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Edited by

Peter Beyer
& Lori Beaman

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INTRODUCTION

Peter Beyer & Lori Beaman

Globalization and Religion

In the late 1980s, globalization was still not a very common word in any language. Its use was more or less restricted to relatively specialized debates in the world of business and in certain corners of the (Western) social sciences. Since then, the term has reached the status of a worldwide buzzword, a kind of value-laden mantra by which a wide variety of people in various walks of life and in most regions of the globe mean a great many different, and sometimes contradictory, things. We have become accustomed to hearing about the 'age of globalization' as a way to describe our current era. Globalization, it almost seems, is about everything, and everything has something to do with globalization. Given this proliferation of the concept, it is perhaps surprising that religion has been *comparatively* neglected in the many debates and in the by now unmanageably vast literature on the topic; at least in the sense that religion does not very often seem to be about globalization nor globalization about religion. To be sure, people who speak from a religious perspective and with religious motivation are well represented in the massed choirs that sing about globalization, but for the most part their voices address the effects of globalization and how religion should respond to globalization. Religion, it seems, is somehow 'outside' looking at globalization as problem or potential. There are, of course, exceptions to this pattern, and many of the authors contributing to this volume are among those who have written explicitly about how religion is an integral aspect of what globalization is all about. It may also be that the literature that does so is now increasing significantly. Indeed, this volume may be one symptom of that changing situation. Nonetheless, during the roughly two decades that globalization has risen to its currently iconic status, religion as irrelevant or as outsider to whatever globalization might mean has been the prevailing orientation, with one exception: 'fundamentalism'.

Although this short introduction cannot be the place to provide a detailed justification, it is entirely arguable that the rise of globalization

discussions—which in their early social scientific and business forms began roughly, and with various antecedents, in the very early 1980s—coincided with the rise to prominence of religious movements tagged 'fundamentalisms'. Here the New Christian Right in the United States and the Islamic revolution in Iran take pride of place as the first notable episodes, as the bellwethers or harbingers of a trend that has not abated since the arrival of both of these in the late 1970s. Such 'fundamentalisms' have indeed been part of many contributions to globalization debates that otherwise ignore religion. Of significance in that inclusion, however, is that the word, fundamentalism, carries with it a kind of exclusionary and usually pejorative denotation of something that is somehow problematic, often negative, and thereby a kind of aberration for which, at the very least, one needs to 'account'. Even when it is included as a symptom or a dimension of globalization, therefore, religion seems to be something that doesn't quite belong or that is a 'reaction against' and thus still basically 'outside'.

In this volume, none of the contributions is directly, let alone primarily, about these so-called fundamentalisms. The topic does come up rather frequently, of course, but not as one of the main issues when it comes to the question of religion and globalization. The reasons for this absence are, in part, that analyses of movements and developments often labelled as fundamentalist can easily be found elsewhere; there is no need to redo or repeat them here. A weightier reason, however, is that religion and more broadly what one might call 'the religious' is implicated in the processes of globalization in far more complex and multi-dimensional ways than a relatively simple concept like fundamentalism can possibly convey. Indeed, a focus on fundamentalism would probably only serve to continue to obscure that complexity, even though the facet which it emphasizes, the implication of the religious in the political, is without question one of the important questions in the globalization/religion nexus. The contested meaning of globalization constitutes another aspect of its complexity. This takes the shape of a continuum ranging from complete denial of its existence to a tendency to frame all analytical possibilities in terms of globalization. This continuum and its myriad forms intersect with contested concepts in the social scientific study of religion, such as secularization, lived religion, and deinstitutionalization, to render 'religion and globalization' a complex, fascinating, and sometimes frustrating field of study.

Accordingly, the number of chapters included in this volume is quite high and was at the beginning of the project intended to be even

higher. The articulation of religion and the religious with globalization, if we are to appreciate it in more than a superficial way, requires a variety of approaches that cannot be reduced to only one or two indicative developments, dominant trends or organizing factors such as, for instance, fundamentalism, secularization, resurgence, resistance, de-institutionalization, theologization, or westernization. The division of the contributions into four parts is one way of organizing the multi-dimensional character of the different approaches. Thus part one includes chapters that focus more on overarching aspects, including the possibly religious character of globalization processes (Robertson, Thomas), the need to reassess or at least keep open our ideas of what actually counts as religious and as religion in the contemporary context (McGuire, Casanova), and the complex question of boundaries or the delimitation of the religious that understanding religion in globalization involves (Warburg, Simpson). Part two unites contributions that address various issues having to do with the place and form of institutional or conventional religion in the context of globalization. Here are chapters that focus on the boundaries between the institutional and the non-institutional (Spickard, Bouma), on forms of institutional religion (Arweck, Beyer, Boli & Brewington), and on the articulation of institutional religion in the core historical transformations that have brought us to our contemporary globalized situation (Turner, Campbell). The third and fourth parts could almost have been expanded at will. The third contain essays that examine the core question of religion and globalization in terms of various specific themes, including environmental concerns (Kearns), religion-state relations (Beaman, Richardson), global migration (Wilkinson, Maduro), social marginalization (Maduro), and opposition to globalization (Stahl). Theses themes are, however, somewhat selective and one could have imagined chapters on a variety of additional topics, including war/violence, women, and religion-economy relations, among others. The fourth part takes a regional approach. Issues involving religion and globalization appear differently depending on where in the world one is. Place still matters even in a world that is in some other respects deterritorialized. Accordingly, the sorts of question that are most salient differ significantly depending on whether one is observing in Japan and Korea (Inoue), in sub-Saharan Africa (Adogame), in Latin America (Freston), in South Asia (Saha, Ramji), in the Middle East (Pace) or in Europe (Riis). These regional perspectives could also have been multiplied, and indeed, embedded in some of the chapters elsewhere in the book, are analysis that take regions

such as Canada, the United States, Australia, and China as empirical reference.

Our strategy for addressing the core question of the ways that religion and the religious is an integral aspect of globalization and not an 'outside' respondent or victim, has thus been multi-dimensional. While we have not done this religion by religion, several of the contributions do in effect, if not in intention, take that form. This concerns the so-called world religions in particular. Although Saha focuses on Hinduism and Ramji on Islam, these are done more in following a regional strategy of looking at globalization and religion from South Asia. All other chapters, even when preoccupied with one religion much more than others, try to address their topics, if only in a more minor way, with reference to different religions and different forms of religiosity. That said, there is *de facto* a noticeable emphasis in a great many of the chapters on Christianity. This characteristic deserves some comment.

To the degree that contemporary globalization is the outcome of a long historical process that includes the history of European and Western projection of its power around the entire globe, it should not be at all surprising that the dominant religion of these Westerners, Christianity, has been an integral part of the story. The Christian religion reformed, restructured, and expanded geographically not only along with Western expansion, but more critically as a vital part of that expansion. That fact alone makes it almost inevitable that it will play a salient role in the majority of analyses centering on the relation between religion and globalization. It explains, for instance, why the chapters on certain regions like Latin America and sub-Saharan, not to mention Europe and North America, are largely, but by no means exclusively about forms of Christian religion. It reverberates through the chapters on various institutional considerations, such as Boli & Brewington's chapter on religious organizations, where Christian organizations dominate numerically and over hundreds of years; or Beyer's chapter which explicitly asks about the degree to which the Christian religion does or does not serve as a kind of global model for all religions to follow; or Campbell's chapter on how phases of globalization have been reflected and expressed in religious developments. Other contributions that fall under this heading would be thematic ones like Kearns' chapter on religious environmentalism, Stahl's on anti-globalization trends, or Maduro's and Wilkinson's chapters that have Pentecostal churches as their empirical focus because they illustrate the themes of marginalization and global flows so well.

In the final analysis, no volume of this nature can do justice to all the important aspects of its topic. We have perhaps put a significant emphasis on the hegemonic aspects of religion's role in globalization, but not to the point of ignoring questions of resistance, reverse flows, and reciprocal influences. Still, there are other stories that need to be told, from the perspective of different issues, yet more regions and subregions, and other religions. What we present here, however, makes a concerted attempt at addressing a good number of the significant possibilities, and doing so with a variety of interpretative strategies. Overall, the effect should be to allow the reader to appreciate just how little sense it makes to continue to try to understand either religion or globalization in today's world in some sort of splendid isolation from one another, as if one and the other did not belong in the same discursive space. Like capitalism and the nation-state, religion and religiousness are an integral aspect of whatever we mean by globalization—unless arbitrarily delimited to the contrary—and have been since its inception, wherever and whenever this is located.

PART ONE

THEORETICAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

GLOBAL MILLENNIALISM: A POSTMORTEM ON SECULARIZATION

Roland Robertson

[T]he eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility
Albert Einstein, quoted in Parsons, 1978:357

Entry

This chapter is an attempt to contribute both to the general theory of globalization and to the theory of religion. Specifically, the secularization thesis is dismissed here as being a modern Western myth, within the context of elaboration of ideas concerning the present phase of the overall globalization process. Since the present author's scheme of the phases of globalization was first produced (Robertson and Chirico, 1985; Robertson, 1992; Robertson, 1995b), it has been found necessary to speak of phases other than those that occurred before the fifteenth century. In fact, during the past ten years or so the author has become increasingly convinced that there were much earlier phases of globalization (e.g. Robertson, 1998a; Robertson and Inglis, 2004; Inglis and Robertson, 2004). This will not detain us here. It should, however, be said that introducing even earlier phases has raised all sorts of questions about the place of religion in the overall globalization process.

In any case, it is argued here that the contemporary phase of globalization is one with very distinctive religious overtones, and it is in this context that the secularization thesis is strongly opposed, largely for reasons having specifically to do with globalization (Robertson, 1985a, 1987, 1993; Robertson and Chirico, 1985).

The Millennial Phase of Globalization

Elsewhere in this volume, Campbell has made an impressive attempt to map the phases of globalization and the religious aspects thereof much more specifically than I have done. In the present chapter my

concern is to deal with the issue of religion in a rather different way. I regard the phase of globalization in which we now live as having a distinctively religious characteristic in its own right. Specifically, I think of the present phase as being the *millennial* phase, dating particularly from September 11, 2001, adding this to my previous model (Robertson, 1992: 57–60) of the phases of globalization. In numerous parts of the world, but particularly in the Muslim regions thereof and in virtually all of the areas westward, there has been much rhetoric of an apocalyptic eschatological kind. There has been what Simon Pearson (2006) cogently describes as "an extraordinary resurgence of Christian and Muslim apocalyptic beliefs". Pearson dates the onset of "the apocalyptic age" to the late 1970s. In fact, many around this time were predicting that, as we approached the end of the second millennium, there would be an outbreak of apocalyptic declarations and movements. And there arose in the mid-1970s the 'peculiar' alliance between American-Christian Zionism and Israeli-Jewish Zionism (Robertson, 1988; Robertson and Mouly, 1985), an alliance that had distinctively millennial features. Additionally, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 could well be said to have been the very beginning of recent millennial Islamic militancy against the West and its so-callled imperialism.

Nonetheless, a global sense of doom has, I suggest, been a little slower to develop than that. Pearson's argument that 9/11 was "the great apocalyptic act of our times" is much more to the point (2006: 1–18). Since the turn of the century we have indeed been living at a time when an end-of-the-world "*feel*" exists in much of the world and people talk increasingly of the real possibility that the world—at least, as we have come to know it—is in a state of demise. Pearson's recent book carries the title "The End of the World: From Revelation to Eco-Disaster" and this neatly indicates much of my own view of what is occurring on a global scale.

I thus begin the present contribution by outlining the ways in which the notion of millennialism can be comprehensively applied to what I have elsewhere called the global field (Robertson and Chirico, 1985; Robertson, 1992: 27–31). The global field consists, in its most general terms, of the following: nation-states; individual selves; the international system; and humanity. I will consider each of these components with reference to the theme of millennialism.

In using the latter term I am leaning primarily in a premillennial, as opposed to postmillennial, direction. Premillennialism embraces doctrines that espouse belief in the imminent end of the world as we

know it and that divine, at least supramundane, intervention will precede such a termination, to be followed by a form of paradise or utopia. On the other hand, postmillennialism involves a belief that the world has to change dramatically along utopian lines in preparation for the coming of a messianic 'force'. Even though I am considering the present phase of globalization in terms of its millennial characteristics, I want to emphasize that I am not here speaking in anything more than loosely theological terms. Moreover, space limitations preclude even touching upon the vast anthropological and sociological literature on millennialism that emerged in the 1960s, probably commencing with Norman Cohn's *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, first published in 1957 (Cohn, 1993; 2001).[1]

In considering globalization in this way I may appear to be veering away from the basically secular way in which the globalization debate has thus far been conducted (cf. Beyer, 1994). This debate has involved *relatively* little mention of religion, even though it was in the contexts of religious studies and the sociology of religion that globalization was first thoroughly thematized thirty or more years ago, i.e. well before the widespread use of the term after the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989. In any case, the rapid march of the rhetoric of globalization has grossly underplayed the 'religiocultural' factor. Indeed, many books and articles on globalization entirely omit this factor. However, as will be shown in the following, this highly regrettable omission has become extremely tenuous in the last few years. In this connection it should be noted that there have been previous occasions when a dramatic occurrence has had a very wide, near-global impact. An outstanding example of this is provided by the Lisbon earthquake of 1755. As Neiman (2002) has admirably shown, this event profoundly altered the course of Western

[1] Much of the relevant literature on millennialism is discussed in Lincoln (2006: 77–92) and Robertson (1985: 236–265). Shortly before this article was completed Smith (2007) published a very relevant book that emphasizes the strongly millennial elements in American foreign policy. Smith cogently insists on the ways in which the Bush administration of recent years actually inherited much of its millennial tendencies from previous democratic regimes. It is useful to note that millennial orientations are creeping into some of the most "secular" forms of globalization theory. A good example of this is in the recent work of Held (2007). It also needs to be said that the so-called neo-liberals' conception of the utopian benefits of globewide capitalism clearly has millennial overtones. Insofar as rational choice theory in religious studies and sociology can be classified as basically neo-liberal, then it too falls into the category of millennialism. Indeed, one might go further and suggest that secularization theory in its strong form envisages a utopian world uncontaminated by religion!

philosophy. The Lisbon earthquake was indeed "earth shaking", but its consequences were, at least in its immediate aftermath, not what one would now describe as *global*. Having said this, one cannot underestimate its effects on philosophy—as well as theology—with respect to thinking about theodicy. Neiman (2002) compares the intellectual consequences of Lisbon, 1755 with those of Auschwitz. Since Auschwitz there have, of course, been a number of mass murders or genocides that have, in cumulative effect, amounted to a crisis with respect to our thinking about the future of life on earth. In any case, Auschwitz, as well as the rape of Nanking, have been globalized in recent decades.

How, then, does the characterization of the present phase of globalization as millennial relate specifically to the global field? In the first place, much of the rhetoric of the so-called war on terror clearly has centred upon eschatological conceptions deriving from Jewish, Christian and Islamic sources. It should be noted, however, that eschatological motifs have been globally diffused well outside Abrahamic spheres (Juergensmeyer, 1993; 2000). In this process of diffusion, millennial tendencies have increasingly been linked to nationalism, although one would certainly not wish to entirely attribute to diffusion the millennial tendencies that one increasingly finds outside of Abrahamic spheres. Much of non-Abrahamic millennialism has developed relatively autonomously.

The complex ways in which the great tensions among the Abrahamic religions are deeply implicated in the terror war are obvious in general outline, although open to a variety of interpretations in their specifics. The main point is that much of the rhetoric of world politics has indeed centred upon millennial visions. Although, undoubtedly, contemporary tensions in *international relations* have much to do with material resources, national interests, personal greed, and so on, the fact remains that many of these phenomena themselves directly relate to the millennial theme. This is most evident in the current concern with what Pearson (2006: 258–290) labels "eco-disaster". There is no need here to rehearse the all too familiar issues of global warming, climate change and the greatly accelerating oil crisis, not to speak of the fast approaching crisis concerning water. Furthermore, since the publication of Pearson's book there has been an escalation of apocalyptic, global talk with respect to climate change. The degree to which the more dramatic of the claims as to considerable climate change are plausible is not relevant to the present argument. Whether or not there has been much 'Hollywoodisation' of the claims is, on the whole, beside the point.

The essential consideration is that the climate of *fear* is growing quickly in many parts of the world. In fact, it could be reasonably argued, in a global sense, that fear is the paramount emotion of our time. Fear feeds millennial thinking.

The apparently reactive announcement by President Bush soon after September 11, 2001 that the USA was engaged in a *crusade*—against what some came to call 'Islamic Fascism'—marked the full onset of millennial-global politics, even though elements of this had been somewhat latent during the long world war of 1914 to 1945. The space created by the end of global communism allowed the messianism inherent in the American Creed to blossom and find its Other in Islam (Lieven, 2004: 48–222; Harrington, 1986; Gray, 2007). So much, then, for *some* of the international-relations components of the global field (cf. Berger, 1999). It should be added that, notwithstanding the clearly millennial elements of the Chinese Revolution of 1949, much of the Eastern embrace of *long-term* change—as opposed to the 'impatience' of Occidental conceptions of change—is really the flip-side of the Occidental world view, a strategy of 'waiting it out' while the rest of the world is engulfed in apocalyptic politics. Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that the Tamil Tigers were among the first in the modern era to employ what are currently called suicide bombers, while religious millennialism has often been just below the surface of Chinese communism. Of particular relevance here is Lincoln's cogent discussion of the ways in which religions of resistance become religions of revolution (Lincoln, 2006: 62–92). It would be misleading, however, to overlook the present signs of rapidly growing peasant discontent in the Chinese countryside, discontent which could crystallize in millennial ways.

Turning now to the *nation-state* component, it is easy to see how national security has become almost an apocalyptic issue. The close link between security and alterity is particularly evident at the present time. The notion of 'stranger-danger' is now applicable almost as much to the nation-state—and relations between states—as it is to children at school and at play (its original modern meaning). This has led to a considerable expansion of the range of topics discussed under the heading of security (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998; Hough, 2004). Security, particularly in the wake of 9/11, now embraces not only national security in the traditional, politicomilitary-centered manner, but also cultural, social, economic, psychological and other aspects. The two best examples of this are the globe wide concern with the preservation and production of national cultures, identities and traditions,

on the one hand and, on the other, the closely related hysteria about immigration and, indeed, the 'contamination' of national 'essence' by waves of migration. Ever since 9/11 the notion of the national state of emergency has been strongly on the agenda of most nation-states around the world. Indeed, the idea of the *risk society has been turned into a political justification* for extraordinary legislation and state action. Many have argued that this has been done to the detriment of human rights, even as a deliberate attempt to undermine the latter. The widespread debate about the meaning and consequences of multiculturalism has sharpened apocalyptic talk, with specific reference to religious inclusion and exclusion. As the nation-state becomes "tighter" in a highly compressed world there arises a tendency toward national theocracies (Robertson, 1989b, Phillips, 2006). In fact it has been argued in some detail that there is an empirically discernible trend of this kind across much of the contemporary world (Robertson, 2007). This trend is currently much in evidence in the UK and in a number of Middle Eastern countries, but the socio-cultural, globalizing constraints to bring forth updated versions of the old theocratic form of society are strong.[2]

Third, let us briefly consider the *individual self* with respect to the theme of millennialism. Although one cannot in this particular case generalize easily on a worldwide basis it seems, nonetheless, that risk has become a particularly strong feature of individual living in our time (Beck, 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). In addition, much of the lifestyles of individuals are certainly apocalyptic, if one is fully conscious of the enormous risks that young people, in particular, take with respect to unprotected and exhibitionist sex, the consumption of alcohol and illicit drugs and their general sense of 'hopeless' abandon. One should quickly add that current health fads, notably obsessions with diet and alternative/complementary therapies, might appear to run against the grain of enthusiastic risk-taking. In fact, however, these phenomena are

[2] As the world becomes increasingly compressed, with particular regard to nation-states, so do national histories come increasingly into conflict with each other and the trend towards presenting such histories as being rooted in the distant past grows more intense. This, surely, is one of the reasons why religion is currently being granted so much attention. At the same time, there is undoubtedly an increasing interest in global—or world—history. The relation between national and rival world histories is a growing subject of interest of intellectual concern. Again, religion inevitably enters the picture, not least because it was during the so-called axial age that there was a remarkable growth—at least among religious elites—in global consciousness. The axial age witnessed, as Jaspers (1953) argued, the rise of the major 'world religions'.

merely two sides of the same coin. The one embraces "deadly worlds" (Lemert and Elliot, 2006), while the other can be seen as a fearful recognition that we do indeed live in a deadly world. Closely bound-up with such matters is the crucial problem of self-identity. The latter has, in fact, become increasingly a matter of state regulation, notably because of the hysteria concerning the clash of religious faiths (Sen, 2006). The state management of personal identity is coterminous with theocratic trends across much of the world, occasioned by the accelerating connectivity that is a major feature of globalization (Robertson, 2006). A particular example of this is the way in which the British government is attempting to stipulate, in great detail, the upbringing of children from birth, and even making extensive proposals concerning the future psychological, as well as physiological, characteristics of human beings throughout their life-cycle. From yet another angle, it can be seen that much of the concern with the reconstruction of identities—including bodies—has a millennial tone about it. The reconstruction of the self is a truly major feature of contemporary life, even though at the moment it is more or less confined to the relatively affluent (Hankiss, 2006).

The fourth component of the global field is that of *humanity*. Here millennial features are, perhaps, most evident. Global warming, climate change and other threats to human life have already been mentioned, to which may be added other kinds of potential disaster, including pandemics. The 'man made' proliferation of a number of types of weapons of mass destruction is particularly alarming, although confirming the beliefs of those who think of the present as the 'end-time'. Usually, these days, it is American 'fundamentalists' who spring to mind in this regard and their strong links with right wing Israelis is very obviously of global significance. However, one must not overlook the large number of millennial movements that are to be found around the world. After all, the Church of Latter Day Saints (Mormons) is one of the fastest growing religious organizations in the world, while there are numerous others—for example, Jehovah's Witnesses and the Unification Church (Moonies).[3]

On the other side of the coin, there is in different parts of the world an increasing concern with the extinction, or likely extinction, of various

[3] Lincoln's work in general is an outstanding example of a scholar who is in the last analysis non-religious, but who takes religion very seriously—primarily as a form of discourse, rather than belief—and yet does not concern himself with the secularization thesis.

species of non-human life. Add to this the growing concern, at least in the West, with *the relationship between* humans and animals. Generally, the rapid development of concern with human rights that developed during the last quarter of the twentieth century has been imperilled by the millennialism of recent years, which is marked by the mounting rhetoric of eco-disaster. Needless to say, the 'signs and wonders' of actual or impending great floods and other 'natural' disasters appear to many around the world to be markers of the 'end-time'. End-time 'fundamentalism' has, of course, spread to many parts of the world—largely as a form of mainly-American religious imperialism.

Secularization, Really?

Perhaps the strangest aspect of the sociology of religion—at least in the West—is that so many people have identified themselves with this subdiscipline by proclaiming the demise of religion itself. This, in spite of the fact that a great many of the members of American organizations promoting the sociology of religion have themselves made no secret of their own religiosity. In this regard it should be emphasized that in the other major site of contemporary sociology of religion—namely, the UK—members of such organizations tend to be areligious or, indeed, atheist. Thus, it is more understandable that some of the most influential or prominent of adamant secularization theorists—such as Bryan Wilson—should have been British. However, in the case of Wilson himself, it is important to note that the idea of secularization was applied primarily to the social rather than the cultural domain. This subtlety in Wilson's work has been insufficiently appreciated (Wilson, 1982, 1985).

A recent issue of the British weekly journal, *The New Statesman* (10 April 2006), announced on its cover page that the feature topic was to be "Religion: Everything you need to know about the great issue of our time". This hardly squares with the dominant theme within the sociology of religion (nor with the kind of topic one associates with this particular, left-of-centre weekly); although one must concede that such an announcement seems more alien in Europe than it would in the USA. In any case, in the sociology of religion at large, the idea of inexorable secularization has been very prominent; notwithstanding the conspicuousness of the generalization among self-proclaimed rational-choice theorists that there is a cyclical shift from religiosity

to secularity and back. This author has for a long time resisted both versions of this view of religion. Indeed, many of the points made in the present context have been preceded in the author's work by a long and sustained attempt to push the obsession with secularization (and desecularization) to the very margins of the study of religion. The concern with secularization is in itself not without interest. In fact, it is a very intriguing aspect of Western cultural history (Robertson, 1969, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1985a, 1993; Pecora, 2006).

The comparative genealogy of the secularization thesis is a topic urgently requiring attention (Robertson, 1998b, 2000). As this author has frequently argued, the very rhetoric of secularization has been the pivotal theme in the reproduction of the identity of the sociologist of religion (at least in the West). In other words, without the concept of secularization, there could not have been anything like the sociology of religion as we know it. But its *irrelevance* to much more pressing themes of the contemporary human condition becomes exponentially obvious. Much of the obsession with the inevitability of secularization, as well as with the marginalization of the sociology of religion (Robertson, 1977, 1985b, 1989a), derives from the close relationship perceived by many sociologists between secularization and modernization. Remarking, less than cogently, that the concept of globalization will not help us, Hans Joas has nonetheless persuasively argued that the recent and blossoming study of "multiple modernities" is leading to an appreciation of the diversity of modernity. Specifically, he draws attention to long-standing religious and cultural traditions (of modernization) outside Europe and North America. On the other hand, Joas does not appear to recognize that adherence to the multiple modernities approach is not at all incompatible with—in fact is complementary with respect to—globalization theory. Joas says that we should recognize the degree to which "European or American social thinkers over-generalized European or American specificities in their approaches" (Joas, 2004: 311).

Joas goes on to say that for a long time there has been a virtual consensus among sociologists that the decline of religion has been an automatic concomitant of modernization. Recognition of the multiplicity of modernities enables us to "come to a fresh evaluation of the modernity in Europe". He does not, however, flesh out such claims (cf. Davie, 2002). This is a classic example of sociologists of religion being far too self-referential, and of 'mainstream' sociologists ignoring much of the (sequestered) work produced by sociologists of religion. While the 'war on terror' has brought religion into the position of centrality

long-desired by sociologists of religion, it has not, for the most part, involved drawing upon their insights. It is here claimed that the virtual obsession with secularization has been a major reason for proponents of the secularization thesis (and thus sociologists of religion generally) being largely neglected as religion 'returns'. This circumstance certainly compels one to the observation that the idea of secularization must now be provincialized, having limited usefulness and only then with respect to certain aspects of religious change in North America and Europe.

The ethnocentric assumption that modernization equals secularization is, indeed, one of the great shibboleths (at least, category errors) in the history of the social sciences (Pecora, 2006; Vattimo, 1992). This equation has been significantly eroded by recent trends, showing that what is commonly called 'fundamentalism' is largely promoted and sustained by very modern means. To put this in a different way, much of what is now called fundamentalism is, to all intents and purposes, an expression of an *alternative path (or paths) to modernity under conditions of heavily constraining globality* (Robertson, 1995c). To put the whole matter minimally, so-called fundamentalism is nowhere near as atavistic as it is usually declared to be. *Insofar* as it is atavistic, it would have to be labelled as *strategic* atavism—that is atavism for strategic, 'political' purposes. This conception is absolutely crucial to the comprehensive understanding of 'fundamentalism'—a concept that the present author, in any case, finds not particularly helpful in serious analysis (Robertson, 1995c).

The present argument involves other pivotal premises. First, it accepts the contention that sociology is itself a manifestation of a move away from religion. Even if it is probably better to say that the rise of sociology was a sudden leap in religious reflexivity, so much so that this leap appeared at first—and still appears to many—to be a form of secularization, a rejection of religion. Much of this has undoubtedly to do with an exaggeration of Enlightenment anti-religiosity (Habermas, 2002). In one rather misleading sense one could say that this was the basis upon which Comte erected the very discipline of sociology and placed it at the apex of all forms of scientific inquiry. In brief, for Comte where religion had been now there was sociology. *However*, Comte was to argue for the eventual *subordination of sociology to a religion of humanity.*

It has to be emphasized that one of Durkheim's major critiques of Comte was, justifiably or not, that the latter did not actually account for the existence of religion in the first place. Indeed, this argument was the subject of perhaps the greatest book ever published in the

history of the social sciences, namely Durkheim's *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1961). Durkheim showed, in a specific manner, which no one since has been able to refute, that religion was inherent in the very nature of human life itself. Without religion, no society. Durkheim's characterization of religion as *la vie sérieuse* is the most succinct expression of his standpoint, and no amount of theoretical and/or empirical work has been able to render it implausible; the implication being that, in a special sense, secularization is impossible unless one conceives of it as a form of *religious* change, as I believe it should be conceived (cf. Martin, 2005). It is insufficiently understood that Durkheim did not so much produce a theory of religion, but more a theory of society (Pecora, 2006). Put another way, he could not envisage a society without religion, an argument with which secularization theorists have singularly failed to engage.

The 'Return' of Religion

Let us turn more directly to the production and reproduction of 'religion' in the world as a whole. In brief, I am considering the issue of *global religion*—which is by no means the same as considering the variety of religions in the world. The latter is what I call the butterfly approach to globality. It is currently all too common in academia generally to consider that adding a few societies to one's frame of reference allows one to claim that one is moving in a global direction. This fallacy is one which I seek, yet again, to rectify here in specific reference to religion. Discussing religion globally involves addressing religion-in-the-world-as-a-whole. This includes an issue that is not considered here but which is of great importance—namely, the global diffusion of the very category of religion (and of the secular). An important premise of this perspective is that religion must be considered as a property of *a system* (Beyer, 2006). More often than not religion has been considered as a property of individuals or movements. The occasional argument against this kind of perspective has had relatively little impact. This can be seen in the fact that we largely talk about the ebb and flow of religion in terms of numbers of individual adherents, paying very little attention to other ways in which the presence, absence or impact of religion can be comprehensively addressed. Some of this is due to the scientistic obsession and methodolatry encouraged by funding agencies, but that is certainly not the only determinant.

The idea of secularization is just as mythological as the idea of its opposite. Or, to put it a different way, disenchantment is just as mythological as the idea of enchantment should be considered to be (Vattimo, 1992; Pecora, 2006). All religious and anti-religious talk is inherently mythological and has the characteristic of a grand narrative. To all intents and purposes, we cannot escape from the rhetoric of religion. An excellent example of this is provided by the highly—not to say fundamentalistic—anti-religion writings of the much publicized Richard Dawkins (2006a, xvii–xxi). Dawkins is involved in a 'religious' *crusade.* His is a classic example of what Hegel called subliminal thrall. He is a cognitive and an emotional victim of the very phenomenon which he opposes, a common feature of social life, but one which it is the task of 'science' to overcome. What makes matters most disturbing is that Dawkins himself seems not to have the minimum amount of reflexivity that would enable him to see that he has been 'victimized' by the very fundamentalists—particularly the creationists and intelligent designists—that he claims to oppose. In other words, he can't see that when one unreflexively opposes a set of ideas one is inevitably drawn into the very frame of reference of the proponents of those same ideas.

In exploring the principal ways in which religion is embedded in the global circumstance, it is the apparent absence for the past few hundred years, of religion from the 'official' world arena, which needs at least as much explanation as does its contemporary presence. The last 'demise' of religion was largely brought about by the calculated efforts of some of the philosophers and historians of the European and subsequent Enlightenments, such as those in Latin America and Asia, ranging from Japan in the 'Far' East, to Istanbul, Turkey in the 'close' East (cf. Delanty, 2006). The present situation is marked much more than in previous times by fundamentalistic clashes between religion and its opponents, on the one hand, and within the realms of the 'religious', on the other. However, this characterization is complicated by the strong presence of the atheistic regime of communist totalitarianism in the period lasting from about 1920 to 1990. The oft cited atheism of fascist totalitarianism is, on the other hand, a more complex phenomenon, especially in view of the quasi-religious features of Hitlerian Nazism (Lepenies, 2006).

The strength in the UK of the 'intellectualistic' diagnosis, prognosis and celebration of 'the end of religion' cannot be exaggerated. In fact, there are those British intellectuals who proclaim that a pivotal feature

of British—indeed, European—identity is atheism. Atheism has, indeed, become a new fundamentalism (cf. Grayling, 2007). The time has come for us now to investigate atheism and secularism with as much force as has been given to the cultivation of the secularization thesis. Let it not be thought that the 'rational' choice obsession with the secularization thesis in its cyclical form is thereby let off the hook. Indeed, rational choice approaches to religious change have probably done even more to sustain obsession with the secularization thesis than have the ideas of those who have directly opposed them. One can see this in the symbiotic relationship between people such as Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, on the one hand, and Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce on the other (cf. Martin, 2005). The former are, of course, rational choice theorists while the latter—particularly Bruce (1999)—are opposed to them.

Interim Considerations

1) It is transparent that in recent years religion has moved to the top of the agenda of global discourse. Many of those who have for a long time shown absolutely no interest in religious issues, and have scorned those who have, are now coming out of their own 'theological' closets and proclaiming, as if it were some great insight, that—if only in an epiphenomenal way—religion really counts. A great deal of the contemporary debate about the significance and value of religion has, undoubtedly, been occasioned by 'the clash of civilizations' in relation to the conflict between 'the West' and caliphate Islam. The latter phenomenon has, in turn, greatly exacerbated the tensions involved in so-called multiculturalism (Robertson, 2007b).

2) The very militancy of those presently mocking religious beliefs and values has itself to be examined. Specifically, the position advanced here is that 'the secularists' protest too much. Are the strong anti-religionists suppressing their own religiosity? Declaring oneself to be anti-religious has become a badge of honour in various, usually non-American, intellectual circles and one wonders why this is so. The shouts of the anti-religious are frequently focused upon the claimed affinity between religion and violence, this obviously having been largely precipitated by the global trauma previously indicated, i.e. by 'the holy terrors' (Lincoln, 2006).

3) It is now obvious that world politics and international relations are heavily bound-up with religion (Berger, 1999). This has become particularly transparent since 9/11 (and, 7/7 in the UK) that it seems virtually unbelievable that quite a few intellectuals and politicians continue to reduce religiosity to 'material' matters; although it should be said that much militant atheism appears to derive from the naive belief that religion is, paradoxically, at the heart of the present 'crisis'. The very idea that we should "lambaste religion for its barbaric history of violence and despotism" is a cherished myth of the secular left (Bunting, 2006: 29). In fact, Bunting herself has cogently mocked the clash of civilizations thesis by invoking the ways in which celebration of the unicity of humanity is manifested in the world's great museums in Germany, France, the USA, Russia and the UK (Bunting, 2007).

4) Much of the prevalence of religious rhetoric in the world as a whole is, to a significant degree, a result of the *Kulturkampf* in the USA. There has been increasing talk within the latter about a societal conflict between groups of opposing *Weltanschauungen*, the so-called culture wars (Hunter, 1992). These, it must be emphasized, have increasingly become entangled in what should be regarded as a *global* Kulturkampf. As Taylor (2006: 300) puts it, "American culture wars now endanger the planet". More is to be said, however, about the flip side of the coin—namely the ways in which extra-American circumstances have become empirically conflated with 'internal' circumstances. In other words, we should not think of this issue simply in terms of American impact on the rest of the world. We must also consider the impact of developments outside of what we normally think of as 'American' phenomena *on* America. The impact from the great tensions within Middle Eastern Islam, are evidence of this. This is a more useful and plausible way of framing an issue, which has largely been discussed in an intellectually fashionable way in terms of the idea of Pax Americana—or the American imperium (e.g. Ferguson, 2004). The USA has been, contrary to conventional wisdom, a *product* of globalization as it has been the agent of the latter and/or a global hegemony. A particularly important consideration in this regard is the culture war within Islam itself (Esposito, 2002). This culture war is not, by any means, recent (Rahman, 1982).

The idea that there cannot be true democracy in one country, but rather that there has to be globe-wide democracy for democracy to survive at all is, by no means, a neo-conservative invention. In fact,

the idea had been an extension of the very themes inherent in the French Revolution two hundred years prior to the full emergence of neo-conservatism (Lepenies, 2006: 194). As Lepenies has written it was the French, not the Americans, who concluded that "progress, liberty, and civilization must, if necessary, be implemented with force at home and abroad". Needless to say, this idea gained strong ground in France long before Alan Bloom (1987) wrote that "when we Americans speak seriously about politics we mean that our principles . . . are rational and everywhere applicable" It was only legitimate, said Bloom (quoted in Lepenies: 194) "to force those who did not accept these principles to do so". Moreover, the idea that the fate of the world was in the hands of the new American Republic was perhaps an even more European idea than it was an American one. Perhaps the most famous exponent of this position was Goethe, who thought that America was the antidote to European misery. It had no ruined castles, useless memories or fruitless brooding over its own identity (Lepenies, 2006: 191).

Let us consider Taylor's argument more closely. Perhaps his most insightful point is that "what we call secularization is a process that destabilized and marginalized earlier forms of religion" (Taylor, 2006: 281). However, he insists, that partly because of this, what he calls new forms are "now 'returning' in strength [but] are thoroughly modern, and we cannot understand either them or modernity if we ignore this" (Taylor, 2006: 281). The principal reason that he gives for this, revolves around the presumption that these reactions to what has come to be called secularization should be considered under the rubric of *mobilization*. In using the latter term he primarily refers to "a process whereby people are persuaded, pushed, dragooned or bullied into new forms of social and religious association" (Taylor, 2006: 282). This is a very important argument, not least because it draws attention away from the strong tendency to think of religious commitment simply in the form of attachments to beliefs and values, while upgrading what has for long been regarded as a secondary aspect of religious commitment. "It becomes clearer and clearer that whatever political, social, and ecclesial structures we desire must be mobilized into existence" (Taylor, 2006: 282). This move away from thinking of religion mainly in terms of beliefs and values is consonant with Asad's (1993: 27–54) view of religion as much more inclusive than belief, as defined by "the regime of truth" that has prevailed in the West, particularly since the medieval period (Lincoln, 2006: 1–8). Building upon Asad, Lincoln has defined religion in terms of four domains: *discourse, practice, community, and institution* (Lincoln, 2006: 5–7).

Taylor's perception is fully in line with a growing recognition across the world that the solidity of inherited structures and cultures is neither comfortable nor restorable. Inherited forms of living are now gone and, in a sense, the world must be made anew. While Taylor is primarily concerned with the USA, much the same could be said of the tensions within Islam. Nonetheless, such have frequently been transcended by Muslim responses to external attacks, perceived or otherwise. Very good examples are provided by the generalized Islamic response to, inter alia, Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, the Danish cartoons of Mohammed, and Pope Benedict's much publicized remarks on the history of Islam in 2006.

In this regard it is useful to invoke some comments by Peter Mandaville (2005), who portrays an emerging tension on a global scale between two versions of "caliphate Islam"—both of them virtual, what he calls rival forms of a "virtual caliphate" As Mandaville says, we now have global confrontations, or at least dialogues, between competing globalized forms of Islam. The development of transnational religion—in large part, virtual religion—has in fact made the re-establishment of caliphate institutions both more attractive and possible. Ironically, the virtualization of religious debate and conflict allows for the development of what Mandaville calls "a sustainable infrastructure for the growth and propagation of cosmopolitan traditionalism" in contrast to those Islamic movements, such as Al-Qaeda, that seek a more radical and exclusivist form of the caliphate (Mandaville, 2005).

The emphasis placed by Taylor on mobilization must, I think, be complemented by a stress on generation, in the sense of the generation of religion. In a loose sense, a connection is being made between the idea of the generation of religion and Durkheim's conception of collective effervescence (Pecora, 2006). We tend to think of religion in terms of beliefs, values, and rituals, neglecting the ebbs and flows of the more general theme of 'spirituality'. A particular interest in the present context of such ebbs and flows is to consider them in a definitely global way. In other words, we should examine and speculate upon the global circumstances that, on the one hand, enhance 'spirituality' and those which, on the other, diminish it. In the present period we live in a circumstance of global spirituality.[4]

[4] It is worth noting that in English translations much of Freud's frequent use of notions of spirituality are missing, thus giving the misleading impression that Freud stands clearly in a secular tradition.

This does not mean that across the world human beings are all becoming increasingly spiritual or religious. At a minimum, it means that human beings live, for the most part, in a world in which religion, or phenomena of family resemblance, matters a great deal. Thus, in the same way that Talcott Parsons spoke of neo-classical economics as constituting a religion (Parsons, 1979; Robertson, 1991), so we may say that the fundamentalistic atheism of Dawkins and his sympathisers are an essential part of the contemporary spiritual landscape. Put another way, Dawkins has contributed mightily to the generation of religion in our time. Karen Armstrong (2006: 35) has written that it is very misleading to think of religion as involving belief in creedal propositions. Rather, she says that "human beings have always sought what the Greeks called *ekstasis*, a 'stepping out' of the mundane, in moments when we feel deeply touched within and lifted momentarily beyond ourselves". The same can be said of the way in which anti-religious scientists, such as Dawkins (2006b) speak of "real mystery" (cf. Adams, 2006; Davies, 2006; Frayn, 2006).

Confronting Rational Choice and Secularization Theories

The deficiencies of rational choice theory have become particularly obvious, in tandem with both the density of the global circumstance in world affairs and quotidian life, and the rapidly increasing analytical concern in relation to global matters. Among the ways in which global considerations deeply affect the viability of rational choice 'theory', are the following:

1) Since much of rational choice theory rests upon a blatant celebration of America and, particularly, the superiority of its religion and its economy, one has to question it if only on these grounds. That is to say that the USA is itself a historical product of processes of globalization. Regardless of the position of the USA in the world arena, it can be said, in any case, that there is no supportable reason for the argument that the 'religious economy' of one society should be taken as paradigmatic for all. In other words, one surely has to make a serious comparison of the world's societies before one takes the decision to select only one as the wave of both the past and the future.[5]

[5] Much rational choice theory involves the celebration of Adam Smith as the first great social scientist. Lechner (2007) has effectively shown that it is highly misleading to invoke Smith as the founder of rational choice theory, given that Smith was

2) The rational choice approach to religion has singularly failed to take into account crucial cultural factors (Robertson, 1992a). Perhaps the most important of these is that religion is, particularly in the USA, a very significant 'cultural fact'. The Jeffersonian separation of church and state ensured this. For, in separating church from state Jefferson and his colleagues reified religion (as well as the state). One might well argue that it was from that fateful time that religion became established as an absolutely central—above all, cultural—feature of American life. In this regard, de Tocqueville, following Saint-Simon, effectively showed that religion was the USA's primary political institution (Robertson, 1985d). This kind of consideration makes it particularly clear that the rational choice approach is singularly misleading in concentrating upon the individual. The overriding emphasis in the rational choice approach has been upon single individuals, quite regardless of the degree to which societies vary in their individualism. Moreover, as Brian Hall has recently stressed in his discussion of the social and cultural contexts of conversion to Christianity among Chinese-American college students, exclusive concentration on the individual precludes any sustained attention to the larger social and cultural context in which conversion occurs (Hall, 2006: 131–147; Yang, 1998: 241–242).

The recent promotion of rational choice theory has not merely been misleading, to a large degree, but also its popularity has actually discouraged much needed, genuinely sociological, analysis. One cannot speak easily of the rational choice paradigm as one of a number of competing sociological paradigms, for a strong argument can be made that it is not sociological at all. In any case, perhaps the most disturbing aspect of rational choice theory is that its viability would seem, as a basic desideratum, to assume the extension of its idealized version of American capitalism to encompass the entire world. In this particular sense, proponents of rational-choice theory are basically, in ideological terms, neo-conservatives, not to speak of their being fundamentalists. Much the same, but on different grounds, could be said of the more militant proponents of secularization theory, such as Steve Bruce (1999), particularly with respect to the global circumstance. (See here also, Martin, 2005: 17–25.) For anti-rational choice secularization theory is

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much more interested in and sophisticated about religion than he is often credited with.

also singularly neglectful of the social and cultural contexts of religious change, particularly the global context, of which Martin (2005) has been, in his own way, deeply appreciative.

This leads us to direct consideration of the contextual features themselves. In our time we have seen, and not—it must be stressed—for the first time in human history, massive migration of peoples in such a way as to lead to religion becoming a major aspect of individual, diasporic and transnational identity. The circumstances under which migrants adopt or carry with them distinctively religious identities cannot be fully explored here. However, a relatively simple example can be provided by the current situation of Muslims who have migrated to what are generically called Western countries. It is more than interesting to note that, among the first examples of sustained attention to Islam as a potentially vital ingredient of "Western" life, was the way in which inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina were classified by the media in terms of their religiosity. This is while their opponents in the old Yugoslavia—notably those in Croatia and Serbia—were not referred to in terms of religious classification; even though the Catholicism of Croatia and the Christian Orthodoxy of Serbia was very clear to most observers.

Indeed, in some respects, this particular Balkan 'incident' was a major seedbed of the current obsession with Islam. The irony, needless to say, lies in the considerable Western sympathy for the downtrodden Muslims in the Balkans compared with the current casting of Muslims as potentially powerful and dangerous inhabitants and opponents of European societies. In this regard it is of more than passing interest, that in the face of hostility to its actions in Lebanon in 2006, Israel proclaimed itself to be on the front line of the defence of the West, on the Western side of 'the clash of civilizations'. This brings into sharp relief the significance of processes of relativization with respect to religious revitalization (Robertson, 1985c, 1992b; Campbell, 2005; Mozaffari, 2002; Harris, 2004).

The relativization thesis maintains that when a worldview is challenged and has to be justified again, then there frequently occurs a revitalization of a religious 'identity'. (For an elaborate discussion of religion and relativization, see Campbell, 2005.) The same can be said with respect to what appears to be an entirely different circumstance. The challenge to "science" by the growing strength of creationism and intelligent designism is clearly affecting dedicated adherence to Darwinian or neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, so much so that,

as we have seen, some of the very strong adherents to the latter have mounted attacks against the creationists and designists in terms of fundamentalistic scientism.

If the concept of secularization is to survive it can only do so, in the present author's view, by conceiving of it, following Durkheim, in the mode of *religious change*. To some degree, this conception is indeed to be found in much of the work of David Martin, in particular, his recent *On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory* (2005). One of the major features of Martin's work on secularization is its, somewhat implicit, deployment of the multiple modernities approach that is, in fact, bound-up a great deal with globalization theory (Nettl and Robertson, 1968). The idea of multiple modernizations was one of the much neglected themes of the modernization debates of the 1950s and 1960s. However, this theme has returned with a vengeance in recent years and, indeed, is a major contemporary site of social-scientific theorizing and empirical research. The ways in which this development impinges upon discussions of secularization—and, indeed, deliberations concerning human choice—are considerable.

Of all those who have written about the idea of secularization, the work of Martin (1965, 1978, 2005) stands out for its thoroughness, its global awareness, and for the sheer breadth of its scholarship. In his Foreword to Martin's *On Secularization* (2005), Charles Taylor emphasizes how Martin has transformed the discussion of secularization in two major respects. The first has to do with what historical sociologists have paid increasing attention to, the theme of multiple modernities. The second, closely related to the first, is that Martin has seen that there are different dynamics of 'secularization', as opposed to the singularity of most prior theories, a tendency that has been typically applied to modernization itself. In any case the overall thrust of Martin's work is the argument that there is a kind of dialectic between 'secularization' and whatever may be its opposite. Moreover, there runs like a red thread throughout Martin's work the suggestion that religion continues, be it all in unspecified ways, as a central feature of the global-human condition (Robertson, 1991b). In brief, Martin appears to be talking less about secularization as the ongoing shift away from 'the grip' of religion, and more about how forms of religious change are occurring. It is in this regard that Martin departs from arguments of the other most sophisticated discussant of secularization—namely, Wilson. The latter seemed to think of secularization as a process which reached an

end point of "complete secularity". Whether or not this meant the end of society itself is not at all clear in Wilson's published work.

Exit

In his *Democracy in America* (2000) de Tocqueville predicted that Islam would be unable to sustain its power and influence for much longer in an age when democracy and enlightenment were rapidly spreading, particularly in America. America, he argued, demonstrated the Christian underpinnings of democracy. Whether de Tocqueville has been proven right or wrong is not entirely clear. Undoubtedly his line of thinking was to be remarkably influential, both in the continuing rise of what is, not unproblematically, called orientalism and the reactive resurgence of Islam. In any case, it is worth recalling that the so-called world religions became truly global during the nineteenth century, in spite of the impact of Enlightenment thinking. Much of this was due to seemingly secular trends, such as imperialism, trade, and labour migration. These facilitated great religious pilgrimages to such places as Benares, Guadeloupe, Lhasa, Mecca and Santiago. There was also a great expansion of missionary work, so that by the end of the century there were about one hundred thousand Christian missionaries in Africa alone and many more Islamic ones (MacGillivray, 2006: 242–244). This expansion has greatly accelerated in recent times.

In conclusion, the following themes have been underlined in the foregoing. First, a global perspective has been employed to grasp the position of religion and religious culture in the contemporary world. Second, this has led to a strong condemnation of both secularization and rational choice theory. Third, this has been accomplished largely in terms of a discussion of the revitalization of Islam and the resurgence of mainly-European, politicized Christianity on the one hand, and a brief dissection of the fundamentalism of Western atheism, on the other. Fourth, it has been argued that in order to understand contemporary religion one has to take seriously the different ways in which matters religious gain global conspicuousness and that study of the religious practices of individuals is relatively futile. Fifth, running through this entire chapter has been an emphasis upon the human-conditional inevitability of 'mystery'.

All of these arguments have been contained within a general thesis that, globally, we are living in millennial times. Lest there be any misunderstanding in this regard, it should be strongly emphasized that the present author has no particular sympathy with millennial ideas, although I have consistently maintained throughout my writings on globalization (Robertson, 1995b) that serious discussion of such might well constitute a way of talking about the possible end of the world.

In addition, there are various features of the global situation that lead us to be extremely suspicious of the secularization thesis. For example, it has recently come to light that in some parts of the world people can now download the entire Bible onto their mobile phones. In this connection it is almost unnecessary to recall that the invention of the printing press led, almost directly, to the Protestant Reformation. In South Africa, in addition to the traditional King James edition of the Bible there will soon be up-to-date translations, as well as Zulu and Xhosa versions. Finally, attention should be drawn to the strong reaction to attacks on creationism and designism in the teaching of biology. At least in the UK, not only is religious studies the fastest growing subject in schools, but also the teaching of zoology and genetics is being extended in the university system so as to incorporate lectures on creationism and intelligent design.

In conclusion, it should have become clear that the whole issue of religion can only be fully comprehended in reference to the global circumstance. This has probably been recognized more in the discipline of religious studies than it has within the sub-discipline of the sociology of religion. Practitioners of the latter have long wished either for the time when their prophecies of terminal secularization would be consummated, or a period in which religion would be very widely accepted as central to 'mainstream' life. The latter has indeed come about, but the concern with secularization restricts the capacity to deal with it adequately. The study of religion—sociological or otherwise—requires much more than the scientific pretensions of a social science. Without a great sensitivity to globality and cultural variation we are ill-equipped to cope analytically and interpretively with the world in its context.

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THE CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS CHARACTER OF WORLD SOCIETY

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We might say of the contemporary world that it is the most secular and the most religious of worlds. World society is thoroughly secular, dominated by a global rationalism of instrumental consciousness and power and yet world society everywhere is awash in religious identities, practices, revivals and contentions. Globalization within world culture presents opportunities and challenges for religions. Religious beliefs and practices in world society take the form of explicit collective action that engages global rationalism.

The cultural and religious character of the world is important in understanding the place of religion and religious movements within it. This paper develops a conceptual framework for understanding the cultural nature of globalization and world society. It traces different sources of world culture in world society, interpreting world culture as global rationalism. It identifies global rationalism's underlying tensions with religions and interprets this as an immanent, salvation religion. The paper then analyses how religious movements throughout the world across religious traditions engage this global rationalism.

