dorr (eds) 1993: 107. Mainwaring disagrees, maintaining that "democratic institutions are not only weak in Brazil, but, though to a lesser degree, in Argentina as well. So long as this situation remains, the prospects for the further consolidation of democracy are in doubt". Mainwaring 1995: 114–15.
46 Motyl 1993: 63–4.
47 Nye 1990: 190–1.

Conclusion

In the preceding pages and chapters, this book has tried to demonstrate the interconnected nature of culture and politics. From whatever angle or perspective it is viewed, politics is essentially a human endeavor, and man is by nature a social animal whose actions are guided by norms, values, symbols and other cultural products.[1] By its very nature, politics cannot help but be influenced by the forces of culture. Yet the inverse of the relationship is just as strong, for culture itself is also subject to influences coming from domestic and international sources of power. These influences may emanate from the state, or from multinational agencies or corporations, or assume the forms of hard or soft powers exerted by another state. People's thoughts and values are influenced by what they read and see, by their travels and experiences, by their own creative imagination and by their exposure to cultures other than their own. Each of these experiences is innately tied to the exercise of power in general and that of state power in specific. State may not always be able to contain the inherent changeability of culture, but they can, at the very least, influence the general direction of the change and use the variety of means at their disposal to encourage the spread of some values and symbols and discourage others.

The relationship between politics and culture is all the more pronounced and direct in the Third World. For a variety of historical, political and economic reasons, most of the states of the Third World rely on bases of legitimacy that are rather fragile and easily subject to challenges from within and from abroad. This is true even in cases in

which "people power" is heralded as the state's main guiding force – i.e., in inclusionary polities, whose policies of inclusion are inherently impermanent and transitory – and of newly established democracies, where the imperatives of neo-liberal economic reform often undermine the public's belief in the desirability of the new era. Throughout the Third World, consequently, culture and politics have a much more pointed and mutually reinforcing relationship than is the case in most Western societies. Third World states often look to culture as an additional – in some cases primary – source of legitimacy and popular support as a substitute for their otherwise lackluster economic and/or political performances. At the same time, the relatively weak basis of institutional power makes the state more directly vulnerable to influences brewing within society, many of which are often derived from cultural forces and dynamics. A thorough conception of Third World politics cannot be understood, therefore, without attention to the cultural forces at work within the polity itself or influencing it from abroad.

It is little wonder that political leaders in the Third World have expanded so much of their energy and attention to cultural matters, often trying, without much lasting success, to mold the culture of their society according to models they themselves appreciated. Perhaps the most striking of these leaders was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who from about 1920 until his death in 1938 sought to transform Turkey into a profoundly secular, modern republic. Atatürk in turn inspired a number of lesser deities who tried to follow his footsteps, but whose record is even spottier than his. Eastern Turkey was left out of Atatürk's modernization scheme, and some seven decades after his death, Turks went to the polls and voted an Islamist party to power. Religion, it seems, has a long way to go before it leaves the hearts and minds of Turks. Next door to Turkey, Ayatollah Khomeini made it his mission to do in Iran the exact opposite of what Atatürk had done in Turkey, and his crusade to instill the love of Islam in Iranian hearts has lasted well after his own mortal life. However, countless lives and untold bloody campaigns later, the average Iranian still lines up to catch a glimpse of the decadent Western movies on satellite television. Despite the best of government efforts, most Iranians keep coming up with the most

ingenious ways of making sure their access to Western, non-religious, or even anti-religious cultural products are uninterrupted. Culture, as I have argued throughout this book, cannot be easily expunged or remade altogether, and yet it is not completely independent either. Huntington has summed it up succinctly:

> Political leaders imbued with the hubris to think that they can fundamentally reshape the culture of their societies are destined to fail. While they can introduce elements of Western culture, they are unable permanently to suppress or to eliminate the core elements of their indigenous culture. Conversely, the Western virus, once it is lodged in another society, is difficult to expunge. The virus exists but is not fatal; the patient survives but is not whole.[2]

By the same token, culture is not a maker or breaker of an emerging politics of civilizations. Culture, as Chapter 3 argued, does influence politics, but that influence occurs in conjunction with the forces of economics, international factors, political culture and historical predicaments. Culture influences the state, but Chapter 5 demonstrated that this influence is far from unidimensional and one-way. And, as examined in Chapter 6, culture can greatly influence the outcome of a phenomenon as historic and monumental as democratization, but, again, this influence is contingent on a host of other, non-cultural dynamics. Culture, in other words, is an inseparable aspect of politics – especially in the Third World – but its precise role and influence is contingent on the circumstance within which it finds itself. Politics and culture are intertwined. Neither is strong enough to exist completely autonomous of the other, nor are they so weak as to be dominated and shaped anew by the other. At the macrolevel of political analysis, neither culture nor politics ought to be studied independent of one another. Instead, attention should be paid to the more comprehensive and nuanced interaction between the two, to cultural politics.

Notes

1 Aronson 1984.
2 Huntington 1996: 154.

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