World Society, World Culture, and Religions

Globalization and World Society

When scholars, journalists and individuals use the term globalization in everyday conversation, they tend to focus narrowly on economic interdependence, but it is better understood more broadly. Globalization refers to the increasing complexity and interdependence of the world as a whole and to the processes and mechanisms involved. These changes undermine stable, taken-for-granted identities, both individual and collective (national, ethnic, religious). This in turn raises issues of authenticity and its sources: authenticity increasingly is viewed as arising from individual or collective self-assertion rather than from tradition or history. It is common wisdom that with globalization there is a need on

the part of individuals, businesses and states to be flexible and innovative, whether to pursue rational action strategies or to assert identity.

Roland Robertson (1992) depicts globalization as an increasingly pervasive and intensive apprehension of the world as one place and one time. With globalization, civilizations are not parallel worlds that have varying degrees of contact; rather, they are closely interdependent, even if contentious, within one world. Singular purposes of peace and justice overarch boundaries. There is a singular flow of time, in part embodied in the dominance of the Gregorian calendar, but more importantly reflected in the general acceptance that different calendars and senses of time are different versions of one human history, or at the very least of diverse temporalities that gain identity relative to a dominant history, present, and future. When groups depict themselves as resisting globalization, they are resisting a particular hegemony and possibly their own marginalization from the center, but they are not resisting the reality of "one world".

People, however, have been hesitant to speak of a world society. Scholars are concerned that the concept of society connotes an old model of highly integrated national societies with strong, effective boundaries. This model was inaccurate for nation-states, and it certainly is inadequate for the global situation. Nevertheless, the concept of society captures the singularity and wholeness of what is emerging. One need not assume integration, homogeneity, or strong binds to interpret diversity as being within one whole thing. In fact, theorists that posit a world society or system are some of the strongest critics of these inadequate views of societal integration (Wallerstein, 1974; Meyer, 1980; Luhmann, 1982; see Beyer, 1994).

The significance of conceptualizing world society is underscored when considering contentions, conflicts, and tensions—political conflicts and civilization "clashes" look much more like they are being played out within one world polity than between several imperial civilizations. Political players attempt to shape global policy. Some assert hegemony. Others resist being marginalized from centers of power and decision-making, and demand a universal global policy by insisting that someone must do something to expand access.

World Culture as Schema: Ontology and Morality

Clearly the world is a multi-cultural place, and if we use the term 'world society' it is crucial to acknowledge that it is a multicultural one. But

this implies one world culture, albeit one marked by diversity, and there s a strong resistance against this that parallels that against conceptualizing a singular world society. A prevalent view is that globalization is an increase in technical, economic material complexity and interdependence that fragments cultures and undermines cultural authority, cognitive systems, and identities (see Tomlinson's critical discussion, 1999). In short, it is a techno-material juggernaut that undermines both traditional and modern ontological securities and marginalizes cultures and cultural identities. This process, it is argued, sets into motion resistance rooted in cultures and identities.

Globalization—the oneness of place and time—is not, however, solely or essentially material or techno-economic; it is also cultural and political. Culture involves consciousness, cognitive schema, models of authority and rational action, and goals of progress and development (Douglas, 1966; Foucault, 1985; Zerubavel, 1997). World culture is comprised of categories of things (endangered species, industrial zones, legal contracts, profits, nation-states, individuals), identities (ethnic, national, religious, gender), and models of action and organization (development, democracy, research, planning) that are pervasive throughout the world across all sorts of borders. Coherence does not arise naturally out of functional social integration or homogenization but is better understood as an assertion, a cultural-political process that results in narratives and 'world building' (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). These are woven into grand narratives of progress or post-colonial resistance. Movements that argue, for example, that global policy must resist homogenizing progress and protect diversity articulate narratives of post-colonialism that present a singular historical flow. These contending cognitive schema and narratives are morally binding and compelling—they are blueprints for the good society, and their violation, it is warned, will call down apocalyptic doom. World building thus is political and moral, and contentions take place within one world polity and world cultural frame.

World culture is reflected in similarities among units and actors, in the growing number and influence of transnational institutions, and in patterns of differences and hybrids. There is a very high degree of similarity among organizations worldwide: nation-states, local governance structures, businesses, and non-governmental associations. Similar agencies and offices are found in all states; similar policies governing education, population, and development are adopted by states and espoused by international organizations. Much of this similarity arises

from the diffusion and institutionalization of categories, identities and models. The system of scientific authority and the credentialing of professional experts generate models and practices that legitimate rational actors (states, corporations, individuals) (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer et al., 1997).

There is a growing density of transnational institutions which comprise a major carrier of world culture. Scientific organizations and professional associations carry world cultural models and practices. Standards are propagated by large, influential international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000). International law, international courts, and myriad rights associations increase both the intensity and scope of world legal institutions and have complex relations with INGOs (Charnovitz, 2006).

World culture thus represents the dominance of instrumentality and instrumental power. World goals of peace, justice, progress, development, effective democratic governance, health, and well-being comprise a program. The global program is to be attained through rational, instrumental means such as markets, state bureaucracy, political mobilization, and science and technology. This is the world of instrumental or practical rationality described by Max Weber, often described simply as modernity or globalization (Robertson) and here referred to as global rationalism (Boli and Thomas, 1999). Global rationalism is a moral order and program (Eisenstadt, 1999). Arguably this cognitive-moral juggernaut makes the technical pale in comparison, although more accurately they are of a whole; just as railroads, telegraphs, canals, and steamships embodied the moral progress of the nineteenth century, so the international space station, the internet, lowered infant mortality rates, and higher GDP per capita embody the moral aspirations of one world. Techno-economic globalization seems so inexorable because global rationalism is so hegemonic.

World culture is marked by contradictions (e.g. individual versus collective, liberty versus equality, universalism versus diversity), and an especially important contradiction is that between rationality and subjective expression. A core characteristic of global rationalism is the primacy of the subjective, expressive individual. The modern rational individual that drives markets and politics is also an affective, expressive being. Expressive individualism indeed can be taken as a defining characteristic of the modern self (Taylor, 1989). This dialectic is experienced personally and politically as resistance, and can be con-

ceptualized as ritualized rebellion. People construct private life as an arena for personal expression set against the demands of rationality in work, market, school, bureaucracy, and technology. Personal relations, love, spirituality and sex are vehicles for pursing subjective expression, for expressing inner subjectivities (Thomas, 1989; Berger et al., 1973). Politically, the expressiveness of cultural identities underlies movements self-described as resistance to global rationalism.

World culture as singular and as plural is marked by irony and moralism. World culture is fraught with disjuncture, particularisms and contradictory cultural elements that are experienced as hybrids (Hannerz 1987). Appadurai (1996) analyzed disjuncture and differences and developed the concept of 'scapes' to short-circuit the debate between globalization as homogenizing versus fragmentizing and the contention between a dominant homogeneity versus a resistance of heterogeneity. This concept is extremely helpful in analyzing the hybrid nature of identities and cultures. Yet, it does not capture the irony between the existence of a world culture and identities of resistance that thrive as part of it. Nor does it capture the moral imperative behind hybridity. Robertson's (1992) isolation of universal particularism captures both the irony and morality of world culture. He points to the universal obligation that everyone everywhere asserts a unique identity. Taylor (1989) points to the individual's obligation to express uniqueness and the vocation of self-creation. The prominence placed on plurality and diversity is a universalistic and moral imperative; resistance is world building; personal and political expressiveness are morally required.

An implication of this understanding is that religiosity and religious collective action in world society are best viewed not as uniquely cultural, expressive, or reactive in contrast to, say, political interest-based movements. Religious collective actions, and religiosity itself, are primarily proactive engagements of world culture in world society.

World Culture, Religion, and Religions

What we see on the global stage thus devolves from universalistic culture. Institutions situated and embedded locally carry general and universalistic significance and derive from universalistic world cultural frames. They appear in very natural ways as the outcomes of rational strategies of actors; however, it is significant that actors of all sorts throughout the world are oriented to, and are constituted by, the same cultural

schema. Institutions in one sense built up through actor strategies in another sense devolve from the cultural frames that generate cultural accounts guiding action. The mechanisms are similar to the early emergence of world society out of Christendom. Christendom provided the universalistic frame and the Church, the institutional arrangements within which rational actors (states, corporations, individuals) emerged, adopted rational strategies. The Church was transnational, universal, and the source of ontological structure: actors, actions, purposes, and sources of authority. It thereby provided the legitimate and largely implicit cultural accounts that defined actors and guided action (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas, 1987).

The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) marked a shift in the nature of religion. Religion became a property of nation-states and of individuals, either as a national frame or as a distinct actor, and it was no longer the overarching frame of the interstate system. Churches, religious orders, and missionary societies continued to act transnationally, but they did so not as agents of an overarching frame but as organizational actors pushing a particular vision or set of interests. State churches functioned as state actors, and other churches tended to articulate with national identity and thus nationalism. Eighteenth and nineteenth century revivalisms, for example, were intertwined markedly with national identity although they too were rooted in transnational networks that helped mobilize domestic movements (Thomas, 1989; Noll et al., 1994). There was further secularization through Enlightenment-informed internationalism (Kant) and subsequent civic, moral and service associations (abolition, temperance, social reform). A simple narrative seems to capture the broad outline of these developments: international and transnational institutions and associations begin as religious, before increasingly playing down religion, emphasizing moral society, and becoming secularized. Religion moves from being the transnational frame, to being players associated with the national state, to being largely just voluntary associations.

While accurate as far as it goes, this narrative is misleading in important ways and is itself part of the emergent world cultural narrative that needs to be analyzed. It misses the religious character of global rationalism and misreads continued religion.

A primary question of scholars, professional policy makers, and individuals in everyday life is how religions respond to and act within world society. While the practical interest is in the commonly understood set

of religions, (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and tribal religions or spiritualities) implicit in the question is a substantive definition of religion. One of the best remains Robertson's (1970) definition, which I adapt: religion is a cultural schema that depicts a super-empirical reality from which empirical reality derives significance and meaning. The issue thus becomes what happens to the belief in and practice of the super-empirical when, as in world culture and society, institutions underlying everyday life assert however implicitly that the material world is all that there is, there is no super-empirical-derived meaning, and humans are sovereign. These and related questions are paramount both for scholars to understand change and for anyone to make sense of everyday life or policy demands.

If we see world culture and world society as essentially secular, however, we will misread both continued religion and world culture. The assumptions that seem so thoroughly secular and anti-religious constitute a world culture, which functions much like a religion. Using a functional definition of religion we recognize things that generally are not taken to be religions, but which function like a religion, such as communism, modernism and global rationalism. I suggest that we cannot fully understand the religious attitude, the actions of religions and of religious people without first understanding the peculiarly religious character of world society and culture (and of globalization).

The dual character of global rationalism as secular and religious is important for understanding it and the nature of religiosity and religious collective action. I first describe how global rationalism is rooted in economic, political-legal, and civil society spheres and how they comprise a secular project in tension with religions. I then analyze how taken together they present a global project that functions as an immanent, salvation religion.

Global Rationalism as Secular Project

Economic: global capitalism

It is common-place to point to popular and consumer culture within the world capitalist economy, but there are also more fundamental cultural assumptions. Popular icons and name-brands flow throughout the world and are incorporated within local settings resulting in hybridity. More fundamentally, however, people in the everyday institutions and

practices of capitalism make a host of assumptions about reality that are the cultural underpinnings of capitalist enterprises and markets. It is taken-for-granted that the individual is a relatively autonomous entity and that rationally pursuing self-interest in the form of profit is virtuous, not greed or shirking collective obligations (Weber, 1930). Nature is viewed as mechanical, disenchanted and transformable into commodities. Land is not a property of the group that stretches into the past of the ancestors, or into the future of succeeding generations. Rather, land is a commodity that can be bought and sold by individuals and corporations. Knowledge, furthermore, is in the purview of professional experts.

Everyday capitalist practices moreover are built on particular institutions. The legal contract is an example. There might be different customs and rules of interaction that make it difficult for, say, a US business person to close a deal with Japanese or Korean counterparts in Tokyo or Seoul, but all parties know what a contract is. Financial instruments are developed and diffuse, constituting common knowledge among practitioners. Corporations, accounting firms, and financial institutions adopt highly similar structures and policies as responses to world standards set by international organizations and informed by the latest professional and academic models. Models of development similarly are elaborated by intellectuals such as academic economists, taken up by international organizations such as the World Bank, and embodied in policies and practices that are adopted by nation-states.

Political-legal: nation-states and global governance

The interstate system was built within a transnational civilization inherited from Christendom, and the dynamics of the modern nation-state continue to be within a transnational cultural context that constitutes the interstate system. With no world state, the sources and contexts of authority are more explicitly cultural in nature. Authority and actorhood are distributed across myriad types of actors: individuals, ethnicities, religions, corporations, and states. Legal authority is distributed primarily to states which are constituted by external, transnational cultural structures and are active agents of world cultural purpose. The nation-state is constituted as a rational actor and a rational project. The *raison d'etat* is peace, justice, security, collective development and individual development. Constitutive principles include sovereignty and

self-determination. Constitutive structures include legislative bodies, judicial structures, and executive agencies. All of these require that states have ministries and formal policies and plans regarding a host of issues instrumental to rational progress, such as education, population, environment, human rights, economic development, and labor. As with world culture generally, intellectuals and professional experts develop policy models that are adopted by nation-states to signal rational actorhood (Meyer et al., 1997).

Attempts to make nation-states accountable to a higher, transnational authority build up world cultural models, principles and accounts. Attempts at global governance include international governmental organizations (IGOs), international treaties, international law, and international institutions such as courts and trading boards. These forms are products of state negotiations, but they shift authority from states to the interstate system and to global institutions. Contentions come to focus on principles of where sovereignty is located, but the larger global purposes are the same; peace, justice, security and development. And the larger global narrative is the same—human authority and sovereignty will produce progress from material nature malleable to human purposes.

Global civil society: international nongovernmental organizations

Within world society individuals are authorized to organize around universal collective goals, and the resulting organizations have significant influence on states, IGOs, legal institutions, and other actors. Many are explicitly political with goals of making states accountable and influencing policies. These are the most well-known—activist and humanitarian relief organizations that confront states or step in when the state fails (Tarrow, 2005; Keck and Sikkink, 1998, Smith et al., 1997). Other INGOs have specific functions of promoting professional and amateur associations in areas from sport to medicine. Others still are fairly technical bodies that promote professional interaction, technical standards, and accounting procedures within different spheres (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000).

INGOs are carriers of world culture, both enacting and elaborating world cultural assumptions (Boli and Thomas, 1999). Individuals have a type of authority—rational volunteerism—with which they organize themselves to pursue collective goods. Based on rational volunteerism

they claim moralistically that they have no self-interest, but only the interests of humanity and claim instrumentally that their organizations are the most rational way to check corporate and state interests and attain the good society. They ground their technical expertise in scientific research. These organizations thus embody general elements of world culture as an instrumental project. There are thousands of INGOs that claim expertise in the means of development: education, medicine, human rights, standardization, and safety. They are routinely consulted by states and IGOs about policy and as sources of expert information. There are debates about the effectiveness of these organizations and whether or not they truly represent democratic processes. However these questions might be answered, INGOs are carriers of global rationalism, espousing organizational forms and policies as means to a new world.

Many of these organizations are religious or faith-based. Religious organizations dominated the transnational civil society scene in the nineteenth century and relatively speaking there is a lower percentage of INGOs today that are religious (see ch. by Boli & Brewington). Nevertheless religious organizations continue to be very active, and they tend not to be reactive and tradition-bound. In the humanitarian-relief sector, for example, religious organizations have been at the cutting edge of technical innovations. Still, they operate by rational volunteerism and the imperative that associational action will produce the good society, and they work hard to balance this instrumentality with faith commitments (Mei, 2003).

The secular project in tension with religions

World capitalism, the interstate system and global civil society in combination depict a highly secularized world in tension with religions. Ontological assumptions of global rationalism depict nature as a mechanical closed system governed by universal laws through which actors can manipulate nature and convert it into commodities. In Weber's terms, it is disenchanted. The individual, "Society," peoples, and the state, are sovereign, and their rational pursuit of self-interests are presumed to lead to the collective good and to carry great moral weight. Humanity is defined in terms of natural rights, biology, and history. Epistemologically, reality is known through science and empirical experience, and knowledge is managed by professional experts. This

epistemology anchors the sovereignty and autonomy of states, peoples, and individuals relative to the super-empirical. It depicts a rationalized natural environment and thereby creates, stabilizes, and legitimates corporations, states, associations, and individuals to rationally pursue interests and goals (Drori et al., 2003). Within this world, humanity is constituted as a sovereign actor in control of nature, history, and progress; God and spirits are not actors but rather are forces that might be appropriated by actors or otherwise marginalized into non-relevance and even nonexistence (Eisenstadt, 1999).

The sources of value and the means of value-attainment are found within nature and society. Purposes of individual happiness, the good society, justice and progress are in the here-and-now of material history, not in a spiritual history. Morality is a property of individuals and attained through virtue, not through fulfilling group obligations. Debates about how to build the good society have revolved around whether the state or the free market are the best means, but all sides view its attainment in terms of rationalistic policies based on technical, scientific knowledge and decided through proper bureaucratic procedures. Some versions emphasize official formal action through governance structures (states and corporations) while other versions argue that only popular participation (civic associations) can attain justice and peace. Global civil society, despite the presence of religious associations, is rooted in this instrumentality and immanent value attainment. The logic of organizing transnationally is that collective goals comprising the good (world) society are to be attained here and now through individual participation and instrumental means. Global rationalism must be spread even at the expense of traditional, local knowledge and practices. Human rights, population policies, education policies, egalitarianism, and standardization as pressed by INGOs comprise an instrumental world often at odds with the substantive arrangements and obligations of religions.

Global economic, political, and civil society institutions each in tension with religions taken together comprise global rationalism, a universal project built around instrumental power and rooted in human sovereignty and purpose. Global rationalism as a consciousness and an order of things excludes the possibility that the super-empirical is an actor in nature and history, and as a set of practices it excludes religious beliefs and authorities from instrumental decision-making. Global rationalism builds a material world closed off to the super-empirical

except only at the margins of private personal expression. Yet, this is incomplete because it also is a religious project.

Global Rationalism as Religious Project

Global rationalism is a project that excludes an active super-empirical order and yet functions as a religion. To say that global rationalism functions as a religion is not to analyze it within a functionalist theory. We are not explaining its rise and dominance in terms of societal needs that it serves, only noting that it works like a religion. Here we shift from defining religion substantively as oriented to a super-empirical order to defining religion functionally: religion is a cultural order containing sacreds, myths, rituals, and a universal ground of order set against chaos.

Global rationalism is an immanent salvation religion. It provides a universal ground for life. It has myths and sacred entities, rituals connecting individuals and groups to history and the cosmos, a promise of salvation, and a depiction of threats of chaos. It is an immanent religion because ultimate value, sources of identity and authority, and ultimate ends are located within humanity and nature. All of this is woven into narratives, from grand narratives to national histories to individual biographies and stories.

There are twin sacreds of rational actor and rational action. The individual, the state, the people (or nation or culture) represent and are expressive of humanity and thus have sacred qualities. The individual, it long has been noted, is sacred and individuals are gods of modern individualism, (Durkheim, 1965; Goffman, 1967) and are normatively celebrated (Taylor, 1989) against institutions (Foucault, 1985). The state arguably is waning as a sacred, precisely as it declines in its privileged status as embodying the people. Rational action is sacred. Political action, especially resistance (the current incarnation of the old sacred of revolution), is sacred. Without it there can be neither progress nor liberation. To not be political is to not enter fully into history. Technology, bureaucratic formal organization, science, and professionalization are ritualized means of action that promise progress. Action and policies rooted in scientific knowledge and technical practices are paramount, the lack of which betray progress and threaten chaos. Policies such as development, liberalization, and military excursions are made sacred by being immersed in scientific knowledge and technical practice, and

marked by professional imprimatur. They are attributed a quality of necessity, threatening chaos if they are not implemented. Resistance gains much of its symbolic power by profaning the sacred of the state and its official policies, but as with all profaning it is immediately sacralized—only resistance can attain the good society (Ellul, 1975).

Narratives cast sacred actors and their actions as producing human progress. Progress is the dominant grand narrative, and post-colonialism has become a powerful version. Historically Western-centered linear progress still dominates but is increasingly viewed through the lens of colonialism. Within the post-colonial grand narrative the simple linear progress of the West is intertwined with slavery, oppression, injustice, and colonialism. Through resistance, peoples have liberated themselves from colonialism, freeing the true sources of progress in the post-colonial era. The differences between the grand narrative of progress and that of post-colonialism and what is at stake should not be minimized, but it also is important to understand post-colonialism is itself a grand narrative. Particular histories of peoples and individual biographies are embedded in these narratives and in the abstract cosmologies and myths of science that depict nature closed to an active super-empirical, within which actors are authorized to pursue progress or liberation.

Rituals of rational action and ceremonies of expressive identity link actors to these grand narratives. Voting and elections comprise the paramount ritual that re-enacts the mythical creation of society through the social contract by the sovereign people, and dramatizes rational action. Rituals of resistance (protests, marches, etc.) simultaneously profane established rituals and re-sacralize the political process (Ellul, 1975). The creation, dissemination and adoption of technologies and formal organization have their own ritual process whereby old practices and knowledge are cast as dangerous. There are ceremonial, expressive events celebrating identities. The World Cup in football and the Olympic Games are prominent examples in sport that celebrate simultaneously the world as a whole, humanity, and particularistic national identities within it. New Year celebrations since the turn of the millennium have taken on global scope. Even in the USA, which tends to be parochial on such things, the celebration of the New Year begins with images from island nations in the Pacific, not with the celebrations in New York's Times Square.

Global rationalism promises salvation. Merely surviving within a harsh arbitrary nature, merely doing what has been done for generations, and

merely being content with one's lot, are stigmatized as false-consciousness and fatalism (both anathema to rational actors). We are to liberate ourselves from the constraints of nature and from all forms of repression, be it from religions, monarchies, colonizers, or contemporary American empire. The good society, whether viewed through the lens of progress or of resistance, is something that requires a death to old ways, traditions, and arbitrary power. The means of new birth are many, but the dominant means is education. Education has been analyzed as the ritual process transforming human persons into individual citizens (Ramirez and Boli, 1987) and as a source of transcendence (Meyer, 2000). At a societal level all social problems are, according to common understandings worldwide, due to a lack of education, which is the key for development and liberation. On an individual level, education is held out as the primary means of making something of oneself. If individuals, peoples, and states are enlightened by or reborn to rational actorhood, they surely will create the good society.

These elements taken together function as a religion rooted immanently in nature, and promising salvation from fatalism, necessity, and insignificance. It is aggressive and provocative, in tension with super-empirical religions. This is not a civil religion that is the lowest common denominator of religious traditions within a polity. The concept of civil religion derives from a functionalist analysis of how political systems generate integrating symbols. Global rationalism as a religion is more profound. When American Presidents refer to God at the beginning and end of their speeches they are practicing civil religion; when in the middle of their speech they refer to programs and policies alluding to expert knowledge and research, or to technical necessity, they are practicing the religion of instrumental rationalism. It might make sense to see a global civil religion in the attempts to construct a human ethic or spirituality common to all civilizations, but there are limitations with this type of analysis (see Beckford, 2003). Irrespective, this is not global rationalism, which is much more assertive and provocative. The dual nature of global rationalism as secular and religious provides the basis for analyzing the powerful confrontations between global rationalism and religion. Historic world religions engage global rationalism, both to resist its secularism and to compete with and desacralize its implicit religious character.

Religious Movements in World Society

Religion in the practice and narrative of world culture: religioscapes

Within global rationalism religions are marginalized and differentiated from rationalistic institutions of states, markets, bureaucracy, technology, schools and professions. Religion is privatized (Berger, 1969) as a property of individual choice and a vehicle for personal expressivism. The separation of church and state is an important aspect of these broad institutional configurations. The establishing of global rationalism as the overarching sacred canopy is another. Religions, consequently, organize to engage global rationalism and take the form of collective action and voluntary association.

These tensions revolve around the 'religion question': what is the place of religion in the modern polity? In the nineteenth century these engagements took the form of conflicts among religious groups and 'secularists' for influence within the state. In Europe and North America, there was commonly a three-cornered conflict among secular professionals, Protestants, and Catholics. The place of religions within a polity resulted from episodes of political mobilization and contention (Smith, 2004; Moaddel, 1992). Negotiated settlements of historical conflicts resulted in different institutional patterns. Church-state "separation" varies from state churches to pillarized society (Netherlands) to a secular state but religious nation (USA) to the secular nation-state (the French Republic). Any catalog of state-religion relations would show common themes but different particulars (e.g. Monsma and Sope, 1997; Gill, 1998; Williame and Séverine, 2005). A settlement is not final but becomes the institutional frame within which subsequent episodes take place.

Religion as collective action is set against not merely marginalization but also the religious, sacred claims of rational actors. Religions view global rationalism as overstepping the bounds of humanity by refusing accountability and submission to God. Movements across historical contexts and religious traditions accuse rational actors of idolatry with a focus on state sovereignty and individual rights (Goldberg, 1992; Ignatieff, 2001).

The practice in private life of religion oriented to a transcendent super-empirical order similarly has an embattled tone and necessarily is explicit. A religious person lives in an alien land with an alien religion. To resist that religion, one must organize to infuse one's beliefs

into everyday life. Religion thus tends to take the form of voluntary association and collective action, even in one's personal life.

Hybrids thrive in such an environment and resemble syncretism among religions as much as religions compromising with secularity. Explicit religion means people pick and choose elements of the larger culture and of their religion and they articulate them in practice. It might be useful to speak of 'religioscapes', following Appadurai's (1996) coining of such terms as 'ethnoscapes'. Again, however, we need to add the irony of global rationalism—universal particularism results in people asserting the primacy of God and salvation through choices. Even tight-knit groups backed by state regimes find it difficult to avoid this irony. Fundamentalism itself has a modern character (Lechner, 1993) and is a hybrid, with groups picking and choosing which elements are or are not negotiable. This is not to debunk fundamentalism as self-contradictory, it is only to point to the irony of transcendent, super-empirical religions engaging global rationalism by taking on the form of voluntary associations.

Religious engagements of global rationalism

Religious movements can be categorized broadly as reactive or proactive (Thomas, 1989). Both are explicit attempts to live a religious life in the modern world, but they take different directions. Reactive movements tend to opt for separation, usually in some way physical and always social. Amish communities illustrate this retreatism, and their relations with the broader society illustrate that such groups necessarily articulate to some degree and proactively manage relations. Many Christian fundamentalist groups illustrate how retreatism can be more social than territorial, keeping to their own groups, social events, music, and schools. Many (from groups in the USA to factions of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) start out politically assertive but adopt retreatism and separation when faced with social and political defeat.

The vast majority of religious movements are proactive and include, using imprecise labels, liberal, conservative (orthodox, fundamentalist), and politicized fundamentalism. Both liberal and conservative types adapt to global rationalism by picking and choosing, including their self-labeling. As ideal types, liberal movements self-consciously adapt their tradition to global rationalism whereas conservative movements explicitly attempt to preserve and use the tradition to modify and manage global rationalism.

Liberal groups adapt by using global rationalism as the standard to pick which elements of the religious tradition can be transposed to the modern world. Protestant higher criticizm at the turn of the twentieth century, for example, 'demythologized' the Bible and Christianity generally by deleting anything that was incredible to the 'modern man come of age'. The liberal style has evolved and is more critical of modernism, emphasizing liberation and personal spiritualism and more frequently includes political action for communal solidarity and economic empowerment. Personal spiritualism resists the materialism and reductionism of rational institutions and the exclusion of the non-empirical. It, nevertheless, accepts the super-empirical as irrational and subjective, and it reclaims texts and practices to construct subjective narratives and experiences. It takes various forms from a recommitment to liturgy, to sponsoring workshops to explore diverse spiritual traditions. The world values survey labels these as post-modern sensibilities and documents them throughout the world (Inglehart et al., 2004).

Conservative groups explicitly formulate uniqueness of their particular traditions, yet they do so *vis-à-vis* global rationalism, resulting in common elements and styles. All such groups attempt to submit sovereign actors to an objectively given super-empirical order, to God, to texts, to doctrines, to religious practices, to religious authorities. Rational action such as technology, science, and state planning are not, in the orthodox scheme, intrinsically evil, but the rational actor must be submitted to the moral order. A prevalent form of submission is moralism—Christian groups call for a Judeo-Christian morality, mullahs call for *jihad* (which at the personal level is a submission to God marked by a spiritual war against worldly temptations), Hindu groups including the BJP party call for *Hindutva*, and Buddhist monks call for *dhamma* (loosely, virtue) (Juergensmeyer, 1993; van der Veer, 1994). Pentecostalism is an important hybrid—it shares some characteristics with subjective, syncretistic spiritualities yet emphasizes a strong moral, disciplined style of life (Brusco, 1995; Gifford, 1994).

Conservative groups, when politicized, expand their goals from having influence in public space to submitting that public space itself to God. These movements claim that secular elites and political and religious leaders are apostate because they allow the marginalization of religion, moral decadence, and the idolatries of secularism. Such groups are found in all religious traditions, and they mobilize politically around the goal of submitting the state and society to religion and morality. Different factions disagree about what submission means. Some insist

that political leaders and state officials must be personally religious and moral and this must make a noticeable difference in their political life. Others have more institutional goals of submitting the legal system to religious law. These groups, like any political group, can be violent, but they are not necessarily so. Political and violent forms generally emerged in statist countries and parallel global mobilization against core states.

Historical sequencing of religious movements

Although all types of religious movements are found throughout the historical encounter with modernism, there seems to be throughout the world and across traditions a general sequence associated with the rise of modernism at the turn of the twentieth century. Religions adapted to initial contact with modernism through a liberal theology and through conservative resistance. Proactive conservative movements quickly and generally tended toward fundamentalist retreatism, not being able to turn back modernism or match the intellectual elite articulating the liberal adaptation (e.g. in the USA) and often actively suppressed by state regimes (e.g., in Egypt). The historical association between fundamentalism and retreatism was so strong that scholars, until at least the Iranian revolution, assumed that fundamentalism essentially is apolitical. After World War II, against this liberal adaptation and fundamentalist retreat, new proactive conservative movements emerged in all traditions. First and foremost anti-heretical movements, they targeted liberals as apostate and chided fundamentalists for retreatism. They emphasized the necessity of influencing society but not through political means. Instead they relied on individual influence—individuals submitted to God and morality 'go out into the world' at work and bear witness, proselytize, influence those around them, and thus change society. These movements at varying points, but generally by the late 1970s, were politically mobilized to target state policies (e.g., Casanova, 1994; Berger, 1999).

This resurgence of conservative religion and the increasing critical nature of liberalism, including apolitical and political versions, can be understood best as a reaction to increased sacralization of instrumental rationality and to encroachments by the state and rationalism into more areas of life. Habermas (1987) conceptualized this as lifeworld colonization where lifeworld refers to the sphere of personal relations

and community. Lifeworld historically was privatized and as systems-rationality pushed into more areas of life, personal relations, family, and religions are further marginalized. Proactive religious movements reassert the relevance of religion in everyday life, including public life, and point to the idolatry of instrumental rationality.

Increasingly, proactive religious engagements take on a global orientation. In some sense Christianity and Islam have always had a global orientation, working to submit the world to God; and religious organizing predates contemporary global civil society and remains prevalent. Groups in all traditions now do so explicitly. Political fundamentalisms target more than their own states, whether it be pan-Islamic movements, conservative groups lobbying international population meetings, or religion-informed terrorist networks. Apolitical groups see the world as their sphere of influence whether to pursue justice and humanitarianism or to proselytize. Many are transnational or post-national either because they are rooted in transnational immigrant communities (Menjivar, 2000) or because they put religious identities and purposes above national citizenship.

The Irony of Religions within Global Rationalism

Instrumental rationality; flows of information, goods, and people; and complex interdependencies create a religioscape that presents opportunities and challenges for religions. Liberal adaptations and subjectivist spiritualities thrive. So do groups attempting to submit this complex order to an objectivist moral-religious order. Myriad contentions and hybrids ensue. These explicit engagements and contentions take place within globalization that is experienced as a juggernaut of instrumental power; yet, it is the cultural aspects of globalization that is the source of this experience. Throwing oneself before onrushing instrumental power derives from a fervent belief in the ontology, morality, and inevitability of global rationalism. Sovereign rational actors establish the reality of global rationalism implicitly as the ground of their actorhood. Global rationalism functioning as a world culture is explicitly secular yet implicitly is an immanent salvation religion. Religions engage global rationalism precisely on these points: sovereign rational actors have both rejected the true religion and embraced a false religion. Much of the strategy of explicit religions is to "expose" global rationalism as a false

religion and to submit sovereign rational actors to God and a moral order. Within these broad processes and engagements, people work to connect their religions to living in this world.

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SACRED PLACE AND SACRED POWER: CONCEPTUAL BOUNDARIES AND THE MARGINALIZATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES

Meredith B. McGuire

In order to have a more thorough and nuanced understanding of religion and other cultural elements under the conditions of globalization, we must first re-examine our concept of religion. To the extent that powerful organizations have controlled the boundaries of what would be accepted as real religion in modern societies, the effect has been the marginalization of many people's religious practices. As scholars, we cannot afford to accept uncritically a notion of religion (or any cultural element) that systematically excludes or denigrates the core religious practices and lived experiences of many people—particularly poor people, immigrants and colonized peoples, women and minorities. How might rethinking those conceptual boundaries enable us to have a better grasp of the nature of religion as it is practiced in diverse cultures under the conditions of globalization?

Sociology uses concepts, such as "religion", "ritual", "sacred", "magic", and "supernatural", that frame our discourse and shape our images of what it is that we are studying. Each concept, however, has a genealogy, traceable back to historical periods in which definitional boundaries were hotly disputed (as illustrated, for example, by Talal Asad's [1993] genealogy of the idea of "ritual"). This paper examines one such historically contested boundary—the concept of "the sacred" and where it is located—in order to illustrate how fruitful it might be to rethink our concepts and images of religion and religious behavior.

Why Should We Rethink Our Conceptual Boundaries?

The conceptual boundaries of "religion" need critical examination and rethinking for a number of reasons. Historians and anthropologists have demonstrated the enormous diversity of religions and religious practices. We readily agree that religion-as-practiced among the Guaraní of the Paraguayan forest is different, in many significant ways, from religion-as-practiced among the Inuit of Greenland. We realize that

similar diversity exists among all the so-called "world religions", such that the religion as practiced by adherents in one cultural context is likely to be qualitatively different from that in another cultural context. For instance, it is no surprise to learn that Christianity as practiced in a Central American village is different, in important ways, from that practiced by adherents of the same world religion in a California megalopolis, or that Islam as practiced by adherents in Malaysia is qualitatively different from that practiced in Cairo. There are so many sources of religious variation and complexity that, surely, the existence of extensive within-group religious diversity is not disputed.

Why, then, do many sociologists continue to study religion as if it were a "single, invariant object" (Beckford, 2003: 16–19)? As James Beckford reminds us, not only the concept of "religion", but also our conceptual toolbox for discussing various religions, too often frames the objects of our study as though they were timeless and impervious to the effects of human agency and societal change. To the contrary, however, those very conceptions of religion and religions are the products of historical and ongoing social contests in which individual and collective actors engage in struggles to create and maintain boundaries that support their interests. Very often, such struggles have historically resulted in the marginalization of the religious practices of the least powerful, such as women, colonized peoples, ethnic minorities, and persons enslaved or living in poverty (Maduro, 2003). A scholarly conception of religion that is based on the boundaries drawn by the powerful "winners" of such historical contests is inevitably biased, because it fails to recognize the religious beliefs and practices of the "losers" as real religions.

Elsewhere, I have argued that sociological definitions of "religion", as well as such related concepts as "religiosity", are themselves social constructions (McGuire, 2003a). When we fail to recognize the effects upon our conceptual apparatus of such historical and ongoing battles over boundaries, we risk misapprehending our data and misusing our sociological interpretations.

A prime example of such a failing is Rodney Stark's misuses of histories of religion in medieval Europe. Stark and Finke (2000) raise the issue of the quality of medieval religion to support their attack against secularization theories, and to set the stage for their own interpretation of religious movements and change, particularly in the last two centuries. I am not going to jump into the fray about secularization theories. Rather, my point is that, throughout his writings, Stark

mistakenly uses indicators of key concepts (e.g., "religiousness", "piety", and "religious knowledge and beliefs") that are themselves social products of a long period of conflict and contestation that some historians call the "long Reformation", roughly 1300 to 1700 CE (Muir, 1997: 6). Stark's interpretations are, therefore, limited by an overly institutional conception of religion and religiosity that is utterly anachronistic and ethnocentric. He emphasizes, as indicators of medieval people's low degree of religiosity, factors like the paucity and low capacity of parish churches, laypeople's sparse church attendance and infrequent reception of communion, improper behavior in church, widespread ignorance of church doctrines and church-prescribed religious practices (such as how to recite the Apostle's Creed), and so on.

To Christians with modern-day sensibilities, his might seem to be a fair assessment. But we must remember that none of those indicators was at the core—that is, were those aspects of religion that really mattered—of ordinary people's belief and practice before the Reformation era. Stark and Finke base their evidence about medieval religiosity, not on neutral descriptions, but rather on critiques written largely by reformer-elites (Protestant and Catholic, alike). In other words, their depictions come from the very groups that, during the "long Reformation", were trying to wrestle control over the beliefs and practices of ordinary Christians (both laypeople and local clergy), in order to consolidate power.

Arguing against Steve Bruce's (1997) assertions about pre-modern religious worldviews, Stark and Finke (2000: 71) do acknowledge: "Certainly most people in medieval times seem to have held religious beliefs, even if these were somewhat vague and included as much magic and animism as Christianity." Notice the value judgments implicit in this dismissal of people's actual religion and religiosity on the grounds that, in their era, they were not adequately Christian—according to 20th-century criteria.

Defining the concepts of "religion", "religious beliefs", and even "Christian", according to post-Reformation (and largely Protestant) ideas of correct Christian belief and practice, thus results in misinterpretation of comparisons across cultures and times. For example, when sociologists attempt to compare the religiousness of religious groups or cultures or eras by using measures of participation in activities of a religious institution (such as a church), they are assuming that such participation is equally central to all people's religious practice. But that assumption

is patently false. Rather, we need sociological concepts that, as much as is humanly possible, allow us to examine people's actual religions and religiosity, in a given time and place, on their own terms.

Pre-modern European Lenses

One way of thinking differently about sociology of religion's definitional boundaries is to imagine them through other lenses, such as those of other cultures. For the purposes of this essay, let us briefly examine some cultural conceptions that shaped people's religious belief and practice *before* the conceptual boundaries used today were socially established. The English writer, L.P. Hartley, wrote in the opening lines of a novel:[1] "The past is another country. They do things differently there." I suggest that, rather than using the cultural conceptions of modern Europe and North America as lenses for "seeing" late medieval European religion and religiosity, let us bracket our culture's assumptions in order to try to understand the "country" of the medieval past. How do "they do things differently there"?

My aim in this essay, however, is not to outline a corrective picture of that "other country's" ways of doing religion and religiosity differently. Rather, I want to turn what we know of that way of understanding back on us and our ways of thinking about religion as sociologists and scholars of religion. In many respects, my efforts are akin to those of other scholars who have noted that our core conceptions of "religion" and "religions" are based on narrow Euro-centric assumptions.[2] Recognizing the limitations of that European framework for conceiving a sociology of religion, Jim Spickard has asked how our discipline might think differently about its subject matter if it were to start from some of the assumptions of, for example, a Confucian, Islamic, or Navajo perspective on religion (Spickard, 1998; 2001; 2005). In that same vein, I ask: What might we perceive differently about religion's place in societies

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[1] *The Go-Between* (1953).

[2] In choosing the lens of pre-Reformation era Europe, I am not suggesting substituting one ethnocentric viewpoint for another. Rather, I argue that sociological analysis could benefit from a wider conceptual framework—even for understanding religious practices linked with sociology's own Western social-historical foundations. At the same time, we could also benefit from a wider conceptual framework than anything based merely on what the West (specifically European and Euro-American scholars) recognized as valid "religions"; see especially Beyer, 1998; and Beyer, 2005.

today if we could "look" at the social landscape through the lenses of late medieval (European) cultural conceptions? If the past is "another country", how might some of that "country's" cultural conceptions help us to understand religion sociologically?

One way to focus this line of questioning is to examine the conceptualization of the sacred and its location. Medieval Christianity was hardly a unified, homogeneous entity.[3] There were enormous differences from one part of Europe to another, and often from a community in one valley to the next valley. So, it is impossible to present all (or even most) of the important historical details. However, especially if we emphasize the religious practices that were the actual core of many people's everyday sense of religion, we can delineate some broad outlines of commonality.

Sacred Place and Sacred Power

At least since Durkheim (1915 [1965]), sociologists have conceptually treated the sacred as something completely separate from the profane. We assume that we can observe the boundaries between them, for example by noticing if a place or object is treated with special awe and reverence. Those same definitional boundaries suggest that sacred space would be set apart and not used for non-religious purposes, and that "religious" people would respect that space with what is deemed as proper behavior, such as silence and attentiveness.

However, if we bracket those definitional assumptions to examine the location of the sacred in that "other country" of pre-modern times, we discover that boundaries between sacred and profane spaces were often blurred, even indistinguishable (Trexler, 1984). Rather, the medieval sense appears to have been that the sacred was nearly ubiquitous, familiar, and highly accessible to everyone. And the norms for appropriate behavior in church or other sacred space did not treat it as strictly separate from profane space as sociologists have assumed (Hayes 2003). In both rural and urban settings, there existed something like a "sacred overlay" across the entire local landscape (Christian, 1981: 176). Everyone in the community knew numerous places where they could readily contact the divine—a votive shrine at a crossroads, a holy

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[3] In fact, one cannot speak of it as "organized religion", which did not begin to exist in Europe until the early Modern era (John Martin, personal communication).

well, a home altar, a standing stone or cairn, the ruin of a hermitage where a holy person once lived, or the grave of a holy creature (usually a human being, but not necessarily). Churches and monasteries, as ecclesiastical places, could also be such sites of sacred power, but they were seldom so important or accessible for ordinary people's quotidian religious practices.

Such a sacred overlay on the entire landscape was important, because religiosity involved physically (as well as spiritually and emotionally) connecting one's mundane concerns or activities with divine power. All of these places were manifestations of the sacred that had erupted within everyday life in the local landscape. One historian argues that, instead of a radical separation of sacred and profane, in medieval Europe, often the sacred seemed to arise from within profane space and everyday, mundane activities (Scribner, 1984a; 1984b). Rather than diminishing the sacred quality of this experience, then, the fact that the sacred was accessible from within profane, everyday life made it more useful. Thus, for practicing their religion, people could suffuse ordinary objects, such as water or cloth, with a little sacred power by having them physically in a site of sacred power and presence. More importantly, a religious person might go to such a space simply to attend to its sacral presence.[4]

That is the first aspect that I would suggest for rethinking our conceptions of religion and religiosity: If we began from the viewpoint of the "other country" of the medieval past, we would emphasize—not beliefs or cognitive aspects—but rather practices that promote the experience of sacred place and time and, especially, the experience of sacral presence. For this reason, our modern conception of a clear dichotomy between sacred and profane may be unhelpful or even misleading.

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[4] The concept of "sacral presence" is suggested by historian Robert Orsi as a core experiential aspect of Catholic religious practice that is not adequately appreciated by most students of religion (Orsi, 2005). He argues that this concept helps us understand, for example, how a person could experience, as "real", the Marian presence at Lourdes through the devotional use of water from a Lourdes grotto (replica) in New York State (Orsi, 2001; 1997). Because his concept is based upon extensive study of popular religion, particularly as practiced by Italian-American Catholics, it is very apt for comprehending medieval European concepts of the sacred. I believe that the concept is also useful for appreciating a very different set of practices of sacral presence in mystical spirituality of that era (as well as much Western mysticism today).

Embodied Practices and Emotional Engagement

In the "other country" of pre-modern Europe, there was an easy familiarity with the realm of the sacred, because sacred places, sacred objects, sacred time were all part of everyday life. For instance, celebrating a saint's day with an all-night feast and community dance in the presence of the saint's shrine or relic was completely consistent with the community's relationship with the saint and how that saint manifested the sacred. Many rituals of that "other country" included ludic (i.e., playful) and even comic elements, which were both expressive and serious. If the ritual celebration of the village's patron saint's feast called for joyous expressions, then everyday joyful music and dances were appropriate for religious expression, as well. The ludic feature of medieval religiosity was not considered irreverent or inconsistent with the deeper purpose of the ritual (e.g., see Duffy, 1992: 22).

Such familiarity and seemingly irreverent behavior applied in church, as well as at home. Although certain times (for instance during the consecration part of the Mass) and places (like the altar) were accorded more reverence than others, the norms for behavior in church appear to have been the same norms as for all public behavior. For example, spitting and flirting in church were not considered to be particularly inappropriate.

Later, reformers drew tidy boundaries around the sacred, in order to protect it from pollution by the profane. Those protections also served to make the sacred less accessible to ordinary people. One key feature that was, in that process, defined out—as not properly "religious"—was the plethora of embodied practices by which people related to the sacred (McGuire, 2006). Postures, gestures, and uses of bodily senses, for example, were once central in how religious people related to the sacred (Muir, 1997: 157). By contrast, before the "long Reformation", hearing clergy preaching, learning church doctrines and creeds, and knowledge of church-prescribed prayers were of relatively little importance, even among those of higher social statuses.[5] Those historical differences point to the second aspect I would suggest for rethinking our conceptions of religion and religiosity: Sociologists, beginning from

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[5] Muir's (1997) synthesis about the importance of embodied practices draws extensively on historical analyses of Bynum, 1991; 1995, as well as Burke, 1978; Christian, 1981; Scribner, 1984a; 1984b; 1987; and others.

the viewpoint of the "other country" of the medieval past, should pay particular attention to embodied practices that engage bodily senses, as well as postures, gestures, and other ways of using the human body and emotions to both reflect and to shape people's social reality.

The involvement of both body and emotions in such ritual practices explains how the religion of the medieval "other country" could deal with such tumultuous and dangerous emotions as fear, grief, and anger (Muir, 1997: 79). Embodied practices (for healing or grieving, for example) worked at multiple levels on bodies, emotions, and social relations. A religious person was one who engaged in such intensely embodied practices. For example, many of their practices for experiencing the sacred were closely linked with the senses—especially, sight. Accordingly, by gazing on a sacred image, a devout person could be profoundly affected by the sacral power emanating from the visual image (Muir, 1997: 193). Sight was linked with insight and believed to lead to deeply emotional and spiritual experiences (Finke, 1993; Miles, 1985).

Relational Spiritual Practices

This feature of embodied practices leads to the third aspect of religion we could rethink: If we began from the point of view of the "other country" of the European medieval past, we would focus on the relational quality of religious devotion and commitment. Rather than frame "religiosity" in terms of membership and participation in the activities of a religious organization, such a perspective would move us to examine the quality and means of interaction between human actors and those manifestations of the sacred that they experienced as powerful. For instance, in medieval Europe, people related to both collective and individual patron saints—understood as powerful manifestations of the sacred, capable of protecting a community, family, or individual from harm and of blessing those under their patronage with health and well-being. Patronage was a reciprocal relationship: both the patron saint and the devotees had reciprocal obligations.

In their relationships with the saints and other manifestations of the sacred, devotees might use familiar terms of address; it was in keeping with their relationship to chat, cajole, chide or plead with the saints (Scribner, 1984a). At the same time, people's commitment to a particular saint or holy place was often contingent and time-bound. For example,

a woman might maintain her relationship with a certain saint only while her children needed the special help for which that saint was known and, at another life stage, have a largely different set of relationships and practices with respect to manifestations of divine power. A single individual might sustain several sets of practices for different saints or other manifestations of the divine, such as one who was patron for his occupation, another for persons with weak eyesight, and yet another for protecting the barnyard animals, as well as the valley's patron saint. Such relationships—like human relationships—were not always happy or supportive ones. Patron saints could be vindictive, jealous, or irritable (Ashley and Sheingorn, 1992). Those relationships were not necessarily personal; they might be based on a strong sense of connection with a place or object imbued with the sacred. Nevertheless, in that "other country", practicing one's religion involved routine maintenance of relationships with the sacred—in its various manifestations—in the course of one's everyday-life activities.

Attending to those connections with the divine was not inconsistent with other practices, such as church attendance, that were linked with what our era would recognize as religion. But because the sacred was experienced as accessible in many ways and in many places, religious commitments pertained as much—if not more—in one's everyday activities and mundane space, like in the kitchen or along the roadside.

A Different Lens for Comprehending Religion Today

These are simply three ways that our scholarly conceptions of religion and individuals' religious lives might be very different if we did not assume the definitional boundaries that resulted from the "long Reformation". Sociologists frequently use an image of religion that is based on 19th- and 20th-century assumptions about individuals' voluntary membership in a religious organization, predicated on assent to core beliefs, and with commitment as a member that is demonstrated by regular attendance and participation in the organization's primary religious gatherings, support of the organization (by giving time, money, and allegiance), and public adherence to that religious group's central moral norms. While such features—sometimes taken for granted as definitive—do describe important parts of many people's religious lives, they may be only a fragment of the whole picture of religion in societies such as those of Europe and the Americas in the 21st century.

I suggest that by "trying on" these three conceptions, borrowed from the other country of the pre-Reformation past, as lenses for viewing contemporary Western societies, we might be able to perceive more clearly both the range of extant religious practices that were marginalized by definitional boundaries and newer practices that Luckmann (1967) called "invisible religion". Using these conceptions, we might be able to appreciate many other practices that the social sciences have often failed to notice as integral parts of people's religion-as-lived (McGuire, forthcoming).

Some of these practices include what some people distinguish today as "spiritual, not religious", but I do not find that distinction very useful sociologically. As I have argued elsewhere (McGuire, 2000), when people make distinctions in identifying themselves or others as "spiritual" or "religious", often they are making value claims about the superiority of their own practices or the negative features of others'. It is true, however, that many of the practices which some individuals now appreciate as "spiritual" were historically defined-out—as not properly "religious"—during the "long Reformation". Thus, it is important for sociologists to examine all such practices, without uncritically accepting the claims of the practitioners of any of them—including institutionally prescribed "religious" practices—about the superiority of their own religion or spirituality.

"Finding" Sacred Place, Time, and Presence

To illustrate what that alternative sociological lens might show us about religion, let us notice some contemporary everyday practices that may escape sociological attention. If we were to try on a lens that allowed us to envision the sacred as (at least potentially) present and accessible in the mundane world of the family home and the surrounding natural environment, then we might notice the practices by which people may be connecting with the sacred in those places and everyday contexts.

Domestic religious practices have long been particularly important in women's religious lives, but women's everyday religious practices generally have been marginalized in the dominant Western religions. Scholars of religion have noticed a few religious practices in the home (i.e., those encouraged by recognized religious groups), but rarely have they considered domestic religious practices to be equally important as formal religious practices in an institutional religious setting, like church

or synagogue service. For example, even if sociologists notice such domestic religious practices as "keeping kosher" in meal preparation or observing Lenten dietary restrictions, they are unlikely to consider the preparation of ordinary meals as a religious practice, even if the person doing the work considers it a part of her religious expression. They may recognize, as religious practices, women's saying of certain blessings in the home, the instruction of small children in religious observances in the home, and the use of prescribed religious symbols in decorating the home. But they are not likely even to notice—much less identify as religious—the many practices by which women and men make sacred space in the midst of profane household space or engage in practices to experience the sacred within their mundane worlds, outside of official religious places and activities.

Arranging and using a home altar or shrine is one such practice that is worth noticing, especially if we drop pre-conceived notions about how such altars would look and be used. In the course of my research, as well as in visiting the homes of friends and neighbors, I have observed domestic shrines or altars in the homes of Roman Catholics, Conservative Jews, Evangelicals, Unitarians, Episcopalians, Buddhists, Methodists, Wiccans, and many others—including several persons whose connections with religious organizations were non-existent. Some people use domestic altars regularly as a central part of practicing their religion; others arrange an altar or shrine as an important aspect of their home, but do not engage in any regular practices in the space of the altar, except to occasionally re-arrange it.

One good example of a person's practices in domestic sacred space was the home altar of a young, well-educated, upper-middle-class Latina, who daily meditated beside it:

> Her home *altar* held several traditional items, including a family heirloom cross brought from Mexico generations ago, pictures of several deceased or distant loved ones, 18 candles of all sizes, small bouquet of wildflowers, and an amulet (*milagro*) attached to the frame of one grandmother's photo (she explained it reminded her to work for the healing of her grandmother's arthritis). There were numerous and prominent non-traditional items as well: amethyst crystals used in healing meditations, oriental incense and Tibetan prayer bell, a large colorful triptych of Frida Kahlo, and a modern representation of the Virgin of Guadalupe as a young Chicana in running shoes, with her blue cape flowing behind her and her athlete's thighs flexed, as she runs vigorously along a road with the snake held confidently in her hand (McGuire, 1997).

Not only her meditation, but also her practice of frequently re-arranging the altar (e.g., with fresh wildflowers, with another photo of a loved one to remember in her prayers, or with a little piece of artwork that meant something special to her), was a part of a routine invocation of the sacred to within her home and mundane life.

A related set of religious practices that have been invisible to many scholars are mundane celebrations of sacred time. For instance, to the extent that some religious groups (such as Episcopalians, Roman Catholic and Orthodox Christians) celebrate a liturgical calendar, their members' domestic practices pertaining to sacred time may appear to be simply an extension of church religiosity. They might, however, be something far more. Is a woman's joyous, if tiring, preparation of special holiday food the same as her preparation of other meals? Likely not. Yet, according to most sociological indices, her observance of a sacred season by extra cleaning and special cooking does not count as "religious", whereas church attendance or bible reading would (Díaz-Stevens, 1996). As popular religious practices were denigrated, particularly in the wake of the "long Reformation", women's work in realizing the sacred within the profane time and space of everyday home life came to no longer count as being "religious".

What if each day was celebrated as having some sacred significance? If an individual or a family (or even a whole community) celebrated extra events of sacred time, above and beyond those recognized by their religious group, would theirs not still be a religious practice? What might we discover about people's religion-as-lived (not just religion-as-preached in congregational meetings which they do, or do not, attend), if we were to notice people's everyday religious practices, including an entire range of possible practices that are not approved by any religious organization? Some scholars of religion have begun this line of questioning toward a new understanding of everyday religion, popular religion, and what others have called "spirituality" in modern societies.[6]

In addition to everyday domestic practices, we might notice some public practices that blur the boundaries between sacred and profane. In the "other country" of the medieval past, pilgrimages, processions, and performances were particularly valuable religious traditions for gaining access to sacred space and divine powers. Many pilgrimages,

[6] See, especially, Ammerman, 2006; Bender, 2003; Hall, 1997; Klassen, 2001; McDannell, 1995; Orsi, 1997; Parker, 1998; Sered and Barnes, 2005.

processions and performances (such as Nativity plays) are approved or even sponsored by religious organizations today, too, but we should not fail to notice the religious quality of pilgrimages, processions and performances that are not officially "religious" but are clearly based on notions of ritual bodily motions regarding sacred space and power. Anthropologists note these features in many political rituals, for instance (Kertzer, 1988).

Through the lens of that "other country", many diverse practices today would make sense as ways of experiencing the sacred within the profane, everyday world. One good example is the contemporary revival and transformation of older pilgrimage practices, such as the long pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela, Spain (Slavin, 2003), the multiple and diverse religious meanings of Glastonbury, England, as sacred space (Bowman, 1993), the arduous mountain pilgrimage way to St. Olaf's shrine site in Trondheim, Norway (Karlsaune, 2002), and popular pilgrimages to sacred sites like the Sanctuario at Chimayo, New Mexico (Howarth and Gandert, 1999). Participation in such spatial religious practices is profoundly embodied, involving the participants' senses, emotions, and memories. In many respects, enactment of the practices themselves is part of how space and time are sacralized, regardless of whether participants imagine their practices as ancient traditions or as new expressions of being in touch with sacred power. Good examples include diverse contemporary religious practices surrounding holy wells and stones in England, Scotland, and Ireland (Taylor, 1995), labyrinth-walking meditations (Beaman, 2006), lighting sacred fires (Pike, 1996), and participating in sweat-lodges (Hornborg, 2005).

Furthermore, a perspective which enables us to understand modern people's sense of sacred power, as identified with the mundane spaces in the everyday world, might apply to quasi-sacred sites like the chapel of the Precious Moments factory or to Elvis' Graceland (Campo, 1998), as well as popular celebration of sacred sites like the impromptu 9/11 memorial in a New Jersey park overlook, which had once been a viewpoint for seeing the Manhattan skyline with its World Trade Center. That "other country's" conceptual lens would also give us a better appreciation of the religious practice of procession-as-protest, such as a protest march against abortion (Orsi, 2001) or procession-protests against the School of the Americas, and of religious performances as street theater or community-organizing like the performances of California's Teatro Campesino (Broyles-Gonzalez, 1994) or U.S. public rituals of the Day of the Dead (Medina and Cadena, 2002).

Noticing Embodied Practices

Beginning from the viewpoint of the "other country" of the medieval past, we would also notice, as integral to many individuals' religion, the many embodied practices that engage bodily senses, postures, gestures, and emotions. For instance, if we allowed for the possibility that individuals might experience their sense of sight, as many medieval Christians understood it, to be linked with insight and a path to deeply spiritual experiences, then we might better understand the devotional relationship between a contemporary Eastern Orthodox worshipper and revered icons in church and home (Kokosalakis, 1995).[7] We might also appreciate the many ways by which people today relate religiously to images and their sense of sight (Miles, 1985; Morgan, 1998). In my study of alternative, non-medical healing groups, I observed a meditation circle that used many such embodied practices:

> [They] deliberately chose which sensual elements to stimulate their meditation each night. They often chose a color in which parts of the room were draped, echoed in the color of candles lit in the center of the circle; sometimes they passed around crystals or other symbolic objects to hold and feel during meditation. They evoked the sense of smell with incense or an herbal oil diffuser; sounds, too, were chosen (e.g., playing an audiotape of the ocean or forest bird calls, sounding Oriental prayer bells, chanting, and silence were deliberate parts of their meditation). Not only senses, but also space and time were deliberately transformed with ritual and symbolic meanings. Participants moved their bodies into ritually created "sacred" space; they participated in new calendric rituals; they learned ritual meanings to the timing of their breaths, the length of meditation, the position of their hands to concentrate healing energy where it was needed (McGuire, 1997).

Although that group planned its collective ritual moments more self-consciously than most, it was not at all unusual in the value placed on embodied practices.

What might we see differently, using the lens of that "other country" of the medieval past, if we focused on the mundane embodied practices by which people, individually and collectively, literally live their religions? Elsewhere, I have examined how contemporary patterns of spirituality

[7] Muir notes that, in areas affected by Western Christianity's "long Reformation", Orthodox Christians re-emphasized the importance of icons in the practice of their faith, despite the development of impassioned and sometimes-violent iconoclasm in some parts of what is now Europe (Muir, 1997: 199).

are linked with embodied practices pertaining to food preparation and singing (McGuire, 2003b), working (McGuire, forthcoming), health and healing (McGuire, 1988; 1996), gardening and dancing (McGuire, 2006), and to gender and sexuality (McGuire, 1994; 2003a). Material bodies are also linked to people's religious lives through childbirth, nursing, parenting, and myriad other ways. Ordinary material existence—especially the human body—is the very stuff of these meaningful practices. Human bodies matter, because those practices (even interior ones, such as contemplation) involve people's bodies, as well as their minds and spirits.

All religions engage individuals through concrete practices that involve bodies, as well as minds and spirits. We readily recognize those bodily practices as religious when we think of, for example, Native American religious experience (see, for example, Spickard, 1991). In that cultural context, intense bodily involvement in practices of drumming, dancing, vision quests, smoking, feasting, sweating, and chanting is completely consistent with a high level of spiritual development. This stands in stark contrast to the typical picture of spiritual development among middle- and upper-class Europeans or Americans, whose ideals of religiosity were peculiarly disembodied—often purely cognitive and unemotional.

This was particularly true in the late-19th to late-20th centuries, when scholars of religion were developing the conceptual and methodological tools for analyzing people's religiosity. In that same period, a case was being made for recognizing certain other (non-Western) religions as valid religions, so their emotional and bodily practices were de-emphasized to frame their systems of beliefs, rituals, and elite religious practices as generally parallel to European religions.[8] Perhaps it is a modern conceit to think that our religious practices are more 'civilized' because they are less linked with human bodies than were pre-modern practices. But there is no reason to believe that modern people ceased experiencing the world through their bodies. Students of modern religion would do well to attend to the ways that religion speaks not only to the cognitive aspect of adherents' lives (i.e., their beliefs and thoughts) but also to their emotional needs and their everyday experiences as whole, embodied persons. If we were, rather, to use the

[8] See Sharot (2001) for a detailed discussion of the differences between elite and popular versions of world religions.

lens of that "other country", we would likely better comprehend the bodily and emotional aspects of the elites' religious practices, as well as popular religiosity. And that understanding would give us a richer appreciation of non-Western religions, as well.

Furthermore, as in that "other country", embodied practices today may be ways of addressing people's pragmatic material concerns (McGuire, 2000). Both religious authorities and secular sophisticates may denigrate any link between spirituality and human material concerns, but that link has not gone away. Bodily sickness and pain, childbearing and fertility concerns, the need for adequate food, shelter, and protection from adversity—these are the matters that dominate everyday prayers, even as they are condemned as somehow less appropriate matters for religious attention than so-called "purely spiritual" concerns. For example, why did people in my audience laugh when I read them some *ex-votos* from a South Texas popular religious shrine: "Thanks for your help in obtaining my truck driver's license", "…for my daughter's rapid recovery from surgery", "…for the washing machine a neighbor left behind when she moved", and so on? Is it because we consider these material concerns less worthy than some "purely spiritual" requests? Students of religion simply cannot afford to make such judgments.

Recognizing Relational Religiosity

The third feature that we might notice, if we began from the point of view of the "other country" of the European medieval past, is the relational quality of religious devotion and commitment. Thus, we might focus, for instance, on how people's religious belonging is expressed in practices of reciprocity and bonds of community that go well beyond any religious organizations or formal membership. For example, in San Antonio, Texas, for more than 100 years, there have been devotional ritual performances every Christmastime of a popular-religious Mexican American play, *Los Pastores*, which depicts the importance of humble shepherds' attendance at the Nativity. The whole event involves a complex process of gifting and reciprocity, based on reciprocal obligations between humans and the divine. The performers enact *Los Pastores* in *barrio* homes as a gift, charging no fees. The reciprocal obligation of the sponsor-recipients of this gift is the physical effort, time and money necessary to provide the necessary setup of the place of performance, an appropriate home altar for the performance, and

a meal with plenty of food and drink for the people who perform and attend (Flores, 1994; 1995).

According to anthropologist Richard Flores, this entire devotional ritual performance, its fulfillment of sponsors' *promesas* (solemn promises to God) and its surrounding festivities, especially the meal, constitute—not merely reflect—bonds of community. He reminds us that, particularly for ritual performances, such gifts must be reciprocated to be efficacious (Flores, 1994: 176). For the people doing this work, it is a labor of gratitude and of reciprocity that creates bonds, not only among the sponsors, performers, and audience, but also between the human community and the sacred in its presence (Flores, 1995). The entire event consists of popular religious practices that, taken together, accomplish the experience of the sacred within the profane: They make the blessings of *el Niño Dios* manifest to the humble 21st century "shepherds" of the West Side *barrio*, as they gather on plastic-webbed lawn chairs around the beautifully decorated altar constructed in a rickety carport.

If we were to observe upper-middle-class Anglo Americans, looking for such relational religious commitments, what might we see? In addition to community bonds of reciprocity and mutuality, which exist in many religious organizations, we might very well notice relational religious commitments outside of religious organizations, for instance in people's volunteer efforts and in some people's social activism (exemplified in Bender, 2003; and in Baggett, 2000). A sense of religious reciprocity is often expressed when people engaging in volunteer efforts feel that they "want to give something back", in gratitude for having received so much from God and/or from others in the community. Gift-relationships characterize many religious practices, and a gift-economy is motivated by a different set of expectations and meanings than a market-economy (Schmidt, 1997). Indeed, perhaps such a religious bond of reciprocity may be underlying the practice of what Ammerman (1997) calls "Golden-Rule Christianity", in which people's religious priorities emphasize concrete ways of living "right" that put reciprocity into practice in everyday life.

Conclusion

Historical struggles have resulted in the marginalization of the religious practices of the least powerful, such as women, colonized peoples, ethnic minorities, and persons enslaved or living in poverty. When

scholars uncritically accept the resulting boundaries of what is considered to be "religion", they are likely to fail to notice and understand many manifestations of religion that have become "defined out"—as no longer properly religious. This essay suggests that there is considerable heuristic value to noticing some of those marginalized beliefs and practices, and not solely for the purposes of understanding the religious expressions of marginalized and non-Western peoples. It also enables us to gain a deeper understanding of many practices today that are outside religious institutional contexts, yet may be equally important ways of being religious.

How is globalization linked with such religious practices? Are people creatively using newly available cultural resources, made accessible by processes of globalized communication, to inscribe sacred space in their mundane surroundings? Are their domestic rituals, which blur lines between sacred/profane, somehow widened or connected with far-flung cultural practices, perhaps by creating a sense of virtual community with distant others who engage in similar practices, or perhaps by creatively blending elements into something new that is simultaneously local/immediate and foreign/distant? When we open our thinking about religion to include the aspects of religious beliefs and practices that were historically marginalized, we may have a better perspective for understanding a wide range of cultural practices that have taken on new significance in the face of the many different religious responses to globalization.

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GLOBALIZATION, MIGRATION AND THE TWO TYPES OF RELIGIOUS BOUNDARY: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Margit Warburg

Proselytising religions have a long tradition of global orientation. Most of them carry a message meant for humanity in general; an example of this is the early Christian message that there is no distinction between Jew and Greek (*Romans* 10: 12). This idea of a global reach was succinctly reiterated by the founder of the Methodist Church, John Wesley (1703–1791), while he toured England and preached under open sky: "I look upon all the world as my parish" (Curnock, 1909: 218).

In connection with such universal aspirations, missionaries representing Christianity, Islam and Buddhism have contributed significantly, through centuries, to international cultural and commercial exchange. Indeed, religion was part of globalization from its very beginning. The spread of the different religious traditions into new territories meant both peaceful and bloody encounters between groups of different religious traditions, making boundaries between them topical. These boundaries were in some cases congruent with ethnic boundaries. In other cases, however, religious groups became multi-ethnic and ethnic groups divided between different creeds. None of the religious or ethnic boundaries were so rigid, though, as to turn the entities they separated into societal billiard balls.

When the Enlightenment ideas of universal human rights and equality before the law broke through in the West, the traditional boundaries that distinguished one religious group from another were supplemented with a new religious boundary: the boundary between religious and secular positions on politics, society and family life.

The issue of defining the boundary between a religious group and the rest of society is topical, also long after a group is formed (Barker, 2006). Peter Beyer has proposed that for analyses of new and/or marginal religions in modern society both the boundary between different religious groups and the boundary between the religious and the secular are topical (Beyer, 2006: 254–256). I shall also consider these two types of religious boundary in an analysis of some of the changes that international migration—one of the major characteristics

of globalization—has meant for religious boundaries in Europe. Since the late 1960s international migration has resulted in the religious landscape of Europe becoming a complex pattern of ethnic and religious affiliations. Therefore, when discussing globalization and boundaries of religion in Europe, the discussion will invariably include considerations on ethnic boundaries too.

In the first main section of this chapter I show that within many religious groups in Europe new internal boundaries arise along ethnic lines. However, pre-existing, internal boundaries within immigrant religious traditions may also become less important in the new homeland. In this section I further show that some religious groups, which at first consisted mainly of proselytes from the European majority population, have changed their ethnic profile through the immigration of co-believers. This has led to the situation where the religious boundary separating such a minority religious group from the Christian majority has gradually converged with the ethnic boundary separating immigrants from the ethnic majority.

In the second main section, which concerns the legal and political aspects regulating the boundary between religious and secular positions, I exemplify and discuss how this boundary has become a zone of contestation in the wake of globalization and the immigration of particularly Muslims to Europe. In some cases, this contestation has erupted in crises and clashes; because of globalization these crises have not always been confined to the national political arenas but have become international affairs.

The overall scope of this chapter is to show that a complex set of boundaries associated with the different religions in Europe has become more salient with globalization and its companion, increasing international migration. These boundaries run along religious, ethnic and national divides, reflecting that religious diversity is interwoven with cultural diversity in the era of globalization.

Throughout the chapter I illustrate the different points with empirical cases, many of them from Denmark. Denmark is a small European Protestant country, and the cases are representative of Protestant Europe in general, but most of them are not widely known. An exception to this is the well-known incident in 2005 and 2006, where Denmark was at the centre of a conspicuous clash over the boundary between religious and secular positions. I am here referring to the international crisis which followed the publication in a Danish newspaper in 2005

of twelve caricature drawings of the prophet Muhammad; this crisis escalated in a manner typical of globalization.

The Boundaries of Religious Groups and the Ethnic Factor

In Europe one of the most important societal changes following globalization has been accelerating international migration. In itself massive migration is not peculiar to present-day globalization; the late nineteenth century saw levels of migration that were comparable, if not higher than in late twentieth century (Scholte, 2000: 19). However, globalization of today is accelerated by innovations in transport and communication, which have created rapid and cheap opportunities of international travel and instantaneous, worldwide electronic communication at a fraction of earlier costs. A consequence of the vastly improved means of communication is that people in a diaspora can uphold contact with their kin much more easily than overseas immigrants a hundred years ago. This has promoted the upholding and survival of collective identities among immigrants coming from the same places on earth (Rudolph 1997). A by-product of globalization has therefore been a proliferation of ethno-religious diasporas in the West (Sheffer, 1995).

Immigration and Ethnic Composition of Religious Minority Groups

The growth of most Hindu, Buddhist and Muslim groups in the West can be ascribed to immigration and not to conversion among the Christian majority populations, although conversion also takes place. The migrants are often drawn selectively from particular regions of their home countries, as exemplified by the nearly two million South Asian immigrants in Britain (Ballard, 2003). These immigrants usually form religious associations along national or ethnic lines and do not attempt to attract new believers from the majority population of the new host country. Typically, the different national religious immigrant associations do not have much contact with co-believers of other nationalities, even if they live next door. Thus, as Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam have expanded in Europe through immigration, internal ethnic boundaries have become visible between followers who nominally belong to the same religion and live in the same country.

Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam are, however, also represented in Europe by small proselytising groups, which mainly have recruited their

members among Westerners, at least initially. The first practising Buddhist group in Denmark was founded in the 1970s by a Danish couple, Ole and Hannah Nydahl; the group has been actively proselytising, and members of this group and its splinter groups are drawn from ethnic Danes (Borup, 2005). Other Danish Buddhist groups have their basis among immigrants, e.g. Vietnamese and Thai, and their presence is largely unnoticed in public (Borup, 2005). Contact between the ethnic Danish and the immigrant Buddhist groups is very limited; they belong to different schools of Buddhism (the ethnic Danish group is rooted in Tibetan Buddhism), and the Buddhist mission among ethnic Danes does not seem to be much affected by the immigration of Buddhists of foreign nationality. The same pattern is seen in Germany: the groups belonging to Tibetan Buddhist tradition are dominated by ethnic Germans and are actively proselytising, while the large immigrant Buddhist groups only proselytise within their ethnic base (Baumann, 1995: 218–223, 322–324, 409–414). Thus, ethnic boundaries may be rather sharp within the outer boundaries that separate Buddhists from non-Buddhists. With second-generation Buddhist immigrants coming of age, however, these sharp divisions between immigrant and convert Buddhists may erode (Baumann, 2002).

A different development has happened in the case of the Ahmadiyyah in Denmark. The group was founded by a Dane, Abdul S. Madsen, who converted in 1955, and it consisted in the beginning mainly of native Danes, with only a few Pakistani members. The group built the first mosque in Denmark, Madsen made the first translation of the Qur'an into Danish, and the Ahmadiyyahs received considerable publicity in the 1960s and 1970s.[1] The growing immigration from Pakistan to Denmark in the 1980s and 1990s also included Ahmadiyyahs from Pakistan, and this drastically changed the ethnic profile of the group. In 1994, there were about 350 Ahmadiyyah members in Denmark, and only about 30

[1] Although the boundaries between Ahmadiyyahs and Sunnis are sharp among the Pakistanis, the Danish majority population does not know such subtleties. For example, Danish school teachers have made excursions to the Ahmadiyyah mosque, assuming that they visited an ordinary mosque and not one belonging to one of the most heterodox fringe groups within Islam. It is an effect of a prevailing perception in the ethnic Danish homogeneous population that all Muslims are alike. This is blindness towards internal boundaries within Islam in a broad sense; it is not based on ignorance about the existence of religious divisions in general, because no Danish teacher would make an excursion to the Unitarian Church in Copenhagen assuming that it represented a mainstream Protestant church.

of them were native Danes, meaning that the group had become an almost all-Pakistani immigrant religious group (Ejsing, 1994). Thus, the religious boundary between Ahmadiyyahs and the rest of the Danish society has gradually merged with the ethnic boundary between some of the Pakistani immigrants and the rest of the Danish population.

ISKCON in Britain presents another interesting case of how religious and ethnic boundaries may converge. ISKCON also initially drew its members from the British majority population, and the group established an important temple in Hertfordshire through a donation from Beatles singer George Harrison (Nye, 1998). This temple soon became a popular place of worship not only for ISKCON members, but also among British-Indian Hindus in general. The large number of 'foreign' visitors to the temple gave rise to local residents' complaints, however, and this resulted in an enduring and very expensive legal battle between the municipality and ISKCON. The dispute angered wider circles of the Hindu population of London and spurred solidarity actions and demonstration among them. As a result of this, ISKCON, which is essentially a fringe organisation in Hinduism, has become more and more part of the general Hindu community in Britain (Nye, 1998).

Globalization and Changing Ethnic Profile: The Case of Baha'i

My own studies of the Baha'i religion provide an illustrative case of the complex ways in which migration may influence religious minority groups, their boundaries and their prospects of growth. The Baha'i religion has its background in a schism in Shi'a Islam in nineteenth-century Iran, and it has succeeded in gaining a widespread membership beyond the pale of Islam, with more than ninety per cent of its claimed five million adherents having a non-Muslim background (Smith 2000). Although scattered individual Baha'is have been living in Europe since 1900, serious growth of the Baha'i religion in Europe was only accomplished after World War II as the result of a coordinated mission programme by Baha'i missionaries sent from the USA. These missionaries were American converts, not Iranian immigrants in the USA, and they succeeded in establishing viable Baha'i communities in many West European countries in the course of the first decade after World War II (Warburg, 2006: 237–242).

The demographic development of the Danish Baha'i community since the late 1940s is typical of Baha'i communities of Western Europe (Warburg, 2006: 25–26, 247–249). Key demographic data from a

longitudinal demographic analysis of migration and ethnic composition of the Danish Baha'i community are listed in Table 1 and show that in the 1950s the Danish Baha'i community was ethnically homogeneous just as Denmark was in general; the few non-Danish Baha'is in this period were other Scandinavians and a few American missionaries living temporarily in the country.

During the 1960s Iranian Baha'is began to move to Denmark to assist the stagnating Danish Baha'i community. This immigration was mainly a response to the urge of the Baha'i leader Shoghi Effendi that Baha'is from Iran should move to those countries in greatest need of new blood (Shoghi Effendi 1971). Although some of these first Iranians left Denmark again after some years, most of them settled permanently in Denmark, and the 15 Iranians in 1970 represent these immigrants.

Table 1. *Growth and ethnic background of the Danish Baha'i community*[a]

End of Year	Total number of Baha'is	Danish background	Iranian immigrants[b]	Other immigrants[b]
1950	35	31 (89%)	0 (0%)	4 (11%)
1960	59	57 (97%)	0 (0%)	2 (3%)
1970	96	72 (75%)	15 (16%)	9 (9%)
1980	184	134 (73%)	31 (17%)	19 (10%)
1990	234	133 (57%)	67 (29%)	34 (14%)
2000	257	126 (49%)	86 (33%)	45 (18%)

[a] The table is based on data extracted from Warburg (2006: 256–257).
[b] An ethnic background other than Danish applies for first-generation Baha'is only. Second generation immigrants are counted as Danes, regardless of their parents' background.

After the Iranian revolution of 1979, thousands of Iranians fled to Europe, and many obtained the right of asylum in Denmark. The great majority of the refugees were Muslims and typically political opponents of the Khomeini regime or deserters from military service; however, a small number were Baha'is, as the Baha'is of Iran were severely persecuted by the Khomeini regime. By 2000 Iranians constituted one third of the Danish Baha'i community. In the 1980s and 1990s the group of Baha'i immigrants of other national backgrounds than Iranian also grew considerably. Most of them came from Asia, Africa or Latin America and were not assigned Baha'i missionaries but rather refugees or 'ordinary' immigrants.

The notable growth of the Danish Baha'i community in the decade between 1970 and 1980, which meant a doubling of the membership

(see Table 1), was not only a result of increased immigration. Like other new religions in the first half of the 1970s, the Baha'is also attracted a sizeable influx of young converts in the wake of the youth rebellion. Many of them have remained members and still make up a strong core of active Danish Baha'is.

Table 1 also shows that during the 1980s and 1990s the number of native Danish Baha'is has remained constant, around 130, while the other nationalities more than doubled their numbers. The result was that the proportion of native Danes in the Danish Baha'i community decreased from 73% in 1980 to 49% in 2000. Considering that according to my data 72% of all new proselytes in this period were native Danes, which is the same as the proportion of native Danish who already were members in 1980 (73%), this relatively large drop in the proportion of Baha'is with a native Danish background seemed surprising. It indicates that other demographic movements than enrolments were influential. A more detailed analysis showed that the observed stagnation in the number of native Danish Baha'is was mainly due to migration: among the group of Baha'is of Danish background there was a sizeable net emigration while there was a net immigration of the other two groups. The effect that migration has had on the ethnic composition of the Danish Baha'i community can be illustrated by a calculation showing that if there had been no migration in and out of the Danish Baha'i community after 1980, the figures by the end of year 2000 would hypothetically have been: 66% native Danes, 21% Iranians and 13% other nationalities. This is quite different from the real figures, which are lower for the native Danes (49%) and higher for the other groups, see Table 1.[2] The drop from 73% native Danes in 1980 to the projected 66% in 2000 could be ascribed to relatively higher figures for deaths and defections among the Danish Baha'is than among the other nationalities.

The observed demographic change in the Danish Baha'i community from 1980 to 2000 is a result of the typical pattern of net immigration to Europe from non-Western countries. In the case of the Baha'is

[2] This calculation is based on observed figures for all demographic movements (conversions, resignations, deaths, emigrations and immigrations), which enter into the demographic balance, see Warburg (2006: 246–282). If net migration (the difference between emigration and immigration) is hypothetically set to be zero, a hypothetical growth of the different ethnic subgroups will stem from the conversions subtracted by resignations and deaths in the period investigated (1980 to 2000). This leads to the projected, hypothetical composition of the Danish Baha'i community in 2000.

the change is augmented by the significant net emigration of Baha'is of Danish background (15% of this sub-group was 'lost' by emigration from Denmark during the 1980s and 1990s). Most of the Danish emigrants went abroad as assigned pioneers (the internal Baha'i term for missionaries) to promote the Baha'i cause. Some, but far from all, later returned to Denmark.

The Baha'is praise cultural pluralism in their call for the unification of humankind, and pictures of people representing the most diverse ethnic groups are favourite Baha'i icons, typified by the top illustration on the international website of the religion.[3] A demographic development, in which Baha'is of Danish background now only constitute half the members might therefore be ideologically acceptable to the Baha'is. However, it may also create inner tensions and problems that may lead to stagnation and even loss of members, as appears to have been the case for the Los Angeles Baha'i community in the 1990s (Cole, 2000). The Danish Baha'i community may likewise be negatively affected, if it mainly becomes an immigrant religious group.[4] As discussed below, such a development may set up a merger of religious and ethnic boundaries, which may have consequences for recruitment among the majority population.

Globalization and the Ethnification Trap?

Both the Danish Baha'is and the Danish Ahmadiyyahs have undergone a demographic change since the 1970s when the groups were dominated by members from the majority population of ethnic Danes. In the course of the subsequent decades both groups have become more and more dominated by members of other ethnic backgrounds. This process is observed in its most pronounced form in the case of the Danish Ahmadiyyahs and is illustrated in the general model in Figure 1 below (the boundaries are shown as thick light grey areas to indicate that they are diffuse and soft).

[3] The Bahá'ís. The International Website of the Bahá'í Faith. www.bahai.org.

[4] This may happen sooner than expected from sheer demographic projections of current trends: In October 2002, a group of 35 Iranian Baha'is suddenly arrived in Denmark as part of Denmark's international obligation to receive a certain quota of refugees. For the time being they are living in Denmark and have thereby boosted the group of Iranian Baha'is in Denmark by 40%. If they stay in Denmark permanently, they will significantly alter future membership demographics of the Danish Baha'i community.



Figure 1. *Convergence of religious and ethnic boundaries of some minority religious groups in the wake of migration*

The left side of the model shows the situation of, for example, the Ahmadiyyahs in Denmark in the 1960s before the immigration of Pakistani Ahmadiyyahs became significant. The two groups, the Ahmadiyyahs and the Pakistanis, were at that time clearly two different groups with only a little overlap. With the increasing influx of Pakistanis into the Ahmadiyyah group, the groups have gradually converged, as shown on the right side of the model. The religious boundary between Ahmadiyyahs and the Danish majority population (who are overwhelmingly members of the Evangelical Lutheran church) now almost coincides with the ethnic boundary between ethnic Danes and immigrant Pakistanis. In reality, the Danish Ahmadiyyahs have become a sub-group of the group of immigrant Pakistanis.

I shall use *ethnification* as a descriptive term for this demographic change, which probably characterizes several other religious minority groups in Europe, although few data exist to document this.[5] Potential converts from the majority population to religious groups that have undergone ethnification must therefore not only adapt to the creed and dogmas of the new religion but also to the foreign cultural settings and habits from which it grew. Of course, there are always proselytes who

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[5] In the present context, ethnification is a demographic change where ethnic belonging is defined by the country of origin of the immigrants; elsewhere, the term ethnification is also used in terms of cultural segregation taking place among some non-Western immigrant groups in the West. As stressed by Jonathan Friedman (1998) the connection between migration and (cultural) ethnification has become topical with the partial failure of the integration/assimilation of non-Western immigrants in many Western countries. The demographic and the cultural meaning of ethnification emphasises different aspects of immigration, and they corroborate rather than contradict each other.

may find the foreign especially attractive, but in particular in Europe it seems probable that the more culturally foreign a particular religious group appears to be, the harder it will be on a wide basis to attract proselytes with no previous ties to the ethnic group. If this is the case, it constitutes an ironic dilemma for proselytising minority religions with a strong ethnic home base abroad. Moderate immigration may help growth by providing the group with experienced believers who can assist and train native members in proselytising. However, a stronger immigration may actually turn out to be counter-productive because of the increasing dominance of immigrant culture in the religious group. The group may then risk seeing the expansion of its creed into the majority population being threatened by the ethnification trap with its converging boundaries of religion and ethnicity.

Relativization of the Boundary between Secular and Religious Positions

Growing globalization affects not only the minority groups. All of society is involved, and no individuals can escape the encounter with the others with their alternative attitudes towards important issues of society and with different ways of doing things (Beyer, 1994: 2–4). A result of this is what Roland Robertson and JoAnn Chirico have called relativization (Robertson and Chirico, 1985). Relativization means that fundamental values and mental images of society and culture to an increasing extent are contrasted with a complex of different values and mental images of the 'good society', and that this comparison—more or less explicitly—is interpreted, debated and acted upon. Since religion deals with fundamental cultural values, mental images and acts, Robertson and Chirico's concept of relativization is a key to understanding the reactions of religious groups to globalization (Dawson, 1998).

In his book, *Religion and Globalization* from 1994, Peter Beyer took up this thread, arguing that with globalization representatives of influential religious organizations are facing a situation of increasing relativization where their religious moral codes no longer are felt to represent the moral codes of the society as a whole, but where alternative moral codes are advancing. Beyer suggested that religious communities may consequently follow one of two options if they are to continue to have a public role: the liberal or the conservative option (Beyer, 1994: 70–96). In brief, the liberal option is to embrace particular aspects of the

globalization process, accept pluralism as a consequence of globalization and adopt a benign, ecumenical attitude towards other religions. The conservative option implies that relativization and pluralism are seen as negative and must be counteracted by insisting that 'the others' are models of evil and negations of one's own moral codes.

The words 'liberal' and 'conservative' have somewhat different connotations in Europe than in North America, and I suggest using the terms 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' instead. The liberal/inclusive option is chosen by, for example, the liberation theological movements in Latin America or by religious environmentalism (Beyer, 1994: *passim*). The liberal/inclusive option is also represented by the Baha'i religion and by the international Christian ecumenical movements; the latter have even intensified their activities in response to the increased relativization of the different forms of Christianity that has occurred with globalization (Warburg, 1999; Beckford, 2003: 137–138).

The conservative/exclusive option is represented by groups which react by turning their back to society, stressing the differences between themselves and society at large. Many examples are found among Christians, Jews and Muslims. Carried to its extreme, the conservative/exclusive reaction can lead to what Emmanuel Sivan has called an enclave culture (Sivan, 1995). Members of a religious enclave are conscious about boundaries, of separating 'us' and 'them' in an attempt to protect the values, life-style and coherence of the group against the temptations of this world. An early, well-known example of an enclave is the Old Order Amish groups in North America, and today, an emerging Muslim enclave finds fertile soil in France with its large Muslim population. For example, in some quarters of Paris dominated by lower-class Muslim immigrants the radical revival movement *Tablighi Jamaat* has established *de facto* parallel communities, which seek exclusion from French society at large (Roy, 2004: 282–283; Khedimellah, n.d.). In that respect they parallel the groups of Hassidic Jews who came to New York after World War II and settled in particular quarters, where a prominent rebbe resided. Some went even further and attempted to establish independent self-sustained communities, insulated from the modern world. The first community of that kind was New Square, a suburban village west of New York City, which was founded and constructed solely for the followers of the Squarer Rebbe (Mintz, 1968: 37–47).

A central theme in Peter Beyer's typology is that globalization may lead to opposing reactions. Many of the groups that he discusses are

so relatively homogeneous in their reaction to globalization that their patterns of reaction are ideal types. In other cases, we may recognise both types of reaction to globalization—the inclusive and the exclusive—within the same group. This aspect of Beyer's typology seems relevant when analysing, for example, young Muslim women's use of the headscarf as a marker of identity in the public space—a practice which has repeatedly given rise to a heated debate in several European countries. The wearing of the headscarf among Muslim women is widespread in Europe and is not confined to certain categories of the Muslim immigrants; it is not restricted to just those who are poorly integrated in the labor market, as may be thought, for example. Some Muslim women wear it out of habit or because the family demands it, but for others the headscarf is perceived of as an exclusive cultural marker and a token of cultural capital, and these women wear it to confirm their particular identity in a globalized world. This may seem to be a purely exclusive reaction, but there is more to it than that, if we can infer from the discussions in France.

In early 2004, the issue of headscarves erupted in big demonstrations in France, where the government opposed the use of the headscarf in public space on the grounds that it was seen as a breech of the secular nature of the state. This is no trivial matter in France, since the secularism doctrine, *laïcité*, is one of the cornerstones of the French republic (Bauberot 1998). However, this was probably not how the women saw it; they did not wear the headscarves as a protest against the principle of *laïcité*, if we can extrapolate from an earlier protest in 1994, where the slogans specifically said yes to both *laïcité* and to wearing a scarf (Soysal, 1997). Thus, the women reacted both inclusively by accepting the principle of *laïcité* and exclusively by wearing the headscarves. The protests against *laïcité* are therefore political protests against the French government's interpretation of *laïcité*, which suppresses public marking of religious identity. These protests cut squarely into the zone of contestation between religious and secular positions, where the two opposing parties, the French state and the protesting women, attempt to define and redefine the boundary between the two positions. My interpretation is that the French state, on the one side, strives to push this boundary from the public sphere into the private sphere to uphold the ideal of a secular public sphere. The Muslim women, on the other side, push the boundary between the secular and the religious further into the public sphere maintaining that wearing headscarves does not infringe on the fundamentals of a secular state; it just signals the cohabitation of different religions in that state.



Figure 2. *The boundary between the secular and the religious constitutes a potential zone of contestation between secular and religious positions*

The contest between the French state and the Muslim women exemplifies how in a European secular society, the boundary between the religious and the secular is fluctuating, creating zones of contestation between religious and secular positions. This is illustrated in Figure 2 above.

The figure is simplified in the sense that both ideal types, the secular positions and the religious positions, are themselves subject to internal discussions and power struggles. Nevertheless, the boundary between the secular positions and the religious positions is of a special nature, and even strongly adverse religious organizations can sometimes unite in a fight against secular liberalism. An example was the formation of an unusual alliance in Israel between rabbis, imams, representatives from the Coptic Church, and the Vatican. They all united in a protest against plans of having a gay pride parade in Jerusalem in the summer of 2006 (Frenkel, 2006). A delegation of more than fifty prominent religious figures visited the Knesset to protest, and in the end the parade was called off, officially due to the war in Lebanon.[6]

The issue of the rights of homosexuals is a typical example of an issue over which secular and religious positions meet on the political battlefield, also in Europe. The Faroe Islands is a small North Atlantic archipelago, which belongs to the Danish Crown but has home rule with its own parliament. Traditional Christianity stands strong among the Faroese, and there is a widespread, religiously grounded opposition against acknowledging any rights to homosexuals. The majority in the Faroese parliament has for a long time shared this opposition, and has repeatedly (most recently in 2005) turned down proposals for adjusting

[6] "J'lem gay parade called off due to war", http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3279506,00.html.

its anti-discrimination law so that it also covered homosexuals. Until late 2006 the Faroe Islands was, in fact, the only nation in Europe which had no clause in its anti-discrimination law making it illegal to discriminate against homosexuals.[7] The arguments in the Faroese parliament against introducing such a clause were based on a reading of the Bible implying that homosexuality is a sin, and that no law shall be passed that is against the word of God.[8] A brutal assault on a young homosexual man re-opened the discussion, however, and on the 16 December 2006 the amendment to the anti-discrimination law was finally passed with the narrowest possible margin.[9] The issue was again whether religious or secular positions should prevail in the Faroese legislation; the debate was heated and visitors to the parliamentary debate prayed during the voting, but this time secularism had the upper hand.

The contests over the boundary between secular and religious positions may be initiated by secular forces or by religious activism. The French Muslim women and the Christian anti-homosexual fraction of the Faroese parliament represented religious activism; the following case is an example of a dispute initiated by secularist forces.

Globalization and Relativization of the Boundary of the Freedom of Expression

A dramatic example of increased relativization following globalization was the international crisis in connection with the Danish Muhammad cartoons in 2005–2006. The background for the crisis was a decision taken by a leading Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*, to invite cartoonists to draw caricatures of Muhammad, testing the boundaries of the freedom of expression. The motive for this invitation was to raise a debate about Danish Muslims' tolerance of a possible critique and ridicule of their religion (Rose, 2005). Twelve satirical drawings were published in *Jyllands-Posten* 30 September 2005, causing some stir among Danish Muslims. However, the case escalated when eleven ambassadors from Muslim countries, headed by the Egyptian ambassador, wrote a joint letter to the Danish Prime Minister on 12 October 2005. In the

[7] "Ekspert: Færøerne har et tilbagestående folkestyre" [The Faroe Islands has a backwards government of the people], *Politiken*, 27 November 2006.

[8] "Fogh: Færøerne bør ikke diskriminere homosexuelle" [The Faroe Islands should not discriminate against homosexuals], *Politiken*, 24 October 2006.

[9] "Overfald åbner færøsk homo-debat" [Assault opens Faroese gay debate], 8 October 2006; "Gråd, bøn og jubel på Færøerne" [Tears, prayer and rejoicing in the Faroe Islands], *Politiken*, 16 December 2006.

letter the ambassadors denounced the publication of the cartoons, and they also used the occasion to refer to a number of other incidents, which they felt were discriminatory towards the Muslim minority in Denmark. Urging the Prime Minister "to take all those responsible to task under the law of the land in the interest of inter-faith harmony, better integration and Denmark's overall relations with the Muslim world", the ambassadors asked for a meeting.[10] The Prime Minister, however, declined the request arguing that the freedom of the press was not to be negotiated.[11]

With this hard-nosed decision relative to diplomatic custom, the Prime Minister intended to send a domestic political signal that the government was tough on constitutional principles and did not wish to yield to any foreign influence on what he saw as an entirely Danish internal affair. However, the Prime Minister miscalculated the effects of his step, because the situation rapidly went out of his control and became a globalized affair. The case served several Arab governments well as a chance to show influential Islamic movements that the governments also cared about the interests of Muslims in other countries. Soon, a group of Danish imams toured the Middle East with *their* view of how Muslims were treated in Denmark. The private diplomacy of the Danish imams added fuel to the fire and shows how easily the ordinary diplomatic channels can be bypassed in a globalized world. In reality, for a period the Danish government was left with no negotiating partner, since the course of events was influenced mainly by local Muslim leaders throughout the Middle East and not by governments. In the subsequent months, there were violent demonstrations against Denmark in many Muslim countries with burnings of the Danish flag, and in a few cases also Danish embassies were attacked and burned. Subsequently, a consumers' boycott of Danish dairy products was orchestrated in a number of countries, primarily in Saudi Arabia. Only gradually, in the course of the spring 2006, did the crisis calm down, and patient diplomatic repair work could begin to take effect.

During the crisis of the Muhammad cartoons, the boundary of the secular versus the sacred was challenged in a discourse over the principles of Enlightenment and secular democracy involving multiple

[10] http://gfx.tv2.dk/images/Nyhederne/Pdf/side1.pdf, http://gfx.tv2.dk/images/Nyhederne/Pdf/side2.pdf (author's translation from the Danish).
[11] http://gfx.tv2.dk/images/Nyhederne/Pdf/side3.pdf.

viewpoints. The two main camps consisted of those who adhered to a principle of absolute freedom of speech also to insult religious feelings, and those who asked for a principle paying special respect to religion. The zone of conflict between the two camps stretched all the way to the highest international level. Thus, on 29 January 2006 the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) announced that they sought to achieve a binding UN resolution banning contempt of religious beliefs.[12] This attempt at delimiting freedom of expression was rejected by Western countries arguing that it might ultimately lead to an unacceptable self-censorship in the public discourse.

The escalation of the crisis of the Muhammad cartoons would probably never have gone so far were it not for globalization. For example, the demonstrations and disturbances abroad did not spread from country to country over a certain period—they erupted simultaneously in several places that were geographically unrelated, demonstrating both simultaneity and de-territorialization in the crisis (Kanter, 1995; Scholte, 2000). The ordinary diplomatic channels were effectively bypassed, and there was no controlling centre that the Danish government could negotiate with. Both bypass and the lack of central control are also distinct features of globalization (Kanter, 1995; Warburg, 2003).

Globalization and the Incipient Contesting of Secular Law

The increased relativization following globalization is also a spurring factor in an ongoing discussion of collective rights for particular subgroups in Western societies. Such collective rights are invariably exclusive, since by definition they cannot be extended to everybody but are confined to a certain group. Thus, again the issue of boundaries is at stake, because with collective rights come the question of drawing the boundary between those that have these rights and those who have not.

The concept of collective rights and jurisdiction for particular religious groups was prevalent in, for example, the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire. The *millet* system necessitates the drawing of a sharp, unambiguous boundary between those that belong to a particular *millet* and those that do not. In principle, the concept of collective rights has no place in the ideals of Western democracy with its basis in universal, individual rights. The idea of collective rights for particular

[12] http://www.islam-online.net/English/News/2006-01/30/article01.shtml.

groups therefore would raise many political and legal problems, if they infringed on the general individual rights of society. Judging from the ongoing discussion in the USA and Canada, collective jurisdiction can be introduced among the indigenous population without too many problems in areas such as health care, village development, fishing and wildlife administration (Cornell, 2004; Chartrand, 2005). However, if indigenous jurisdiction is extended to more personal matters, they may risk eroding basic civil liberties, as argued by for example Native Women's Association of Canada (Chartrand, 2005).

A further extension of collective rights to more hardcore matters of jurisdiction, in particular criminal law, obviously raises many challenges to basic, universal civil rights. It is therefore hardly surprising that the other side of the coin, collective *guilt*, has not been proposed seriously. That said, in Denmark the well-known imam, Abu Laban (2007), who was a master in making moves that emphasize a Muslim exclusivity while at the same time urging Danish Muslims to engage in society, embarked tentatively on this path in 2005.

The background was a murder case that took place in Copenhagen on 28 May 2005. It began with unrest outside a discotheque, and a group of young Muslim men threatened the bouncer (also a Muslim). The bouncer fired a shot with a handgun, and a young Danish-Palestinian man was hit and died. A wave of uproar went through the local Muslim community, and Abu Laban interfered and suggested that the family of the bouncer should compensate the victim's family by paying DKK 200,000 (EUR 27,000). Abu Laban argued for this proposal by stating that he feared more bloodshed, thereby alluding to that the victim's family might take revenge. He gave an interview to a leading Danish newspaper, where he explained that he had estimated the amount of money by scrutinising Islamic texts and settled it to be equal to the value of one hundred camels.[13] With this proposal Abu Laban operated within a context of classic Islamic jurisprudence, where *quisas*, retaliation, can be compensated with *diya*, blood money. He stressed this by quoting the compensation in the currency of camels, and it is apparently not important for the argument that in this case the camels were extraordinarily cheap—only 270 Euros apiece!

Abu Laban's controversial proposal of a religiously founded settlement in a serious criminal case was—not unexpectedly—almost unanimously

[13] Interview with Abu Laban, *Politiken*, 4 June 2005.

denounced, being a violation of fundamental principles of Western jurisprudence. The imam was, of course, aware of this—he had lived in Denmark for twenty years—and it is unlikely that he could have believed in the realism of his idea. It was a symbolic proposition by which the imam succeeded in placing the local tragedy into a global context, relativizing important principles of the secular state in an attempt to push the boundary between religious law and secular law in favour of the former.

Secular Law and Human Rights

The Western idea of a secular basis for law and order stems from the Enlightenment and its confrontation with the political dominance of religion. However, secularism has religious roots itself; for example, the idea of universal human rights was an outcome of the discussions of natural law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which were again influenced by earlier Christian theological considerations on human nature. Being part of the core heritage of Western philosophical, religious and political thinking, human rights have widely attained a kind of higher moral status. This seems to have lifted human rights above ordinary articles in international conventions, with the result that in the eyes of many "human rights beliefs are essentially religious" (Spickard 1999: 6). Likewise, the discourse on human rights in connection with the drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has been interpreted as a messianic promise beyond the existing legal situation in Europe (Reader, 2003). Thus, a blurred boundary between the religious and the secular seems to run through the idea of universal human rights, rebutting in some way the Enlightenment ideals of a purely secular basis for the law.

Because of the historical and religious roots of human rights, it has been argued in international politics that they are not as universal as they were intended to be when drafted in the United Nations. A typical example from the early 1990s was the vogue among authoritarian rulers in several countries in South East Asia to emphasise 'Asian values' in contrast to the "socially and economically decaying West" (Mendes n.d.). This decay was among other things ascribed to the Western emphasis on individual human rights.

In some religious circles this emphasis on the given rights of the individual above all is a thorn in the flesh. For example, an outstanding Danish right-wing Lutheran theologian argues against the concept of

human rights precisely because it places humans and not God in the centre (Krarup 2006). A parallel to this is the Muslim argument that in an Islamic state any acceptance of such a human-centred concept of universal human rights would be a denial of the religious supremacy of Allah and an acceptance of secularism.

In all cases, it concerns the relationship between religion and state. The extreme interpretation of the Lutheran doctrine of two kingdoms, which calls for a sharp division between religion and politics, or the extreme Islamic call for the adoption of *shari'a* in family law are both challenged by human rights as universal rights that can only be exercised in a secular state.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed how globalization affects the boundaries of religious groups, in particular when they are de-territorialized as a consequence of migration and are challenged in an encounter with Western society. In some cases the ethnic and religious boundaries of religious groups converge in a process of demographic change, a process of ethnification, whereby these groups become more and more dominated by members of ethnic backgrounds other than that of the majority population. This change was observed for the Danish Ahmadiyyahs and most explicitly documented in a demographic analysis of the Danish Baha'i community. Western democracies, in particular in Europe, are also facing a new situation where the general acceptance of a secular basis for the societal order is questioned by some religious groups. Some examples were given such as the issue of the headscarf versus the principle of *laïcité*, the Faroese battle over the rights of homosexuals, the crisis of the Muhammad cartoons, and the Danish imam Abu Laban's controversial attempt of speculating in a *millet* system in a criminal case. In all cases the controversies concerned the interpretation of the proper position of the boundary between the secular and the religious.

Globalization scholars usually stress that a characteristic feature of globalization is the intensification and ease by which geographical boundaries are transgressed or even superseded (Robertson, 1992: 179–180; Kanter, 1995: 45–46; Scholte, 2000: 46–56). In the light of this it seems almost ironical that other kinds of boundaries become important to consider in a discussion of religion and globalization. Yet,

boundaries are associated with order, and when existing boundaries become more and more leaky with globalization, new boundaries are set up to create order. Among them, religious boundaries are significant and maybe even of growing importance for each turn of the great kaleidoscope of globalization.

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RETHINKING SECULARIZATION: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE[1]

José Casanova

Over a decade ago, I suggested that in order to speak meaningfully of 'secularization' we needed to distinguish three different connotations:

a) Secularization, as **decline of religious beliefs and practices** in modern societies, often postulated as a human universal developmental process. This is the most recent but by now the most widespread usage of the term in contemporary academic debates on secularization, although it remains still unregistered in most dictionaries of most European languages.
b) Secularization, as **privatization of religion**, often understood both as a general modern historical trend and as a normative condition, indeed as a precondition for modern liberal democratic politics. My book, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, (1994) put into question the empirical as well as the normative validity of the privatization thesis.
c) Secularization, as **differentiation of the secular spheres** (state, economy, science), usually understood as 'emancipation,' from religious institutions and norms. This is the core component of the classic theories of secularization, which is related to the original etymological-historical meaning of the term within medieval Christendom. As indicated by every dictionary of every Western European language, it refers to the transfer of persons, things, meanings, etc., from ecclesiastical or religious to civil or lay use, possession or control (Casanova, 1994).

Maintaining this analytical distinction, I argued, should allow to examine and to test the validity of each of the three propositions independently of each other and thus to refocus the often fruitless secularization

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debate into comparative historical analysis that could account for different patterns of secularization, in all three meanings of the term, across societies and civilizations. Yet, the debate between the European and American sociologists of religion remains unabated. For the European defenders of the traditional theory, the secularization of Western European societies appears as an empirically irrefutable *fait accompli* (Bruce, 2002). But Europeans tend to switch back and forth between the traditional meaning of secularization and the more recent meaning that points to the progressive, and since the 60's drastic and assumedly irreversible, decline of religious beliefs and practices among the European population. European sociologists tend to view the two meanings of the term as intrinsically related because they view the two realities, the decline in the societal power and significance of religious institutions and the decline of religious beliefs and practices among individuals, as structurally related components of general processes of modernization.

American sociologists of religion tend to view things differently and practically restrict the use of the term secularization to its narrower more recent meaning of decline of religious beliefs and practices among individuals. It is not so much that they question the secularization of society, but simply that they take it for granted as an unremarkable fact. The United States, they assume, was already born as a modern secular society. Yet they see no evidence of a progressive decline in the religious beliefs and practices of the American people. If anything, the historical evidence points in the opposite direction of progressive *churching* of the American population since independence (Butler, 1990). Consequently many American sociologists of religion tend to discard the theory of secularization, or at least its postulate of the progressive decline of religious beliefs and practices, as a European myth, once they are able to show that in the United States none of the usual 'indicators' of secularization, such as church attendance, frequency of prayer, belief in God, etc., evince any long-term declining trend (Stark, 1990; Stark and Bainbridge, 1995).

The new American paradigm has turned the European model of secularization on its head (Warner, 1993). In the extreme 'supply-side' version of the rational choice theory of religious markets, American sociologists use the American evidence to postulate a general structural relationship between disestablishment or state deregulation, open free competitive and pluralistic religious markets, and high levels of indi-

vidual religiosity. What was until now the American exception attains normative status, while the previous European rule is now demoted to being a deviation from the American norm. The low levels of religiosity in Europe are now supposedly explained by the persistence of either establishment or of highly regulated monopolistic or oligopolistic religious markets (Caplow, 1985; Stark and Iannaccone, 1994; Finke, 1997). But the internal comparative evidence within Europe does not support the basic tenets of the American theory. Monopolistic situations in Poland and Ireland are linked to persistently high levels of religiosity, while increasing liberalization and state deregulation elsewhere are often accompanied by persistent rates of religious decline (Bruce, 2000).

An impasse has been reached in the debate. The traditional theory of secularization works relatively well for Europe, but not for America. The American paradigm works relatively well for the United States, but not for Europe. Neither can offer a plausible account of the internal variations within Europe. Most importantly, neither works very well for other world religions and other parts of the world. Thus, in order to overcome the impasse and surmount the fruitless debate one needs to make clear the terminological and theoretical disagreements. But most importantly, one needs to historicize and contextualize all categories, refocus the attention beyond Europe and North America, and adopt a more global perspective (Casanova, 2003).

In my previous work, I challenged the decline and the privatization sub-theses of the theory of secularization, but I left untouched the thesis of secular differentiation. In a recent reply to Talal Asad's compelling critique, I acknowledged the need to rethink and revise also the thesis of the differentiation of the secular spheres, while insisting that we cannot simply discard the theory of secularization altogether as an ideological construct, or as an artifice of secularism (Casanova, 2006; Asad, 2003). To drop the concept or the theory of secularization would leave us analytically impoverished and without adequate conceptual tools in trying to trace the 'archeology' and 'genealogy' of Western modernity.

While the decline and privatization theses have undergone numerous critiques and revisions in the last fifteen years, the understanding of secularization as a single process of functional differentiation of the various institutional spheres or sub-systems of modern societies, remains relatively uncontested in the social sciences, particularly within European sociology. Yet, one should ask whether it is appropriate to

subsume the multiple and diverse historical patterns of differentiation and fusion of the various institutional spheres (i.e., church and state, state and economy, economy and science) that one finds throughout the history of modern Western societies into a single teleological process of modern functional differentiation.

One should further ask the extent to which it is possible to dissociate the analytical reconstructions of the historical processes of differentiation of Western European societies from general theories of modernity that postulate secular differentiation as a normative project or global requirement for all 'modern' societies. In other words, can the theory of secularization as a particular theory of European historical developments be dissociated from general theories of global modernization? Can there be a non-Western, non-secular modernity or are the self-definitions of modernity inevitably tautological insofar as secular differentiation is precisely what defines a society as 'modern'?

I fully agree with Asad that **the secular** 'should not be thought of as the space in which *real* human life gradually emancipates itself from the controlling power of 'religion' and thus achieves the latter's relocation" (2003:191). In the historical processes of European secularization, the religious and the secular are inextricably bound together and mutually conditioning each other. Asad (2003, 192) has shown how "the historical process of secularization effects a remarkable ideological inversion…For at one time 'the secular' was a part of a theological discourse (*saeculum*)," while later 'the religious' is constituted by secular political and scientific discourses, so that 'religion' itself as a historical category and as a universal globalized concept emerges as a construction of Western secular modernity (Asad, 1993).

But in my view, Asad's own genealogy of the secular is too indebted to the self-genealogies of secularism he has so aptly exposed, failing to recognize the extent to which the formation of the secular is itself inextricably linked with the internal transformations of European Christianity from the so-called Papal Revolution to the Protestant Reformation, and from the ascetic and pietistic sects of the 17th–18th centuries to the emergence of evangelical denominational Protestantism in 19th century America. Should one define these transformations as a process of internal secularization of Western Christianity, or as the cunning of secular reason, or both? A proper rethinking of secularization will require that we examine more critically the diverse patterns of differentiation and fusion of the religious and the secular and their mutual constitution across all world religions.

The contextualization of our categories should begin with the recognition of the particular Christian historicity of Western European developments as well as of the multiple and diverse historical patterns of secularization and differentiation within European and Western societies. Such a recognition in turn should allow a less Euro-centric comparative analysis of patterns of differentiation and secularization in other civilizations and world religions; and more importantly the further recognition that with the world-historical process of globalization initiated by the European colonial expansion, all these processes everywhere are dynamically interrelated and mutually constituted.

Multiple Differentiations, Multiple Secularizations and Multiple Modernities

The theory of the Axial Age and the narratives of multiple and diverse axial age breakthroughs in various civilizations offers an alternative to the Enlightenment grand narrative of the universal progress of humanity from primitive sacred to modern secular, and from faith to reason. The question whether pre-axial tribal and archaic societies were more or less 'religious' than axial civilizations is meaningless. Following S.N. Eisenstadt, one can characterize the axial breakthroughs as the emergence of a quasi-spatial separation and sharp tension between the 'transcendental and mundane orders ' (Eisenstadt, 1986; 2003; Arnason, Eisenstadt and Wittrock, 2004; Bellah, 2005). This new dualism entails the configuration of some kind of transcendental order, morally and ontologically superior, which can serve as the basis for critique and as a regulative norm for all kinds of projects of transformation of the mundane order, from the individual self to the socio-economic and political orders.

Along with this dualism, however, there emerges also the reflexive awareness of a clear chasm between the two orders, the reflexive recognition of the congenital imperfection of human nature and of the mundane order and a explicit reflexive discourse over the limits one must observe in any attempt to implement the transcendent vision in this world. Augustin's distinction between the City of God and the City of Man is simply one of the most radical and poignant formulations of the common, yet also very diverse, types of dualism one finds in all axial civilizations and of the different types of tensions that emerged from the impossibility of bridging that dualism.

In Medieval Christendom such a dualism will be officially recognized and institutionalized in the differentiation between the *saeculum*, which although regulated by Christian norms could not lead to a state of perfection, and the monastic life of the 'religious' orders, withdrawn from the world, which following the special evangelical calling strived to attain already in this world the state of perfection. Throughout the Middle Ages one can observe all kinds of fundamentalist monastic movements, as well as sectarian and gnostic-heterodox movements, which will try to overcome the dualism either by extending the state of perfection beyond the monastery or by attempting a radical transformation of the *saeculum* in accordance with the transcendent norms.

Through multiple paths and in various ways those will be the two great patterns of secularization, which will try to overcome the axial dualism through a transvaluation of the secular sphere by imbuing it with transcendent significance. As Max Weber made clear, the Protestant Reformation will open up one of these two roads by erasing physically and symbolically the walls separating the world and the monastery and by extending the calling to perfection to all Christians living in the world through their professional calling. 'To be monks in the world,' this is the spirit of the Protestant ethic and of modern secular vocational asceticism. In Protestant countries, secularization will have from the beginning an anti-monastic and anti-popish, but not an anti-religious meaning, insofar as its rationale was precisely religious reformation, putting an end to the dualism between religion and world, making religion more secular and the saeculum more religious, bringing religion to the world and the world to religion. The Protestant Reformation brought down the monastery walls separating the religious and secular worlds, and opened the way for their mutual interpenetration. This marks particularly the Anglo-Saxon Protestant road of secularization. Secularization and the parallel modernization do not entail necessarily the decline of religion. On the contrary, as the history of the United States clearly indicates, from the Enlightenment and Independence till the present, processes of radical social change and modernization are often accompanied by 'great awakenings' and by religious growth.

The alternative road to secular modernity and the other way of overcoming the dualism and tension between *saeculum* and transcendent order is through the naturalization of the transcendent principles and norms, eliminating any supernatural or 'religious' reference and translating the transcendental vision into immanent projects of radical transformation of the world. This will be the road taken in much of

continental, and particularly in Latin Europe leading through Renaissance and Enlightenment to the French and later liberal and proletarian revolutions.

The great modern transvaluation at the core of all modern processes of secularization will be the revaluation of the *saeculum*, in its dual temporal and spatial dimension of 'age' and 'world,' and with it the revaluation of all human activities in the world, and particularly of work and labor, of human productivity and creativity, as the source of wealth, of progress and indeed of value itself, and of human dignity. The Protestant ethic served as paradigm of this secular revaluation before it became doctrine and ideology of the bourgeois capitalist as well as of the Marxist political economies and of all modern socialist and proletarian movements.

There are multiple and diverse secularizations in the West and multiple and diverse Western modernities and those are still mostly associated with fundamental historical differences between Catholic, Protestant and Byzantine Christianity, and between Lutheran and Calvinist Protestantism. As David Martin showed, in the Latin-Catholic cultural area, and to some extent throughout Continental Europe, there was a collision between religion and the differentiated secular spheres, that is, between Catholic Christianity and modern science, modern capitalism and the modern state (Martin, 1978). As a result of this protracted clash, the Enlightenment critique of religion found here ample resonance; the secularist genealogy of modernity was constructed as a triumphant emancipation of reason, freedom and worldly pursuits from the constraints of religion; and practically every 'progressive' European social movement from the time of the French Revolution to the present was informed by secularism. The secularist self-narratives, which have informed functionalist theories of differentiation and secularization, have envisoned this process as the emancipation and expansion of the secular spheres at the expense of a much diminished and confined, though also newly differentiated, religious sphere. The boundaries are well kept; only they are relocated drastically pushing religion into the margins and into the private sphere.

In the Anglo-Protestant cultural area, by contrast, and particularly in the United States, there was'collusion' between religion and the secular differentiated spheres. There is little historical evidence of any tension between American Protestantism and capitalism and very little manifest tension between science and religion in America prior to the Darwinian crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. The American

Enlightenment had hardly any anti-religious component. Even 'the separation of church and state,' that was constitutionally codified in the dual clause of the First Amendment, had as much the purpose of protecting 'the free exercise' of religion from state interference as that of protecting the federal state from any religious entanglement. It is rare, at least until very recently, to find any 'progressive' social movement in America appealing to 'secularist' values. The appeals to the Gospel and to 'Christian' values are certainly much more common throughout the history of American social movements as well as in the discourse of American presidents.

The purpose of this comparison is not to reiterate the well-known fact that American society is more 'religious' and therefore less 'secular' than European societies. While the first may be true, the second proposition does not follow. On the contrary, the United States has always been the paradigmatic form of a modern secular, differentiated society. Yet the triumph of 'the secular' came aided by religion rather than at its expense and the boundaries themselves became so diffused that, at least by European ecclesiastical standards, it is not clear where religion begins and the secular ends. As Tocqueville (1965: 284) already observed, "not only do the Americans practice their religion out of self-interest, but they often even place in this world the interest which they have in practicing it." Yet, it would be ludicrous to argue that the United States is a less functionally differentiated society, and therefore less modern, and therefore less secular, than France or Sweden. On the contrary, one could argue that there is less functional differentiation of state, economy, science, etc., in *étâtiste* France than in the United States, but this does not make France either less modern or less secular than the United States.

When American sociologists of religion retort from their provincial perspective that secularization is a European myth, they are right if only in the sense that the United States was born as a modern secular state, never knew the established church of the European caesaro-papist absolutist state, and did not need to go through a European process of secular differentiation in order to become a modern secular society. If the European concept of secularization is not a particularly relevant category for the 'Christian' United States, much lesss may it be directly applicable to other axial civilizations with very different modes of structuration of the religious and the secular. As an analytical conceptualization of a historical process, secularization is a category that makes sense within the context of the particular internal and external

dynamics of the transformation of Western European Christianity from the Middle Ages to the present. But the category becomes problematic once it is generalized as a universal process of societal development and once it is transferred to other world religions and other civilizational areas with very different dynamics of structuration of the relations and tensions between religion and world, or between cosmological transcendence and worldly immanence.

The category of secularization could hardly be applicable, for instance, to such 'religions' as Confucianism or Taoism, insofar as they are not characterized by high tension with 'the world,' insofar as their model of transcendence can hardly be called 'religious,' and insofar as they have no ecclesiastical organization. In a sense those religions which have always been 'worldly' and 'lay' do not need to undergo a process of secularization. To secularize, i.e., 'to make worldly' or 'to transfer from ecclesiastical to civil use', are processes that do not make much sense in such a civilizational context. In this respect, China and the Confucian civilizational area have been 'secular' *avant la lettre*. It is the postulated intrinsic correlation between modernization and secularization that is highly problematic. There can be modern societies like the United States, which are secular while deeply religious; and there can be pre-modern societies like China, which from our Euro-centric religious perspective look deeply secular and irreligious.[2]

It just happened that the particular, specifically Christian, Western European dynamic of secularization became globalized with the expansion of European colonialism, and with the ensuing global expansion of capitalism, of the European system of states, of modern science, and of modern ideologies of secularism. Thus, the relevant questions become how Confucianism, Taoism and other world religions respond to the global expansion of 'Western secular modernity', and how all the religious traditions are reinterpreted as a response to this global challenge.

[2] Indeed, in the same way as the United States appears as an 'outlier' or deviant case among advanced post-industrial societies, similarly China appears as an outlier among agrarian societies. Actually, China evinces the lowest level of religious beliefs and religious participation of any country in the world, challenging the assumed correlation between insecurity/survival values and religious beliefs and participation. On the Norris/Inglehart scale agrarian China, at least its Confucian elites, would have appeared for centuries as a higly secular-rational society. See Figures 10.1 and 10.2 in Norris and Inglehart, (2004):224–226.

The concept of multiple modernities, first developed by S.N. Eisenstadt, is a more adequate conceptualization and pragmatic vision of modern global trends than either secular cosmopolitanism or the clash of civilizations. In a certain sense, it shares elements from both. Like cosmopolitanism, it maintains that there are some common elements or traits shared by all 'modern' societies that help to distinguish them from their 'traditional' or pre-modern forms. But these modern traits or principles attain multiple forms and diverse institutionalizations. Moreover, many of these institutionalizations are continuous or congruent with the traditional historical civilizations. Thus, there is both a civilization of modernity and the continuous transformation of the pre-modern historical civilizations under modern conditions, which help to shape the multiple modernities.

Most of the modern traits may have emerged first in the West, but even there one finds multiple modernities. Naturally, this multiplicity becomes even more pronounced as non-Western societies and civilizations acquire and institutionalize those modern traits. Modern traits, moreover, are not developed necessarily in contradistinction to or even at the expense of tradition, but rather through the transformation and the pragmatic adjustment of tradition. In this respect, the multiple modernities position shares with the clash of civilizations position the emphasis on the relevance of cultural traditions and world religions for the formation of multiple modernities.

Secular cosmopolitanism is still based on a rigid dichotomous contraposition of sacred tradition and secular modernity, assuming that the more of the one the less of the other. The clash of civilizations perspective, by contrast, emphasizes the essential continuity between tradition and modernity. Western modernity is assumed to be continuous with the Western tradition. As other civilizations modernize, rather than becoming ever more like the West, they will also maintain an essential continuity with their respective traditions. Thus, the inevitable clash of civilizations as all modern societies basically continue their diverse and mostly incommensurable traditions.

The multiple modernities position rejects both, the notion of a modern radical break with traditions as well as the notion of an essential modern continuity with tradition. All traditions and civilizations are radically transformed in processes of modernization, but they also have the possibility of shaping in particular ways the institutionalization of modern traits. Traditions are forced to respond and adjust to modern

conditions, but in the process of reformulating their traditions for modern contexts they also help to shape the particular forms of modernity.

Decline, Revival or Transformation of Religion?

The progressive decline of institutional Christian religion in Europe is an undeniable social fact. Since the 1960's an increasing majority of the European population has ceased participating in traditional religious practice on a regular basis, while still maintaining relatively high levels of private individual religious beliefs. Grace Davie (1994) has characterized this general European situation as 'believing without belonging'. At the same time, however, large numbers of Europeans even in the most secular countries still identify themselves as 'Christian,' pointing to an implicit, diffused and submerged Christian cultural identity. Danièle Hervieu-Léger (2004) has offered the reverse characterization of the European situation as 'belonging without believing.' From France to Sweden and from England to Scotland, the historical churches (Catholic, Lutheran, Anglican or Calvinist), although emptied of active membership still function, vicariously as it were, as public carriers of the national religion. In this respect, 'secular' and 'Christian' cultural identities are intertwined in complex and rarely verbalized modes among most Europeans.

Yet traditional explanations of European secularization by reference to either increasing institutional differentiation, increasing rationality, or increasing individualism are not persuasive since other modern societies, like the United States, do not manifest similar levels of religious decline. Once the exceptional character of European religious developments is recognized, it becomes necessary to search for an explanation not in general processes of modernization but rather in particular European historical developments. Indeed, the most interesting issue sociologically is not the fact of progressive religious decline among the European population since the 1950's, but the fact that this decline is interpreted through the lenses of the secularization paradigm and is therefore accompanied by a 'secularist' self-understanding that interprets the decline as 'normal' and 'progressive', that is, as a quasi-normative consequence of being a 'modern' and 'enlightened' European. The secularization of Western European societies can be

explained better in terms of the triumph of the knowledge regime of secularism, than in terms of structural processes of socio-economic development. The internal variations within Europe, moreover, can be explained better in terms of historical patterns of church-state and church-nation relations, as well as in terms of different paths of secularization among the different branches of Christianity, than in terms of levels of modernization.

It is the tendency to link processes of secularization to processes of modernization, rather than to the patterns of fusion and dissolution of religious, political, and societal communities, that is of churches, states, and nations, that is at the root of our impasse at the secularization debate. Following Weber (1946:272) we should distinguish analytically the community cult and salvation religious communities. Not every salvation religion functions as a community cult, i.e., is coextensive with a territorial political community or plays the Durkheimian function of societal integration. One may think of the many denominations, sects or cults in America which function primarily as religions of individual salvation. Nor does every community cult function as a religion of individual salvation offering the individual *qua* individual salvation from sickness, poverty, and from all sorts of distress and danger. One may think of state Confucianism in China, Shintoism in Japan, or most caesaro-papist imperial cults. Lesser forms of 'folk' religion tend to supply individual healing and salvation.

The Christian *church* and the Muslim *umma* are two particular though very different forms of historical fusion of community cults and of religions of individual salvation. The truly puzzling question in Europe, and the explanatory key in accounting for the exceptional character of European secularization, is why national churches, once they ceded to the secular nation-state their traditional historical function as community cults, that is, as collective representations of the imagined national communities and carriers of the collective memory, also lost in the process their ability to function as religions of individual salvation. Crucial is the question why individuals in Europe, once they lose faith in their national churches, do not bother to look for alternative salvation religions. In a certain sense, the answer lies in the fact that Europeans continue to be implicit members of their national churches, even after explicitly abandoning them. The national churches remain there as a public good to which they have rightful access when it comes to celebrate the transcendent rites of passage, birth and death. It is this

peculiar situation that explains the lack of demand and the absence of a truly competitive religious market in Europe.

In contrast, the particular pattern of separation of church and state codified in the dual clause of the First Amendment served to structure the unique pattern of American religious pluralism. The United States never had a national church. Eventually, all religions in America, churches as well as sects, irrespective of their origins, doctrinal claims and ecclesiastical identities, would turn into 'denominations', formally equal under the constitution and competing in a relatively free, pluralistic, and voluntaristic religious market. As the organizational form and principle of such a religious system, denominationalism constitutes the great American religious invention (Mead, 1976; Greeley, 1972).[3] Along with, yet differentiated from each and all denominations, the American civil religion functions as the community cult of the nation.

At first, the diversity and substantial equality was only institutionalized as internal denominational religious pluralism within American Protestantism. America was defined as a 'Christian' nation and Christian meant solely 'Protestant'. But eventually, after prolonged outbursts of Protestant nativism directed primarily at Catholic immigrants, the pattern allowed for the incorporation of the religious others, Catholics and Jews, into the system of American religious pluralism. A process of dual accommodation took place whereby Catholicism and Judaism became American religions, while American religion and the nation were equally transformed in the process. America became a 'Judeo-Christian' nation and Protestant, Catholic, and Jew, became the three denominations of the American civil religion.

The fact that religion, religious institutions and religious identities played a central role in the process of incorporation of the old European immigrants has been amply documented and forms the core of Will Herberg's (1960) well-known thesis. Herberg's claim that immigrants became more religious as they became more American has been restated by most contemporary studies of immigrant religions in

[3] E. Mead, (1976); A. M. Greeley, 1972. In Western Europe, by contrast, the model has remained that of one single church which claims to be coextensive with the nation or that of two (Catholic and Protestant) competing but territorially based national churches along with an indefinite number of religious minorities, which tend to assume the structural position of sects vis-à-vis the national church or churches. Post-independence Ukraine may be the only European society that resembles the denominational model. See, J. Casanova, 1998.

America (Casanova, forthcoming).[4] It is important to realize, therefore, that immigrant religiosity is not simply a traditional residue, an old world survival likely to disappear with adaptation to the new context, but rather an adaptive response to the new world. The thesis implies not only that immigrants tend to be religious because of a certain social pressure to conform to American religious norms, something that is undoubtedly the case, but more importantly, the thesis implies that collective religious identities have always been one of the primary ways of structuring internal societal pluralism in American history. In my view, the thesis also offers a more plausible explanation of American religious vitality than rational choice supply-side theories of competitive religious markets.

There is a sense in which both, European secular developments and American religious developments are rather unique and exceptional. In this respect, one could certainly talk, as Europeans have done for decades, of 'American exceptionalism' or one could talk, as it has become fashionable today, of 'European exceptionalism.' But both characterizations are highly problematic, if it is implied, as it was in the past, that America was the exception to the European rule of secularization, or if it is implied, as is often today, that secular Europe is the exception to some global trend of religious revival (Davie, 1999).[5] When it comes to religion, there is no global rule. All world religions are being transformed radically today, as they had already been transformed throughout the era of European colonial expansion, by processes of modernization and globalization. But they are being transformed in diverse and manifold ways.

All world religions are forced to respond to the global expansion of modernity as well as to their mutual and reciprocal challenges, as they all undergo multiple processes of aggiornamento and come to compete with one another in the emerging global system of religions. Under

[4] Racialization and racial identities has been the other primary way of structuring internal societal pluralism in American History. Not religion alone, as Herberg's study would seem to imply, and not race alone, as contemporary immigration studies would seem to imply, but religion and race and their complex entanglements have serve to structure the American experience of immigrant incorporation, indeed are the keys to 'American exceptionalism.'

[5] Grace Davie, "Europe: The Exception that Proves the Rule?" in Peter Berger, ed., The Desecuarization of the World (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999).

conditions of globalization, the world religions do not only draw upon their own traditions but also increasingly upon one another [see Beyer in this volume]. Intercivilizational encounters, cultural imitations and borrowings, diasporic diffusions, hybridity, creolization, and transcultural hyphenations are all part and parcel of the global present.

Sociologists of religion should be less obsessed with the decline of religion and more attuned to the new forms which religion is assuming in all world religions at three different levels of analysis: at the individual level, at the group level, and the societal level. In a certain sense, Ernst Troeltsch's (1931) three types of religion—'individual mysticism', 'sect' and 'church'—correspond to these three levels of analysis.[6] At the individual level the predictions of Troeltsch and William James (1985) at the beginning of last century concerning individual mysticism have held well (see also Taylor, 2002).[7] What Thomas Luckmann (1967) called 'invisible religion' in the 60's remains the dominant form of individual religion and is likely to gain increasing global prominence.[8] The modern individual is condemned to search and to pick and choose from a wide arrangement of meaning systems. From a Western monotheistic perspective such a condition of polytheistic and polyformic individual freedom may seem a highly novel or post-modern one. But from a non-Western perspective, particularly that of the Asian pantheist religious traditions, the condition looks much more like the old state of affairs. Individual mysticism has always been an important option, at least for elites and religious virtuosi, within the Hindu, Buddhist, and Taoist traditions. What Inglehart calls the expansion of post-materialist spiritual values can be understood in this respect as the generalization and democratization of options until now only available to elites and religious virtuosi in most religious traditions. As the privileged material conditions available to the elites for millennia are generalized to entire populations, so are the spiritual and religious options that were usually reserved for them. I would not characterize such a process, however, as religious decline. But what is certainly new in our global age is the simultaneous presence and availability of all world religions and all

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[6] Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches. New York: MacMil¬lan, 1931.

[7] William James, Varieties of Religious Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1985; and Charles Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today. William James Revisited. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 2002).

[8] Thomas Luckmann, Invisible Religion. New York: Macmillan, 1967.

cultural systems, from the most 'primitive' to the most 'modern,' often detached from their temporal and spatial contexts, ready for flexible or fundamentalist individual appropriation.

At the level of religious communities, much of sociology has lamented the loss of *Gemeinschaft* as one of the negative consequences of modernity. Both, individualism and societalization are supposed to expand at the expense of community. Theories of modernization are predicated on the simple dichotomies of tradition and modernity, and of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Most theories of secularization are based on the same simple dichotomies and ultimately on the premise that in the long run processes of modern societal rationalization make community inviable. But the fact is that modernity, as Tocqueville saw clearly a long time ago, offers new and expanded possibilities for the construction of communities of all kind as voluntary associations, and particularly for the construction of new religions communities, as voluntary congregations. The sect is, of course, the paradigmatic type of a voluntary religious congregation. But in the traditional theory, the sect lives in a high and ultimately unsustainable tension with the larger society. American denominationalism, by contrast, can be understood as the generalization and relaxation of the sectarian principle of voluntary religious association.

Most of the so-called 'cults', 'new religions' or 'new religious movements' assume the form of voluntary congregations, but so do the most dynamic forms of Christianity, like the Christian base communities in Latin America or the Pentecostal churches throughout the world, or the most dynamic forms of Islam, such as Tablighi Jamaat, a form of evangelical Islam akin to early 19th century American Methodism, and the many forms of Sufi brotherhoods. Even within world religions, like Hinduism or Buddhism, that have a less developed tradition of congregationalism, the latter is emerging as a new prominent institutional form, particularly in the immigrant diasporas. This institutional transformation in the immigrant diasporas is in turn affecting profoundly the religious institutional forms in the civilizational home areas.

At the societal level of what could be called 'imagined religious communities,' secular nationalism and national 'civil religions' will continue to be prominent carriers of collective identities, but ongoing processes of globalization are likely to enhance the reemergence of the great 'world religions' as globalized transnational imagined religious communities. While new cosmopolitan and transnational imagined communities

will emerge, the most relevant ones are likely to be once again the old civilizations and world religions. Therein lies the merit of Samuel Huntington's thesis. But his geo-political conception of civilizations as territorial units akin to nation-states and superpowers is problematic, leading him to anticipate future global conflicts along civilizational fault lines. In fact, globalization represents not only a great opportunity for the old world religions insofar as they can free themselves from the territorial constrainst of the nation-state and regain their transnational dimensions, but also a great threat insofar as globalization entails the de-territorialization of all cultural systems and threatens to dissolve the essential bonds between histories, peoples and territories which have defined all civilizations and world religions.

Religious Privatization, Religious De-Privatization or Both?

Over a decade ago, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Casanova, 1994) challenged the thesis of the modern privatization of religion as a global historical trend both on empirical and normative grounds. We are still witnessing processes of de-privatization in all religious traditions and in all political systems throughout the world. But de-privatization is not necessarily a reverse universal global trend. It is unlikely, however, that either modern authoritarian regimes or modern liberal democratic systems will prove ultimately successful in banishing religion to the private sphere. Authoritarian regimes may be temporarily successful through repressive measures in enforcing the privatization of religion. Democratic regimes, by contrast, are likely to have greater difficulty in doing so, other than through the tyranny of a secular majority over religious minorities. As the case of France shows, *laïcité*, can indeed become a constitutionally sacralized principle, consensually shared by the overwhelming majority of citizens, who support the enforcement of legislation banishing 'ostentatious religious symbols' from the public sphere, because they are viewed as a threat to the national system or the national tradition. Obviously, the opposite is the case in the United States, where secular minorities may feel threatened by Judeo-Christian definitions of the national republic.

I cannot find either on democratic or on liberal grounds a compelling reason to banish in principle religion from the public democratic sphere. One could at most, on pragmatic historical grounds, defend the need for separation between 'church' and 'state', although I am no longer

convinced that complete separation is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for democracy. But in any case, the attempt to establish a wall of separation between 'religion' and 'politics' is both unjustified and probably counterproductive for democracy itself. Curtailing the 'free exercise of religion' per se must lead to curtailing the free exercise of the civil and political rights of religious citizens and will ultimately infringe on the vitality of a democratic civil society. Particular religious discourses or particular religious practices may be objectionable, and susceptible to legal prohibition, on some democratic or liberal ground, but not because they are 'religious' per se.

Tocqueville was perhaps the only modern social theorist who was able to elaborate these issues with relative clarity and freed from secularist prejudices. He questioned the two central premises of the Enlightenment critique of religion, namely that the advancement of education and reason, and the advancement of democratic freedoms would make religion politically irrelevant. He anticipated, rather presciently, that the democratization of politics and the entrance of ordinary people into the political arena would augment, rather than diminish the public relevance of religion. He found empirical confirmation in the democratic experience of the United States, at the time the most democratic of modern societies and the one with the highest levels of literacy.[9]

The history of democratic politics throughout the world has confirmed Tocqueville's assumptions. Religious issues, religious resources, interdenominational conflicts, secular-religious cleavages have all been relatively central to electoral democratic politics and to the politics of civil society throughout the history of democracy. Even in secular Europe, where a majority of the political elites and of ordinary citizens had taken the thesis of privatization for granted, unexpectedly, contentious religious issues have returned again to the center of European politics (Byrnes and Katzenstein, 2006; Banchoff, 2007). It is not surprising therefore that this should be even more the case in the United States, where historically religion has always been at the very center of all great political conflicts and movements of social reform. From independence to abolition, from nativism to women's suffrage,

[9] The fact that Tocqueville uses the subterfuge of discussing the problems of black slavery and of the genocide of the Native American in a separate chapter at the end of Book I because 'they are outside democracy' shows the extent to which Tocqueville was at least implicitly aware that America was a 'racial' democracy, for whites only, and therefore far from being a model democracy

from prohibition to the civil rights movement, religion had always been at the center of these conflicts, but also on both sides of the political barricades. What is new in the last decades is the fact that for the first time in American political history, the contemporary culture wars are beginning to resemble the secular-religious cleavages that were endemic to continental European politics in the past. Religion itself has become now a contentious public issue. It is not clear yet that one should interpret such a fact as an indication that American religious exceptionalism is coming to an end and the United States is finally joining the European rule of secularization.

If I had to revise anything from my thesis today, it would be my attempt to restrict, on what I thought were justifiable normative grounds, public religion to the public sphere of civil society. This remains my own personal normative and political preference, but I am not certain that the secular separation of religion from political society or even from the state are universalizable maxims, in the sense that they are either necessary or sufficient conditions for democratic politics. As the example of so many modern secular authoritarian and totalitarian states show, from the Soviet Union to secular Turkey, strict no establishment is by no means a sufficient condition for democracy. On the other hand, several countries with at least nominal establishment, such as England or Lutheran Scandinavian countries, have a relatively commendable record of democratic freedoms and of protection of the rights of minorities, including religious ones. It would seem, therefore, that strict separation is also not a necessary condition for democracy. Indeed one could advance the proposition that of the two clauses of the First Amendment, 'free exercise' is the one that stands out as a normative democratic principle in itself, while the no establishment principle is defensible only insofar as it might be a necessary means to free exercise and to equal rights. In other words, secularist principles per se may be defensible on some other ground, but not as intrinsically liberal democratic ones.

The rules for protection from the tyranny of religious majorities should be the same democratic rules used to defend from the tyranny of any democratic majority. The protection of the rights of any minority, religious or secular, and equal universal access should be central normative principles of any liberal democratic system. In principle one should not need any additional particular secularist principle or legislation. But as a mater of fact, historically-pragmatically, it may be necessary to disestablish 'churches', that is, ecclesiastical institutions that

claim either monopolistic rights over a territory or particular privileges, or it may be necessary to use constitutional and at times extra-ordinary means to disempower entrenched tyrannical majorities.

Finally, on empirical grounds there are good reasons why we should expect religion and morality to remain and even to become ever more contentious public issues in democratic politics. Given such trends as increasing globalization, transnational migrations, increasing multiculturalism, the biogenetic revolution and the persistence of blatant gender discrimination, the number of contentious public religious issues is likely to grow rather than diminish. The result is a continuous expansion of the *res publica* while the citizen's republic becomes ever more diverse and fragmented. The penetration of all spheres of life, including the most private, by public policy; the expansion of scientific-technological frontiers giving humanity demiurgic powers of self-creation and self-destruction; the compression of the whole world into one single common home for all of humanity; and the moral pluralism that seems inherent to multiculturalism—all these transcendent issues will continue to engage religion and provoke religious responses.

RELIGION AS IDENTITY AND CONTESTATION

John H. Simpson

Introduction

In the last quarter of the 20th century sociologists wrote about the world as a single economic, political, and social place. This work differed from that of economists in the field of international trade and development, or political scientists specializing in international relations. It emphasized the totality of the world rather than sets of relations between its parts. And it eschewed unelaborated references to the world as a 'global village'.

- The world was seen as an economic system where the rules of capitalism brought about and sustained differences in wealth and power not only within societies but especially between nation-states. (Wallerstein 1974–1989).
- Nation-states were seen as societal units having legitimate authority associated with a global set of expectations and rules, formal and informal, which described and mandated the ways in which a nation-state should act in order to serve its citizenry and the world in humane ways (Meyer, 1980; Meyer et al., 1987; 1997).
- The sociality of the world was viewed in terms of a universal press for comparisons between and among the acting units of the world: nations, nation-states, and selves (individuals). The flow of comparisons constructed an identity for each unit, an identity that was reflexive, projected onto the world's stage, and revised where necessary to take into account events and changes (Robertson and Chirico, 1985; Robertson, 1992). Socially, the world was a much more complex place than the image of a 'global village' suggested.

These ways of seeing the world sociologically defined an approach to the world that was covered by the descriptor 'globalization' (Simpson forthcoming). And each way stated or implied a position on the role of religion in a globalized world.

- Religion is an epiphenomenon or a correlate of action, especially economic action, with no independent effects of its own on contemporary world history (Wallerstein).
- Secularized Western (Judeo-Christian) values point to the desiderata of a world-polity that is the normative framework for the behavior of nation-states (Meyer).
- Religion is a solution for the endemic identity crises of the world's acting units—nations, nation-states, selves—crises induced by the world having become one place where comparisons cannot be avoided (Robertson).

At about the same time that sociologists began to think globally in the ways laid out above, the German theorist, Niklas Luhmann, was developing his description of modern society (1982). Luhmann was concerned with how modern society could think of itself in a way that adequately described how the differentiated institutions of a modern society—the economy, politics, science, law, education, art, religion—worked and formed a unity. Luhmann was not content with simply recognizing the presence in modern societies of an elaborate division of labor presumptively tied together by national solidarity, common values, economic necessity or political hegemony. He wanted to know how each institution operated and whether there was commonality across the autonomous institutions of a modern society in the absence of substantive similarities in the operational logics of those institutions. The economy was not science, education was not law, etc.

Luhmann (1995) proposed that the institutions in a modern society are self-constructed by communication using binary codes. Each institution has its own code: ownership/no ownership (the economy), true/false (science), legal/not legal (the law), etc. Each institution is a social system, an operationally closed process that only exists because there is something that it is not: its environment.

Luhmann's analysis leads to the conclusion that the unity of modern societies is found in the sameness of process within its social systems: self-construction using distinctions (binary codes). The differences between social systems are found in the differences in the codes each system uses to construct itself. The legal system's code (legal/not legal) is not the same as the political system's code (in power/out of power), etc.

Luhmann's theory is a theory of modernity. As such it poses interesting possibilities for the understanding of globalization and, especially, religion in a globalized world. It is not difficult to see globalization

as the spread of institutions that developed in the modern West: the nation-state, science, capitalism, socialism, etc. Each can be viewed as systemic in Luhmann's sense, a social system diffused across the world. Each system uses the same code everywhere, true/false (modern science), etc. But is on-ground religion across the world systemic as well?

Were religion in a globalized world systemic, in the Luhmannian sense, it would be an autonomous, code-specific, communication-based social system like an economic system or a political system, something in the environment of all other social systems. But is religion a global social system? *It is if it uses the same code everywhere*. Beyer argues that that is the case (2006). In the global circumstance religion takes the form of a Luhmannian social system, according to Beyer. Beyer's turn takes religion in globalized society away from the niche of established perspectives (while not denying their validity) and places it within the broad frame of Luhmann's general sociology.

This chapter provides an understanding of identity and contestation from a Luhmannian perspective. It spells out the 'how' of identity and contestation and, therefore, religious identity and contestation in the global circumstance *if religion in global society is systemic.* The question regarding the form(s) that religion takes in the globalized world is left open, but left open as a contingency and not as an opportunity to close on a position of either necessity or impossibility regarding how religion operates in the contemporary global situation.

Approaches to Religion, Identity, and Contestation

The themes of contestation and identity cover several possible ways of developing this chapter. One starting point would be a timeline of events describing religion and conflict in the post-9/11 world, and 9/11, itself, as an event underwriting antagonism and aggression flowing from religion. Attention would be paid to the impact of economic, political, social, and military conflict on religious identities. In this framing contestation intensifies religious self-definitions that in turn thicken and escalate conflict as in the case of Sunni vs. Shi'a after the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Another possibility steers analysis in the direction of observing the formation and maintenance of identities as a factor contributing to conflict. Emphasis would be placed on the role of religion as a personal or social sign that can be mobilized in the designation of sides. In this

framing identities lead to the observation of events. Empirical starting points might include the flowering of Iran as a theocratic player in the world of nuclear arms, the struggles between religion and the state in China, and the emergence of India as a scene of rapid development overlaid on a religiously justified stratification system. In each case the distribution and character of religious identities within systems of power and exchange would be analyzed as sources of contestation and conflict.

There are other possibilities. Developing the chapter from the history of religion perspective would lead to an analysis of texts and practices. The meaning of individual and social identities within traditions would be sought and relations (or a lack thereof) established between identities and the doctrines, ethics, rituals, practices, poetry, stories and theatrics of a tradition as they are brought to bear on difference and contestation.

The possibilities described above share a common methodological strategy: finding correlations between conflict and identity. Properly applied, the methodology would enhance (albeit in a conventional way) our understanding of religious identities and conflict in the current situation. But it would also leave a number of matters up in the air.

Chief among these is the question of how useful identity is as a term that can be constructively deployed to guide the empirical search for clues which yield insight and understanding of the role of religion in today's world. To be constructively deployed a term must be above interpretive suspicion. Identity and its theoretical 'chums' (self and I) fail that test according to some engaged in the modern/post-modern debates (cf. Lash and Friedman, 1992: 1–3).

Contestation is also a problematic word. What it signifies is not at issue. The difficulty lies in the ameliorative burden assumed by those who think about contestation. Contestation and its sibling, conflict, are usually seen as problems to be solved, things to be overcome: the contradiction of labor and capital, social order vs. social disorder, irrational (unresolvable) discourse vs. rational discourse. And from Marx to Parsons to Habermas the solutions that are offered are utopian or descriptively flawed (societies don't operate like that): the revolutionary disappearance of capital, value consensus, ideal speech situations (Marx and Engels, 1967; Parsons, 1971; Habermas, 1984).

Is there a way of theorizing contestation and conflict so that it has more conceptual adequacy, more fit with the complexities of the contemporary situation than the counter-factual solutions of the

modern theorists? Finding that way may also transfigure the meaning of identity. What we are looking for, then, is insight into two sets of words that may intermesh and can be used to construct a version of the contemporary phenomenon of conflict anchored in religion: 'I', 'me', 'you', 'they', 'self', 'other', 'identity', and 'competition', 'struggle', 'conflict', 'controversy', 'contestation'.

I, Me, You, and Them

Within Western thought words in the 'I', 'me', 'you', etc. set congeal in a pattern where self and its component units, I and me, are set off in fundamental division from you and them, the other. Identity is the set of properties associated with self and other. The idea of agency supplies movement and action to the self-other pattern and with it comes another fundamental division. Does the source of an act lie within the self (the self as an agent for itself) or does it lie within the other (the self as an agent—willing or unwilling—of the other)?

Answers to that question crosscut long-standing religious and secular perspectives in the West. Two polar strands in the Western (Latin) Christian tradition address the matter of God and the self. One emphasizes the immanence of God in an ordered world and the other stresses God's transcendence (cf. Swanson, 1968; 1986).

Where the first theme (the immanence of God) dominates, the self exists as part of a natural order infused by the supra-naturalness of God. The self's (or soul's) end is harmony with the natural order and God. The acts and properties of the self come from the effects of the natural order and God interwoven with the I. Immanence limits the agency of the self. Harmony with the good is acquired or restored through the penetrating, transforming force of benevolent immanence. The self and its identity are in the final analysis constituted by the Other (Aquinas, 1965: 152).

An emphasis on the transcendence of God, on the other hand, underwrites the agency of the self and limits the constraints of externalities on the 'I'. The 'I' comes into relationship with God by choosing the good that God is and recognizing the force of benevolent immanence. The acts and properties of the self flow from the expression of internalities and their contingent relationships with the natural order and transcendent goods. The self moulds itself and its identity through choice and recognition within a divinely ordered chain of being (Calvin, 1960: 35).

Secularization replaces an immanent or transcendent god with a mundane structure or force thereby changing the nature of the ultimate other in the self/other relationship, and also shifting the possibilities for the 'I'. As the age of faith subsides, in one version of European rationality, the 'I' becomes the source of its own being. Its judgments—cognitive, aesthetic, moral—order the world without any necessary reference to a divine horizon (Löwith, 1964).

The self is an agent for itself within a physical world where metaphysics is a self-achieved transcending construction of the 'I'. The 'need' for metaphysics may disappear altogether. The remembered/imagined presence of the other may be a 'hell' that malignantly constrains or deforms the ego (Sartre, 1956). Salvation becomes therapy, the neutralization of the image of the hellish other in order to form a space for the 'I' where there is freedom, authenticity, and security.

Secularization not only underwrites the construction and repair of the self as an agent for itself in a world where everything proceeds as if there were no God. It also (and, perhaps, more famously and notoriously) spins out a self that is an agent of the purposes of mundane structures that transcend the self. Here we find the modern world of institutional differentiation and bureaucracy, a world that embeds the self in the rules and procedures of compelling contexts that run from laboratories of science to death camps ('I was only following orders'), from the offices and agencies of democracies to the organization of totalitarianism, and from the firms and markets of capitalism to the welfare state and the state-planned economy.

Transcended by the forces and structures of modernity, the self is an agent or even tool of history. The frame of pragmatic progressivism attributes a better state of things (if only for the moment) to history's formation of selves equipped to muddle through and reform the present. In the frame of revolution, the self is channeled and submerged in a collective movement that imagines a best world brought into being by disciplined practice, practice that will solve the problems of the present by transforming its structures. In either case (reform or revolution) the self is not an agent for itself.

Viewing the self/other duality from the perspective of agency and the secular/non-secular distinction points to a constant and a variable. The self/other difference is common to both the age of faith and its secular successor. What changes across the faith/secular divide is the source of reflexivity (the self as agent for itself) and the source of asymmetry (the self as agent of the other). Where the divine horizon recedes, only the

naked 'I' or mundane, contextual other is immanent in the thoughts and acts of the self. Transcendence is self-transcendence without the aid of 'bell, book, and candle'. As the agent of another, norms, rules, procedures, and models of practice infuse and direct the self from an earthly outside, not from the starry heavens above.

The fracture adduced above, the faith/secular divide, is more complex than either the progressive or revolutionary views of history admit. Their deep structures embed the notion of linear change. The past (an age of faith) is left behind and a future where humanity acts for itself—the source of inspiration for change—becomes the present. Some hold the converse of that view. Linear change occurs but rather than undoing faith it overcomes the disappearance of the divine horizon and re-enchants the world (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985).

In either case the linear view is underwritten by the resolution of a contradiction and, thereby, the achievement of a new unity. The tension between the presence of a divine horizon and the Promethean urge is resolved by the unity of a new world without God or by the unity of a *late modern* world where God is the measure of all things for some (Simpson, 1992).

How many flowers are there in the garden of modernity? Linear views say, 'Either roses or lilies, but not both.' Unity requires overcoming difference. *E Pluribus Unum!* But what if the assignment is to think and do a world of persistent difference, a world where there is a divine horizon for some and only a human reference for others, a world of myriad otherness, a world of diverse expertise, a world of thick political, social, and economic complexity: a world where there are not only roses and lilies in the garden side by side but cactus and hibiscus, pansies and dahlias, gardenias and skunk cabbage, etc. as well?

How do we think this world? Where is there unity in a world of unfathomable diversity, a world where difference is resolved by creating more difference and never overcome by destroying difference in the name of unity? Where are the 'I', 'me', self, and identity in this world and how does religion affect them?

The Luhmannian Turn

According to the social theorist Niklas Luhmann, the world of difference and otherness, our world, can be theoretically grasped. But only where value consensus, ideal speech situations, counterfactual utopias, and

the post-modern sensibility that unconnected difference reigns are bid farewell and a new array of concepts or new uses of familiar concepts are welcomed into the world of theory. Thus, Luhmann writes about observation, operation, information, communication, system/environment, autopoesis, self-reference, attribution, and expectation among other things (1995). Familiar terms such as role, identity and conflict are folded into a new theoretical apparatus that both qualifies and expands their meaning.

Luhmann's account of modernity ventures far beyond the bounds of classic sociological thought in order to retrieve answers to problems that for him point to dead ends in understanding or beg questions about the sufficiency of received positions. For example, the theme of this chapter, "Religion as Identity and Contestation", could easily be explicated and analyzed within the long-standing symbolic interactionist tradition of American sociology whose immediate roots are traced to George Herbert Mead (1934). The grand question is: What is the relation between the individual (and her/his identity as a self) and society? How is the society/individual duality resolved? How in other words is the universal (society)/particular (individual) problem solved in this case so that one can see society in the individual and the individual in society without contradiction? How can the whole (society) appear in a part (individual)?

Mead located the difference between the individual and society within the individual as the difference between personal and social identity. Thus, individuality was not simply an individual's own performance based on self-reflection. It included the social as well. But this theoretical maneuver, as Luhmann notes, merely repeats the doubled paradigm of individual and society within the individual and therein lies a problem:

> The 'universal' is reconstituted as the 'social'; the world is given through others. This may be advantageous heuristically, but the question of how the I relates to the universal and how the I becomes universal are not carried one step further by it (Luhmann, 1995: 260).

The problematic absence of how the 'I' relates to and becomes the universal in symbolic interactionism is only one of many 'irritants' provoking Luhmann's theoretical turn, a turn that begins with a simple assumption: "The following considerations assume that there are systems" (1995: 12). As Luhmann notes, this is not a position of epistemological doubt, a thinking away of (nearly) everything in order

to assert the foundational idea of systems. Neither is it purely analytic. The concept of system refers to something that is in reality a system and whose statements can be tested against reality.

But why systems? Here Luhmann employs a conventional device, the time-line of pre-modern, modern, and beyond, and the shifts that occurred in the West's self-understanding as transitions and transformations came to pass. By the turn of the 20th century there were two problems that needed to be solved if the epistemic crisis in the West's self-understanding were to be overcome: the problem of social integration in a modern society and the problem of rationality. These are intertwined problems. What the social is and how it forms a unity can only be determined if there is an adequate (rational) way of thinking the social. Structure (the social) and semantics (rationality as meaning) are two sides of the same coin (Luhmann, 1998: 1).

The Problem of Structure

The traditional Western view of society stretching back into antiquity saw it as whole composed of parts (people). It was both an aggregate totality (the sum of the parts) and a unity of the whole that was more than the sum of the parts. The question is: How is unity achieved on the level of the parts if unity is more than the sum of the parts?[1]

Living together required people (parts) to recognize the whole in which they lived and live their lives according to that knowledge, thereby, expressing human nature and the unity of the whole on the level of its parts (people). This perfect model of society was, however, subject to general imperfection and, therefore, disunity. Knowledge could be compromised by error and wrong things could be willed.

The problem of the unity of the whole was solved by differentiating dominant and dominated parts. Dominant parts were vested with correct insight and will and were, thus, able to represent the whole within the whole and, thereby, guarantee the unity of the whole. Not so vague traces of this model are still found in dictatorial and totalitarian polities.

By the 18th century in the West the parts/whole model had taken the humanistic turn. The figure of humanity defined the universal. The

[1] Luhmann's review and critique of Western parts-whole thinking appears in 1995: 5–7.

part (an individual) became universal by expressing humanity. Debate raged about the form in which humanity had to be present: reason, moral law, education, the state? The sense of corruptibility disappeared and freedom from domination was mooted as the basic condition of the unrestricted presence of the universal (humanity) in the particular (the individual). This, of course, is easily recognized as the world of Enlightenment humanity, a world where the universal could be expressed by and through the self in freedom.

But whose self? Was every particular (individual) clothed with freedom to express the universal? The differentiation of dominant and dominated parts in the stratified societies of feudalism and early modernity had assigned freedom to the dominant stratum whose self-representation guaranteed the presence of the universal and the unity of the whole. By the end of the 18th century, that stratum—the nobility, the aristocracy and the Church—had been successfully challenged if not undone by democratic revolutions and the correlative appearance of the differentiation of society based on function.

The idea of a division of labor based on specialization and expertise was clearly identified in the latter part of the 18th century. At the same time the democratic revolutions of the West assigned freedom to all parts of the whole. The free self, the self ennobled by democracy and in possession of rights, was everywhere in principle. But unlike the dominant persona of (diminished and disappearing) stratified societies or the (bourgeois) self of Enlightened humanity, the free, democratized self was doubly constrained as the 19th century unfolded.

- In the context of societal differentiation the free self could not represent the whole because the socio-logic of the whole was obscured by incommensurate parts that could only represent themselves and only be represented by themselves.
- The presence of universal freedom in the self-as-humanity and its possibilities for expression were limited by the asymmetries of the emergent orders of modernity. Labor was not capital. Science was not folklore. Some but not others were full citizens.

The myriad struggles within the Western world of the 19th and 20th centuries for freedom from something and the struggles that emerged in the late 20th century and early part of the present century for freedom to be something/someone exemplify and underscore the contradiction

of freedom and the asymmetries of power in modernity. And that contradiction provokes the question of the unity of the whole or, in more conventional sociological language, the question of societal integration in the circumstance of difference.

The conventional answers to that question adduce (among other things) preexisting similarities in a society (religion, language, etc.) that hold things together as differentiation proceeds, a widespread sense of interdependence, trust and obligation, common values that can be articulated with differences in action to provide a sense of unity, or the unity of consensus achieved by reasonable agreement. But these answers lack force. On the logical side, they tend to be tautological and assert the consequence: (a) in order to exist complex societies must be integrated (have ascribed similarities, interdependence, trust, etc.); (b) societies do exist; (c) therefore, there is societal integration.

On the sociological side, the answers claim the existence of integration among the complex divisions of modern society—its groups, organizations, corporate bodies—without providing a general theoretical description of how diverse social units within a modern society operate and the implications that has for societal integration. Luhmann refers to this situation as theory deficit and the notion of social systems is designed to overcome that deficit (1998: 5).

The Problem of Semantics[2]

Having pointed to the deficit in the West's self-understanding of the structure of its sociality, Luhmann peers at the other side of the structure/semantics distinction: the history of the dissolution of the European tradition of rationality, a tradition that was marked by a continuum connecting the observer in the world with the world. Assuming a rational observer, the tradition focused on the convergence between thought and being and action and nature. Intelligence was directed toward things where the totality of things and the finality of movement "... carried what happened in the world" (Luhmann, 1998: 23). Whatever happened was manifested in a visible order and/or attributed to the knowledge and will of the Creator.

[2] See Luhmann 1998: 22–29.

Where the classical European tradition of rationality was concerned with convergence, it operated by drawing distinctions; generalized as being the difference between thought and being, and that between action and nature. The unity of rationality was guaranteed by the presumption that the world was ordered in such a way that there was a correspondence between the sides of the distinctions. Thought reflected being; being could be thought. Action was in agreement with nature; nature could be molded by action. Where thought was not in accord with being or action was unnatural, there were mistakes and errors that could be remedied by reason.

By the 17th century, the increasing structural complexity of the West and the arrival of printing led to truth 'wars' and skepticism about a universally valid rationality. The 18th century belief in reason adduced distinctions but distinctions that no longer converged. The Enlightenment drew a line between the rational and the irrational. Specialized rationalities emerged. They begged the questions: Was everything that was not within the bounds of a specialized rationality (for example, things outside the scope of emerging modern science) a mistake, an error, a misspecification, inconsequential or, simply, irrelevant? In this situation rationality does not guarantee the unity and certainty of a worldview. Rather it divides the world in a way that cannot be remedied within the scope of its own terms.

Since the 19th century we have become accustomed to working with distinctions without raising the question of the unity of a distinction, according to Luhmann. Countless explicit distinctions serve as opportunities with options for the attribution of rationality (and in many instances what might be called 'entanglement with social movement attributions of politicized meanings') to one side or the other: mind/matter, sacred/secular, state/society, individual/collective, faith/reason, labor/capital, war/peace, women/men, etc. Rationality itself becomes a component of a distinction whose other side is something irrational: pleasure, fantasy, imagination.

Luhmann concludes that the one-sidedness of attributions of rationality enervates modern society's ability to reflect on its own unity. Furthermore, to the extent that empathy and the other's reactions are incorporated into decisions on action, the idea of the unity and certainty of a worldview is undermined (Luhmann, 1998: 25–6).

Unity in a World of Difference

Can modern societies think themselves in a way that satisfies the 'canonical' criteria of unity and rationality in a world of difference, discontinuity, and specialization? Luhmann's answer is 'yes", and it is based on four conceptual devices: the observer, loss of symmetry, distinctions, and re-entry. Luhmann retrieves the position of the observer in European thought in order to associate the observer with the loss of symmetry, the making of distinctions, and the re-entry of distinctions:

> Despite the emphasis of world unity as nature or as creation, and despite the theories of the representation of being in thought or the imitation of nature in artistic action, a "break in symmetry" was inevitable in the Old European cosmology. A remarkable position was reserved for the observer. The rationality continuum was thought to be asymmetrical. The preferred position in the building of the world, containing both itself and its opposite, was that of humanity (1998: 31).

The break in symmetry occurs where an observer makes an observation, draws a line creating a distinction, one side and another side, and there is re-entry. So with the re-entry of the distinction thought/being into itself on the thought side, the observer is able to handle being because the difference between thought and being is available. With the re-entry of the distinction humanity/world into itself on the humanity side humanity becomes the constructing observer of the world. The figure of humanity as the universal that could be manifested in a particular (the individual) disappears. All depends on the figure of the observer making distinctions (not finding distinctions). Reason as the discoverer and explorer of what is goes out the backdoor.

To 'concretize' and narrow these considerations for theory development, Luhmann puts the distinction between system and environment on the table (1998: 33–43). This way of proceeding uses the figure of re-entry—the re-entry of the system/environment distinction into a system—to establish and elaborate the system/environment difference. A distinction is made within the system between self-reference and external reference. The system observes (knows) itself as the difference between self-reference and external reference. That difference is the system.

The distinction between self-reference and external reference is a first-order observation. A first-order observation can be observed by the system where it is made. The system observes how it divides the world using the self-reference/external reference schema. That is

what Luhmann calls a second-order observation, an observation of an observation. With re-entry a second-order observation rapidly leads away from the unity of the world based on the convergence of the sides of a distinction and the certainty that each observed distinction represents the world or, as Luhmann puts it, makes the world visible. Far from suspending differences between distinctions in order to bring about unity, Luhmann keeps distinctions and multiplies them in order to (eventually) assert the unity of society.

With an increase in the order of observation (second-order, third-order, etc.) and the successive reentry of each observation into the system side of the system/environment distinction, the system rapidly digs deeper into itself and builds its complexity. The side of the primal distinction where reentry does not occur—the environment in the system/environment distinction—is, paradoxically, the inchoate side of the distinction that enables the system to build itself. The environment is not the system yet without that which it is not, the system cannot be (itself). To distinguish, to draw a distinction and indicate or point to one side or the other cannot occur unless there is an 'is' and an 'is not'—a distinction in this case without any ontological connotation.

The system operatively excludes itself from the environment and includes itself (in itself) at the same time by observing and basing its difference from the environment on observations that are internal to itself. Thus, a system (that always means the system/environment distinction) constructs itself. It is autopoetic, self-making. It makes attributions to things and holds expectations for things that are its constructions: attributions and expectations that would not 'be' without the environment from which the system distinguishes itself (and, thereby, becomes a system) and that it never knows as a thing-in-itself. The system can only operate with its own constructed attributions and expectations, memories and dreams, stories and rules, things that would not be without the system/environment difference that gives the system its identity.

Having laid out an argument regarding the course of Western rationality and modern society's inability to reflect on its own unity, Luhmann turns to the system/environment distinction and the notion of self-making: the autopoesis of a system constructing itself by distinguishing itself from its environment. How does this turn enable modern societies to reflect on their unity, a unity that must be conceptualized in the circumstance of difference, specialization, and incommensurability? How can unity and difference hold at the same time? According Luhmann they can.

- There is unity because all of the social systems that make up a modern society are the same in terms of how they operate. All of them construct themselves by distinguishing themselves from their environment.
- There is difference because each social system uses its own set of distinctions to construct the difference between itself and its environment.

Luhmann's proposed solution to the deficits in the West's understanding of its unity and rationality, his unfolding of the idea of social systems, is neither an ontological solution to the theoretical dead ends he finds nor a post-modernist shrug in the face of unfathomable ever-changing difference.

A social system is not a thing, an existing object with substance, something that one finds and then makes decisions about. Nor is a social system a mirage or false harbor, a stable illusion of place, comfort, and safety in the midst of ungraspable, chaotic difference**.** A social system is (without any ontological connotation) "...communications and their attribution as actions" (1995: 174).

Unfolding Communication[3]

Communication can occur where alter and ego must take one another into account in doing whatever they do. This is the circle of double contingency (Parsons and Shils, 1951:16). In order to act each must 'read' and respond to what the other is doing. But communication according to Luhmann is not simply the transmission and receipt of a message, a gesture or linguistic event that evokes a response. Communication is a process of selection and, thereby, also, a process of rejection or leaving something (known or unknown) aside.

- There are three moments of selection in communication: information, utterance, and understanding. The direction of communication is from alter to ego.
- A communication ends or is closed off when ego understands via interpretation based on meaning what alter has uttered. Interpretation based on meaning is selection.

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[3] See Luhmann, 1995: 137–75.

- Alter's utterance is a choice that assumes a selection of information. An utterance is not a selection of information, but a selection by alter, based on the information that has been selected.
- The unity of communication is the selections of information, utterance, and understanding and where any selection is missing there is no communication.
- Where there is communication and an attribution (an action in Luhmann's terminology) by ego to alter of the meaning to ego of alter's utterance there is a social system.

The re-entry of distinctions (every selection assumes a distinction) into a system and its self-observation is a social system where distinctions and self-observations are the 'special' types of distinctions and re-entry that have been described as communication and attribution. Social systems are moments in time that rise and fall on the basis of selections and attributions. There is no guarantee from one moment to the next apart from the selections of information, utterance, and understanding (communication) and attributions (action) that there are social systems.

Given that there are two sides to any distinction and that one side or the other can be designated as the side included in the system and that there is no guarantee that one side or the other will be designated as such, social systems from one perspective are achieved 'miracles' dependent on the re-selection of one side again and again. Social systems, then, are neither necessary nor impossible. They are contingent on the always-probable selection of one side of a distinction.

Reality and Success in the Sea of Contingency

Why do social systems have the aura of objective reality, permanence, social fact, rock-fast plausibility, given-ness and there-ness? The Luhmannian answer is: One side of a distinction is designated again and again in the communication with attribution that is a social system. Here ritual, stories, wisdom, and humor, as well as the continuous repetition in their own spaces of the codes of the social systems of modernity (the economy, the law, etc.), come into play in the recall and repetition of distinctions. Without memory there would be no social systems because selections would be random. Should one or more of the selections of communication and attribution disappear or evolve

in a different or contradictory direction, a social system would collapse or no longer be what it is.

The likelihood of continuity must be viewed in terms of the likelihood of stability in communication. Continuity depends on the same side of the distinctions that are in play in the selections of information, utterance, understanding, and the attribution of communication by ego to alter being selected over time. Given that the bodies and minds (genes and experience) of ego and alter are not the same, there is an improbability that ego will understand what alter means. Furthermore, there is an improbability that a communication will reach more persons than are present in a concrete situation, especially if there is a demand that the communication remain unchanged. Reaching more persons increases the likelihood of utterance and, hence, continuity.

Finally, there is the question of the success of a communication. Success is a selection that is not part of the three selections (information, utterance, understanding) that together with the act of attribution make up a social system. There can be communication but there is an improbability that it will be successful:

> Even if a communication is understood by the person it reaches, this does not guarantee that it is also accepted and followed. Rather, 'Every assertion provokes its contrary.' Communication is successful only if ego accepts the content selected by the communication (the information) as a premise of his own behavior (Luhmann, 1995: 158–9).

The aura of fact that we believe social systems have depends on a conjunction of improbabilities embedded in the selections of communication. There are no guarantees of anything when it comes to the 'existence' of social systems. Should communication cease there would be no social systems. Yet there are social systems. So there is communication, the successful coupling of selections improbable as that is, coupling that has features that are the same as the formal properties of the familiar evolutionary process of descent with modification except what is reproduced and modified in the case of social systems are words and gestures not genes and their expression as proteins.

Identity, Contestation, and Religion

What then of identity, contestation and religion? Identity is the attribution by ego to alter of a communication. Identity in other words is

a social system. This Luhmannian way of looking at identity includes but is not limited to the case where there is a thematization (a topical selection) of the properties of a person: 'Donna is a kind person.' 'Patricia is an attractive person.' 'Are there any skilled swimmers in this group, Bob?'

Alters do not have, acquire or possess properties in any substantial sense. Under double contingency an ego having understood, accepted and attributed a communication may observe that social system, and then select information connected with his/her attribution and do the selection of utterance, thus, 'turning into' an alter. Ego (formerly alter) may do the selection of understanding and the attribution of communication to alter (formerly ego) thus 'creating' (another) social system. Where an observer attributes equivalence to the social systems—they use the same distinctions and make the same selections—the common observation is that Donna is a kind person, or Patricia is an attractive person, or the question addressed to Bob has been answered. But those are attributions not possessions, 'is-nesses' or 'havings' in any substantial or essential sense. They arise from the observed equivalence of social systems.

Like identity, contestation is also a social system. Contestation occurs where a) there is communication plus attribution by ego to alter (where there is a social system); b) the fourth selection regarding the acceptance or rejection of the communication by ego (its success or failure) designates the rejection side of the accept/reject distinction; c) ego 'turns into' alter and uses the rejection as information in a communication sequence where ego (formerly alter) understands and attributes the rejection to alter (formerly ego) thus 'creating' another social system. An observer would notice the difference between the two systems as the difference between true/false, believe/not believe, etc. but not as the difference between understood/not understood.

Communication can only occur where ego understands an utterance using selections based on distinctions available to him/her. This has far reaching consequences for contestation, which can only be based on understanding that always completes and closes communication and the subsequent selection of false or 'not to be believed' by ego regarding the conclusions reached in the selections of understanding. Orientalism is not a misunderstanding of the East by the West. It is a rejection by the East of the West's understanding of the East using selections based on distinctions available to the West.

A final word regarding contestation. Based as they are on distinctions and selections, social systems embed the probability of contestation. To select one side of a distinction and reject the other side (put it in the environment) and, thus, be autopoetic, self-making, is to affirm and reject. There is no such thing in a social system as equilibrium, the restoration of a normal state by ordering disorder and converting deviants into conformists. There is only the ongoing choice of one side or the other of distinctions that autopoetically 'creates' a social system. Contestation, one might say, in the form of selecting one side or the other of a distinction is the reason that there are social systems. Contestation is never necessary—the Hobbesian state of nature—nor impossible because Leviathan, the state, overcomes and liquidates the state of nature. It is merely more or less likely depending.

Identity and contestation are forms but not in a substantive sense. One might say that they are like the algorithms that one uses to do statistical analysis on a computer, procedures that instruct the machine to operate on data in such and such a way. But software is not data. Statistical software uses data to find answers. Social systems as analyzed by Luhmann are analogous to software. Culture provides the data that are 'inputs' into the formation of social systems. Precisely, an observer uses distinctions and the distinctions are selected from what is at hand in a culture. In effect Luhmann is saying, "You give a me a distinction and I will tell you what the consequences of that distinction are when it is made (by/available) to an observer."

It's pretty clear what's going on where distinctions such as profit/loss or true/false (empirically based) are used. We have the (social) systems of a (capitalist) economy and modern science. What about religion? There are well-worn abstract distinctions: sacred/profane, immanent/transcendent, for example. These distinctions for the most part turn out to be distinctions used by those who make observations of observations, second order observers: scholars, researchers, social scientists. What distinctions, then, 'generate' the social systems of religion (as distinct from the social systems of those who observe the observations (distinctions) of religion)? What about such distinctions as Islamic/Un-Islamic, Jew/Other, Christian/Not Christian?

From a conventional perspective the distinctions Islamic/Un-Islamic, etc. have global salience. They circulate far beyond the reach of any concrete face-to-face situation as, especially, the reproductions of the media. Now, via the internet—a kind of half-way house between the

media and face-to-face situations—they have a new home with new possibilities. In some respects they can be viewed as brands that like material objects—Adidas, Coca-Cola, etc.—have global recognition and can be associated with local values that implicate choices, choices that result in a decision to buy and consume or not to buy and consume (cf. Stark, 1994).

Where and how often are these distinctions used? As 'pure' distinctions put forward in a context bereft of other distinctions (latent or manifest)? Never! The selections of understanding are always 'informed' by (that is embedded in) what can be viewed as a cross-tabulation or nesting of distinctions that are at hand. Thus, Islamic/Un-Islamic may be put forward where mosque/media is the other margin of the table so to speak. We have the 'cells' Islamic/mosque, Islamic/media, Un-Islamic/mosque, Un-Islamic/media. There are different possibilities for each of these combinations. The descriptors Islamic and Un-Islamic point to debates, life-styles, and, generally, semantic selections that advocate and underwrite various ways of being Muslim. The mosque/media distinction uses nouns of place and points to variation in the meaning of Islamic and Un-Islamic that depend on the context of utterance.

To wear or not wear the niqab is currently in play among Muslims. A press for wearing the garment as communication in a mosque advocates one way of being Muslim, although for the advocate it may be the only way, something necessary if one is not to be Un-Islamic. A push for wearing the garment as communication in the media, especially the Western media, may mark a difference between Muslims and non-Muslims and not a difference within Islam. That would be fine for the advocate of one-way-only Islam. It would also set the teeth of many Muslims on edge, those who know and believe that wearing the niqab is a historically relative practice.

> From the times of the early Arab Umayyads and Abbasids to the Turkish Ottomans, the Indian Moghuls and the Persian Safavids, never have Muslim women been forced to cover their faces as a act of religiosity and piety.
>
> Tying religiosity and piety to face coverings is a 19th- and 20th-century phenomenon started by the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia (Fatah, 2006).

Similar elaborations could be done for the Jew/Other, Christian/Not Christian distinctions using the place distinctions of synagogue/media and congregation/media for cross-tabulation. In all cases the distinc-

tions in the margins and cells of the table with re-entry (for example, Jew/synagogue/synagogue) and communication 'create' a social system, an identity and the basis for contestation where there is a selection of the reject side of the accept/reject distinction, the fourth selection after the three selections of communication.

And, of course, the analysis is not limited to the varieties of Islam, Judaism, or Christianity. There is no 'world' religion that does not encompass a practically uncountable number of social systems. Of the making of distinctions there may be no end.

Conclusion

What has been gained? As we gaze on a world rife with lethal conflict and contestation some of it anchored in religion, we understand that the way we view the world uses communication with attribution to make sense of what is going on. Our sense making is an autopoetic achievement, a construction of selections that is unified but, paradoxically, unified because it uses distinctions that endure in the midst of unity. The unity of a modern society is the unity of a sea of difference. Selection means that we only know in part. Wisdom means that we realize that what we know, we know only in part. That is a long way from Hegelian totalities where all could be known, everything understood, and the world perfected by Enlightened Humanity.

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PART TWO

RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBALIZATION

GLOBALIZATION, RELIGION AND EMPIRE IN ASIA

Bryan S. Turner

Introduction

Religion as an aspect of globalization has been neglected by sociological theory, which has concentrated primarily on the economic, financial and military aspects of the process. Those sociologists who have considered religious aspects of globalization have focused narrowly on the issue of fundamentalism. Furthermore, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism is often regarded as the principal consequence of religious globalization. In these perspectives on religious change, religious fundamentalism is defined simply as traditionalism, because it is seen to be anti-modern. This view, for example, pervades "The Globalization Reader" (Lechner and Boli, 2004: 326–360). There is obviously evidence to show how fundamentalism has attempted to contain the growth of cultural hybridization, to sustain religious authority and orthodoxy, and in particular to curb the growth of women's social and political autonomy. But this view of global fundamentalism as the re-assertion of traditionalism is questionable for two main reasons. Firstly, fundamentalist movements employ the full-range of modern means of communication and organisation, and secondly they are specifically anti-traditionalist in rejecting the taken-for-granted assumptions of traditional practice (Turner, 2003). In Islam, since the formation of the Muslim Brothers in the 1920s, fundamentalists have consistently rejected traditional religion, specifically Sufism, and persistently defined themselves by reference to the Salafis, that is to reformist modernization (Hasan, 2006).

Fundamentalism has its roots in various reformist movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but it is essentially a movement to create 'religion' as a separate set of institutions and a distinctive cultural activity, and it is best regarded as an 'alternative modernity' (Eisenstadt, 1996; Turner, 2002). My principal argument is that one consequence of the global spread of western Christianity has been to construct a model of religion as a special institution in which religion is essentially a private matter of individual subjectivity. This model of religion was basically an expression of the political attempt to prevent religious

wars in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. In response, intellectuals in Asian cultures, especially in Japan and China, started inventing a new terminology to give local expression to this new phenomenon. The religious cultures of the East were slowly transformed into formal religious systems with leaders, theologies, texts and hierarchical institutions as "Eastern Religions" (Coogan, 2005). This sociological argument is, in part, an application of Niklas Luhmann's notions of the internal and external differentiation of religious systems from their social environment, and the need of religious dogmatics to provide a coherent theological reflection on those changes (Luhmann, 1984). Globalization transforms the generic 'religion' into a world-system of competing and conflicting religions. This process of institutional specialization has transformed local, diverse and fragmented cultural practices into recognizable systems of religion. Globalization has therefore had the paradoxical effect of making religions (via their religious leaders and elites) more self-conscious of themselves as being 'world religions' (Beyer, 2006). The Internet, pilgrimage, consumerism and the spread of higher education have all conspired to make "religions more self-consciously global in character" (Smart, 1989: 556). Religions—or at least their leadership—become more reflexive about their beliefs and practices as 'world religions', and these religions make increasingly exclusive claims as to the truth of their theology and the undivided claims that they have over their members.

We can trace this development of a global consciousness of a system of religions back for example to the World's Parliament of Religions in 1893. In order to comprehend this construction of religion as a specialized institution, on the one hand, and the notion of religion as the private consciousness of each member of the community, we need to understand how Christianity was shaped by empire, and how religion and politics came to be institutionally separated in the West in the seventeenth century.

My subsidiary argument is that the process of religious globalization cannot be understood without grasping the relationship between religion and politics, and their mutual interaction, in the development of various western imperial powers. The specific history of religion and politics in Europe was translated into the Asian context, involving, amongst other things, a more or less constant competition between Catholicism and Protestantism. It is important, as I shall demonstrate, to recognize significant differences between the early Portuguese and

Spanish empires in which the church and state worked in unison, and the Anglo-American imperial expansion in which there was greater separation between the economic imperatives of empire and the missionary churches. In the British case, the Indian Mutiny of 1857 led to a more or less permanent division between profit and souls. Perhaps the final stage of this relationship between empire and religion is the creation of numerous diasporic communities in the West, the growth of multiculturalism based on both ethnicity and religious identity, and the blurring of the distinction between the Christian West and the 'religions of Asia'. Multicultural or more precisely multi-faith communities in the West have produced "marbled societies" (Cox, 2003) in which there are significant causes of social tension associated with religious education, intermarriage, conversion and apostasy.

The globalization of religions and the historical role of Christianity in social modernization have therefore involved a complex set of processes. While the spread of Catholic Christianity in Asia engendered a development whereby existing cultures underwent a process of defining 'religion' as a specialized institution, there was a double process of competition between Catholic and Protestant churches for hegemony, and a struggle between Christianity and other religions, in particular Islam, for control of populations and states. In the post-communist world order, the revival of religions also results in further competition, often resulting in a 'clash of civilizations'. The result is a new form of imperial domination. None of these historical developments can be properly understood without grasping the relationships between empire and religions, or without understanding the relations between emergent nation states and organized religion. This chapter is therefore primarily concerned with the complex interaction between politics and religion (or between states and churches) for social and political hegemony in Asia. With globalization, however, the Christian West is confronted by the growth of a variety of significant diasporic communities of 'Asian religions', and therefore the issue of religious militancy becomes a pressing issue of state policy, especially with the substantial growth of Muslim communities in Europe and North America. These changes are one aspect of the growing crisis around multiculturalism, secularization, *laïcité* and desecularization.

Separation of Religion and Politics

The early Christian community is best understood as a millenarian movement in the context of Roman imperialism (Brandon, 1957). As a Jewish prophet and in all probability a member of the Essene sect, Jesus' message anticipated the overthrow of Rome and the end of this world. Writing of the failed Jewish rebellion against Rome in 66–70 AD, Josephus in "The Jewish War" (1970) provided a brief description of the ascetic beliefs and practices of the Essene sect, such as their commitment to celibacy. Reproduction can have no significance for a world that has no future (Vermes, 1968). The New Testament has relatively little to say about the bases of family life, the proper conduct of politics, the inheritance of wealth or the organization of an economy on a permanent basis. These earthly matters were now irrelevant and the disciples should simply prepare themselves for Paradise. The message of the early Church clearly separated sacred from profane history in which Christians were enjoined to give unto Caesar the things that belong to him. In the letters of St. Paul, by contrast, we see a set of arrangements being assembled for specifying the relationship between Gentiles and Jews, the regulation of sexual behavior, and the management of secular conflicts. It is also in St. Paul's discussion of circumcision that we get a glimpse of Christian universalism, and the need to confront and convert the secular world. In rejecting the idea that physical circumcision can be a condition of membership of the Church, and in embracing the idea of a spiritual circumcision of the heart, St. Paul laid the foundations of Christian universalism and the need to bring the secular world under its control (Gager, 2000). Although sociologists are inclined to regard the second half of the twentieth century as the origin of globalization, St. Paul's vision of an external world in need of righteousness inaugurates Christian globalization. These historical examples should force sociologists seriously to rethink the model of globalization developed for example in Anthony Giddens's "The Consequences of Modernity" (1990). In "The City of God", which St. Augustine started to write in 412 immediately after the sacking of Rome, the millennial aspects of Christian theology have been gradually replaced by a theology that has to take permanent relationships with secular institutions seriously. Augustine's political writings therefore spell out how Christians can perform their duties as Roman citizens without compromising their spiritual obligations to the Church (Atkins and Dodaro, 2001). Furthermore, Augustinian theology developed a view

of just wars and the place of violence in the conduct of secular affairs. With the fall of Rome, European Christendom fell eventually into a patchwork of weak and competitive principalities, resulting eventually in feudalism. These changes in military structure, slavery and land tenure were brilliantly described by Weber (1976) in "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations". With the coronation of Charlemagne as emperor in 800 AD in the creation of the Holy Roman Empire, the western Church was split between western Christianity in Rome and Greek orthodoxy in the East. With the insertion of the clause *filioque* ('and from the Son') into the Creed following the Council of Toledo, Greek Orthodoxy claimed that the balance of the Trinity had been disturbed. In the West, the power of the Bishop of Rome continued to expand, and in the East a form of 'Caesaropapism' developed in which the temporal power of the emperor was combined with the authority of a patriarch. These institutional forms in fact masked the crisis of Christendom under pressure from barbarians in northern Europe, and Muslims in the East.

While in Europe civilizational coherence was fragmenting, with the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632AD, a new state was created and Islam spread rapidly. In 636 the Roman army in Syria was defeated and the cities of Syria and Iraq fell to the new Islamic state. Egypt was occupied in 641 and Sicily was pillaged in 652 (Hodgson, 1974). These early conquests laid the foundation for a competition between Islam and Christianity that was shaped by the Crusades, by the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and by the extension of Islam into the Balkans under the leadership of Sulayman the Magnificent (1520–1566). The high water mark of the Islamic expansion of Islam into Europe and the beginning of the global ascendancy of the Christian West is often associated with the failure of the second Ottoman assault on Vienna between July and September 1683, resulting in the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 between the Ottomans and the Holy Roman League. This battle outside Vienna continues to carry significant ideological baggage. For Bernard Lewis (2002) in "What Went Wrong?" not only did the Ottomans lose considerable territory, but they were also compelled to negotiate with European powers through diplomacy. However, for Lewis the real lesson of Carlowitz was that the Europeans, through scientific invention and experiment, had gained decisive military superiority, the end result of which was the termination of the caliphate in 1924.

How and why the Christian West recovered from its political and social decline to assert its military, economic and cultural hegemony has

been in one sense the central question of western historical research and the social sciences, perhaps best and most controversially epitomized in Max Weber's essays on "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" in 1904 and 1905 (2002). The resulting debate occupied sociologists for the next hundred years (Lehmann and Quedraogo, 2003). There is no need to repeat the contours of this Orientalist debate about the religious causes of modernization (Lehmann and Roth, 1993). Suffice it to say that the military and political aspects of the religious ascendancy of the Christian West in Asia have been neglected in the endless discussion of the theological aspects of Christian "Personality and Life Orders" (Hennis, 1988). In terms of western historiography, probably only Marshall G.S. Hodgson adequately raised the issue of the legacy of empire in both Christianity and Islam in his attempt at "Rethinking World History" (1993). Both of these religions of 'brotherly love' were heavily compromised, according to Hodgson, by their association with empire, slavery and warfare. Hodgson (1974:185) argued that the community at Medina was not merely a spiritual organization but a confessional community "designed to transform the world itself through action in the world", but this action in the world came also to include military action. He went on to assert that the problem of Muhammad's legacy as Prophet and statesman was the issue of warfare and that the "peculiar test of Islam lies in how Muslims can meet the question of war" (1974:186). Hodgson was a Quaker who regarded war as a form of violence that corrupted the inner journey of spirituality in the religious life (Turner, 1976). Given these historical connections between secular power and the emergence of world religions, the central question in this chapter is therefore: how did secular power shape the historical development of Christianity in Asia?

The great turning point in the modern history of religion and politics in the West was the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the aim of which was to bring to an end the wars of religion that had plagued Europe after the Reformation. The Treaty reduced the authority of the Pope, who was furious that the Treaty had recognized the authority of the Protestant rulers. It also made Christianity, at least in the Protestant states, a matter of personal and private conscience, and not a feature of public institutions. More precisely, it recognized the difference between private faith as personal subjectivity and religion as a matter of public rituals. The Treaty also recognized the power of princes to determine which version of Christianity would be dominant

within their territorial boundaries, and that princes would not interfere in the religious character of other states (Hirst, 2001). This Westphalian system of states created the conditions whereby liberal tolerance of belief (among Christians) was formulated by John Locke and those who followed him. However, from the perspective of western liberalism, Islam does not fit the Westphalian model of individual conscience, public tolerance, and a system of secular law. These problems arose partly because the Westphalian version of tolerance favored Protestantism as the model of religion, which was individualistic and private. The Protestant model assumes the absence of significant public religious ritual and to a large extent secularized the calendar. Westphalian tolerance had difficulties, not only with Islam, but with Hinduism and Judaism, especially over schooling, law, the status of women and dress codes (Spinner-Halev, 2005).

Although Westphalia created the conditions in which tolerance of private belief was a requirement of public peace, we should not assume that Christianity could be neatly confined within such a system. Christianity is, like Islam, an evangelical religion for which the world is a corrupt place, and for which the state is a necessary evil—that is, an institution necessary to curb the evil character of human beings as fallen creatures. New Testament theology necessarily has a concept of 'the world' as a place that must ultimately be overcome, and so in one sense Christian theology treated life in this world as merely a moral preparation for life in the next. Its monotheism, discipline and opposition to the world were exactly the basis of what Weber in "The Sociology of Religion" (1966) called its 'inner-worldly asceticism', a vocation that gave Protestantism its peculiar dynamism. This aspect of the drive to evangelize can be conceptualized in terms of three types of Christian church (Rose, 1993: 149). The Petrine Church of Patristic and Mediaeval times was imperial, and established a worldwide and visible unity in the Holy Empire. The Pauline (Protestant) Church is invisible and opposes faith to the world. For this Church the secular world has authority, and it must conduct its business within this duality. The Johannine Church is completely invisible and is brought into existence by Pietism. Its theology is one of hope, and it is the individual, not the community, who bears the authority. This overriding individualism was also a product of the Treaty of Westphalia on the one hand, and the Enlightenment on the other. This subjectivity was combined with an imperative to bear witness to the world, a place that is fallen

and godless, but capable of redemption. Hence Christian mission is a necessary adjunct to the idea of the world as part of sacred history, an unfolding of religious grace.

Enlightenment, Religion and Asia

In the West the Enlightenment treated organized religion, specifically Catholicism, as being incompatible with reason. Moral action and reason required the autonomy of the individual, whereas traditional Catholic Christianity, Enlightenment philosophers argued, required the subordination of the individual to the Church. The Enlightenment was of course a diverse set of principles, and many Enlightenment thinkers such as Gottfried Leibniz, the German founder of the Enlightenment, retained a theistic view of reality. Living in a period of intense commercial exploitation of the outside world, Leibniz proposed a "commerce of light" or mutual enlightenment (Perkins, 2004). Leibniz famously argued that the world is characterized by its infinite diversity, richness and completeness. The world, which is teaming with endlessly diverse phenomena, exists in a state of harmony in the best of all possible worlds (a theodicy), which is the simplest in concepts and the richest in empirical phenomena. Recognition of cultural diversity leads us to recognize the inherent value of cultural difference. Advocating a tolerance of diverse views, Leibniz went beyond the philosophers of his day to establish a moral imperative to learn from other cultures.

The background to Leibniz's philosophy was formed by considerable theological interest in China, which gave rise to the so-called 'Rites Controversy'. Christian missionaries had noticed the importance of respect for ancestors in Chinese traditional culture, and the prominence of rites towards them. Filial piety, as expressed through ritual activities towards dead ancestors, was a central pillar of Confucian belief and practice, only declining in modern times with the erosion of the traditional family throughout Asia (Ikels, 2004). The question confronting the Catholic authorities was whether these rites were religious, in which case they were idolatrous, or secular, in which case the Chinese respect for the dead was to be commended. In deciding whether they were idolatrous rites or merely secular acts of commemoration, the Catholic theologians had to decide whether the Chinese had a concept of God. The Jesuits favored a strategy of accommodation, accepting the rites as harmless. Some observers of Chinese culture argued that they had no

conception of God, and hence the practices were simply civil rites of commemoration. Cultural accommodation had been adopted by Matteo Ricci, the founder of the Jesuit mission to China, but the strategy was opposed by the Dominicans, Franciscans and Jansenists. Ricci had also concluded that, since Chinese thought contained a natural theology, Christianity was itself better presented as a natural theology rather than a revealed religion. He also concluded that the rites, although idolatrous, could serve a moral purpose. The debate eventually focused on a technical issue, namely on whether the ancient Chinese in fact knew God through the name of *Shang Di* or *tian*.

Those members of the Church who favored accommodation realized that the Chinese would not abandon their rites, because to do so would show the utmost disrespect for their ancestors. At a material level, the Chinese had to practice these rites within a Confucian system if they were to gain employment as an official within the government. While accepting these rites showed a pragmatic approach towards conversion, the strategy of tolerance was condemned in 1700. Four years later Pope Clement X1 issued a decree prohibiting participation in the rites, and in response the emperor banished the missionaries in 1724, thereby ending the Catholic mission in China.

This conception of Christianity as having a special redemptive relationship to history raised in an acute form the questions: what is a religion and what is the relationship of Christianity to other religions? The expansion of European powers into Asia, and especially the spread of Christianity in the middle of the sixteenth century, raised these questions in an urgent and acute form. In European romance languages, the word 'religion' (*religio*) has two distinctive roots. Firstly, *relegere* means to bring together, to collect together, to harvest or to gather in. Secondly, *religare* means to tie or to bind together (Benveniste, 1973). *Relegere* expresses the idea that any social group that is gathered together has a religious foundation, while *religare* recognizes that discipline and morality are necessary for controlling human beings and creating a regulated mentality. This distinction formed the basis of Immanuel Kant's philosophical analysis of religion and morality. In 1793 in "Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason" Kant (1998) distinguished between religion as cult which seeks favors from God through prayer and offerings to bring healing and wealth to its followers, and religion as moral action that commands human beings to change their behavior in order to lead a better life. Kant developed this idea through an examination of 'reflecting faith' that compels humans to strive for salvation through

personal faith rather than the possession of religious knowledge. The implication of Kant's distinction was that Protestant Christianity was the only true 'reflecting faith', and therefore the model of all authentic religious intentions. Kant's distinction concerned those religious injunctions that call human beings to moral action, demanding that they assert their autonomy and responsibility.

Max Weber's "Sociology of Religion" (1966), in which he distinguished between mass and virtuoso religion, can be said to apply Kantian ideas in a comparative sociology of rites and reason. While the masses embrace religion to secure comfort, healing and protection from adversity, the virtuosi comprehensively fulfil the ethical demands of religion in search of spiritual salvation. Mass religion requires charismatic holy men to satisfy their needs, and hence charisma is corrupted by the demand for miracles and spectacles. Weber went on to distinguish between those religions that reject the world by challenging its traditions (such as inner-worldly asceticism), and religions that seek to escape from the world through mystical flight (such as other-worldly mysticism). The former religions (primarily the Calvinistic radical sects) have had revolutionary consequences for human society in the formation of modernity. The implication of this tradition is paradoxical. Firstly, Christianity (or at least Puritanism) is the only true religion (as a reflecting faith) and secondly Christianity gives rise to a process of secularization resulting in its own self-overcoming (*Aufhebung*). Radical Christianity ultimately rejects rituals, religious authorities and institutions. Consequently, these Kantian criteria raise the question as to whether the religions of Asia are really religions at all. This Kantian notion of reflective faith produced a set of negative comparisons with the religions—Buddhism, Islam and Confucianism—which missionaries encountered in Asia.

In "The Buddha" Trevor Ling (1973) argued that our modern conception of religion as a private affair relevant to our 'ultimate concerns' about meaning, salvation and psychological satisfaction, is a misleading historical tool for understanding religious cultures. The Buddha's teaching presupposed the social and political transformation of society to restrain the growth of individualism in urban India and to defend the idea of community. In early Buddhism the separation of religion and politics made no sense, but possibly because the rationalist ethic of Buddhism, which tolerated lay religiosity, popular beliefs in gods, magic and healing rituals were assumed to be harmless. To some extent Buddhism, which originally presupposed a close relationship between

monarchy and sangha, has undergone a process of accommodation to a western model, becoming a religion of spiritual, therapeutic assistance to the individual (Spiro, 1970). In his analysis of the historical origins of Buddhism, Ling profoundly disagreed with Weber's characterization of 'ancient Buddhism' in "The Religion of India", where Weber claimed:

> It is a specifically unpolitical and anti-political status religion, more precisely a religious "technology" of wandering and of intellectually-schooled mendicant monks . . . it is a "salvation religion" if one is to use the name "religion" for an ethical movement without a deity and without a cult (Weber, 1952: 206).

Buddhism in fact had very clear political concerns for the reform of society. It was not simply a movement of isolated monks, but had to build a sangha to carry out the reform of society. In the modern western context, Theravada Buddhism has adapted to the individualistic culture of urban America, abandoning the rituals of traditional Buddhist communalism and introducing greater gender equality (Cadge, 2005). Similarly, the Orientalist D.S. Margoliath in "Mohammed and the Rise of Islam" (1905) argued that, while we now think of Islam as exclusively a religion, the Prophet also thought of it as a nation. The Constitution of Medina recognized a set of contractual obligations, binding the tribes in loyalty to the Prophet, and with Muhammad's death many of these tribes abandoned their contractual relations to Islam, and the Apostasy War or War of the Ridda ensued. In China, the people's allegiance was not to a single religion but to a collection of diverse worshipping communities within a highly pluralistic cultural context. In China, there was historically no exact equivalent to the western notion of religion and a new term (*zongjiao*) was borrowed from the Japanese, and introduced by intellectuals around 1901. The opposite of this notion of institutionalized religion was superstition (*mixin*). The spread of missionary Christianity entailed a deep psychological and cultural antipathy to the religions of Asia, which Christian missionaries dismissed as cultic practices, or worse counterfeit versions of the true religion.

Trade, Empire and the Religious Struggle for Asia

In discussing the spread of Christianity in Asia, we should distinguish between the Portuguese and Spanish empires, the British and Dutch

trading empires, and the emergence of American military power in the region from the late nineteenth century onwards. These different stages of empire produced significant struggles between Catholic and Protestant missionaries. There is also the important question as to the importance of a religious dimension to the civilizing mission of empire. In this respect, one can argue that there was a significant difference between the Portuguese and Spanish empires and the British Empire.

It is often assumed that Christianity was a latecomer to Asia. This view of the historical spread of Christianity into Asia as primarily the product of imperialism serves important political functions in contemporary Malaysia and Indonesia, where it can be important, ideologically, to define Christianity as being a foreign intruder. In fact, Christianity arrived at more or less the same time as Islam into Southeast Asia, and both spread with the growth of commerce (Reid, 1988). Of course, the spread of Islam has often been seen by western commentators as simply the consequence of military expansion. Weber adhered to this view, regarding Islam as basically a faith of warriors (Turner, 1998). In reality, Islam spread through Asia along with the arrival of Sufi traders from Hadramout in the Arab peninsula, probably through Gujarat, as a result of maritime trade. After 1200 Bengal and Gujarat became important in the spread of Islam after the conquest of north India and the Ganges valley by Mohammed of Ghor, and Cambay fell to Muslim troops in 1298. The development of Islam as a result of trade with Indonesia had a strong connection with Cambay. There is evidence of an Islamic presence in Trengganu from a stone inscription as early as 1303, but there is little evidence of significant Muslim activity in the Peninsula before the fifteenth century. There is strong historical evidence that Malacca had been a trading centre for many centuries. It was built up by Paramesvara, who, changing his name to Megat Iskandar, converted to Islam and died in 1424. Malacca as an emporium played a major role in the conversion of the peoples of the Malay Peninsula to Islam. By the fifteenth century, there was therefore an important religious and trading network joining Mecca, Aden, Cambay, Malacca, Johore, Trengganu and China.

Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1497, thereby opening the sea lanes that led to Portuguese trade throughout India and Southeast Asia. Under the leadership of the Portuguese admiral Alfonso de Albuquerque, the Portuguese seized Goa (1510), Hormuz (1515) and Malacca (1519), driving out their Muslim competitors.

Portuguese dominance was made possible by technical improvements to the galleon, which served as both warship and merchant vessel. With these fortresses, the Portuguese were able to impose taxes on shipping passing through the region and came to dominate much of the spice trade between Southeast Asia and Europe. Despite various attacks against Malacca in the second half of the sixteenth century, Portuguese Malacca prospered.

By 1535, the whole of the north coast of Java was Muslim, and the spread of Catholicism depended on both the disposition of local sultans to European involvement in the region and on the military success of the Portuguese. The Sultan Hairun of Ternate was for example an enemy of the Portuguese and attacked their fortress at Amboina, threatening Christian communities in the whole region. Portuguese economic and military expansion into the region was closely associated with the spread of Catholicism.

In 1529 the Treaty of Saragossa established spheres of influence in Asia between Spain and Portugal. Spain was anxious to participate in the spice trade and sought to bring the Philippines under their control. Discovered by Magellan in 1521, Ruy Lopez de Villalobos had in 1542 named the islands after Charles V's son Philip, and in 1564 Miguel Lopez de Legaspi landed on Cebu creating the first Spanish settlement there.

While Islam had spread to the southern parts of the Philippines among the so-called Moros of Mindanao, Catholicism was able to gain control of the central and northern parts of the archipelago. The Filipinos were animist and had little political organization. By baptizing the Filipinos, they brought them within the Church and made them citizens of the Philippines. After the conquest, the Church and state remained wholly interdependent, "ecclesiastical advance aiding the consolidation of political power" (Hall, 1966: 227). The Philippines proved to be strategically important, not only for the spice trade, but as a bridgehead in the quest to convert Japan and China to Christianity. However, the attempt to convert China came to grief, as we have seen, in the Rites Controversy. Catholicism was brought to Japan between 1549 and 1551 by St. Francis Xavier, and was at first successful in achieving conversions among both ordinary people and *daimyo* or feudal lords. But in 1587 Hideyoshi Toyotomi the ruler of Japan issued an edict banishing all Jesuits missionaries and ordering all Japanese Christians to give up their faith. The exclusion of Christianity remained in force until 1871, shortly after the restoration of the Meiji in 1868 (Beasley, 1973).

By 1600 the Portuguese began to experience competition from the Dutch, especially as a result of the creation of the Dutch East India Company or the *Vereenigte Oost-Indische Compagnie* (VOC) in 1602, giving the Company a complete monopoly over Dutch trade. The VOC also had the right to build forts and to make war against local potentates. Having failed to take Malacca, they set up their headquarters in Jakarta in the Sultanate.

The Dutch company sought to legitimize its attacks on Spanish and Portuguese ships in the southeast of Asia by reference to the natural law theories of Hugo Grotius. The attack on the *Santa Catarina* by Jacob van Heemskerck in the Straits of Singapore in February 1603 was a turning point and found its ultimate justification in Grotius's *De Jure Praedae*. Regarded as one of the most significant political and legal philosophers of the seventeenth century, Grotius's importance rests not on his theory of state sovereignty, but on his conception of law regulating relations between states. Given the break-up of Christian unity and the erosion of Christian authority, Grotius was forced to consider natural law in antiquity. Because a peaceful social order is a good in itself, private individuals should be bound by contractual obligations, fair trade and secure property rights. Before John Locke (who was born in 1632), Grotius argued that private property in land arose from its cultivation. This became the classical legal justification for both English and Dutch colonialism in Asia. Grotius went on to argue that indigenous people could forego their subjective rights by entering into contracts with colonialists. As a result Dutch traders had every right to enforce contracts by violence if necessary against indigenous peoples, once they had freely entered into such contracts. Because the lands outside Europe resembled a state of nature, Dutch traders had every right to enforce contracts. This theory involved a notion of divisible sovereignty in which European powers (Britain and the United Provinces) could also engage local elites as intermediaries to run local affairs.

Grotius's juridical legitimation of Dutch interventions in the colonial empires of Spain and Portugal in his *De Jure Praedae* ("On the Law of Prize and Booty") and *Mare Liberum* ("The Free Sea") assisted the dramatic ascendancy of the VOC in the Malay Archipelago in the early decades of the seventeenth century (van Ittersum, 2006). Although Grotius was highly successful as a political lobbyist, his natural rights theories were inherently contradictory. On the one hand, he affirmed the validity of the Company's contracts with infidel rulers in Asia, quoting the natural law principle of *pacta sunt servanda* whereby treaties must

be honored. Contracts were valid when applied to free and rational human beings regardless of their religious convictions. On the other hand, while he supported the idea of freedom of trade and navigation, he defended the Company's monopoly in the Spice Islands during the Anglo-Dutch conferences of 1613 and 1615. The publication of *Mare Liberum* in April 1609 proved useful to both the Estates General and the VOC directors in protecting Dutch commercial interests. These rights justified continuing Dutch conflict against Spain and Portugal in the south east of Asia, as for example, when the Company resumed attacks on the Spanish in the Moluccas in April 1612. In conclusion, whereas Portuguese expansion contained an important religious dimension, Dutch colonial endeavors were largely commercial and secular. The Estates General did not confuse preaching and trading.

The British also created a company to promote trade in Asia, namely the English East India Company, but it did not enjoy the monopoly and wealth of the VOC. The East India Company was also less successful in Asia, and they closed down their Japanese trading posts in Siam and Japan in 1623. Conceding Indonesia to the Dutch, the English focused their attention on India. They acquired Madras in 1639, Bombay became an English colony in 1665 and a settlement was established in Calcutta in 1690.

The British Empire was to a large degree the unintended consequence of trade. There was, unlike republican France, no strong sense of a mission to take civilization to the colonies. Whereas France saw the Middle East, especially Lebanon and the eastern Mediterranean, as an object of Catholic missionary zeal, British motivation towards empire was secular. There was no emphatic civilizational mission. In the late Victorian period, there emerged a greater sense of imperial power, Victoria was Empress of India from 1877, and the poetry and short stories of Rudyard Kipling provided a simple but romantic defense of empire against the criticism of London-based intellectuals. The British Empire was the unintended consequence of the quest for profit; Singapore and Hong Kong existed to promote British trade, not to civilize the inhabitants. While many critics of colonialism have argued that trade, colonial state and missionary societies worked closely together to bring about both physical and spiritual control of the colonies, the historical evidence is more ambiguous.

British attitudes towards India and empire were profoundly shaken by the Indian Mutiny of 1857–58. The Mutiny had many causes, but they included resentment against the reform of ancient Indian

institutions, the use of either cow-fat or pig-fat in the greasing of cartridges and opposition to forcible conversion to Christianity. After the Mutiny, British civil servants were anxious to exclude missionaries from the colonies, because they wanted to avoid offending indigenous communities. The Westphalian separation of state and religion was thought necessary for trade to avoid communal conflict (Ferguson, 2003). The Mutiny had other lasting consequences. The British sought to strengthen their control not through the spread of liberal ideas but by defending the 'real India' of the countryside, the princes, peasants and retainers (Wolf, 1982). In becoming a socially exclusive colonial elite, the English created stereotypes of the Indians as lazy, weak and cowardly. However, these racial stereotypes were not religious, but Darwinian. After the great age of mercantilism in the seventeenth century, British industrial supremacy meant that the Empire no longer provided any significant economic advantage and, where colonial self-sufficiency resulted in secession, British governments would not intervene—at least not with gunboats.

Asian Christianity is in fact diverse, for reasons that are connected with variations in the relationship between politics and religion, and the particular and contingent nature of the historical path towards post-colonial independence. The history of the Christian churches has been checkered, in so far as different states either sought to exclude Christianity, or to embrace it as a necessary precondition of modernization. In this brief account of these separate trajectories, it is important to distinguish between the early arrival of Christianity in the sixteenth century to parts of Asia where there was relatively little competition and where local states were either weak or non-existent, and the later arrival of missionary churches in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when Christianity was opposed by nationalist or communist movements. American missionary activity in Korea and Japan in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries was associated with the struggle against communism, and both societies came to identify with western values and institutions in their quest for modernization. Christian identity in South Korea, Vietnam and Japan became a method of identification with western values against secular communism.

Christian missions played an important role in Asia, and especially in China, in establishing institutions of higher education, which became vehicles for modernization, creating a new intelligentsia that was well versed in western literature. After the 1870s, American Protestant missionaries began to secularize their curriculum to include a wide-range

of subjects and to widen their appeal to a broader audience of Chinese. After the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), there was a new emphasis on institutional reform, and intellectuals argued in favor of adopting western institutions of citizenship and parliamentary democracy. In 1887 the formation of the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge made the communication of Christian values through secular subjects an effective method of extending the influence of Christianity.

It is important to remember, of course, that the majority of the Chinese population perceived Christianity to be a foreign, disruptive sect. Christian reluctance to worship the ancestors and their disregard for Confucius were widely resented. Furthermore, the spread of missionary Christianity was also associated with gunboat-diplomacy and humiliating treaties that gave special rights to foreign powers, including the right to propagate Christianity through missionary activity. On the pretext of securing compensation for an illegal search of a British registered vessel by Chinese officials, the British adopted a belligerent approach to relations with China and eventually attacked Canton and subsequently forced the Chinese authorities to agree to the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858 which, among other provisions, opened new ports to British trade and allowed freedom of movement to both Catholic and Protestant missionaries. The Convention of Peking in 1860 permitted missionaries to rent or buy land for the construction of churches. Conversions to Christianity were, however, generally slow, and it was alleged that the missionaries bribed converts with monetary subsidies, and hence it was said that these converts "eat by religion" (Hsu, 1990:388). Hostility to Christian missionaries boiled over in the Boxer Uprising of 1900, when Boxers attacked Peking, exhuming the graves of missionaries including Matteo Ricci, who had been influential in the Rites Controversy that, as we have noted, had inspired Leibniz to argue in favor of cosmopolitan generosity.

There were important differences between the Portuguese and Spanish empires and their relationship to Catholicism, on the one hand, and between British and Dutch empires and Protestantism on the other. We have also noted that, after the Indian Mutiny, the British authorities were reluctant to support missionary institutions. Nevertheless, it is clear in Asia that Christianity spread as a result of both trade and military power. In the southeast of Asia where sultans supported Christianity, it was successful, but where Islam was supported by the authority of the sultans, it did not succeed. A similar set of power relationships

had conditioned the spread of Christianity in the Pacific. Given the power of the chiefs, conversion only occurred if and when the headman accepted Christianity. Thus in 1854 Thakombau, the ruling chief of the Mbau confederacy, the dominant power in nineteenth century Fiji, finally converted to Methodism and church attendance increased from 850 regular worshippers in 1852, to 8,870 in 1855. A century later Christianity was still referred to as "the religion of Thakombau" (Sahlins, 1985: 37). In China, gunboat-diplomacy opened up China to missionary activity. In the Philippines, the absence of Islam in the central and northern areas and the weakness of local leadership allowed Catholicism to become dominant. In Korea and Japan, American Protestant missionary activity became identified with national opposition to communism. In Asia, Thailand therefore represents a more or less unique example of a society that escaped direct imperialism and preserved its own version of Buddhism. The thrust to modernize Siam through a western model of 'official nationalism' based on 'King and Country' had resulted in the (superficial) secularization of the social-class that ran the state bureaucracy, but successive kings emphasized the importance of Buddhism as a civil religion and the necessity of excluding evangelical Christianity (Mead, 2004). Despite many political and violent changes of power, including military rule, the Buddhist sangha still remains central to legitimating the Thai kingdom (Tambiah (1976) in a country with only a small representation of other religions, such as the Muslims in the south (Gilquin, 2002). We can conclude by arguing that the spread of Christianity was closely associated with western secular power, the receptivity of local rulers to external cultures and the presence or absence of Islam.

Conclusion: the rise of globalism and the future of Christianity

By the end of the twentieth century, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of fundamentalism and the retreat of assertive humanism, sociologists abandoned the secularization thesis. Religion, far from declining, was recognized as central to modern political life (Berger, 1999). Contemporary interest in religion in the social sciences is however dominated by interest in the revival of Islam. Given the alleged relationship between terrorism and political Islam, it is difficult to avoid the question: is there any relationship between Islam as a religious

system, violence and authoritarian rule? The traditional answer of mainstream political science has been to argue that, because Islamic culture does not differentiate between religion and politics, it assumes an undemocratic and typically an authoritarian complexion. This conventional answer follows Weber's theory of hierocracy in which religion and politics are combined in a single ruling institution and it is this Weberian argument that underpins liberal political philosophy, which requires the separation of church and state.

In the twentieth century radical ideas from the Middle East and Iran have found an audience in the Muslim communities of Asia and Southeast Asia, which have developed strong inter-regional ties with the Middle East, mainly through trade and labor migration. Because the Arabic language has such a high status as the language of the Prophet, Arabic institutions of learning command high respect in Asia, where Quranic teaching centers have become a major aspect of Muslim reformism. Christianity in Asia is now on the defensive. Islamic revivalism in Asia is related to the improvement in transportation that has allowed many Muslims to travel to Mecca, and return with reformist ideas. Saudi Wahhabism has become an influential force in Southeast Asia and there is a steady intellectual flow between the region and academic centers in Egypt such as Al-Azhar (Abaza, 2002). There is a new emphasis on practices that distinguish 'good Muslims' from non-believers in Malaysia and Indonesia, and growing tensions around inter-marriage, conversion and apostasy. Conflicts between Muslims and Christians have been particularly violent, for example in the Moluccas.

In this chapter, I have argued that the success of Christianity in Asia cannot be separated from economic and imperial power, and that its spread in Asia has also been a function of the strength or weakness of other religions, especially Islam. The future of Christianity in Asia is therefore threatened by the reform of Islam and by the general 'pietization' of personal conduct, but it is also influenced in the contemporary world by the declining power of the United States, and the rising authority of China. In recent years, we have also seen a greater willingness of South Korea and Japan to secure a future that is more independent of the United States. If the People's Republic of China becomes more open, it may be that the evangelical churches will experience some success in China. Some commentators have argued that the Chinese are hungry for a system of meaning that only religion can supply, and hence the prospects for Christian growth are positive (Tu, 1999). The growth of

Christianity, if it occurs, will also be accompanied by the revival of Islam (Berlie, 2004). The growth of both Christian churches and Muslim mosques will more likely be constrained by growing Han nationalism and a revival of Confucian and Taoist ethics. More importantly, the decline of the western powers in relation to both India and China indicates that the influence of Christianity in a post-imperial environment will also decline, despite the proselytizing efforts of the Christian mega-churches and Christian evangelical sites on the Internet. With the globalization of religions, Christianity is no longer in a privileged position as the religion of the dominant educated elites. Christianity as a result finds itself in global competition with Buddhism, Islam and Chinese popular religions.

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GLOBALIZATION AND THE INSTITUTIONAL MODELING OF RELIGIONS

Peter Beyer

Introduction

At the beginning of the 21st century, the idea of globalization has become so widespread in both popular and specialized discourses that it is already difficult to remember a time, less than three decades before, when the term was virtually unknown. Currently, still the most common understanding sees globalization as primarily a matter of increasing economic integration across the entire globe. A relatively little noticed correlate of the meteoric rise of this neologism, however, is a dramatic shift, again both in academic and non-academic discussions, in attitudes to the idea and social reality of religion. This shift does not reflect itself so much in literature that focuses explicitly on the relation between religion and globalization—there is still comparatively little of this—as it does in the increasing attention that religion is receiving as such. Much of that attention is somewhat negative, emphasizing religion as 'reaction against' globalization and, within that perspective, centering on religio-political movements such as those in Iran or India, often availing itself of pejorative terms like 'fundamentalism' (Marty & Appleby, 1991–95; Almond, Appleby *et al.*, 2000; cf. Beckford, 2003); or going so far as to postulate a religiously-based 'clash of civilizations' as a driving force for conflict in our integrated and globalized world (cf. Barber 1996; Huntington 1996). On the more positive side, at least within the academic subdiscipline of the sociology of religion, the rise of the idea of globalization corresponds to widespread and in most cases very recent abandonment of the secularization thesis, the idea that modern societies will on the whole become less religious over time or at least that religion will be marginalized as a privatized domain (Stark & Bainbridge, 1985; Hervieu-Léger, 1993; Berger, 1999; Robertson and Casanova in this volume). Now, within a more global perspective, it is rather the lack of strong religion in some areas of the world that seems to need explanation, not its presence or 'resurgence' (Davie, 2003).

This transformation in the understanding of the place and importance of religion in the globalized context is, however, about more than just 'resurgence', whether in the attention of observers or in terms of an actual increase in religion. It is also, more subtly perhaps, about the *forms* that religion takes under contemporary global conditions. Although academic specialists are not the only ones involved in debates about religion, globalization, and connected ideas, focussing on developments within their disciplines can illustrate what is happening more broadly in this respect. Thus, within the social sciences, and the sociology of religion in particular, beside the now broad disenchantment with the secularization thesis, one notices a parallel rise in the attention being paid to what one might call non-institutionalized forms of religiousness such as so-called 'spirituality' and phenomena like the New Age (Inglehart, 1997; Roof, 1999; Rothstein, 2001; Heelas, Woodhead *et al.*, 2005); and to new religious developments ranging from Christian Pentecostalism (e.g. Cox, 1995; Dempster, Klaus *et al.*, 1999; Corten & Marshall-Fratani, 2001; Martin, 2002; Wilkinson, 2006) to a plethora of constantly arising new religious movements all around the world (Hexham & Poewe, 1997; Barker & Warburg, 1998; Dawson, 1998; Lewis, 2004; Richardson, 2004).

At least as interesting are some recent developments in the field of the academic study of religion or religious studies. Here, in parallel with the questioning of received wisdom in sociology, an increasing number of scholars have been sharply critical of the way this discipline understands its core concept, religion. Although numerous scholars have been involved in this shift (see e.g. Smith, 1988; Chidester, 1996; Fitzgerald, 1997; King, 1999; Masuzawa, 2005), Russell McCutcheon's book, *Manufacturing Religion*, is in many senses quite representative (McCutcheon, 1997). The central criticism of previous work in the discipline here is that it has treated religion too much as a kind of foundational yet splendidly isolated reality *sui generis*, relatively devoid of necessary interconnection with other aspects of society, notably but not exclusively with the reproduction of political power relations. In its stead, McCutcheon espouses what he calls a 'naturalistic' approach to the study of religion, one that analyses the religious as an integral dimension of broader social processes and not as something that can only be understood in its own terms. Moreover, McCutcheon suggests that, in this light, the modern category of religion appears to a significant degree as an invention of the modern West and one that has been

in the service of this region's historical trajectory of global colonial and imperial dominance. At first flush, this reorientation seems to be the opposite of what has been happening among sociologists. Yet its effect is actually quite similar. What it does is to deny that religion is some sort of counter-essence, fundamentally at odds with the modern world; that it is the opposite side of the secularity of this world. Rather religion should be seen as an integral and historically co-arising part of that world. Significant in this regard is that McCutcheon and most others involved in this shift defend their conclusions largely on the basis of global analyses—mainly by looking at the 'Western' category and analysis of religion from non-Western vantage points. The world that they envisage is therefore the contemporary globalized world.

Within this discussion, the question of form arises most clearly through a consistent questioning of the idea of 'world religions'. Following the argument that the modern notion of religion is invented by and for Western observers, the so-called 'world religions' come in for scrutiny as prime instances of such invention (see esp. Fitzgerald, 1990; Masuzawa, 2005); (cf. also, from various disciplinary perspectives, Balagangadhara, 1994; Jaffrelot, 1994; Lorenzen, 1999; Mendieta, 2001; Peterson & Walhof, 2002; Asad, 2003). The idea of a world religion, it is argued, to the extent that it has any validity at all, is essentially a Christian concept and therefore involves projecting the form of the dominant religion of Westerners onto the 'others' in the rest of the world. Here again, the perspective from which this criticism gets its purchase is a global one: the concept supposedly does not apply in non-Western settings, or is at best artificially or politically imposed there. It is for that reason universally (globally) problematic. Intriguingly, however, all the religious movements that, both inside and outside academic disciplines, receive attention under the rubric of 'fundamentalism' are expressions of one of these 'world religions': there is Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, Sikh, and even Buddhist fundamentalism, but not generically religious fundamentalism in whatever region of the world. This far from obvious relationship points to a link between the two disciplinary transformations: the idea of world religions appears problematic when the frame of analysis shifts to a global one and when religion is observed as an integral aspect of that global frame. Just so, fundamentalisms occurring all around the world signal that religion is (still) an important domain in a globalized society, thus helping to render the secularization thesis problematic.

These complex disciplinary transformations and critiques are thus in certain respects even somewhat contradictory, pointing perhaps to a situation in which observers are clearly dissatisfied with received ways of understanding, but are still very much undecided as to what they wish to put in their place. In this chapter, I address that ambiguity, at least in part, by carrying the critique one or two steps further, namely by linking the 'invention of religion', the 'desecularization of the world', and the disputed reality of the 'world religions' with the question of religious form and globalization. The main argument can be formulated like this: since about the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, a conception and corresponding institutional reality has formed, which understands and reproduces religion as a distinct social sphere concerned with a postulated transcendent domain or reality. Internally, this re-imagined and reconstructed religion manifests itself chiefly as a plurality of recognized and self-identified religions, the so-called 'world religions' in particular, but by no means exclusively. Externally, this pluralized religious sphere differentiates itself from other, analogous social spheres—for example, economy, state, science, art, health, education—which, by contrast, are conceived as immanent and even secular, but this precisely in the sense of non-religious. The formation of this distinguishable and differentiated religious domain has depended on the simultaneous and parallel formation of these other spheres. Historically, this peculiar understanding and institutionalization of religion as religions began first in the European West during and after the Reformation era; but, in the wake of the imperial and colonial expansion of European influence over subsequent centuries, has become rooted and further developed more broadly in the rest of the world. This formation and globalization of the religious sphere has thus been an integral aspect of the wider historical process of modern globalization; religion and religions are and have been a dimension of globalization, not something apart and traditional that belongs to a bygone era. In accordance with both sociological and religious studies critiques, religion, and the 'world religions' especially, are indeed inventions with roots in the West, and not some splendid reality *sui generis*, except in the sense of this differentiation based on the distinction between the transcendent and the immanent, the sacred and the secular. Moreover, as integral players in the formation of today's globalized society, these religions 'belong' to the modern and the global as much as any other differentiated domain, including the global capitalist economy or the modern

sovereign state. Today's globalized society is therefore not inherently secular or even secularizing, but that says nothing about the relative strength and importance of this religion in any given period or in any given region of the world. It may be weak; it may be strong; it may be publicly influential; it may be privatized.

Here cannot be the place for a thorough elaboration and defense of this perspective; that, I have tried to do elsewhere (see Beyer, 2006). Instead, I focus on one particular aspect of the overall position, namely that concerned with the dominant *form* that this modernly differentiated and institutionalized religion takes. The early modern invention of this religion occurred first in Europe, and it did so in a context of prolonged religious wars and nascent European imperial expansion. This combination is important because it provided the main conditions for both the differentiation of religion and its pluralization. Religion was evidently not the fundamental and integral activity upon which the health of society rested; it was, if anything, more a fundamental source of division and strife (cf. Pailin, 1984; Byrne, 1989; Luhmann, 1989; Preuss, 1996). There were therefore evidently different and to some extent mutually contradictory religions, which could not all be reduced to the same basic (and true) religion; and other domains of social action, especially the political, were necessary to control the disintegrative force that religion could evidently be or become. Moreover, as the Europeans expanded their presence and their influence gradually around the world armed with this conception of religion, they looked for and 'discovered' yet more religions (see, e.g. Marshall, 1970; Almond, 1988; Smith, 1991). To the degree that various non-Western local elites, in their attempts to stand up to Western power, collaborated in the imagining of these religions, they helped to institutionalize their social reality in their regions as well. This modern understanding and formation of religion thereby ceased to be merely a Western curiosity. Rather, to a large extent, it globalized.

The question now becomes on what basis both the European and the non-European religions were actually formed. In response, we can return to the religious studies critique of religion and world religions. The accusation there is that both categories assume not just a Western, but a Christian model for what religion is/can be, and therefore what the world religions are. Christianity, it is charged, implicitly serves as the standard by which *any* religious manifestation is judged to be religion or not, to be a world religion or not. That is part of the 'Western' character

of the concept and an integral aspect of its imperial imposition onto the rest of the world. In the bulk of this chapter, I examine the validity of this assertion.

The Christian Model of a Religion

On the basis of this background interpretation, what then might be the most important characteristics of this implicit model of a religion? For the present purposes, I suggest that these can be subsumed under the interconnected headings of *fundamental transcendent reference*, *programmatic reflexivity*, *differentiation*, *organization*, and *voluntarization*.

Fundamental transcendent reference means that a religion is basically about God. While not requiring a single God, the implicit model does favor monotheism: somehow a religion that funnels everything through a single, personal being is more clearly a religion. Moreover, this God has to be ultimately transcendent in the sense that he—the model is as patriarchal as it is monotheistic—is both present in the world and yet beyond comprehension, ultimately unrepresentable, and invisible (even Jesus has to come *again*). He is supra-empirical, a spiritual as opposed to material being. Moreover, ultimate reality is in the realm of this God, including the ultimate reality and therefore the fate of human beings. The purpose of religion is to allow people somehow to get to God.

Programmatic reflexivity means that a religion has to have a defining and self-referential set of beliefs and practices which are deemed to be all about this getting to God. The model favors a clear set of, preferably written, core sources or scriptures like the Bible, which can assure the reflexivity. Far from this reflexivity cutting religion off from all of the other aspects of human life, it rather allows the inclusion or interpretation of anything that happens. In consequence the model therefore assumes a very close relation—but not an identity—between religion and morality as a way of assuring the possibility of this connection.

Differentiation means that, even though religion has relevance to all aspects of life and can be expected to make claims on them, it is nonetheless something distinct, not to be subsumed under other social categories or social institutions like culture, knowledge, society, law, morality, or community. Above all, religion is distinct from the secular, and to some extent even at odds with the secular. While the model does not imply secularization in the sense of the inevitable decline of religion, it does assume that strong religion cannot 'accommodate' too

much to the dominant, 'secular' values and orientations in society if it is to remain strong, or even that religion must be inherently critical of these trends. Differentiation of religion, in other words, means that for it to remain what it is, to maintain its 'vitality', it must be adequately 'strict' religion (see from different perspectives and eras Otto, 1957; Augustine, 1958; Kelley, 1972).

Perhaps the most subtly Christian characteristic of the model is the assumption that the communal dimension of religion expresses itself through *organization*. To render its differentiation and its identity clear, religion takes not just common institutional form, but organized institutional form. Religion is therefore about something like churches, referring not just to buildings—the model reserves a special place for buildings, as in 'churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples'—but more importantly to groups of people that are members of, or at least who identify with, an organization. From this assumption flow several critical derivative features, including that, preferably exclusive, 'belonging', 'membership', 'practice', and 'faith' in terms of a religious organization is the default way the religions operate and are present in society; that professional, expert, leading, or otherwise specialized members of such organizations represent them in a purer form much like the leaders of any organization; and that religious difference expresses itself fundamentally as organizational difference. As a result, phenomena like 'believing without belonging' will appear as anomalies, religious vitality will almost self-evidently be judged by membership or adherence, and the question of forms of religion will express itself in terms of organizational distinctions like church-sect which, peculiarly, if one thinks about it, has no place for a non-organizational form.

Finally, *voluntarization* refers to the idea that religion is fundamentally and essentially a matter of individual and personal choice, not an ascribed or essentially collective affair (cf. Firsching & Schlegel, 1998). From this feature derive a number of derivative qualities, critical among which are two. First, individual experience is either essential to religion or at least has a privileged status for assessing religion's authenticity. Personal search, discovery, and choice are the basis of authentic religion. Second, therefore, individuals can 'for their own personal reasons' change religion. The possibility of conversion (and apostasy) is critical for a religion to be an authentic religion, meaning that it is not coerced. Voluntary religion means 'freedom of religion'.

Beyond the Christian Model?

Christianity as it developed historically after the European Middle Ages fits this model very well; in some, but only some, respects it fit it reasonably well even before that time. This latter idea is key: the Christian model, as I am calling it here, to a large extent only emerged since the sixteenth century. Its characteristics were therefore shaped by what Christian religion had been before that time, to be sure; but even more critically by subsequent developments that included the differentiation and pluralization of the religious domain and the interaction of Christian religion with other 'discovered' and reconstructed (world) religions, and with the co-arising secular domains as well. The question of the Christian model is therefore at the same time the question of how 'other' religions formed and reconstructed themselves in that same globalizing historical context. To assess to what degree this is actually a 'Christian' model and thereby be in a position to move 'beyond' this model, we must examine to what degree and how the 'other' religions have contributed to the model, reacted against it, and appropriated it in ways that modern Christianity has not. Only then can we assess the validity of the assertion that Christianity serves as the (implicit) imperial standard for religion in our globalized social world.

Western Imposition and Non-Western Appropriation

The expansion of European influence around the world between the 15th and 20th centuries included as a significant component religious, that is missionary, expansion. This missionary dimension has been key in the transformation of Christianity into one of the 'world religions'; and the adoption of Christianity by other, non-Western peoples has, in turn, been a critical aspect of this change. These have in many cases created significantly different versions of this religion, thereby removing the Western/European variants from their putatively normative status. Quite specifically, in terms of the implicit model outlined above, these non-Western Christianities in places as varied as sub-Saharan Africa, South Korea, Latin America, and the Philippines have probably been among the global phenomena that have lately cast simple models of secularization as linear decline of religion into serious doubt. They also point to the global 'interactive' processes involved in the (re)construction of religions, Christianity included. Rather than focus on such global

Christian developments for examining the basic question of modeling, however, I wish to concentrate on non-Western contributions, transformations, and appropriations from other 'world religions'. I select three cases in order to show at least some of the possibilities. The first case is Hinduism, a religion that in its modern reconstruction has pushed and thereby helped to form the boundaries of all four of the model's characteristics: programmatic reflexivity, organization, differentiation, and voluntarization. The second example is Buddhism, a case that comparably relativizes transcendent reference, organization, and differentiation. The third is Islam, a religion that for the most part has actually sharpened the typical characteristics of the implicit model, especially as concerned programmatic unity. It has also, however, as a way of declaring and constructing its specificity, challenged the model in terms of the assumptions of organization and voluntarization, but not, be it noted, differentiation. In each case, we are not dealing in any sense with 'essential characteristics' of these religions which are, as it were, at the source of their difference in comparison with the supposedly Christian model. What is rather at issue are different contributions to the construction of the religious domain in modern and global society, ways that are on occasion adopted and adapted, at least to some extent, in order to distinguish these religions from the others and from Christianity in particular. The variations are dialogical, and only in the context of that dialogue are they sometimes put forward as essential.

The Case of Hinduism

The construction of Hinduism as a single religion among other religions began toward the end of the 18th century, following on the observation of such a unity and such a distinction on the part of a number of Westerners, mostly British colonial representatives, and the active collaboration in this revisioning of certain members of Bengali and then wider Indian modernizing elites. Here cannot be the place for even a cursory presentation of this historical development (see Dalmia & von Stietencron, 1995; Beyer, 2006: 188ff.). Certain of its features are, however, what interest us. These concern the way the unity of Hinduism has come to be understood, the strategies of distinguishing this religion from others, and the differentiation of this religion within the wider society.

Hindu unity, the internal coherence of what does and does not belong to this religion, is not just a matter of contestation and variation

as it is in any modern, recognized religion. Reconstructed Hinduism actually shows that the level of *overall* programmatic unity of a religion can be quite minimal, based on little more than a shared conviction on the part of practitioners that it is there. The situation is typified in a 'definition' of Hinduism in recent years again confirmed in a decision of the Indian Supreme Court. Quite aside from the fact that it is a legal body that is affirming this definition as opposed to a recognized religious one, there are the almost paradoxical features of this vision of Hindu unity, namely that Hinduism gives a central position to the Vedas, and that it recognizes that there are many gods/goddesses and many paths to salvation (see Hinduism Today, 1999). The content of the Vedas is not determinative; its unifying role is rather symbolic. Beside this, the unity consists in diversity. Now, a great many people who consider themselves Hindu do share much more than this in their religious beliefs and practices; but any further specification always risks leaving a great many others out. Thus, for instance, most versions of Hinduism share a kind of neo-Vedantic emphasis on the unity of all being, a kind of monotheism or henotheism in that all is deemed to refer ultimately to a single divine principle. That is a construction that could be seen to imitate the Christian model. Yet these Hindu versions will not agree on what that principle is (e.g. Brahman-Atman, Vishnu, Shiva, Devi) nor on what is the essential religious practice in relating to and eventually attaining some sort of unity with that principle. What this shows is that a religion in today's world can have a very loose or very expansive sense of its own 'orthodoxy' or 'orthopraxy' and still maintain effective form as a social institution. This points to the contingent role of supplementary social forms that assure that religion can operate as a unity: this does not come somehow automatically from theological principle, for instance, in the form of a single source like a scripture or a religious authority like the Qur'an, the Bible, the Pope, or the Dalai Lama, which is precisely what the implicit model might assume. These supplementary forms *can be* organizational, as they are in Christianity, Judaism, and indeed in certain versions of Hinduism like the Ramakrishna Math and Mission or the Pushti Marga. They need not be organizational, however, even in Christianity. Degree of organizing religion, much like degree of programmatic unity is, not so much optional, as variable and thereby one way of distinguishing one religion from another.

Modern Hinduism within India—as opposed to diaspora Hinduism—is in fact not overly organized. Much of what counts as Hinduism

happens outside organizations, even though there is probably a certain advantage to organized forms of religion in the modern global context and therefore perhaps a certain social pressure favoring these organized forms even in India. Another strategy espoused or adopted by other Hindu movements, today and indeed since the 19th century, is a nationalist-political one, that is, the attempted use of the state to lend religion its supplementary institutional form. This is a strategy that one finds in many other religions as well, but certain features of how Hindu nationalism operates in India are revealing (Jaffrelot, 1996). Although its understanding of 'Hinduness' (*Hindutva*) does have certain ideational and practical components (e.g. the notion of Mother India or the practice of cow protection, the holiness of Ganges water, the public procession of deities), these, in keeping with the loose overall programmatic unity, are minimal. More important are the physical bodies of Hindus. Hinduism in this vision is essentially what Hindus do, and therefore from this perspective, the important thing to know is not so much *what* Hindu is as *who* is a Hindu (cf. Jaffrelot, 1994; Vishwanathan, 1998). Accordingly, voluntarization becomes peculiarly problematic. In particular, the issue of conversion becomes critical because it involves the movement of bodies: in the absence of the form given by clear programmatic unity as in the case of Christianity, Judaism, or Islam, the movement of bodies 'out of' the Hindu fold is the equivalent of sacrilege. In the parlance of South Asia, this way of conceiving Hindu unity is therefore called *communalism* (at least by those who oppose it), and the opposite, which is essentially the reliance on other strategies to construct the Hindu, is called *secularism* (by both its opponents and proponents). Both these terms have a peculiar meaning in the Indian context that is not easily subsumed under the dominant Western meanings of these terms. They refer to a certain way or emphasis in constructing the religious field.

To many observers, this communalist way of constructing Hindu unity appears illegitimate. It seems to deny religious freedom, politicize the religious too much, lead to violence, and there does not seem to be that much that is clearly religious about it. In other words, it appears too much to violate the implicit model. From the cold perspective of sociological observation, however, these complaints may simply be symptomatic of the limiting operation of that model of religion. One does not have to agree with the Hindu nationalists to appreciate what their effort might contribute to a broader understanding of how religion operates, or can operate, in our globalized world. In particular, the seemingly

'illegitimate' use of bodies to define both unity and indeed the equivalent of orthodoxy in other religions can serve to profile the contingency of the entire idea of 'belonging' to a religion. As noted above, the dominant sociological model has taken this for granted: religious strength and vitality are to be measured in terms of the number of bodies/people that adhere, believe, and practice. If that is straightforwardly the case, then the Hindu nationalists are pursuing religion 'correctly'. They are seeking to strengthen the religion by maximizing the adherents. The fact that this tactic, on its own, eventuates in very little explicit 'religious' behavior can therefore be seen to show that 'belonging' may not be all that critical in religion; that the 'properly religious' in our world is more centrally about the belief/practice, which is to say programmatic reflexivity with respect to fundamental transcendent reference, than it is about belonging. Among the implications of this conclusion is that 'believing without belonging', 'belonging without believing', 'belonging without practising', or 'practising without belonging' are not inherently problematic; that belonging is just an optional strategy for assisting in the supplementary formation of religion when overall programmatic reflexivity is difficult to attain. Belonging, in other words, is functionally equivalent to religious authority. Just as religions do not necessarily have to have strong central authorities, they do not have to have strong belonging. Some sort of mechanism for assuring programmatic reflexivity, however, probably must be present. The insight that the Hindu example can provide is that such mechanisms can be varied; one does not have to do it the way modern Christians typically have, let alone the way contemporary Hindu nationalists would wish.

The Case of Buddhism

The Buddhist case confirms this contingency by demonstrating that religion, and institutional religion in particular, can survive/thrive in the relative absence of exclusive mass belonging to organized forms or even in terms of personal identification. In contrast to Hinduism, Buddhist unity or programmatic reflexivity has historically and today not been that difficult to conceive, since it has clear core teachings and even to an extent, core practices, if one can count meditation, chanting, or meritorious offerings. In addition, although in the 20th century a significant number of Buddhist movements and organizations with mass lay following have emerged—for example, Soka Gakkai or Fo

Guang Shan/Buddha Light International—this religion still relies to a significant extent on monastic practitioners to carry and represent the core institutions of the tradition. The monastic and quasi-monastic followers, whether in Asia or elsewhere, do for the most part practice an exclusive Buddhism and this allows most lay practitioners to be non-exclusive and to participate in the institutional religion in partial, occasional, and 'syncretic' ways. Particularly in regions of the world where Mahayana Buddhism is strongest, such as most of East Asia, even a weak Buddhist monasticism seems to be enough to maintain the institutional identity of the religion and to allow lay people to engage in such non-exclusive behavior as belonging to Buddhist organizations but rarely participating (and then not even with actual belief in the fundamental transcendent realities to which such practice refers), participating in Buddhist ritual on an 'as-needed' basis, engaging in Buddhist practice without even considering oneself a Buddhist, and creating a variety of new religions which incorporate much that is Buddhist without necessarily even identifying as Buddhist. Examples of the latter range from Falun Gong in China or Won Buddhism in Korea to Yiguan Dao in Taiwan or Aum Shinrikyo in Japan.

One of the consequences of this difference for understanding religion in today's globalized society is that—again paradoxically if one assumes the dominant implicit, and Christian, model—a religion can be strong and institutionally solid without a huge exclusive following and, like Hinduism again, with a relative lack of emphasis on mass-involvement organization. Differentiation as religion does not seem to depend on either mass organization or exclusive belonging. Nor does it need the Hindu nationalist alternative of state sponsorship or incorporation. To this one can add the older observation about Buddhism, that it does not even need fundamental transcendent reference in the form of spiritual and all-powerful beings; although most of Buddhist belief and practice does have them. What this means is that religion can be carried (or continue to be carried) by a relatively few specialized institutions like monasteries, involving only a small minority of 'adherents', while the larger society becomes and appears largely 'secular', with most people, even those identifying themselves as Buddhist, availing themselves of religion only occasionally, and then not even exclusively. The Buddhist example, in this way, can help us understand, for instance, how Western Europe can be from one perspective so highly secularized, and yet still be a region where religion (here Christianity) maintains its importance, albeit largely beneath the surface. Religion, like other key institutional

domains, can be carried in its differentiation by a minority and by relatively little explicitly religious activity, as long as there is sufficient occasional (even if not 'serious') participation by much larger segments of society. One is reminded of a parallel institutional domain in this respect, that of art.

The Case of Islam

In almost all ways, contemporary Islam fits the dominant model quite well. In fact, Islam in some ways fit the model before Christianity did, given its historic sense of Islam as one (admittedly the best and only completely true) religion among many, its highly elaborated programmatic unity and its clearly fundamental transcendent reference. Where contemporary Islam pushes the edges of the dominant way of understanding and constructing religion—the implicit model, that is—is in the area of differentiation, voluntarization and organization. Pushing at the edges, however, as in the case of belonging and exclusivity, does not mean negation of these characteristics so much as helping to expand and clarify the ways of understanding them and how they operate.

It is by now a commonplace, both among Muslims and among outside observers of Islam, that this is a religion which in its dominant contemporary currents denies the differentiation of religion and other areas of life, including law and the state; that it is not just a religion but a whole way of life. Moreover, although there are many Muslim organizations, the prevailing way of practising Islam is not through membership in such organizations; one does not have to go to, let alone 'belong' to, a mosque to practice Islam properly even on the ritual level. Finally, contemporary Islam has appreciable difficulty with voluntarization, albeit not in the same way as Hinduism. There is probably no denying these features; they are fairly clear in the ways that Islam operates in today's global society. Yet, as in the cases of Hinduism with its seeming lack of programmatic unity or Buddhism with its rather flexible sense of what constitutes adherence, so with Islam it is perhaps instructive not to take these claims and features quite at face value. They may demonstrate more the use of the implicit model to distinguish Islam from other religions than they bespeak essential differences.

Going beyond the statement that Islam is a religion and a way of life can begin by noting that what is most often meant by this is that

explicitly Islamic programmatic elements ought to condition other aspects of life. There should be a way of acting in all realms of life which is in conformity with Islam. Most often this refers to Islamic moral precepts which dictate the limits of how one can use one's body, how one should treat other human beings, what it is good to strive for in one's personal and in public social life, and so forth. These sorts of determination, however, are what one would find within the programmatic ambit of any religion or version of a religion. They do not push the implicit model. Where various movements in modern and contemporary Islam do go significantly further is in the idea that Islamic programmatic elements should be used to run the differentiated institutional domains that have become dominant in modern and now global society. In other words, they challenge the characteristic of differentiation. Thus, to take the most common examples, there should be Islamic law as the law of the land, Islamic government as the way a state is organized, Islamic economics as the way to conduct business affairs. The implication is usually more than that Islam should exercise a general moral influence in these domains: it is that Islamic precepts taken from the religious sources (above all Qur'an and Hadith) should themselves directly structure these domains; that, for instance, Islamic sources provide the actual laws and legal proceedings, dictate how government is formed and how it is carried out, or determine the financial structures that regulate such key areas as banking, investment, and credit. Closer inspection of what exactly the proponents of such structuring are advocating, or what various Muslim countries implement in pursuit of this goal tends to show, however, that the range of applicable Islamic precepts in these domains is in fact quite limited. Beyond various symbolic clusters like the Hudud ordinances, inheritance regulations, *zakat* (almsgiving), *riba* (proscription of fixed interest rates), or the principle of *shura* or consultation in government, most of what gets done in these domains even in the most Islamic of countries is really no more Islamic than law, government, or business is Christian in predominantly Christian countries, Buddhist in Buddhist countries, or Hindu in India. A generalized influence, often more cultural than it is clearly religious, is present in all these cases. Yet by and large, the legal, political, and economic systems operate on their own logic, roughly in parallel with the operation of these systems in other countries. And where this has not been the case, such as in the Islamic Republic of Iran after the 1979 revolution or the Taliban regime in Afghanistan

of the late 1990s, the consequence seems to have been to weaken the efficacy of all the institutions, including the religious. Put into slightly different terms, in those instances where the 'interference' of religion in other domains has been kept within limits—thus essentially maintaining institutional differentiation—Islamization has been, certainly controversial, but arguably more a matter of making things look Islamic than of actually having religious practice run other institutions. In those instances where matters have gone farther, the institutions have tended to break down or to lose their credibility (cf. Roy, 1992).

What these Islamic developments suggest for the understanding of how modern global religion works and for the expansion of the implicit model of religion is that differentiation is rather more constitutive of this religion, of its social efficacy, than even many ardent religious practitioners would allow. Put in somewhat paradoxical terms, it may be that, in contemporary global society, the vitality of religion depends to some extent on the secularization of society in the sense of the institutional differentiation of other, non-religious domains. The efforts of many Islamists to go in the opposite direction only end up confirming this conclusion. A corollary of this realization is that the de-differentiation of religion and society, far from implying the 'religionization' of society, may actually have the reverse outcome, the de-institutionalization of religion. The Ayatollah Khomeini may have been correct when he asserted in his version of Islamic government that, for genuinely Islamic government to happen, the religious experts would have to exercise direct rule. In this he succeeded, but the outcome was that a lot of mullahs became politicians with the result that both their political and religious legitimacy was, if not destroyed, then certainly weakened (cf. Khosrokhavar & Roy 1999). Ironically and perhaps paradoxically, the effort to go substantially beyond the 'Christian' model of how religion should operate in society does not just accomplish that, but also its opposite. Thus, overcoming the quasi-Christian model of religion is a little like the perpetual allure of the 'third way': an ideal that hovers on the horizon, but recreates what it was meant to overcome, the closer it comes to realization.

The degree to which Islam does not operate so much on the basis of organization need not detain us overly, for in this case we are clearly dealing with a matter of degrees: Islam, like most religions beside Christianity, is less organized (cf. Boli & Brewington in this volume), but organization still plays a substantial role. In countries such as Indonesia and Turkey, in fact, the level of organization, complete with substantial

voluntary membership, is actually quite high. On the issue of voluntarization itself, however, there is more at issue than just a question of degrees. Islam, historically and today, has operated as a proselytizing religion, constantly seeking the conversion of outsiders and even at times measuring its validity by its ability to attract such conversions. Yet accompanying that emphasis has been an equal difficulty with the issue of de-conversion or apostasy. That continues to be highly problematic, even though Muslims leaving Islam is not unheard of, nor is it all that problematic in various parts of the world. Still, the matter is highly ambiguous. It is perhaps indicative both of the strength and flexibility of the implicit model for a religion that, while the proscription of apostasy remains a clear programmatic item in the prevailing forms of contemporary Islam, putting it into effect is also highly problematic and controversial on a global scale, typically resulting in condemnation of the attempt to proscribe apostasy or evasion of its attempted enforcement. Islam, one might say, is under clear pressure to 'relativize' this programmatic feature, and this in the name of being a 'good' religion, of conforming to the model and constructing its distinctiveness vis-à-vis other religions in a variety of different ways.

Conclusions

If there is a straightforward conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing considerations, it is perhaps this: the globalization of religion over the past centuries does seem to have yielded a peculiar and particular model of what 'one of the religions' looks like and how it operates. That modeling has clear historical and contemporary Christian influences, much like the institutional models in other spheres such as economy, science, and politics/state are similarly formed in ways that are more or less clearly 'Western'. Yet it is also not just a 'Christian' model. To the extent that religions other than Christianity 'count', that they are regarded and treated as legitimate religions around the world—and even a casual observation will confirm that they are—the model for a religion appears to be both clear and flexible. A particular religion can challenge almost any aspect of the model even while the 'pressure to conform' may also be real. Imposition of the supposedly Christian model is not entirely absent. Nonetheless, that imposition, if one wishes, may well be working in both directions. In other words, we can just as well ask if, in the future, Christianity will move towards the adaptation

of the model represented in other religions as we can ask if they will conform more to Christianity. There are signs that Christian belonging in many parts of the world may be becoming less exclusive as people who consider themselves Christian combine more and more elements from 'other' religions into their personal and voluntary constructions. The still burgeoning Pentecostal movement may be an indicator that Christianity will not continue to follow its organizational/denominational path with quite as much clarity as it did over the past two centuries. The model is not written in stone nor exclusively determined by what Christianity has been and has become. The variations introduced by other religions like Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism are on the whole just as effective and, in that way, valid. In this sense, the religious domain can be seen to have become more truly globalized than it has ever been: a universal model that gains its reality only through concrete particularizations, none of which can claim to serve as the clear and dominant standard for the others.

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RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE, CONFLICT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF BOUNDARIES

Gary D. Bouma

The facts of religious resurgence, increased religious diversity and increasing religious conflict raise issues about the nature, construction and negotiation of the boundaries between and within religions groups. Some of the religious diversity literature has taken a multicultural celebration of diversity approach, avoiding issues of conflict largely in-keeping with the assumptions of 20th Century ecumenism and policies of optimistic multiculturalism. They seem to assume that multicultural policies will prevent conflict or even competition. On the other hand, there is a large literature that argues that religious conflict is inevitable and will be overwhelming (Huntington 1993). Persistent and increasing religious conflict taking a variety of forms and occurring in a range of intensities, along with evidence of the role of religion in peacebuilding (Appleby 2000) compels a more realistic assessment of interrelgious relations and a renewed exploration of the nature and transformation of religious boundaries. It is also necessary to be mindful of the changing social, cultural and political contexts of the transformation of religious boundaries as the consequences of the end of the Cold War and the transition of some societies from modernity to what is described by some as post- or high-modernity.

Religious Resurgence

The evidence for the resurgence of religion is by now overwhelming and need not be debated (Thomas, 2005; Berger, 1999; Martin, 2005; Bouma, 2002; 2006). While particularly evident in Africa and Latin America, evidence of resurgence also pours in from Asia and even Australia—where the secular press has been doubling the coverage of religious issues annually since 2001. The fact that Europe appears to be an outlier in its continued extreme form of secularity has been discussed (Davie, 2002; Martin, 2005). Resurgence can be detected not only among Christian and Muslim groups but also Buddhist, Hindu,

Sikh and others (Almond, Appleby and Sivan, 2003), to say nothing of a burgeoning array of Spiritualities (Bouma, 2006) and within Christianity the Mega-church phenomenon (Connell, 2005; Chavez, 2005).

This wave of religious resurgence has several causes. Some people are reacting against the failure of otiose secularized, liberal and formally organized forms of religion to meet their religious needs. This is a familiar pattern in the history of religions. The early 19th century witnessed such a reaction against The Church of England in the Oxford Movement and the rise of evangelicals, as well as revolts against the state churches of Europe, for example the *afscheiding* in the Netherlands. At the same time many new religious groups and movements emerged, for example the Church of Latter Day Saints, the Disciples of Christ, The Brethren and the Churches of Christ. Religious resurgence and innovation also occurred in other parts of the world for example; in Iran this period witnessed the rise of the Baha'is. A second source of religious resurgence is found in continued failures in justice, the inability to achieve a fair distribution of goods and services, including food and health. Some people react against the failure of the secularist humanist paradigm to deliver peace and prosperity with justice, and to provide satisfactory explanations for evil, inequality and pain.

Meanwhile migration moves people, and with them religions and religious ideas, around the globe. Some migrants use religious organizations to assist them in settling (Bouma, 1994). Migrants also tend to be more religious than those they leave behind, and more traditionally religious. Migration has dramatically increased religious diversity of many societies and as a result has increased interreligious contact. Much of this migration has been voluntary, but some has involved less voluntary forms of population resettlement bringing religious groups into conflict over land tenure and use, as in the case of the Maluku (Stern, 2003: 70–74).

The forms of this religious resurgence or revitalization found in each of the Abrahamic faiths and in others include increased intensity of commitment, increased salience of religious identity, the rise of puritanical extremes (Almond, Appleby and Sivan, 2003; Antoun, 2001; Porter, 2006) and a return to political engagement to apply faith whether by establishing Shariah Law in newly Muslim majority countries like Malaysia, promoting the teaching of 'Creation Science' in the USA, or condemning particular patterns of sexuality (Bates, 2004). Resurgence often brings conflict between the more liberal and more conservative or

fundamentalist positions within religious groups, as seen in the history of the Southern Baptist Convention, and now among Anglicans, but also within Islam, Hindusim and Buddhism (Almond, Appleby and Sivan, 2003). Resurgence is also associated with more emotive and charismatic forms of spirituality and worship, particularly in the West where it forms part of the reaction against rational, cerebral and propositional forms of Christianity (Bouma, 1992; 2006). As the more intense forms of religiosity make themselves more evident, there is some evidence of the rise of newly articulate voices from more liberal streams (Rudd, 2006; Khatab and Bouma, 2007).

All of this religious resurgence runs strictly counter to mid 20th century secularization theory (Berger, 1999; Martin, 2005). Religion was supposed to become increasingly private, less engaged with political issues and decreasingly a force in both society as a whole and in individual lives. An echo of this expectation that religion would fade away can be heard in some multicultural policy orientations to religion, which seem to expect that religious difference should not, and with proper management will not, make a difference. This position will be increasingly difficult to sustain. Meanwhile the ideological foundations of the secularization hypothesis are becoming clearer (Stark, 2003; Martin, 2005; Berger, 1999). The reactions of those who work hard to exclude the religious variable from explanatory frameworks make it clear that secularity is not a neutral, or objective position, but a committed anti-religious standpoint, a belief system in its own right with consequences.

Increased Religious Competition and Conflict

A direct result of increased religious commitment and practice will be an increase in religious competition. The increased number of religious groups in a society can and often does lead to competition (Finke and Stark, 1988; Finke, Guest and Stark, 1996; Thomas, 2005). Although Finke and Stark focus on the impact of competition on religious life, the nexus between religious plurality, competition and religious vitality is complex. Certainly in Australia plurality has led to an increase in vitality and following the vitality an increase in competition. Although often confused with each other, competition is different from conflict and clarifying the differences helps to sharpen thinking in the area of

managing religious diversity (Bouma, 2006). Religious conflict is treated here as a subset of religious competition. Competitors recognize the legitimate existence of each other and the right of the market to choose. In competing, religious competitors often learn more about their position and approach to their faith, thus increasing their particular commitment to it, and perhaps the general salience of the faith. Religious conflict, in contrast, does not proceed on this assumption, but actually seeks to overcome, eliminate, or convert the other to extinction. With increased diversity, increases in competition can be expected; whether this competition will flow on to conflict depends on how boundaries are defined and how these boundaries are viewed by social policy makers.

The Cold War had a strong religious dimension—Christian Democracy versus Godless Communism. The rhetoric of the Cold War was redolent with religious imagery, and the threat of communism was not just to capitalist economic systems, but to Christian society as expressed in Western bloc democratic nations. This major global polarity, with clearly drawn boundaries easily depicted on maps, produced a common external enemy, which in the West had the effect of promoting a more open interpretation of the boundaries between their religious groups resulting in a more generous internal sense of 'us' against 'them', a common external foe 'Those for us, or who are not against us, are us.' Communism as a global threat and common external enemy facilitated the rise of ecumenism as the internal tensions in Christianity were reduced. There was a denial of difference, as we stand together against them, whoever 'they' are. Thus in the USA there was a ready hearing for Herberg's (1955) contention that Protestants, Catholics and Jews were all American. It was in the closing days of the Cold War that the Christian right began its resurgence and involvement in social issues.

Following the Cold War most violent conflict in the world has had a religious dimension. Some of this conflict has been the result of the passing of heavy-handed regimes that have repressed religious groups, and in so doing also prevented conflict between them, for example in the former Yugoslavia and in some of the former Soviet republics. The conflict in Afghanistan which in many ways brought the Cold War to an end was heavily laced with religious rhetoric, as the United States funded the Taliban to engage in a *jihad* against the Soviet occupation forces. However, after the Cold War no simple bilateral polarities could be sustained, even though Huntington (1993) tries to construct one between the West and Islam, or the West and the rest. The lines of this conflict are not able to be drawn, the boundaries are not clear, do

not stay stable, are not able to be visualized or identified geographically. They are boundaries between ideas, images, and beliefs—not geopolitical realities.

There are several sources of post-cold-war religious conflict. The conflict between Israel and Palestine is over land, access to resources and fundamentally the right to exist. Each side includes both those who seek a peace that accommodates the other and those who seek the removal or annihilation of the other. Theological and biblical passages are used to defend Israel's right to exist. The fact that this position is adopted by conservative evangelical Christians in the United States, as well as some Jewish groups, indicates the theological underpinnings of this conflict. The claim of Palestinians, particularly Muslim Palestinians rests on historical possession and the importance of Al Quds/Jerusalem to Muslims.

Conflicts between Christian and Muslim groups in Nigeria are over the implementation of their religious ethics in social policy and the religious tone of the nation. The violent conflict between Christians and Muslims in the Indonesian province of Muluku has been over land and social position. It was initially prompted in 1990 by the migration of Muslims into territory that had been controlled for several centuries by the Christians, who had been put in leadership positions and favoured by the Dutch. The Christians massacred Muslims and burnt mosques, and then the Muslims retaliated. Later a peace was brokered and the religious divisions removed as cooperation emerged (Stern, 2003: 70–4).

Increased religious competition and conflict arises not only from increased diversity and religious resurgence, but also involves internal conflicts *within* religious groups. Resurgence brings new life and with it internal differences that lead to competition for the resources of leadership positions, adherent support, and the capacity to define both the direction of the organization and its public perception. The organizational weakness of many religious groups prior to the resurgence reduced their capacity to manage internal diversity in creative ways, to socialize newcomers and to train clergy effectively, resulting in unproductive conflict rather than creative competition. In addition, the fact that many religious groups—like their societies—have lost the threat of an external Other has decreased tolerance for internal difference as the Other is found within and more conflict ensues.

Key examples of conflicts occurring within religious groups include 'the clash within civilizations' literature describing in particular the

clashes among Muslims over degree of strictness, political involvement, appropriate forms of political order and theology (Hefner, 2001; Bilgrami, 2003). Conflicts between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims are largely over theological and ritual differences, but take on political dimensions when territory is shared and questions of access to power emerge as in Iraq (Nasr, 2006). These conflicts are also deeply rooted in history as well as in recent violent clashes such as the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. These differences also are found within diasporic Muslim communities where they are not usually associated with violent clashes. Further examples are provided by internal wrangling in Christian denominations over the election of openly gay Anglican bishops, gay and lesbian marriage, abortion and church planting (Wallis, 2005; Bates, 2004; and Porter, 2006) and the emergence of the conservative evangelical Christian denial of 'belief in one/same god' for Jews, Christians and Muslims (Cimino, 2005).

The forms of post Cold War religious conflict have included intercommunal violence in countries as varied as Australia, Bosnia, Nigeria, and Indonesia. Religious vilification legislation follows the precedent set by other forms of anti-vilification legislation often directed at ethnic and racial vilification. Religious anti-vilfication legislation prohibits public speech and writing that incites to hatred and violence. Cases in Canada (R. v. Harding, Ontario Court [Provincial Division] June 19, 1998) and Australia (Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries, Victorian Civil And Administrative Tribunal, Human Rights Division, Anti Discrimination List, VCAT reference No. a392/2002) have resulted in convictions of people speaking of Islam in ways that would increase hostility and hatred toward Muslims living in those countries. Other instances of religious conflict include the use of law to limit rights to practice or build places of worship in Greece and Australia, and the denial of the right of religious groups to exist, for example, Falun Gong in China and Scientology in Germany, France and Switzerland (Boyle and Sheen, 1997; Richardson, 2004a; 2004b).

Boundary Definition

Resurgent religion and the attendant increases in religious competition and conflict raise issues of boundaries. Conflict presupposes the existence or declaration of boundaries. This requires knowing who the 'other' is, identifying the enemy and declaring the boundary between

us and them. Competition and conflict both require the drawing of lines, taking offence at someone or something, and declaring the other to be wrong, morally inferior, or theologically in error.

Much of current religious conflict is *within* group conflict involving the (re)defining of boundaries between subsets of larger religious groups. Certainly this is true within each of the Abrahamic faiths—Judaism, Christianity and Islam as new puritanical and sectarian groups emerge each claiming to have 'the way', the correct interpretation of scripture, the correct theology, and the only acceptable views on the implications of faith for life (Antoun, 2001). Similar movements are found in other groups including Buddhism, Sikhism and Hinduism (Almond, Appleby and Sivan, 2003). Puritanical groups maintain high tension within their group, insisting on strict standards for membership and sanctioning deviants. They clearly set themselves off from other subsets by defining themselves both over the less pure within their larger group, and of course over the totally polluted wider world. For puritanical groups the most salient other is the deviant within, those others who claim to be within the same group but whose beliefs and practices are not up to the strict requirements of the more demanding subset of the group. The boundaries drawn in this case are not just between religious groups but also involve an attempt to define the group as different from the larger society through a radical condemnation of issues the larger society has accepted—gays, abortion, divorce, and gender equality. The choice of issues to be used to distinguish the group from the larger society is interesting. Social justice issues could equally well be chosen as could economic, work-related, and educational issues (Wallis, 2005).

While often intensely internal, some of this conflict spills over into international and global crises. In such cases it is critical not to lose sight of the fact that the conflict is largely internal and only incidentally external. Osama bin Laden's agenda is to impose a pure Islam on other Muslims who adhere to less strict, more liberal versions of Islam. In doing this he uses 'The West' as a useful 'imagined other' against which to unite Muslims.

Role of the Imagined Other

Boundary definition and maintenance within and between groups as well as between them and the larger society is often assisted by the creation of an 'imagined other'. While involving stereotypes, this is more than

stereotyping; it is the creation of imagined communities of otherness. The use of imagined others in the definition of boundaries is a product of the rhetoric used in competition and conflict, and often has no basis in the actual interactions between the groups involved. The imagined other is more convenient than the awkward realities of a real other, that is, a real person or group. The role of imagination in boundary creation and maintenance has been apparent in past conflicts including the Cold War. War posters, slogans and stories of atrocities perpetrated by the other combine to create the imagined other.

The West has had a long history of using Islam as an imagined other. The rhetoric that launched the Crusades had little to do with the reality of Islam or its tenure of what became called the Holy Land. The hero worship of Crusader Knights as opposed to the demonization of Muslims created images of otherness that still shape relations between Muslims and Christians. Of course, this process of otherness creation happened on both sides. When I was a child, Catholics were the other. We never encountered any, but our imaginations were well stocked with images of what 'they' were like. For example, Catholic girls were supposed to intend to seduce Protestant boys so that more children would be raised as Catholics. Beware! It was not until I attended university that I had the opportunity to revise my imagination in interaction with the real McCoy.

While the threat of Communism had been used earlier to motivate foreign policy and wartime decisions, during the Cold War the creation of Communists as the 'imagined other' was used to fuel mistrust and hostility as well as support policies to eradicate countries of this evil. Godless Communism was the threat, they would do horrible things, and had 'our' cities locked into the trajectories of their missiles. During the McCarthy era the external imagined other was imagined to exist within, and a program of self-purging instituted. The current use of 'the Satanic West', the impure, naked, fleshpots of New York and Hollywood, by Al Qaeda and other radical puritanical groups in Islam provide additional cases of the rhetorical construction of 'imagined others' to define boundaries.

The examples of anti-Muslim and anti-gay rhetoric among evangelical Christians provide interesting case studies of this phenomenon. Since the mid-1990s a whole theology differentiating the Christian God from the Muslim Allah has emerged (Cimino, 2005). This process has accelerated since September 11, 2001. While it would seem that

the primary function of this theology is to make clear the boundary between Christians and Muslims, this is unlikely to be the case since those most active in promoting these views are not in actual daily contact with Muslims. If not the primary purpose, at the very least the secondary function of this theological imagining is to differentiate evangelical Christians from liberal Christians—most of whom do not share this view. Since the average evangelical Christian has little or no contact with actual Muslims the role of imagination and rhetoric remains substantial. They are much more likely to encounter either liberal Christians or softer views on religious difference in everyday life. The references to actual conflicts involve others at a distance—Christians and Muslims elsewhere, in places where rhetoric is not needed to inflame the conflict and where leaders are often much more subtle and nuanced in their inter-group relations. The same, of course, is true of the strident attacks on male homosexuality. This is not usually done as a result of direct encounters with gays in church, but again is an attack on an imagined community, a demonized group.

Rhetoric is one thing, but serious problems arise when the imagination produces reality—the acting out of fantasy. For example, in the McCarthy era of the United States not only was the imagined other sought within, the quest for an actual object of the 'imagined other' led to forms of 'Commie bashing' that deprived citizens of their rights, jobs and respectability. Negative rhetoric about racial and ethnic groups, gender and sexuality groups is, or is increasingly, disallowed by equal opportunities and other legislation or social policy designed to promote fairness and equality. The Canadian Province of Ontario and the Australian State of Victoria have enacted religious anti-vilification legislation to address the negative social impact of negative rhetoric and image construction. These extend the logic of ethnic legislation to religious groups.

Who Defines Boundaries

In European societies before 1648, and in many other societies with strong religious monopolies, the boundaries between what is acceptable and what is not are drawn by religious groups. Before the Reformation, the Catholic Church defined the acceptable range of religious diversity and used the powers of the state to sanction deviants. The horrors of

the European wars of religion made clear that religion could destroy the social cohesion of a nation and of the continent. This period of time also saw the emergence of stronger states. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 changed the locus of responsibility for defining the acceptable range of religious diversity from a religious monopoly to the state—in this case stated in the principle, *cuius regio, eius religio*, giving each prince the right and responsibility to determine the religion of his realm. It was assumed that a single religion, indeed a single form of Christianity—Catholic, Calvinist, or Lutheran—would be chosen. Religious identity and religious affiliation, if not practice and belief, became a part of the duties of a citizen. Later, the Netherlands was the first European country to provide freedom of religion to its citizens. In this context, the United Kingdom did not extend the full rights of citizenship—including admission to the universities, the public service, and higher ranks of the military—to those who were not members of the Church of England until the 1830s.

With the rise of various forms of religious freedom the state retained its role in defining the acceptable range of religious diversity. Religious groups were expected to manage their own internal diversity, but without the power of the state. Residual use of the power of the state can be seen in the vestigial remains of the Church of England in the former colonies, where appeals to courts to settle internal differences occur even in the late 20th century. These appeals are based on legislation that incorporated the local forms of the Church of England. Contemporary examples of the state defining the limits of acceptable diversity include the rejection of Scientology in many European states, its acceptance and definition as a religion by the High Court following challenges to its right to exist and operate as a religion in Australia (High Court of Australia 1983 Church of the New Faith v. Commissioner for Pay-Roll Tax 154 CLR 120). Issues related to the training and management of imams and other religious personnel provide further examples.

In these examples can be seen the shift from the role of the religious organization in post-Westphalian Christendom in defining membership. Church membership was a part of citizenship. The state church recognized the person through the ecclesial rite of baptism, regulated family relations through ecclesial marriage, and recognized the passing of the person through funerals. Citizenship and Christianity were tied together. The rise of religious freedom first had to do with extending the range of religious organizations allowed, or required, to manage

the definition of citizenship. Still the state defined which groups were permitted to exist and practice. Many European countries still actively certify which groups may operate. The United States operates a more free market religious economy, so long as the groups support the state. If not, the FBI or armed forces can—and have—been sent in. Where governments do not manage the range of acceptable diversity, actively religious groups are left to established organizational structures to train and certify clergy and to monitor diversity. The issue of who decides and how to decide what is acceptable now has become an issue as new forms of religious diversity reveal the Christian assumptions of much of western secular legislation and policy in this area (Bouma 2006). Muslim societies face much the same issue as they confront issues of boundary definition and maintenance.

Shifting Salience of Boundary Definitions

The social significance of religious labels and boundaries may shift in response to events and political change. In Australia, the election of a liberal federal government following more than a decade of pro-multicultural labour was associated with a rising concern about the capacity of the country to absorb 'Asian' migrants. The shift to concern about Asian migration came as the rate of migration from Asia increased. However, following the events of September 11, 2001, The Bali Bombings and London Bombings, the concern has shifted from ethnic definitions of boundaries to religious definitions with the concern focused on the capacity to absorb Muslims. The terrorist attacks had the effect of turning attention from racial and ethnic differences to religious differences. The processes of boundary definition and the creation of imagined others is the same, the groups involved differ. The definition of who is an Australian, and who is 'ethnic' has shifted since World War Two. In the late 1970s Italian and Greek migrants were beginning to be included as Aussies, a process that is nearly complete in 2006. Now other religious groups seek universal religious education to reduce the chances of being confused with Muslims.

Boundary Definition in Postmodernity vs High Modernity

In the West, the socio-cultural context of postmodernity differs from that of high modernity in ways that affect the recognition, evaluation and boundary definition of difference including religious difference.[1] High modernity through much of the 20th century was characterized by the formal organization of religious difference on the one hand, and attempts to overcome religious difference through the ecumenical movement, which had 'organic unity' as one of its ambitions, on the other. Christian and Jewish diversity was increasingly reflected in denominational organizations. Among Protestants theological and liturgical innovation was often attended by the formation of a new denomination. Waves of migrants within similar theological frames often found it more comfortable to establish a new denomination—the Reformed Church of America, The Christian Reformed Church, the Protestant Reformed Church and the Orthodox Protestant Reformed Church provide an example of this phenomenon within Dutch Calvinism.

The high modernity of 20th century Western societies also witnessed the establishment of national and global coordinative councils such as the National Council of Churches, the World Council of Churches etc. Each of these were beset by the need to define the boundaries of membership and by the fact that some groups refused to participate at the levels they wanted, most notably the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches. Other groups formed the World Evangelical Federation to represent that stripe of Christian groups.

High modernity was characterized by clear lines of authority within religious groups, clerical domination of agenda and policy, clearly defined boundaries between groups, and organizational forms that were mirrored in local, state and national government; labour and political organizations often possessing interlocking directorships. In this closely knit web of organizational networks, religious innovation and diversity were able to be controlled—where possible channelled back into the life of the organization and where not relegated to a

[1] The terms 'modernity', 'high modernity' and 'postmodernity' have arisen in attempts to understand social and cultural changes in Western societies, and do not comfortably apply to many Asian or Muslim societies with quite different histories and forms of social organization. Moreover they apply differentially to Western societies. The interconnection between the end of the Cold War and the transition from modernity to postmodernity is too complex to pursue here.

splinter group, itself soon subject to the control of the larger network. Only complete withdrawal from the society permitted uncontrolled innovation, but the desire to apply their faith and influence the larger society brought most into interactions that entailed compromise and participation (Yinger, 1947).

Postmodern secular societies are characterized by hyper-differentiation. Secularity does not mean that there is no religion but that religion and spirituality have moved out of control of religious organizations and societies. Hyper-differentiation results in internal fragmentation of the once apparently homolithic denominations present in high modernity. No one can speak for all Anglicans, or Catholics, or Presbyterians. Once hierarchically organized religious groups are becoming loose congeries of congregations, themselves often divided into small groups. This internal differentiation diminishes the capacity of religious leaders to shape and direct their followers, deliver the vote on any issue, or significantly shape social policy. Religious organizations are less able to articulate with local, state and national levels of government, labor, or the arts. Religion and spirituality are not only less under the control of religious organizations; religious organizations are less under the control of the state. The assumption so widely held in the middle to late 20th century that secularity would sweep away all religion (Thomas, 2005) led policy makers to ignore religion and fail to maintain effective communication with religious communities and organizations.

In postmodernity, religious boundaries are less legal, less organizational, and much more fluid and volatile. Moreover, the rise of religious diversity to include significant communities of religions other than Christianity means that the familiar forms and rhetoric about religious difference do not apply, as these are constructed differently in different groups. While the West was accustomed to formal hierarchical organization of religious life, in most societies Muslims are not organized like Presbyterians, or Baptists and Buddhists are not organized like Anglicans. All this makes religious boundaries harder to detect; more difficult to define or draw. However, the rise of terror—some of which is linked with religion—has increased concern about, and brought more attention to, religious boundaries both within and between groups. As a result there is more anxiety about them and more conflict. One of the functions of conflict is to define boundaries, sharpening the understanding of center.

Religious Conflict in Postmodern Global Secularity

Globalization—the global movement of people, ideas and capital—has brought not only a dramatic increase in the religious diversity of many local communities, it has also enabled the rapid spread of ideas, images and stories which are instantly communicated to communities that associate themselves with both the victims and perpetrators of global events that undermine local senses of security. The regular reports aired on television and the internet of atrocities committed by persons and groups associated with each of the world's religions serve to maintain continuous moral panics about terror, its prevention and the search for security. When the encounters between religious groups go wrong and become violent, global communication networks ensure that the stories are heard around the world. It is unfortunate that stories of religiously diverse communities who are living together in harmony and productivity do not travel as far, or as rapidly.

Given the facts of religious resurgence, increased religious diversity and the forms of secular postmodernity that are emerging, there will be more encounters between religious groups not previously accustomed to dealing with difference. Most of these encounters will be managed in ways that promote social cohesion, but some will not. Instances of religious competition and conflict will appear to increase in absolute numbers, while it may actually be decreasing as a proportion of instances of religious intergroup interactions. As societies seek to manage this new religious context, maintaining a distinction between competition and conflict is critical. Competitors recognize each other as being legitimate operators in a religious market, while in conflict one or more groups seek the exclusion or annihilation of the other. When conflict occurs, groups feel their very existence to be threatened, and respond with extreme measures.

While globalization has eroded previously well defined national and religious boundaries, and has brought diversity to many local contexts, it has increased the salience of religious boundaries as groups struggle to find appropriate ways of organizing their own internal diversity. In all of this the boundaries between religious groups will be continuously renegotiated.

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RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS[1]

John Boli
David V. Brewington

In February of 2006, Abdul Rahman suddenly went global. The Barnabas Foundation, the Seventh Day Adventist Church, the Family Research Council, Christian Monitor, the Catholic Church, Christian Freedom, and Religious Tolerance.org, among many other organizations, quickly made Abdul Rahman their *cause célèbre*. These religious nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), some global and others much less than global, sent petitions, issued press releases, wrote to Afghani politicians, and mobilized numerous governments on behalf of a poor Afghani who had converted to Christianity. Non-religious NGOs also spoke out, among them Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Democracy Now, charging that Rahman's rights to freedom of conscience and free practice of religion were being violated. In the end, Rahman was released to asylum in Italy, but religious freedom made little headway in Afghanistan.

In the Rahman case, religious organizations addressed classic religious issues—religion's relationship with the state, and the question of religious tolerance—and engaged in directly political activity. Other religious groups covered by this chapter, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Harakat ul-Ansar in Kashmir, grab the world's attention through flamboyant or destructive political activities, and conservative Christian organizations in the United States, while viscerally disdainful of the United Nations system, lobby vigorously to sway the World Health Organization's family and reproductive programs (Buss and Herman, 2003). But these kinds of issues and engagements are not typical of religious NGOs. Most of the time, their work is apolitical or only indirectly engages politics and they concentrate on essentially secular issues—poverty alleviation, refugee support, peace, health,

[1] We thank Laura Braden for research assistance, and the Union of International Associations for its on-going diligence in compiling information about nongovernmental organizations.

education, mutual understanding, environmental protection, women's equality, and so on. In the Luhmannian terms of Beyer's (1994: 80) framework, religious NGOs engage more in religious performance than religious function, the latter referring to "pure" religious activities such as salvation, worship, and the cure of souls, the former signifying the "application" of religion to problems generated or left unsolved by other institutional sub-systems, such as the economic and political systems. In this respect, religious NGOs are not fundamentally unlike their secular NGO counterparts.

In this chapter we provide an overview of a broad class of religious organizations—all those that qualify as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the *Yearbook of International Organizations* (2001–02, CD version). These are voluntary, not-for-profit, self-organizing entities of sufficient public presence to come to the attention of the Union of International Associations, the publisher of the *Yearbook*. In fact, little public presence is required; the UIA captures an enormous range of organizations, from globally prominent bodies like B'nai B'rith International (annual budget: $25 million) and Dorcas Aid International ($12 million) to obscure regional and domestic organizations, such as the World Islamic Association for Mental Health (annual budget: $12,000) and the Institute for Planetary Synthesis (ca $40,000).

International and domestic NGOs, often depicted as being crucial to the formation of global civil society, have become a major subject of research over the past decade. Human rights, the environment, development, women's rights, international labor, indigenous peoples, health, and numerous other sectors have received much attention (Anheier et al., 2001–2004; Charnovitz, 1997; Florini, 2000; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Willetts, 1996), and comprehensive data has been compiled for a number of sectors (Boli and Thomas, 1999a; Frank et al., 1999; Chabbott, 1999; Berkovitch, 1999a). Systematic study of religious NGOs is rare, however, despite the enormous literature on religion as such, both for long established faiths (the "world religions") and for less conventional religious movements (Casanova, 1994; Barker, 1986; Wilson, 1999). Mei (2003) gives special attention to religious organizations in her study of humanitarian charity and relief NGOs, and Bush (2007) presents data on religiously oriented human rights organizations active in the late 1990s, but broader work on religious INGOs is lacking. Almost all international or internationally oriented religious NGOs (RINGOs hereafter) toil away largely unnoticed, yet they are numerous, energetic, and often significant actors in many global sectors.

Making Sense of Religious INGOs

In interpreting the RINGO data explored here, we use the world-cultural theoretical perspective (see the chapter by George Thomas in this volume, Thomas et al., 1987; Meyer et al., 1997; Boli and Thomas, 1997; 1999; Lechner and Boli, 2005) that has underpinned a variety of long-term studies of INGO sectors and issues (e.g. Berkovitch, 1999b; Boyle, 2002; Frank and McEneaney, 1999; Drori et al., 2003; Ramirez and Wotipka, 2001). Tracing the roots of world culture and the world polity to Christendom and European transnational culture, this perspective emphasizes the cultural dimension of global development—the construction of world-cultural elements, principles, models, and prescriptions for action that are crystallized primarily by nongovernmental organizations but also by states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and economic entities (e.g. transnational corporations). INGOs embody and reflect world culture; for example, they reflect the strongly individualistic character of world culture in governance structures that give each member or participant an individual vote in outreach efforts that attract individual supporters, and in normative positions that champion individual rights of many kinds. INGOs also debate, elaborate, propagate, and implement world culture; for example, Boyle (2002) discusses heated global debate among various INGOs and IGOs regarding female genital cutting, while Chabbott (2003) shows how INGOs and IGOs (particularly UNESCO) collaborated in the 1990 World Conference on Education for All to push for the expansion of schooling throughout the world.

INGOs have an especially large role in global cultural processes because, as Lechner and Boli (2005: Ch. 5) argue, they are notably disinterested and irresponsible. Unlike states, IGOs, and transnational corporations, INGOs' interests typically are not their own but those of other entities (nature, refugees, victims of religious persecution, the poor, and so on). INGOs are also irresponsible; whatever their positions or principles, they do not bear responsibility for the consequences of their advocacy and actions. Unconstrained by the rigors of the market or the demands of political competition, INGOs are free to engage in world-cultural construction, expression, and propagation. To study INGOs, then, is to study world culture—its content and composition, dynamics, and long-term changes. For example, Boli and Thomas (1999a: Ch. 1) infer that the bulk of world culture concerns rationalized, scientized, highly structured social action because the bulk of the INGO population

falls within such domains—technical, knowledge-related, professional, scientific, commercial, production-oriented, etc. World culture is not especially concerned with religion as such, they surmise, because in their data less than five percent of conventional INGOs have primarily religious aims; indeed, religion was never central to world culture throughout the period of their investigation (from 1850 onward) because RINGOs accounted for only a small share of INGOs even in the 19th century. Similarly, they infer that world culture embeds egalitarianism as a central normative principle because so many INGOs express concern about inequality and emphasize their dedication to improving the lot of the poor and marginalized—while virtually no INGOs explicitly advocate inequality of rights, opportunities, or outcomes.

Here we use the RINGO data to explore key scholarly issues related to religion as a globalizing world-cultural domain. A foundational issue is that of world religions: while Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism, Taoism, and one or two others are routinely seen as world religions, our data reveal which religions are highly organized transnationally not as formal religious structures but as voluntary associations of religious character engaged in the culture and organization of world society. We trace the rise of globalized religions by looking at patterns of RINGO foundings over time, using the founding dates for 2,431 RINGOs starting in the year 312, to see the relative pace and extent of religious globalization by different faiths. Similarly, we shed light on the enduring secularization debate by considering the prominence of "purely" religious INGOs relative to RINGOs with more secular aims and purposes, and we evaluate the breadth of RINGO participation of peoples from different regions of the world. As we proceed, we treat these and other issues in our world-cultural interpretation of religious nongovernmental organizations over the past two millennia.

The RINGO Data

Our data come from the CD-Rom version of the *Yearbook of International Organizations* (Union of International Associations [UIA] 2001–2002). The *Yearbook* is the most comprehensive source of data on international organizations available and is widely used for scholarly research, despite problems and limitations that are bound to afflict any data source of this nature (see Boli and Thomas 1999b: 20–1 for a general discussion, Bush 2007 regarding religious human rights NGOs). The 2001–2002

CD contains information on 33,526 international non-governmental organizations of all types, including some 3,833 that have ceased operations or merged with other organizations.[2]

To identify RINGOs in the database, we applied a keyword search using 272 distinct terms and cognates related to religion to all data fields (organization name, aims, history, events, publications, and so on). The terms ranged from the obvious ("religious", "Islamic", "Torah", "prayer") to the not-so-obvious ("theosophy", "soteriology", "tithe", "ecclesia", etc.). We then removed false positives, dissolved or apparently inactive organizations, unconfirmed bodies, conference series, and "unconventional" NGOs, as well as organizations devoted solely to academic research. We retained all organizations classified by the UIA as genuinely international bodies (*Yearbook* categories A through D, the limitation adopted by Boli and Thomas 1999b); we also included organizations classified as internationally oriented national bodies because our analysis of these bodies (categories "G" and "N", in UIA parlance) revealed that most such organizations are international in membership, stated aims, and activities. For instance, BibleLands, listed by the UIA as a United Kingdom national organization with an international focus, aims to "Help Christian mission in the lands of the Bible, especially the Holy Land, in the work of carrying the Gospel back to the lands of its birth and in providing comfort, education and healing for the sick, blind, disabled, poor and homeless." Founded in 1854 and active in several countries, BibleLands is an international operation of the same character as many INGOs in categories A through D. A similar example is the Christian Jugglers Association, based in Ft. Worth, Texas, which is coded as a national association but lists members from six countries and held its 2000 conference in Montreal. In our analyses below, we combine all of these categories of RINGOs.

Because every *Yearbook* is incomplete for the years immediately preceding its publication (Boli and Thomas, 1999b: 21), we limit the range of cases in our data to the years prior to 1994 (thereby removing 76 organizations founded from 1994 to 2001). The final number

[2] Recognizing that no consensually accepted definition of "nongovernmental organization" is possible, the UIA uses a set of seven "rules" to identify NGOs. The thrust of these rules is that INGOs must be functioning, voluntary, non-profit organizations with a high degree of autonomy from the state, a demonstrated international presence or orientation, and ongoing activities oriented to reasonably well-specified goals. See Judge (2000) for a full discussion.

of RINGOs is 3,123. With the same set of limits for the entire INGO population, the total for 2001–02 is 23,179 organizations, so INGOs with at least some degree of religious orientation amount to 13.5% of all INGOs active at that time that were founded before 1994.

Unlike the comprehensive effort by Boli and Thomas (1999a), we were unable to code the aims and social sectors of RINGOs but we did capture information showing where members are located, using a total of 232 political entities (mostly independent countries). Such membership data are available for 1,602 RINGOs, or 51.3% of the total. We also captured contact data for each organization and use the contact address as a proxy for the location of the organization's headquarters, which enables us to count the number of organizations based in each political entity (country). Headquarters locations are available for 2,754 RINGOs, or 88.2%.

With the complete data extract in hand, we then coded the religious orientation of each organization, using 19 categories: Buddhist, Catholic, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox Christian, Zoroastrian, and so on. We constructed a "Christian" category for all evidently Christian RINGOs for which we could not identify a denominational affiliation; close study of these organizations indicated that they are virtually all Protestant rather than Catholic, so we combined them with all explicitly Protestant RINGOs as a "Protestant" category. If an organization was oriented toward religion but we could identify no specific religious tradition, we classified it as "general"; organizations that explicitly work to bridge two or more religions or find pan-religious common ground were grouped as "ecumenical". We also constructed a category for "new" religions (which may have long histories but have globalized relatively recently), such as Baha'i, Falun Gong, Hare Krishna, Scientology, Theosophy, and the Unification Church. This category includes organizations with a spiritualist or new-age flavor, so long as they are not identified with an established world religion.

Features and Interpretations of Religious (I)NGOs

What do religious INGOs do? Like secular INGOs, they operate in virtually every imaginable social sector and engage in a wide range of activities. Here we give a variety of examples to illustrate the diversity of their concerns. The Ecumenical Coalition on Third World Tourism provides "constructive professional services to enable [third world]

communities to participate in decision-making related to tourism and to seek a tourism which contributes positively to the quality of peoples' lives". Another ecumenical organization, BikeAbout, promotes "peace and cooperative understanding through the use of modern technology and cycling", hoping to increase "awareness and access to world religions through personal contact and communication". In contrast, the International Christian Cycling Club takes a more particularistic approach; its aims are to "unite Christian cyclists for a worldwide testimony in lifestyle, training and sportsmanship; expose each cyclist to the love and grace of Jesus Christ, so that they may want to have a personal relationship with Him". Note that these groups' ecumenicism centers not on religion as such but, in the first instance, on empowering the marginalized of many faiths with respect to tourism's impact and, in the latter two, on connecting adherents of particular religions through cycling, hardly a traditional religious activity.

Maritime matters are central to the concerns of at least four organizations: the International Christian Maritime Association, the Lutheran Association for Maritime Ministry, the North America Maritime Ministry Association, and the Islamic Shipowners' Association. The Christian groups provide religious services to sailors the world over while working on behalf of Christian seafarers, fishermen, and their families, while the Islamic group promotes Islamic members' interests and enhances "contact between the Islamic world and other countries within an integrated maritime network".

Of course, missionary work is of prime importance for many organizations. Worth noting in this regard is the elaborate infrastructure and wide variety of media used by missionary organizations. For example, the Christian Pilots Association transports "food, medical supplies and clothing to missions throughout Latin America and the USA". The Christian Literature Crusade "specializes in the distribution of Christian literature worldwide". Engineering Ministries International provides "design and construction expertise to the needy through professional ministry teams". The International Christian Centre for Research on Information about and Analysis of the Strip Cartoon promotes "Christian strip cartoons and their distribution".

Over one third of our RINGOs (1,181 organizations) produce some manner of publication. These include conference proceedings, magazines, books, newsletters, and much more. Periodicals such as the *Panda Bearer* (published quarterly by the China Outreach Ministries) keep members informed about their organizations' activities, while the

weekly *Muslim World* by the Muslim World League reports on an entire civilizational arena. Many publications are translated into multiple languages, such as the *Triangles Bulletin* by the new age group Triangles, which comes out in ten different versions. Besides publications, 599 RINGOs (19% of the total) report sponsoring events such as annual meetings, conferences, or world councils. Reflecting many RINGOs' global scope, these events take place all over the world and usually are recurring affairs.

RINGOs do not work in isolation; nearly 50% report more or less formal relationships with other NGOs, both religious and secular. Some 150 RINGOs in our database report consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council; this likely undercount amounts to about 6% of the total number of INGOs formally connected to ECOSOC. The Council of Europe has granted consultative status to 73 RINGOs, while the World Health Organization and the United Nations Development Fund for Women have five RINGOs each among the INGOs holding consultative status with them. UNESCO, UNICEF, UNCTAD, FAO, and the ILO have also granted consultative status to RINGOs.

Religious distribution. Table 1 shows the distribution of 3,123 RINGOs ranked by religious category. Protestant and Catholic organizations, with 1,235 (39.5%) and 1,208 (38.7%) organizations respectively, account for the great majority, a total of 78.2%. The next largest categories are Islamic INGOs (5.4%) and Judaism-related RINGOs (4.5%), followed by the "new" religions (3.7%) and ecumenical organizations (3.5%). Each of the remaining categories, including Buddhist, Orthodox, and Hindu, garner 1.1% or less of the total; only 35 Buddhist, 20 Orthodox, and 19 Hindu organizations appear in the database, while other recognized world religions (Sikhism, Shintoism, Confucianism, and Taoism) have a total of only five RINGOs among them. Shintoists and Confucians each have a single "world" or "international" organization, Sikhs have one general world organization and a world youth organization, and Taoists have a single international organization which uses Esperanto to promote the "evolution of a world-wide rationalist Taoist movement". These latter numbers contrast sharply with the plethora of RINGOs organized by the religions of Western Christendom and the disproportionately large number of Judaism-related INGOs (adherents of Judaism make up only about a tenth of one percent of the world's population). Further, the descriptions of Buddhist, Hindu, and other non-Western organizations indicate that they concentrate almost solely on promoting their respective religions, while Catholic and Protestant

Table 1. *Distribution of Religious INGOs by Religion*

	Count	Percentage	Cumulative %
Protestant	1235	39.5	39.5
Catholic	1208	38.7	78.2
Islam	170	5.4	83.7
Judaism	139	4.5	88.1
New	115	3.7	91.8
Ecumenical	110	3.5	95.3
General	57	1.8	97.2
Buddhism	35	1.1	98.3
Orthodox	20	0.6	98.9
Hindu	19	0.6	99.5
Zoroastrian	4	0.1	99.6
Indigenous	3	0.1	99.7
Sikhism	2	0.1	99.8
Druidism	1	0.1	99.9
Taoism	1	0.1	99.9
Shinto	1	0.1	99.9
Rastafarian	1	0.1	99.9
Confucian	1	0.1	99.9
Deist	1	0.1	100.0
Totals	**3123**	**100.0**	

Source: UIA 2001–2002

RINGOs engage in an almost bewildering array of activities besides directly religious concerns like evangelical outreach or pastoral education. Among many other activities, they organize relief efforts, women's groups, development projects, communication systems, labor union support, and professional associations for pilots, writers, athletes, even jugglers.

Given the paucity of RINGOs for non-Western religions, we simplify our analyses below by combining all of the categories from Buddhism to Deism in a single residual category ("other" RINGOs); together they account for 146, or 4.7%, of the RINGO total. Our comparisons thus cover the categories of Catholic, Protestant, Islamic, Judaic, new, ecumenical, and other religious types.

Foundings since the fourth century. In Figure 1 we present the number of RINGOs founded each year for the 2,431 organizations (78% of the total) for which we have founding dates. The figure also gives the

five-year moving average to smooth out year-by-year variations. The earliest organization is the Sovereign Constantinian Order, founded in 312, the year that Constantine defeated the Roman emperor Maxentius; in 313 Constantine issued the Edict of Milan granting religious freedom to Christians. Next in order are the Order of St Basil (358), the Canons Regular of Saint Augustine (400), and the Benedictine Confederation (529). Of the 23 organizations founded by 1200, all but one were Catholic orders, including the Benedictine Nuns, Carthusians, Cistercians, and Teutonic Order. The lone exception is the School of Islamic Sufism, founded in 670, a few decades after Muhammad's death. Another 23 Catholic RINGOs (mostly orders) were founded in the great ecclesiastical upswing of the 13th century, with another Islamic organization, Shádhilíya, a Sufi order, as the only additional non-Catholic organization (in 1240). With 48 more organizations between 1300 and 1600 (all Catholic except for one Islamic organization and the first Protestant organization, the Moravian Brotherhood in 1475), the rate of RINGO formation remained very low until the challenge of Protestantism evoked another great renewal of Catholic activity. Thus, in the 17th century some 56 new RINGOs emerged, still almost all Catholic religious orders and most of them for women; in the 18th century, 43 more organizations appeared, only four of which were Protestant.

As with so many other aspects of globalization (Lechner and Boli 2005: Ch. 3), great changes occurred in the 19th century. From 1800 to 1849, 220 new organizations were founded, more than in all of the preceding centuries combined; from 1850 to 1899, 270 more appeared. Catholic organizations continued to dominate but Protestant RINGOs accounted for a growing share and the first Judaic and new religious INGOs appeared (B'nai B'rith International, 1843; the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 1830, and Baha'i International Community, 1844). In 1844, for the first time, as many as ten RINGOs were founded in a single year; from 1890 to 1899, 53 organizations emerged, followed by 89 organizations from 1900 to 1914, or about six per year. Note the decline in Figure 1 just after the turn of the 20th century and the resurgence in the run-up to World War I, with 12 new RINGOs in 1914. Foundings fell off moderately during the war years and then jumped sharply, with 13 in 1919 and 25 in 1921. Another decline marked the late 1920s and most of the 1930s, with a low of 2 foundings in 1935, but the general rate was still much higher than for any period prior to the 20th century.



Founding Year; N = 2431 (77.8%)

Figure 1. *Foundings of Religious INGOs, 312 AD to 1994*

Source: UIA 2001–02.

During World War II, foundings continued at a substantial rate (almost 9 organizations per year from 1940 to 1945), with another great leap to come: 12 in 1945, shooting up in the following two years to 20 and 32 new organizations. After a relative lull in the 1950s, religious nongovernmental organizing became routine and extensive, with more than 20 foundings per year in almost every year after 1958. The highest peaks were 40 organizations in 1973 and 1980, 39 in 1979 and 1982. The slight decline at the end of the period is probably due to incomplete data, as not all of the organizations founded in the early 1990s were captured in the *Yearbook* by 2001.

Comparisons with all INGOs and with human rights INGOs. The overall pattern of RINGO foundings is generally similar to that of the full INGO population charted by Boli and Thomas (1999b: 22–3): rather rare before 1800, religious INGOs appeared in ever-growing numbers in the 19th century, declined noticeably around the times of the two great wars, and experienced unprecedented upswings after each war, achieving consistently strong growth throughout the second half of the 20th century. Like other sectors, religion globalized broadly from the 19th century onward and with exceptional intensity after World War II.

On the other hand, RINGO formation has differed in important ways from the general INGO population. Most notably, far more RINGOs appeared prior to the 19th century; as indicated above, these were mostly Catholic religious orders, discussed further below. In the 20th century, the pattern of foundings around the world wars differs in small but revealing ways. For all INGOs, the years immediately prior to each war brought sharp declines in foundings and very little INGO formation during the war years themselves. For World War I, foundings for all INGOs peaked in 1910 at 51 and nose-dived to 4 in 1915; for World War II, the peak was 33 organizations in 1937 and the valley was 8 in 1939, remaining very low until 1945. Foundings of RINGOs did not follow suit (see Figure 2). The first trough for RINGOs was earlier, 1905–7, with strongly renewed activity just before the war (11 in 1911 and 12 in 1914); the second trough was also earlier, 1933–35, with another renewal just before the war (14 in 1937, 13 in 1939). During the wars, RINGO foundings were reduced but not to nearly the same extent as for the broader INGO population, and the 1943 founding of 14 RINGOs was the third highest figure for any year to that point.

Boli and Thomas (1999b) interpret the almost complete interruption of (non-religious) INGO formation during the wars as a breakdown



Source: UIA 2001–02.

Figure 2. *Foundings of Religious INGOs, 1900–1955*

of internationalism and transnationalism; the steep declines just before the wars indicate that the breakdown was "felt" by potential INGO organizers in advance of the wars. We suggest a variant of this line of thinking regarding RINGOs, a "salvation effect" hypothesis. The early troughs in RINGO formation (six to eight years before the outbreak of major hostilities) may reflect a spiritual and attitudinal awareness of the gathering storm that put a heavy damper on RINGO foundings. However, as each impending cataclysm cast an ever darker shadow—in other words, as the apocalypse approached—it energized transnational soteriological responses intent on saving souls through millennial mobilization. This hypothesis is consistent with the predominantly Protestant and Catholic composition of RINGOs (see Figure 4 below), although it is not clearly supported by the types of organizations that appeared in the pre-war and war years. Some of these newly emerging RINGOs were dedicated to peace, ecumenicism, mutual understanding, and the like, but most had other purposes and concerns. Thus, while the distinctive character of international religious organizations is evident, more study is needed to determine how much their religious functions can explain these striking founding patterns.

Another comparison of interest is the pattern of RINGO foundings in relation to that of human rights INGOs. In the years surrounding major global action on human rights, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), and the Helsinki Accords resulting from the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE, 1975), we observe increased organizing of both religious and human rights INGOs (Brewington, 2005). Human rights INGOs thus are responding to much the same moral currents as religious INGOs (see Elliott forthcoming). Further, the peak years of RINGO formation fell around the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, in 1981. General human rights organizing dipped during this time, but foundings of human rights bodies advocating religious liberty increased markedly. Such correspondences between global events and global organizing, reflecting central processes in the operations of global civil society, have been noted in other contexts (e.g., Frank et al. 1999 on environmentalism), although much work remains to be done to sort out the causal connections between major IGO declarations and INGO activity.

The religions of religious INGOs. The foundings for different religious categories of the RINGO population, from 312 to 1994, appear in Figure 3. As the figure indicates, Catholicism was by far the dominant transnational organizing faith well into the 20th century. Protestant organizing began in earnest only in the 19th century, sustaining a modest pace from mid-century through the end of World War II; it began to outstrip Catholic organizing consistently in the years 1945–1950, by about 33% (71 Protestant organizations versus 47 Catholic organizations). Catholic INGO foundings exceeded Protestant INGOs for the last time in 1965, when the Vatican II Council ended; from 1966 through 1994, new Protestant INGOs outnumbered Catholic foundings, 477 to 172.

For non-Christian religions, INGO organizing was highly sporadic before World War II. A handful of Islamic organizations appeared before 1850, while new religions made their world debut in the mid-19th century; both categories gained only a few additional organizations in the first half of the 20th century.[3] Modern Zionism spurred the formation of Judaic INGOs (the World Zionist Federation was founded in 1897); another impetus was large-scale Jewish migration that gave rise to organizations intended to help immigrants, and Jewish women founded several early organizations, the first of which was B'nai B'rith Women (1897, now known as Jewish Women International). Ecumenical and other (mostly Eastern) RINGOs were also sparse until recently; the earliest ecumenical bodies were the International Religious Liberty Association (1888) and the Council for a Parliament of the World's Religions (1893), while the first "other" INGOs were the Pali Text Society (Buddhist, 1881) and Ramakrishna Math (Hindu, 1886).

In the era of rampant globalization after World War II, however, all non-Christian categories experienced rapid growth, with Judaism peaking in 1980 with six INGOs, Islam peaking in 1981 and 1982 with six INGOs each year, and new religions peaking at seven foundings in 1975. The other (Eastern) category grew fairly evenly through the last three decades of the period, peaking in 1987 and 1992 with five foundings each year. Ecumenical groups expanded at a slow but steady pace, reaching a sizeable number only in the 1950s as the World

[3] Earlier Buddhist orders and Hindu movements do not appear in the *Yearbook*. Their absence may reflect a Western bias in the data, but more likely it is due to their lack of a clear international orientation or presence.



N = 2431 (77.8%); Catholic = 1042 (42.9%); Protestant = 918 (37.8%); Islam = 110 (4.5%); Judaism = 102 (4.2%); Other = 91 (3.7%); New = 91 (3.7%); Ecumenical = 77 (3.2%). Percentages are calculated on total RINGOS with founding years reported.

Source: UIA 2001–02.

Figure 3. *Foundings of Religious INGOs, 312 AD to 1994, by Religion*

Council of Churches (1948) became a prominent global entity. The WCC focuses on Christian unity, having added interfaith endeavors to its agenda relatively recently; most ecumenical bodies, however, take an all-inclusive approach.

In sum, international and transnational religious organizing was for a long time the almost exclusive province of the Catholic faith. Protestant-oriented RINGOs became numerous in the 19th century, some 300 years after the Reformation, and surpassed Catholic foundings only after World War II, at which time Judaic, Islamic, new, ecumenical, and Eastern religion INGOs entered a phase of considerable growth. By the end of our period, the "religions of the book" (Christianity, Judaism, Islam) were well organized globally, with highly diverse RINGO subpopulations engaged in a wide variety of activities. Other religions have a more subdued global presence, despite their vigor and importance in the lives of their followers.

The Changing Organizational Forms of RINGOs: Secularization in the World Polity

The UIA codes INGOs by organizational form, with the "R" category indicating "religious, military and fraternal orders, and some similar bodies based on charismatic leadership or commitment to a set of religious practices". According to the UIA (2001–02), "A major reason for including this type lies in the interesting range of questions raised by the differences and similarities between orders (created over the past millennium) and many conventional organizations (created over the past century)..." The soundness of this reasoning is borne out in Figure 4, which shows the foundings of "R" RINGOS (almost all of which are Catholic religious orders) compared to foundings of all others (the great majority of which are more recent voluntary membership associations).

Religious orders were virtually the entire RINGO population before the 20th century; indeed, they were virtually the entire INGO population before the 19th century. Foundings of religious orders peaked in about 1845, just as the modern form of INGO membership organization started to appear in appreciable numbers. While religious orders showed considerable staying power through the world wars, their foundings declined greatly in the post-war period, precisely when modern international membership organizations exploded.

The sharp contrast between the decline of strictly religious bodies and the enormous increase of religion-oriented membership organizations is directly relevant to the on-going debate about secularization. Long dogma in the sociology of religion, the secularization thesis has been challenged in recent years by many scholars (for reviews see Lechner, 1991; and Warner, 1993). Chief among the criticisms of secularization theory is the continuing relevance of religion in international relations (Berger, 1999; Thomas, 2005); in Huntington's (1997) oft-discussed clash of civilizations thesis, civilizational arenas distinguished primarily by their religious identities are the central axis of future geo-political conflict (for a critique, see Lechner and Boli, 2005: Ch. 9). Scholars depict religion as both a growing source of violence and terror (Juergensmeyer, 2003) and a key social movement resource (Smith, 1996). What the data in Figure 5 suggest, however, is that discussions of religious resurgence overlook the crucial fact that the institutional nature of religion itself has changed in a secular direction. The transition from the religious order to the non-governmental membership organization is a shift from



N = 2431 (77.8%); Religious order = 783 (32.2%); Other organizations = 1648 (67.8%). Group Percentages are calculated based on number of organizations having a founding year reported.

Source: UIA 2001–02.

Figure 4. *Foundings of Religious INGOs, 312 AD to 1994, by Organizational Form*

the highly disciplined, totalistic brotherhood or sisterhood committed to working primarily for the glory of God to a voluntary, world-citizenship based modern organization pursuing rationalized progress, egalitarian universalism, and social justice (cf. Boli and Thomas, 1999b).

Weber (1946) described a similar institutional shift resulting from the advent of Christianity, which severed the traditional ties of the individual person to the "sib", i.e., the household community headed by a patriarchal figure exercising traditional authority. Bonds of community formed instead around a brother- and sisterhood of faith in the Christian God. This "neighborly" community transcended and shattered traditional barriers separating highly unequal status groups. Eventually institutionalized in extreme form in the religious orders of western Christendom, strictly Christian transnationalism dominated the global organizational field for almost two millennia, reaching its zenith in the mid-1800s: twelve religious orders were founded in 1845, the largest figure for a single year, and far more orders appeared in the 19th century than any other.

By the 20th century, the many forces impelling this-worldly concern for the problems and prospects of humanity per se, essentially autonomous from the divine power that was seen as ever less active in history (Ellul 1973), led to the institutional shift from religious order to membership organization. As with other aspects of global development, the two world wars opened the floodgates for the new institutional form, and thus the great majority of newer RINGOs champion not a god's greater glory so much as service to humanity within a god-given meaning and identity system. We therefore see the continuing rapid increase in (modern) RINGOs not as evidence of de-secularization or religious revival but as a further adaptation of religion to the dominant institutions of world society. Religious INGOs are not mainly propagating their faiths; their focus is on aiding the poor, healing the sick, supporting the marginalized, and championing the oppressed. This is the contrast between, say, the Church dogma of Thomas Aquinas and the liberation theology of Gustavo Gutiérrez, the latter being much more likely than the former to have affinity with the ideological underpinnings of modern RINGOs.[4]

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[4] Of course, many religious orders engage in this-worldly activities. We suspect that this-worldly orders account for an increasing proportion of all orders and that many have evolved to more voluntary organizational forms, thus becoming more like non-order RINGOs. Such long-term trends would further support the secularization thesis.

Another interpretive point of importance derives from the long-term domination of the RINGO organizational field by Catholic orders. Meyer et al. (1987) argue that Western Christendom formed the cultural and ideological nucleus of the emerging world polity, with the Church constituting the most important transnational organizational structure until the rise of modern INGOs and IGOs. This argument is well supported by our findings: almost all of the transnational organizations before the 19th century were Catholic-related bodies, and by the take-off period of globalization in the second half of the 19th century (Robertson 1992) they already comprised a highly differentiated organizational population active across a great many social domains.

At the same time, modern RINGOs are distinctive from other INGOs in that relatively few have truly globe-spanning memberships. While RINGOs are typically universalistic, welcoming all citizens of the world, those with global or intercontinental membership bases make up only 3.4% of all RINGOs founded before 1995; this is well below the comparable figure for INGOs of all types, 6.7%. They are also less likely to have substantial regional presence (members from many countries in a single region, e.g., Africa or Latin America); some 10.9% of RINGOs have broad regional memberships compared to 19.1% of all INGOs. Thus, RINGOs are considerably more likely than other INGOs to have members from only two or a few countries, often in a single region. This finding reflects the particularistic nature of religion. Since most religions promote a single religious path, deviations from which risk spiritual ruin, and religious adherents are highly unevenly distributed around the world, particular RINGOs find it difficult to attract members from all corners of the globe. Their universalism is, as it were, conditional—they seek members everywhere, but individuals join religiously-grounded voluntary associations of their own faiths only and RINGOs operate primarily in places where their respective faiths are well represented (with the exception of missionary and evangelistic organizations). In this sense Huntington is correct: religions reinforce divisions that undercut the centrality of humanity as a single world community, even though a great many RINGOs are fully globalized in that they see the entire world community as their arena of action.

Geographical Distribution of Memberships and Headquarters

The UIA data identify all of the countries having members (individual residents or organizations) in each RINGO but not the number of such members. For example, the 3HO Foundation, a Sikh organization, reports that it has at least one member in each of 25 countries—Canada, Chile, South Africa, and so on—but no information is available about the number of members in each country. For our purposes, then, 3HO has 25 "country-resident" memberships. Summing this figure for all of the 1,602 RINGOs with membership data yields a total of 39,157 country-resident memberships, an average of 24.4 per RINGO. Table 2 provides basic information about the distribution of these country-resident memberships, grouping countries by continents.

The totals at the right side of Table 2 show, not surprisingly, that Europe is the dominant geographic region for RINGO country-resident memberships, with nearly one-third of the total. Less expected is the share for residents of North America—only 957, or 4% of the total country-resident memberships, of which the USA accounts for just over 2%. This is much less than one would predict in relation to the USA's inordinate political, economic, and military capacities, and it is even well below the USA's share of world population (about 5%). Also surprising is Africa's 8,765 country-resident memberships (22% of the total), given the relatively poor and peripheral status of most African countries. Sizeable shares of country-resident memberships are also held by Central and South America (15%) and Asia (16%). These numbers suggest that residents of the less developed countries are highly active participants in RINGOs, and they are consistent with the finding by Boli et al. (1999) that the less developed regions of the world have substantially increased their shares of memberships in all INGOs throughout the post-war period.

The rows in Table 2 show the proportion of each continent's country-resident memberships for each religious category. For example, 43% of Europe's memberships are in Catholic RINGOs, 35% in Protestant, and only 2% in Islamic organizations. Given the preponderance of Catholic and Protestant RINGOs overall, every region's memberships are primarily in such organizations, but some disproportions are worth noting. Latin American memberships are the most disproportionately Catholic, but still only modestly so (50%, versus 43% overall); Oceania has the most disproportionate share for Protestant bodies (45% versus

Table 2. *Country-Resident Memberships in Religious INGOs, by Continent*

	Catholic		Protestant		Ecumenical		Islam		Judaism		New		Other		Totals	
Europe	5380	*43%*	4441	*35%*	399	*3%*	211	*2%*	702	*6%*	890	*7%*	561	*4%*	12584	***32%***
N America	789	*46%*	562	*33%*	35	*2%*	39	*2%*	90	*5%*	113	*7%*	86	*5%*	1714	***4%***
C & S America	3832	*47%*	3055	*38%*	175	*2%*	40	*0%*	287	*4%*	509	*6%*	243	*3%*	8141	***21%***
Africa	3782	*43%*	3696	*42%*	201	*2%*	317	*4%*	98	*1%*	463	*5%*	208	*2%*	8765	***22%***
Asia	2257	*37%*	2299	*38%*	169	*3%*	363	*6%*	131	*2%*	493	*8%*	382	*6%*	6094	***16%***
Oceania	638	*34%*	839	*45%*	66	*4%*	35	*2%*	59	*3%*	147	*8%*	75	*4%*	1859	***5%***
Totals	16678	***43%***	14892	***38%***	1045	***3%***	1005	***3%***	1367	***3%***	2615	***7%***	1555	***4%***	39157	

Source: UIA 2001–2002

38%), while Africa is especially likely to have Islamic memberships (6%, versus 3% overall). On the other hand, Islam is especially underrepresented in Latin America and Oceania and Judaism is underrepresented in Asia and Africa. These figures reinforce the finding that believers usually join only those RINGOs affiliated with their particular faiths. Yet it is also noteworthy that ecumenical and new religion memberships are rather evenly distributed across continents, and even other/Eastern memberships are fairly well dispersed. On the whole, we see broader participation in the different categories of RINGOs than we expected, another indicator of the high degree of globalization of religion in the contemporary world.

The distribution of RINGO headquarters (Table 3) tells a different story: they are heavily concentrated in the developed world. Europe hosts 51% of all headquarters, while North America's share is 28% and the USA alone hosts about 25%. Still, despite the relative paucity of resources and expertise in much of Asia, Africa, and Central and South America, these continents host 9%, 5%, and 5% of headquarters respectively. One might expect that even fewer organizations would locate their headquarters in these places.

Turning to headquarters distribution within religious categories, Europe is highly overrepresented for Catholic RINGOs, boosted especially by the large numbers for Italy and the Vatican. North America (the USA) is especially likely to host Protestant organizations, as is Africa (where Nigeria, Kenya, Lesotho, and South Africa are prominent hosts). Asia and Africa are overrepresented for Muslim headquarters, as expected, and Asia's disproportionate share of Judaic bodies is due to Israel alone. One surprise here is the disproportionate share of ecumenical organizations based in Latin America and Oceania; another is the modest overrepresentation of headquarters for new religion INGOs in Latin America and Asia. RINGOs affiliated with other/Eastern religions, of course, are especially likely to locate in Asia.

In sum, the data on country-resident memberships and headquarters suggest that, like proselytizing activities, religious culture flows mainly from the developed world to developing nations but overall RINGO membership participation is widely dispersed and not as dominated by the developed countries as one would expect. Further, these flows are often reversed as immigrants bring back to the West versions of Christianity that have been reworked with African, Latin American, or Asian cultural tools, thereby altering the religious landscape of the West (Levitt, 2004; Yang and Ebaugh, 2001). This phenomenon is

Table 3. *Headquarters Locations of Religious INGOs, by Continent*

	Catholic		Protestant		Ecumenical		Islam		Judaism		New		Other		Totals	
Europe	1028	*58%*	516	*29%*	51	*3%*	38	*2%*	44	*2%*	41	*2%*	43	*2%*	1761	***51%***
N America	196	*20%*	547	*57%*	33	*3%*	24	*3%*	49	*5%*	64	*7%*	47	*5%*	960	***28%***
C & S America	80	*48%*	62	*37%*	6	*4%*	0	*0%*	5	*3%*	8	*5%*	5	*3%*	166	***5%***
Africa	53	*28%*	102	*55%*	3	*2%*	17	*9%*	3	*2%*	2	*1%*	7	*4%*	187	***5%***
Asia	57	*19%*	95	*31%*	6	*2%*	51	*17%*	40	*13%*	14	*5%*	39	*13%*	302	***9%***
Oceania	18	*26%*	36	*52%*	4	*6%*	0	*0%*	5	*7%*	2	*3%*	4	*6%*	69	***2%***
Totals	1432	***42%***	1358	***39%***	103	***3%***	130	***4%***	146	***4%***	131	***4%***	145	***4%***	3445	

Source: UIA 2001–2002

common in most large cities of the West, and it reflects the vitality of non-native religious movements in all parts of the world (on Pentecostalism, see Lechner and Boli, 2005: Ch. 8). Amassing ever greater religious resources, the less developed world will surely increase its shares of memberships and headquarters in coming decades as the RINGO population continues to expand.

Conclusion

Religious INGOs, above all organizations tied to the Catholic Church, led the way in transnational and global organizing. They were also crucial early contributors to what would eventually coalesce as world culture; for example, they led the way in promoting the universal sacrality and dignity of the individual through their efforts to end slavery in the 19th century (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and their engagement in relief and development efforts in poor countries in the early 20th century (Mei 2003). Like secular INGOs, they enact numerous world cultural principles in their dedication to development, poverty alleviation, education, and many other essentially non-religious goals; unlike secular INGOs, they also put matters of religious belief, salvation, or enlightenment high on their transnational agendas. Thus, their concern for the welfare of individuals, families, ethnic and national groups, and so on, is both this-worldly and transcendent. They make full use of modern material and symbolic technologies, publishing evangelistic literature and conference proceedings, piloting aircraft filled with relief supplies, designing edifices with engineering know-how, and building bridges between different religious traditions. Their growth over the last 150 years mirrors in many ways the growth of all INGOs, with a "take-off" period in the latter half of the 19th century, interruptions related to the world wars, and explosive growth after World War II. Although RINGOs have a much longer history than secular INGOs, they have largely completed the transition from a predominance of Catholic religious orders to a highly differentiated population of voluntary membership organizations, becoming ever more like their secular counterparts in their aims, activities, and operations.

What distinguishes RINGOs from the larger INGO population, then, is that they also, but not always primarily, enact the "pure" religious functions of proselytizing to gain new adherents and nurturing individual souls, while politicking for religious liberty at both the national

and global levels. Their soteriological concerns especially set them apart from secular INGOs during the world wars, which completely disrupted secular INGO formation but sparked renewed (Christian) RINGO formation after sharp declines preceding the outbreak of hostilities. The post-war period of enormous growth entailed a sharp relative decline in Catholicism's share of the RINGO population as Protestant bodies came to the fore and increasing numbers of Islamic, Jewish, ecumenical, and new religious organizations stepped onto the transnational stage. Overall, however, western Christendom continues to dominate the RINGO population, with Judaism being strongly represented as well. Some of the other world religions—Buddhism, Orthodox Christianity, Hinduism—have a modest RINGO presence, while others (Sikhism, Shintoism, Confucianism, and Taoism) are all but absent from this global organizational field.

The lopsided religious distribution of RINGOs implies that Christian concerns dominate the religious segment of the global public sphere. A revealing illustration arose in October, 2006, when Abdul Rahman, the Christian convert whose threatened execution prompted so much activity by religious and other INGOs earlier in the year, again became a global news item. A group of armed Afghanis kidnapped Italian photojournalist Gabriele Torsello and sought to exchange him for Rahman. Although the Pope publicly prayed for Torsello's release, none of the Christian RINGOs that had mobilized on Rahman's behalf took up Torsello's case, probably because Torsello was a Muslim convert. Only one religious NGO became engaged, the national Union of Italian Islamic Communities and Organisations, whose voice joined those of secular bodies like Reporters Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists in seeking Torsello's release. Torsello's case involved no perceived threat to Christendom; accordingly, his eventual release was a much less prominent event in the global news media.

Seen more broadly, RINGOs represent a bifurcation in the global public sphere, mirroring the secular world in numerous ways and assuming organizational forms that are increasingly similar to secular INGOs but basing their endeavors on underlying Weltanschauungen that often are in tension with predominantly secular world culture—and with one another. Generated by and contributing to globalization, they bring their religious commitments to universalistic this-worldly activities that resemble those of secular INGOs while also seeking to spread their particularistic spiritual beliefs to all of humanity. They thereby

contribute substantially to the on-going differentiation of the world polity and the complex richness of world culture.

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'RELIGION' IN GLOBAL CULTURE: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AN INCREASINGLY SELF-CONSCIOUS WORLD

James V. Spickard

Globalization involves much more than our newfound ability to telephone friends on the other side of the world. It involves more than the complex network of trade relations that bring coffee and tea to our breakfast tables. It even involves more than the interconnected financial markets that let us use our credit cards in Timbuktu but can collapse with worldwide repercussions, as they did in Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, or in the U.S. tech stock crash of 2001. As significant as these links are, they are only part of the global picture. These connections both support and depend on an increasingly globalized culture—one that imagines the world much differently than was the case in previous eras. In this chapter I shall explore certain aspects of this emerging global culture, focusing on the role that religions have played and are playing in it. This role is not one-sided, as global culture shapes today's religions as much as it is shaped by them.

Let me start by noting what I do *not* mean by 'global culture'. I do not mean the rise of the Internet, the spread of hip-hop and rock music to all corners of the globe, the Davos World Economic Forum, and so on. Although technology, art, and interlocking economic elites are all aspects of our globalized world, they are not the level of culture that I believe salient. To an anthropologist, culture is a communal matter. It involves a group's core outlook on the world as it manifests itself in daily living. It consists of that group's root assumptions about the world. This includes the ways in which these assumptions generate both the taken-for-granted rules for living and the 'things everyone knows' about a given social scene.

What distinguishes the global era from others is the spread of certain cultural assumptions worldwide. It is not just that we connect (or don't connect) with one another, listen (or don't listen) to the same music, and watch (or don't watch) the same mass entertainment. More importantly, we share core ideas—ones that our various ancestors would have found strange.

- Among other things, we observe that people throughout the world increasingly see themselves as individuals. They see themselves as having individual 'rights', whether or not they can articulate these at any depth. Furthermore, they see *everyone* as having such rights, no matter to which government they owe allegiance. These rights are seen as 'universal'—a result of being human, nothing more.
- Among these rights is the right to 'place'—a right to citizenship in one or another locality. This locality is typically a nation, but it can also, for some, be a tribe, a clan, or a region. Many people see themselves as having 'ethnic' ties to these nations, tribes, or clans, and they see these ties as being somehow primordial. To use Michael Ignatieff's (1993) phrase, "blood and belonging" are seen to go together, especially in the nationalist violence that has wracked much of the world in recent years. The notion that 'they've been fighting for hundreds of years' has much cachet today, if little reality.
- Interestingly, people simultaneously see themselves as global citizens, part of a common humanity-at-large that shares an essential status as rights-bearing human beings—including the right to associate with others of like ethnicity. The dual notion that everyone is simultaneously a citizen of a nation-state, often an ethnically based one, and also a world citizen is something new.
- Also new is the idea that all people have (or don't have) a religion, and that they have (or ought to have) a certain kind of relationship to this religion (or non-religion). Specifically, 'religion' is something in which people are supposed to believe and to whose organizations they are supposed to belong.
- Until recently, Euro-American intellectuals argued that religions would fade as world society grew more technical and scientific. This is now questioned, but such elites still assume that religion is more strongly held by 'less-developed' peoples.
- Religious people claim that religion should be a center-point that orients people's lives. Even those who oppose religious conflict in such places as Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Gujarat, see that conflict as somehow 'natural'—as an outgrowth of deeply held religious loyalty. And they, by-and-large, see the loyalty (though not the conflict) as a good thing, the perversions of which only education and strong government can overcome.
- In some situations, 'religious' ties act just like 'ethnic' ones. 'Shiite' versus 'Sunni' in Iraq presents itself as an ethnic conflict, for example,

> and is popularly regarded as similarly primordial. The Bosnian civil war presented itself as an ethnic conflict, but the prime line of division was in fact religious—given that skin color, language, dress, or other external markers could not differentiate Serb from Croat from Bosniac. (Ethnically-based death squads often identified their victims by asking what prayers they had learned as children.)

The naturalness of rights, ethnicity, and religion are so commonly accepted today that they are hardly noticed, except by scholars. True, these things are a bit different from one another. All people are seen as having rights, but they do not necessarily share either the same ethnicity or the same religion. Although the *content* of their ethnicity differs, however, most people—at least those who are connected to the international socio-economy, influenced by mass media, and so on—believe that ethnicity is an inevitable human attribute and they pretty much share the same idea of what it is.[1] Similarly, though they may belong to different religions, or to no religion at all, most people also share a sense of what religion is and how it can command allegiance.

When Roland Robertson (1992) notes that global economic integration has not been matched by an equivalent global cultural integration, he is not arguing that we don't share notions such as rights, ethnicity, and religion. He is pointing out that, through migration and trade, people with different identities, skin colors, values, and views mingle on a level not seen since late Roman times. Despite their differences, these minglers share certain core outlooks: they see themselves as individuals, with individual rights, and they also see themselves as at least somewhat integrated into ethnic, national, or religious groups. They expect people to have different ethnic and religious identities, and to hold them with varying degrees of certitude. Furthermore, they believe that people have a right to these identities, at least in their private lives. Only outlaw regimes practice forced conversions.

[1] Dominant ethnic groups sometimes have to be reminded that they possess ethnicity. In the United States, for example, one of the main goals of the multicultural consulting industry has been to show Northern White Anglos that their accustomed ways of doing things are as particularistic as are the cultural practices of urban Blacks, New Mexican Hispanos, working-class Chicago Poles, or Southern 'Crackers'. This industry's success demonstrates my point, as does the industry's (countervailing) assertion that everyone must be treated as an individual rather than as a member of a group. Both ideas are core contemporary cultural assumptions.

If, at the level of content, we do not share much global culture, we thus share quite a bit at the level of form. The first task I have set for this chapter is to outline how religion has aided such ideas' growth, as well as the role that such ideas have played in shaping contemporary religion. My second task will be to examine the quasi-religious nature of some of these ideas—and the social consequences of such quasi-religiosity. (Space forces me to be brief on all counts.)

Imagining a World Community

Benedict Anderson (1991) charts a major shift in socio-political imagination that occurred during the modern era. Beginning with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, but not fully implemented in Europe until after World War I (and even later in the rest of the world), this shift involved a rethinking of the notion of 'sovereignty'. Before Westphalia, sovereignty was multiple and overlapping. A person living in the Rhine valley, for example, might owe certain duties and taxes to the local prince, others to the local free city ('free' because it was not under the prince's rule), and yet others to the local bishop (who usually possessed temporal as well as ecclesiastical power). Rather than being strictly bounded, these sovereignties should be thought of as overlapping circles. As Anderson puts it, in pre-modern Europe, "the fundamental conceptions about 'social groups' were centripetal and hierarchical, rather than boundary-oriented and horizontal" (p. 15). Any one individual divided his or her allegiance among several superiors, depending on how extensive or limited was each superior's reach. Superiors received their due, in so far as their power made it so.

Westphalia changed all this by enunciating a new principle of socio-political life: that each state would have precisely one sovereign who would command the full allegiance of all those living within certain borders. 'The state' became the institution tasked with political sovereignty; 'the church' was relegated to sovereignty over souls. The state encouraged residents to see themselves as 'subjects' to a single ruler. The 17th and 18th century revolutions later shifted this to an image of 'citizens', whose mutual citizenship became a tie that replaced family, kinship, and even religion as the source of community. Anderson shows how specific technical innovations—print capitalism, the national museum, maps and censuses—further imagined this citizenship as one of ethnic nationhood, not merely governmental allegiance. Each 'people', having

one language, one history, one ethnicity, and one culture, should have one state of its own.[2] Michael Ignatieff (1993) shows the role that such ethnic nationalism has played in recent history—a fate that has been largely avoided by those early states, such as the U.S. and France, which continued to imagine themselves as civic communities.

The key idea here is the relationship between concrete social practices and the nature of the connection people feel with one another. Massimo d'Azeglio, one of Cavour's ministers, is supposed to have remarked, "We have created Italy; now all we need to do is to create Italians".[3] The French state forged unity among the disparate peoples inhabiting 'the Hexagon' by imposing a common language and a centralized education system (Hobsbawm 1992b); so elsewhere have elites used various practical tools to create a felt sense of national ties. Not all of these have involved manufactured ethnicity (Hobsbawm 1992a; Bauman 1992), but many have. Anderson shows how this European project spread worldwide:

> From World War I on, the legitimate international norm was the nation-state.... The new states of the post-World-War II period...took from linguistic European nationalism its ardent populism, and from official nationalism its Russifying policy-orientation.... One sees both a genuine, popular nationalistic enthusiasm and a systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, the educational system, administrative regulations, and so forth. (Anderson, 1991: 113–14)

The irony here is obvious: European ideas about what constitutes a 'nation' are now embraced worldwide. They are no longer the property of European culture, but are now part of global culture—part of the entire world's accustomed way of seeing things. For those who hold them, these ideas make sense of recent 'ethnic' violence in places like Bosnia, Rwanda and Iraq. How can 'different' groups, who are divided

[2] Robert Borofsky (2000) points out that anthropology's famous four-field paradigm (linguistic, physical, cultural, archaeology) parallels this 19th-century image of the nation (shared language, race, culture, history) and is thus a part of the same ideological apparatus.

[3] Among other things, some 30 different languages (not dialects) were spoken within the new state's borders. Most are Romance languages, but many are related to Greek, German, Slavic, and Albanian. Many of the Romance languages are closer to French and Spanish than to modern Italian (which was based on the Tuscan dialect). France, by the way, still hosts over 20 native languages—not counting those spoken by immigrants. (Gordon, 2005)

by language, culture, 'blood', and/or religion, be expected to identify with the same political community? Is it not 'natural' that they are at each other's throats?

In reality, so-called ethnic conflict is not primordial. Primordialist ideology says that ethnicity and culture go together; so different ethnic groups would have different views of the world, including different views of the nature and importance of ethnicity. Some groups would think ethnicity is important while others do not. Instead, global culture expects everyone to have a dominant ethnicity and also to be part of an ethnic community that deserves its own state. There is no room for difference here.

This is not, however, the only global expectation governing state formation and behavior. Alongside the global belief that ethnic communities and states go together, stands a global belief that each individual human being possesses certain inalienable rights, particularly those found in the 1948 United Nations Declaration. As is well-known, this document lists two types of rights. The first are the political and civil rights enshrined in European and American constitutions: to life, liberty, freedom of speech, religion, and so on. These are individual rights—rights that are vested in persons *qua* persons, especially rights *vis-à-vis* the state. The second are the social and economic rights promoted by the former Soviet bloc—the right to meaningful work, to education, to social support in old age, to organize unions, etc. These rights connect people to each other, usually with state aid. The right to an education, for example, is something that a government is supposed to provide, while that same government is supposed to avoid suppressing individual religious choice. The logical conflict between first and second-generation human rights has taken many forms in the last 60 years.

I have elsewhere argued that these two types of rights complement each other in the context of globalization (Spickard, 1994; Spickard, 2002: 234–36). To the extent that our interconnected global society depends on individual initiative, and especially on individuals' ability to develop their personal skills to the fullest, that society implicitly supports individuals' rights to be different from each other. The U.N. Declaration of Human Rights merely enumerates the civil and political rights that make this possible. This same global society simultaneously depends, however, on its interconnections—the globe-spanning ties that make economic globalization work. To the degree that governments protect individuals' rights to education, meaningful employment, social

support, and so on, they affirm mutual social responsibility. This is the moral analogue of global social interconnectedness. First- and second-generation human rights are not so divided after all.

The fact remains, however, that only first-generation human rights have reached iconic cultural status, at least in the West. America's Bush Administration, for example, has had to hide its violations of international statutes on the treatment of prisoners, on the rights of the accused, and so on, behind claims of exigency—something that it has not had to do with its shredding of the U.S. social safety net. No American dares to claim that only the wealthy have a right to a fair trial, a right to religious freedom, or a right to free speech; that would be unacceptable. On the other hand, it seems to be perfectly legitimate, at least in the American public eye, to limit education, old-age security, food, health care, and so on to those who can afford it on their own. Put more abstractly, current international culture recognizes the legitimacy of individual rights more than it recognizes the responsibilities entailed by social connections. To use a religious metaphor, first-generation rights are still holy, while second-generation rights are not—or at least not yet. (I shall return to this below.)

The Role of Religion

What role has religion played in these imaginings? How did religion help us get from the multiply particular world that existed roughly before Columbus to the more unified cultural world in which we now live? Several pathways present themselves.

Instrumentally, Christian elites were heavily involved in the Euro-American colonial enterprise—sometimes as critics, but more often as fellow travelers. The so-called 'Whiteman's burden' called for social and spiritual uplift, alongside the economic. Missions played a part throughout the colonies, even in Belgium, that most exploitative of imperial outposts (Hochschild, 1999). To the degree that our globalized world is the successor to a colonial one, then Western religious personnel aided its creation.

Western religions provided more than staff, however; they also provided content. Alongside Christianity (in its various incarnations), missionary elites saw themselves as carrying European enlightenment into the 'heathen darkness'. From the Caribbean to New Guinea, from the Himalayas to South Africa, missions introduced core Euro-American

cultural ideals that were inseparable from religion in their minds. The notion that people should follow individual conscience rather than blindly following native custom, for example, was a staple of mission-based education, as was the idea of a transcendent God, who called individuals to dedicate their lives to higher purposes. As anthropologist Mary Douglas (1970) has noted, Western definitions of religion are not culturally universal. A good many of the world's peoples had nothing corresponding to the 19th century European notion of religion as a transcendent life-sphere, grounded in strongly-held beliefs and supporting core life-values. She notes that humans' relationships with their gods can be crass and manipulative just as easily as they can be uplifting. Western missions were part of the intellectual process that gave global culture a new notion of what religion should be.

Peter Beyer makes a similar point, in noting that "the modern sense of what counts as religion . . . is a product of a relatively recent, highly selective, and somewhat arbitrary historical (re)construction" (2003a:334). In his account, Western religious scholars looked at other parts of the world and saw things that looked like our post-Reformation Christianities; they named these 'religions'. Those that did not look so much like Euro-American Christianity, they labeled 'superstitions' or 'cults'.[4]

To some degree this was a political process, one that involved non-Western elites as well. Indian nationalists, for example, reacted to the British missionaries' claim that India had no 'high religion' by shaping 'Hinduism' from the welter of old texts, priesthoods, and forms of temple worship. See, they said: we, too, have a 'world religion' (Dalmia and von Stietencron, 1995). Eastern and Western intellectuals similarly shaped 'Buddhism' from a jumble of popular practices, creating, in the process, more a mirror of their own concerns than a separable religious entity (Tamney 1992). The attempt to construct a similar Chinese 'religion' foundered on the response of Chinese intellectuals that China did not have any indigenous *zongjiao*—'sectarian teaching' (Overmyer and Adler, 2005)—a term that fit their reading of what the Christian missionaries had brought them. Ironically, this solidified a cross-cultural definition of religion—one modeled on the religions of the West. It was the exception that proved the rule (Beyer, 2003b: 174–77).[5]

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[4] Meredith McGuire (2003) describes the Reformations-era definitional shifts that shaped the new Christianities in both Europe and America.

[5] Late-20th century religious scholars more successfully constructed 'shamanism' as a cross-culturally coherent means by which tribal peoples interacted with the spirit

Mission education had other, more practical consequences. It gave (some) natives the skills, firstly, to staff positions in the colonial service and, later, to lead independence movements—transcendent callings *par excellence*. These movements were based on other (learned) Western principles, especially those of national self-determination and the right of democratic self-government. Indeed, the newly independent states of the post-World War II period embodied Western assumptions about the nature of political life, the relationship between statehood and ethnicity, and the rights of the governed—even in situations, such as post-colonial Africa, where ethnic conflict was justifiably seen as a danger. In short, missions and missionaries did not just spread Christianity (even where they succeeded in doing so); they also spread the now-global cultural imaginings mentioned earlier in this chapter.

The Western way of imagining religion posited a universal 'religious sphere', to which all societies must somehow respond. Scholars as well as missionaries saw this sphere as foundational, because Christianity claimed to be the ground of life, and also to be transcendent, because Christianity claimed to transcend life. Based on their own history of religious wars, Westerners encoded religious freedom in their constitutions. As the world left the colonial age, this freedom was added to various international documents: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and so on. Thus 'religions' came to be seen as more than a Western product, but something basic to human life, not to be denied. In short, Beyer argues, though there was once no universal image of 'religion', there is one now. Where it was originally a result of Western political and ideological imperialism, it has outlasted that origin.[6]

The point is, people in most parts of the world now treat 'religion' as a natural, if transcendent, part of human existence—even while holding different attitudes toward its value. Religion thus not only shaped global

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world—e.g. Smith (1991)—a success made possible both by the difficulty tribal peoples have in organizing politico-intellectual opposition and by the cachet that having their own 'world religion' gives to the relatively powerless.

[6] Beyer (2003b: 172–77) also notes that some societies view religion with suspicion, precisely because of its transcendent claims to human loyalty. The Chinese Communist Party, for example, "acknowledged both the legitimacy of the category of religion while also considering it to be problematic" (p. 176). Both China and Japan treat "religion as something other than the necessary foundation for a meaningful world, the good society, and the good person" (p. 177).

culture, it was (ideologically) reshaped by it. As in the colonial era, the post-colonial intellectual world still clothes itself in Western weeds.[7]

Rights as 'Religious' Ideals

Sociologists have notoriously argued over the applicability of religious concepts to non-religious or quasi-religious phenomena. The issue is not so much whether 'civil religions', political ideologies, popular culture, and so on are or are not themselves religious, but whether the concepts that scholars have developed for analyzing religions can help us understand such phenomena. Without opening the question of whether contemporary human rights and ethnic nationalist ideologies are really 'religions', what can religious analysis tell us about them?

Let us start with human rights. I already mentioned the first two generations of human rights: civil and political rights (as enshrined in Western constitutions) and economic, social, and cultural rights (supported by Europe's social democracies). A third set—the rights of socio-cultural groups—has been proposed as a new generation of rights, largely to protect various indigenous peoples, linguistic minorities, and so on. Finding their cultures, resources, and even lives threatened by outsiders, such groups seek either sovereignty or 'self-determination' within the boundaries of existing states. They proclaim their 'human right' to this sovereignty, though this right is so far recognized in few international agreements.

I have elsewhere argued (Spickard, 2002: 231–34) that each of these three generations of rights sacralizes a different aspect of our current global situation. Civil and political rights treat individuals as sacred, protecting them against state oppression. This corresponds to the increasingly important role that individual knowledge-workers play in the global economy. Unlike past economies, which were based largely on farming, manufacturing, or resource extraction, knowledge is now a factor of production (Bensman and Vidich, 1971). Technical expertise makes global production possible; it also makes transportation and

[7] For various approaches to this process, see Chidester (1996), Masuzawa (2005), and, above all, Smith (1982).

marketing work on a scale heretofore inconceivable.[8] Our economy is subject to significant inequalities (Ehrenreich, 2001; Shipler, 2004), but they are not the same inequalities that typified the eras of landed or industrial wealth. Land and money can be sequestered rather easily; education and skill cannot. Our complex, world-spanning division of labor rewards highly differentiated individuals; each possessing special combinations of skills. Though these workers are a minority, they are the minority on which all else depends. Given that anyone could, in principle, be valuable in this way, it makes sense for us to sacralize such individuality, for, by doing so, we honor the principles that make our own (collective) lives possible. As sacred symbols, individual human rights provide the ideological underpinning for a global social system that depends on individuals' skills. Religious analysis tells us to learn from what people hold sacred. Sacred individuality corresponds to a core part of our contemporary world.

As noted above, second-generation human rights focus on the economic and social ties that connect people to one another. The 'rights' to meaningful work, to education, to old-age assistance, to join unions, and so on affirm these connections. They remind us of our interdependence. Pure individualism forgets that connection is just as important to our global economy as are differentiated persons. How better to symbolize the globe-spanning networks that make that economy work than by portraying them as positive rights that no person should be denied? Neo-liberal ideology, of course, plays down such connections, as it plays down state-sponsored social supports, efforts to limit economic inequality, and so on. The fact that some countries treat these 'rights' as aspirations, not as absolutes, is a good indication of what their elites do, and don't, regard as sacred. Yet there is enough conflict over our collective social responsibilities to remind us that elites do not speak for everyone, certainly not in the developed West. The vehemence of that conflict—for example, between American self-proclaimed 'conservatives' and 'progressives'—tells us that competing visions of the sacred are at work. Though currently trailing neo-liberalism, the push for second-generation human rights is still in the race.

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[8] Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000), for example, note the importance of computer technology to the contemporary garment industry.

Taken broadly, first- and second-generation human rights symbolize two pillars of our emerging global social order: its reliance on individuals and its reliance on their interconnections. As a compressed symbol, the idea of 'human rights' thus stands for that order. Durkheim would have had no trouble understanding the reverence with which such symbols are held.

In this context, so-called 'group rights' seem counter-intuitive. Emphasizing groups seems to belittle both individuals and globe-spanning connections. It seems to elevate the local over the global. Are group rights really a protest against the social implications of globalization? Are they counter-cyclic efforts to return to an imagined past, in which people were imbedded in their local communities and those communities gave their members a secure sense of identity? Are they like the religious fundamentalisms[9] that many accuse of similarly imagining a return to past security? Or is something else going on?

When I wrote about this topic a few years ago, I thought the movement for group rights had both pro- and anti-systemic implications. I distinguished the structural implications of first- and second-generation rights from the cultural implications of this (proposed) third generation. As I put it then:

> *Structural* globalization makes *cultural* localism possible precisely because it makes *economic* localism irrelevant.... Group membership (and the rhetoric of group membership) arguably serves as a counterweight to a feared massification and isolation, while not actually decreasing global integration. Localistic ideologies can thus fill globalization's cultural void. (Spickard, 2002: 233)

I am no longer sure that this is true. Exploring third-generation human rights in the context of resurgent ethnic nationalism—read at the level of ideology—now seems to me to paint a more complex picture.

Ethnic Conflict and the Culture of 'Group Rights'

Ethnic conflicts seem to fall into two camps, which vary not by their level of violence but by their position in the world economic system

[9] Clearly, there is no single 'fundamentalism' in the modern world (Cohen, 1990; Marty and Appleby, 1991; Antoun, 2001). I use this term as shorthand for religions that imagine themselves adhering militantly to tradition in the face of perceived secular hostility. See Jenkins (2002). See below.

(Wallerstein, 2004; cf. Chirot, 1977). Both involve shifts in the role of the state, though not in the same way.

The most peaceful, not to say the most tractable, of these conflicts take place within countries that stand at the core of the global economy. Belgium's Flemish and Walloons, Spain's Catalans, the U.K.'s Scots and Welsh, and Canada's Québécois have sought (and gained) a measure of socio-political autonomy vis-à-vis their respective states without violence, though not without hard feeling. France's Occitans agitate for minority status, mostly by reviving their language and re-imaging the late-medieval ascetic Cathars as freedom fighters against Parisian aggression.

Here, group identity seems as I had previously described it: as a cultural localism, made possible precisely because true economic localism is not up for discussion. The economic integration of Europe, for example, makes the state less relevant as the chief unit of economic activity (Goddard *et al.*, 1994). Identities can thus shift more freely. There seems little point in continuing to organize governance along the line that used to divide, say, the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) from the Free Provinces (Netherlands)—a Catholic south versus a (mostly) Protestant north—when religion has lost much of its salience to both camps. The Dutch/French language division affects life more directly, and the EU makes the choice of political dividing lines less weighty. To the degree that activists can convince people that a change lacks costs while rectifying perceived inequities, then soft ethnic nationalism can rule.

Not all ethnic conflicts in core countries are so balanced, but the opportunities opened up by growing globalization favor local identification. Some American Indian tribes, for example, have become rich by building gambling casinos—an ironic reversal of their previous impoverishment at the hands of bead-and-whiskey-wielding White traders. Where once they lost their land, they now take White folks' dough. Rights-language, both individual and group, supports this irony, precisely because America can afford such localism. It does not threaten the big picture.

Conflicts in the global system's semi-peripheral and peripheral regions have been more deadly. The former Yugoslavia imploded, in part, because of its semi-peripheral economic status, and in part because of real developmental differences between its constituent provinces. As the Titoist state collapsed, agitators framed the economic crisis as a matter of ethnic liberation, hoping thereby to capture whatever state power

remained (Silber and Little, 1994). Milosevic and Tudjman both succeeded, at least for a time, at the cost of two Serb-Croat wars. People found themselves forced to identify with their purported ethnic group rather than with their ideals, their families, their occupations, or any of the other dimensions that they had previously enjoyed (Ignatieff 1993: 25). Tekle Woldemikael (1993; 2005) has pointed out that war is one means by which ethnicity is made salient, and the memories of war fuel future inter-group conflict. This was certainly the case in Yugoslavia, where self-identified 'Yugoslavs' were systematically pushed to ally themselves with one or another of the exclusive 'nationalities' into which the country collapsed (Sekulic *et al.*, 1994).

It is hard to equate this conflict with the cultural localism noted above. Yet semi-peripheral ethnic nationalism merely pursues the 19th century European dream of one 'people', one state (Llobera, 1994). Core countries defined themselves ethnically, so why should not those seeking to join the core do so as well? The fact that core countries can now indulge ethnic localism may lead poorer peoples to imitate what they think is the path to development. The self-determination of ethnic states—the logical outcome of 'group rights'—seems to outsiders to be a path to success. The reality is a good deal more brutal. As Michael Ignatieff writes:

> Nationalism . . . is a language of fantasy and escape. In many cases—Serbia is a flagrant example—nationalist politics is a full-scale, collective escape from the realities of social backwardness. Instead of facing up to the reality of being a poor, primitive, third-rate economy on the periphery of Europe, it is infinitely more attractive to listen to speeches about the heroic and tragic Serbian destiny and to fantasize about the final defeat of her historic enemies. (1993: 245)

In such a context, 'group rights' are dangerous—both to those against whom the rights are claimed and to those who think the claims will bring them a better life. Only the demagogues profit.

If the dream of ethnic nationhood is dangerous in the world's semi-periphery, it is doubly so in peripheral locales. In Rwanda, Afghanistan, post-invasion Iraq, Somalia, and other failed states, opportunistic struggle often uses ethnicity or quasi-ethnicity as an operating metaphor. In Rwanda, for example, Belgian colonialists transformed a native class division into an ethnic one, creating 'Tutsi' and 'Hutu' as primary identity categories (Fenton, 1996; Prunier, 1995). Post-independence politics accentuated these lines, producing first a civil war and then genocide

(Gourevitch 1998). The fact that the killers targeted moderate Hutus as well as Tutsis belies the supposed ethnic nature of the conflict, but there is no doubt that ethnicity now provides the intellectual frame for events. As Ignatieff wisely writes after his investigation of Croat-Serb conflicts: "So often, it seemed to me, the violence happened first, and the nationalist excuses came afterwards." (1993: 244).

As I write this, Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis are fighting a civil war, guerrilla-style, which is similarly reported as 'ethnic' in the American press. Religious differences that were not, in fact, terribly salient for centuries now determine who bombs whom—and who retaliates. Iraq's actual 'ethnic' division, between Arabs and Kurds, is not currently its most deadly. American troops seem unable to stop the violence, and many doubt that anyone else can either.

The important fact here is not the mistake of framing these conflicts as 'ethnic' rather than class-based, in the Rwandan case, or religious, in the Iraqi one. Instead, both illustrate the self-fulfilling nature of the current global cultural imagination. Our world thinks in terms of 'ethnicity' and so reads intra-state conflicts as ethnic conflicts. We can imagine wars between states (Iran vs. Iraq, Iraq vs. Kuwait, Vietnam vs. Cambodia, etc.), but we can scarcely imagine wars *within* states along any but ethnic lines. This is one aspect of the global culture that we all share.

Things were different thirty years ago. Then world culture took Marxist ideas more seriously, and intra-state warfare was usually interpreted along class lines. In Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru, for example, rural rebellions presented themselves as class-based, and were so interpreted by intellectuals (Debray, 1967; Stern, 1998). Only later were they widely reinterpreted as Indian movements against ethnic oppression.

Why this shift in framework? What does the growing salience of ethnicity on the world stage tell us about global culture?

A key, I think, is the decline of the state, especially at the margins of the global economic system, and the growing importance there of sub-state identity to people's survival. Even core states have increasingly lost power to transnational economic concerns, both private and public. WTO, NAFTA, CAFTA, EU, IMF, and the World Bank, alongside Nestle, Shell, Exxon, Pfizer, OPEC, and Walmart, now contend with all but the strongest states as equal players. What leverage can far weaker peripheral states have? If an increasingly globalized economy makes cultural localism possible in core societies, shifting power there from

the state to both local and international entities, then state decline at the periphery and semi-periphery forces people to turn elsewhere for protection.

This process is not merely cultural revitalization (Wallace, 1956)—neither in response to 'globalization' nor to an imagined loss of past stability—largely because there are no pure cultures to revitalize. Arjun Appadurai points out that neither at the core nor the periphery of the world system do we encounter self-enclosed local cultures. In his words, "the landscapes of group identity... are no longer tightly territorialized, spatially bounded, historically unselfconscious, or culturally homogenous" (1996: 48). Instead people nearly everywhere know about U.S. television shows, Japanese *anime*, GPS technology, and international migration (Nelson, 1996). People may embrace these features of globalization or reject them, but such elements shape "the imaginative resources of lived, local experiences" (Appadurai, 1966: 52).

Appadurai argues that globalization produces what he calls "constructed primordialisms". Contemporary ethnic and ethno-religious identities are not holdovers from the past. Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi, Iraqi Shiite and Sunni, Serbs, Croats, Bosniacs, and so on are not reinvigorating long-established struggles. Instead, they are fighting to create protective communities that can carry them into the future. As he puts it, "the violence that surrounds identity politics around the world today reflects the anxieties attendant on the search for nonterritorial principles of solidarity" (p. 165). If the declining significance of the state in the global core makes ethnic localism possible, state collapse makes imagined ethnic solidarity crucial for survival on the periphery.

Back to Religion

What does religion have to do with this picture—or this picture with religion? Beyond the quasi-religious aspects of human rights ideologies (Ignatieff, 2001) and some people's quasi-religious devotion to ethnic nationalism, I think it points to a neglected aspect of worldwide religious 'fundamentalism'.

It is not news that self-styled 'conservative' religious movements have gained strength in the last 30 years, nor is it news that these are by no means all technically 'fundamentalistic' (Cohen, 1990; Marty and Appleby, 1991; Antoun, 2001). They all, however, lie toward the sectarian end of the religious spectrum. That is, they all see themselves as

possessed of truth, and they see others as benighted, if not downright evil. The degree varies, of course. The Iranian Mullahs, the Taliban, and the partisans of the Israeli Kach Party sit on the extreme end of the spectrum, as all have used (or have sought to use) state power to purify their respective territories. The 'conservative' Christians about whom Jenkins (2002) writes have, by and large, not held state power, and their movements have also been diverse enough to require considerable cross-boundary accommodation. But they are sectarians, nonetheless.

Is religious 'conservatism' a backlash against globalization, as claimed by Lechner (1993), Tijssen *et al.* (1995), and others? If by backlash we mean a wish for religious certainty on the part of people uncomfortable with the open-ended freedoms of late-modern life, I think the answer is 'no'. Despite various claims that most religious people favor the certainty of 'the good old ways' (Finke and Stark, 1992; Stark and Finke, 2000), it strikes me that ideological certainty is not such movements' chief appeal. Social certainty seems much more likely to be at stake here. In a world whose economic order has, in the words of two classic critics,

> [p]itilessly torn asunder the motley . . . ties that bound . . . man and man, . . . has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade (Marx and Engels, 1848: 44)

the preservation of human solidarity seems a worthwhile undertaking. To the degree that globalization weakens states in the international system, and to the degree that people find themselves under threat because of that weakness—as they especially do in semi-peripheral and peripheral regions—it makes sense for them to turn to ideologies that draw firm boundaries between 'us' and 'them'. Religious sectarianism is akin to ethnic nationalism in its promise of secure group membership for the chosen. It is also like such nationalism in its claim that people outside its own group do not matter.

If my analysis of the cultural logic of third-generation human rights is at all valid, globalization should favor the growth of multiple religions in the core regions of the world economic system. There, economic integration has progressed far enough to allow multiple localisms. These provide their adherents with a sense of identity without threatening either of the social pillars of the global order: individual differentiation and globe-spanning socio-economic networks.

The situation in peripheral and semi-peripheral regions is somewhat different. There, declining state power exposes people to threats against which they construct religious and/or ethnic primordialisms. These do not solve their problems; indeed, they leave people open to demagoguery. But such communalisms bring hope and common purpose in a world that seems organized for others' benefit.

On both a social and a cultural level, religious 'fundamentalism' and ethnic nationalism may well have more in common than we suspect.[10]

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[10] Ibn Khaldûn (1377–99) famously used the same set of concepts to describe both religious and ethnic solidarity. This would be a useful avenue for modern sociologists to pursue. See Lechner (1994); Spickard (2001), Alatas (2006).

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GLOBALIZATION AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

Elisabeth Arweck

Introduction

Since the mid-1980s, scholars of religion have examined religion, religious organizations, and religious movements in global perspective. Scholars like Robertson (1985; 1990; 1992; 1993; Robertson and Chirico, 1985), Featherstone (1990), Ritzer (1995), and Kurtz (1995) were among the first to take a global approach in charting the processes and implications of religion(s) in the global context, the consequences of internationalization and 'McDonaldization', etc. In some ways a continuation or a complementary strand of the secularization debate, globalization theory related to religion is embedded in theories about modernity or post-modernity, resting on the insight that the industrial revolution has gone global and that globality forms the social and cultural context within which to explore and analyze social phenomena. The expansion of industrial and economic structures to the worldwide scale and the concomitant rate of exchange and interaction between geographical and cultural spaces put the role and function of large-scale religious structures into question, as traditions, customs, lifestyles, civilizations, etc. clash, mingle, and interact with one another with ever increasing speed. Like other aspects of (post)modern life, and despite apparent evidence of trends toward greater secularization, religion constitutes a vital part of globalizing processes, being both subject to and a significant factor effecting change, plurality, and transformation. At the same time, religion interacts—positively and negatively—with other social processes and institutions, notably in politics, education, economics, and with the different forms in which it manifests itself (see also Hadden and Shupe, 1988; Beckford and Luckmann, 1989). However, while global forces involve distinct dynamics, local and regional agents remain remarkably relevant and add momentum of their own and may thus be disregarded at one's peril. Hence the notion of the 'glocal'—literally the conflation of the global with the local. These

and other themes are reflected in the writings by, among others, Peter Beyer (1994), David Lyons (2000), John Esposito and Michael Watson (2000), and José Casanova (2001).

There is neither the space nor the place in this chapter to provide an overview of the now extensive literature on globalization and rehearse the arguments advanced in the globalization theories proffered. However, the point could be made that globalization theory (or globalization theories) re-casts (re-cast) 'traditional' theoretical approaches in social scientific research and places (place) these within a new frame—approaches such as conflict vs. function, Marxism vs. capitalism—or re-packages (post-)structuralist thought in the language of globalization. The globalization debate could thus be considered a proxy for theoretical debate in social science and in some instances it can be observed that the term 'globalization' is used with different ideological overtones. One of the problems of having a definition of globalization is similar to having a definition of religion or of New Religious Movements (NRMs): however many aspects a definition may capture, sufficient exceptions will be found to render the definition invalid or only partially applicable and thus lay such definitions open to challenge.

Peter Beyer's approach in his recent *Religions in Global Society*, for example, can be described as neo-functionalist, arguing that Western cultural forms have been dominant in globalization processes and thus encroached on other cultures. Religion in global society follows functional differentiation, with health, medicine, politics, etc. becoming specialized and forming separate functional systems. Implicit is the view that the model for these systems is the West. Those dealing with religion, such as scholars, lawmakers, etc., face the problem of trying to define religion based on the dominant (Western) system and culture. There is conflict between what is religious and what is not religious and this raises the issue of the boundary or boundaries of religion and the boundaries between religion(s). When Eastern religions were dominated by the West (e.g. Hinduism in India), they remodelled themselves in distinction to the West. This has engendered conflict between religions and between religions and the state. However, some guises under which religion manifests itself, such as New Religious Movements, the New Age, and the new spirituality, escape the boundary of what is defined as religion, involving neither social movement nor system nor institutions (see Beyer, 2006, esp. chapter 6).

In the light of what has been stated above about globalization theory being a proxy for theoretical debate in social science, this chapter focuses on recurrent themes, with particular reference to New Religious Movements (NRMs). One such theme is the question of boundaries—boundaries between religions, and boundaries between religion and non-religion. It is particularly pertinent in the study of NRMs, giving rise to a range of issues relating, for example, to definitions of NRMs, developing typologies or categories of NRMs, and the question of whether they are 'truly' religious or really 'new'. Another theme is the impact of communication (in the wider sense of the term) on NRMs and, conversely, the global impact of NRMs which arises from their use or even exploitation of communication. A third theme is the dynamic between NRMs and the social and political systems within which they operate. These are the main themes which arise from my material on NRMs in the global context more generally. One theme cannot be clearly demarcated from the others, but grouping the material under thematic headings allows for certain aspects to be brought into the foreground.

These are aspects of globalization which matter empirically. An essentialist notion of either religion or globalization does not underlie this chapter. The processes involved are of a dynamic nature and therefore never complete. Situations and conditions are constantly changing and changing faster and faster. This creates the difficulty of keeping abreast with developments and maintaining some overview of events. Therefore, this chapter works with a dynamic concept which seeks to take account of inbuilt ambiguities, with the author being acutely aware that by the time this text is in print, situations will have altered and new aspects arisen which may prompt a reframing of perspectives.

The following account will pick up the above themes (communication, boundaries, and local contexts) and discuss these in the light of NRMs and globalization. A brief conclusion seeks to draw these various strands together. The term 'New Religious Movement' is used here in the wider sense, following the general notion of 'cult' or 'sect' as often referred to in the media. However, the section on boundaries will return to this topic. Further, perhaps not unsurprisingly, the section on communication takes the lion's share of this text, partly because there are so many facets to this topic, and partly because it picks up some aspects of the other sections in order to make certain points. The themes are closely interlaced, which makes it difficult at times to separate out some aspects without too much repetition.

Communication

Global communication is used here in the wider sense of the term, including electronic communication, physical transport, all types of media and media discourse about NRMs, virtual and real networks, etc. The nature and availability of these means of communication have implications for NRMs and their membership, also because they are part of these. This means that there is interaction at multiple levels which runs along existing communication channels: NRMs can and do talk back to those who create discourses about them and challenge, if not vociferously contest—at times in courts of law—verbal (and other) constructs of them. These in turn are commented and subjected to critique and criticism by those who created the discourses to begin with—former members (dissidents), various so-called 'anti-cult groups', so-called 'anti-anti-cult groups', journalists, representatives of other religious organizations, public authorities, academics, to name but some. Some NRMs have also attempted to eliminate information about them, by removing Internet pages or seeking injunction against Internet service providers, thus provoking further contest and debates. It means, secondly, that, when expedient and judicious for their purposes, NRMs can and do communicate with one another, form alliances and join forces, thus creating entities which fall into the category of 'anti-anti-cult movements'—coalitions and partnerships of varying combinations (depending on the cause or purpose which brings particular NRMs under one heading) and varying time frames (short-, medium- or long-term). It means, thirdly, that NRMs can and do use these channels of communication to pursue their own agendas and defend their interests. They may use such channels, for example, to insert themselves in mainstream society or gain legitimacy (see also below) simply by possessing such channels (the Unification Church for instance owns a considerable 'media empire') or to exert influence by joining available sources of information (see e.g. the repercussions of a smear relating to the 2008 presidential race in the US, posted on a website which is a remnant of a defunct conservative print magazine owned by the Unification Church; this incident also illustrates the interactive nature of the communication at multiple levels—see Kirkpatrick, 2007). NRMs may also use the channels of communication to mobilize forces (existing and potential allies) as and when they feel the need for these, thus rallying support and assistance from individuals and organizations whose 'authority' and 'weight' may be harnessed. It means,

fourthly, that NRMs can and do 'exploit' means of communication to at least raise awareness of and spread knowledge about particular issues, although at the risk of seeing readily available information about them having adverse effects. Communication in whatever form or guise can thus be powerful, yet double-edged: constructive and effective when serving the aims and needs of NRMs themselves, destructive and detrimental when used by those who pursue, for want of a better word, an 'anti-NRM' agenda.

The immediacy of information thus places NRMs in competition not only with other religions—globally and in their respective host cultures—but also with one another and with the various discourses—public or other—about them. Information is immediately available, both in terms of the speed with which news can travel and be made (almost/virtually) instantly available, and in terms of the geographic distances which information can traverse and thus reach even the remotest parts of the globe. Thus rate and extent of dissemination are (potentially) comprehensive and far-reaching. Also, information can—at least theoretically—be immediately processed upon receipt and thus lead to shorter and shorter spaces of time within which to respond. Again this has implications for the speed with which exchanges and processes travel across geographical distances. Reports about particular incidents, scandals, legal cases, unusual practices, individual misdemeanor, etc. can be instantly and widely disseminated, revealing aspects which a group might wish to keep restricted to its members, alerting the global community to particular issues, charting the rise of new movements, and throwing groups into the limelight of the world stage, all of which might otherwise have remained 'obscure' or unnoticed except by the community/communities immediately surrounding them. The recent child custody case in the United States which is connected with The Family, formerly known as the Children of God, is an example (see e.g. *KFMB News* 8, 2006) of a legal case; as is the string of trials associated with the Solar Temple, the most recent of which went to court in France (Grenoble) in late October 2006 (see e.g. Gordon, 2006); and the protracted proceedings against Aum Shinrikyo, culminating in Japan's Supreme Court finalizing the death sentence of Aum Shinrikyo's founder Shoko Asahara in September 2006 and the group attempting to re-organise itself (see e.g. *Kyodo News Service*, 2006). (Aum Shinrikyo renamed itself 'Aleph' in 2000.) Allegations against Sathya Sai Baba, leader of the Sathya Sai Service Organization, a Hindu-related international movement, have been widely spread and extensively discussed

on the Internet, before reaching different audiences through dissemination in other types of media (e.g. television). News of political activities of the Exclusive Brethren in New Zealand—the group ran an initially covert campaign against Labour in the 2005 election—revealed not only an unexpected international strategy, but also the thinking behind it (see e.g. *New Zealand Herald*, 2006). Communities like Sky Kingdom, also known as Ayah Pin, in Malaysia (see e.g. *The Star*, 2006) would normally not come to the attention of a wider audience (both 'lay' and 'expert'), were it not for mass communication. The case of the 'Kanungu Tragedy' of March 2000, the tragic death of hundreds of members of the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments in Uganda, would undoubtedly not have received worldwide attention were it not for the power of communication. There is a well-nigh countless array of relatively small and localized religious groups scattered across the world, which make headlines or are deemed newsworthy at some point, for whatever reason. Such groups often do not engage in communicating with an audience beyond their immediate surroundings. Further, the very fact that these examples can be cited here testifies to the power of the channels of communication, given that coverage of such 'stories' tends to occur through the medium of 'local', regional or national (rather than international) media, in most cases newspapers. On the other hand, any number of sites on the worldwide web would provide an abundance of information, facts and details about religion and religious groups, were it not for the sheer impossibility of having a comprehensive overview of all that is posted on the Internet (see also Cottee, Yateman and Dawson, 1996). The dual nature of the Internet—both source and medium of communication—is an additional dimension in this multi-dimensional world which mediates and is mediated.

Even groups which shun modern technology and choose not to be part of any communications network, such as the Amish, are drawn into the system—the coverage of the recent shooting in the school room in the US being a case in point (see e.g., *MSNBC News*, 2006; Goodstein, 2006; Dewan, 2006). Instant communication means, for NRMs, that information about any matters that concern them can be immediately made public and highlights the boundaries: between different religions on the one hand and between religions and other institutions on the other hand. Immediate availability of information inevitably juxtaposes NRMs to whatever group or movement is perceived to be 'like them'

and thus tars them with whatever brush is used to draw the picture. Research into the way in which the media report on NRMs has shown that stereotypes tend to permeate such representations, the common currencies dealt with either directly pointing to and implying that NRMs are 'bizarre', have outlandish beliefs and practices, use religion as a 'front' for other ambitions (mainly power, whether political or financial), and combine abuse of power and authority with sexual improprieties. Any religious or spiritual group whose outlook suggests any of these stereotypical aspects is 'like', or resembles, a 'cult'. Therefore, the Amish rejection of modern life and its amenities and their separateness from the world has tended to give rise to reports related to these aspects, such as accidents which their unlit buggies cause on public roads and their 'bizarre' stubbornness in refusing to deviate from their 'outmoded' ways. The case of the Amish is of interest also in the light of the attitudes expressed in the global media in the wake of the shooting. While the incident and the death of the children elicited sympathy and compassion towards the Amish community in the first instance, and remarked on the social cohesion of the community as being a strength, some of the later reports drew attention to other, less favorable aspects, notably their separateness and the status of women (see e.g. Smith, 2006).

While instant communication also involves a certain levelling in that all the 'players in the field' compete under similar rules and conditions, this is offset by a range of other factors, among them, degree of access to means and channels of communication (technology), chance, coincidence, and 'local' circumstances. Despite the wide penetration of communication technology across continents and its remarkable popularization (in both senses of the word 'popular'—widely accepted/embraced and common/widespread), with mobile phones reaching to the ends of the world, laptop computers able to tap into the worldwide web almost anywhere, Internet cafés having sprung up in the most remote places, high levels of personal computer use, etc.—there are still 'digital divides', which have an impact on Internet diffusion and web use (see e.g. Anderson et al., 2007). There is also the question of computer usage and the skills needed to master these technologies—we may live in a digital (digitally globalized) society, but this does not necessarily mean that everyone is an 'expert', both in terms of the know-how involved in using the means of communication available, and in terms of the ability to put such means to maximum effect, for example, where

to look for, or place, information or which medium/media to use, etc. There is also the question of the financial means necessary to buy or lease the technology and/or communication channels (air time, etc.), despite the relative affordability of some equipment. Further, given the array of channels and sites, chance and coincidence play some part in facilitating or preventing access to particular information, depending on where individuals are, what their agenda is, which channels they access, how much time they can devote to processing information, etc. Means of access to communication and mastery of communication skills imply aspects of power; the more such power(s) an NRM can wield, the more influence it is likely to be able to exert where applied. Finally, all of the above aside, any information or comment that is communicated needs to be interpreted by those who process it. Given the lack of regulation or control, this requires some knowledge about the voices involved in the debate and the weight they carry in terms of trustworthiness and importance—a topic expanded on elsewhere (see Arweck, 2006; see also Cottee, Yateman and Dawson, 1996).

However, whichever way communication is used, its application and reception is bound to be selective and thus partial, with particular circumstances playing a role in the selection process. Just to illustrate, a brief conversation with a colleague in media studies about the reports on the shooting incident in the Amish community revealed the importance of the factors outlined above. While there was overlap in what we had both read about this incident and thus come to conclude about the coverage, our perspectives diverged on account of the channels of information to which we had access and the purposes which had guided us towards them. Our respective selectivity had shaped some of the views and positions we formed. This very selectivity also underlies this chapter—the sources available and readily accessible to me have shaped the approach and format of this text.

In any case, as already indicated, communication and the means of communication (technology) may work both in NRMs' favor and to their disadvantage. They work in their favor when they themselves wish to disseminate information widely—for example, if they wish to attract members or report on the successful outcome of a court case against them or campaigns against or in favor of particular causes. Communication presents a disadvantage to NRMs when less favorable news reaches wide circulation—scandals, bad publicity, members behaving disreputably, etc.—or when particular plans or strategies

are publicized in such a way as to marshal opposition or concerted action against them. The former case hardly needs illustration, but the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, the leader of the Unification Church (it renamed itself in the mid-1990s 'Family Federation for World Peace and Unification'), serving a prison sentence for tax evasion in the US in the early 1980s or the child abuse allegations relating to The Family (formerly the Children of God) in the 1990s, may be cited as examples. Once these incidents are reported, they are replicated or referred to whenever further reporting takes place subsequently. Once on file, these 'stories' stick. As to the latter case, the recent establishment of prominent Church of Scientology centers in London and Berlin, as part of a Europe-wide plan to create centers in major cities, may serve as an example. While the opening of the center in the City of London in October 2006 was a well-publicized affair before and afterwards, with 'celebrities' present and high-ranking police officers invited to attend; (see e.g. *The Observer*, 2006; *The Guardian*, 2006; *This Is London*, 2006), the opening in Berlin in early 2007 was a fairly low-key event, with no 'celebrities' present (although initially invited) and a vigorous debate in the media about Scientology and its activities in Germany, including the question of how Scientology was able to acquire the premises (close to the district where Parliament and all the government offices are located), the issue of whether Scientology should, once again, be placed under the observation of the *Verfassungsschutz* (the national security service) and the role of the public authorities to provide information about Scientology and prevent the establishment of further centers in other German cities (see e.g. Mayerl, 2007; Buhr, 2007).

NRMs use and adapt means of communication to overcome the fact that, in most cases, they lack a firm territorial foothold, such as the Mormons possess in Utah, despite maintaining national and international headquarters and (literally) building a worldwide network of branches made of bricks and mortar. Some NRMs have sought to establish or are in the process of establishing such footholds, for example, the compound of the People's Temple in Guyana or the Unification Church's acquisition of wide swathes of land in South America. In the absence of substantial physical realms, NRMs need to be ingenious in order to maintain a 'community', especially one which is physically spread and scattered across the world and one which is composed of members who represent an array of cultural backgrounds. A number of NRMs have used the institutionalized mobility of their members to achieve

a degree of global presence and to create an international network. Being available at an instant's notice has, however, implications for the individual and his/her role in the movement with regard to the global context: while opening new opportunities which can be both enriching and challenging, the value of the individual is set on a par with a commodity: exchangeable, disposable, available, generic, almost impersonal. Individuals are deployed where needed, just like employees of multi-national companies are, regardless of family circumstance or even personal preference. Such availability stands in contradiction to the emphasis which is placed on the importance of the individual within the movement. The way members marry within the Unification Church may serve as an example. Spouses are matched by Reverend Moon, on the basis of photographs. Individual members are mixed and matched across continents and cultures. Couples are betrothed in mass weddings. They are issued identical wedding outfits, which they wear for the occasion and then hand back again. If a prospective spouse is not able to attend the ceremony, s/he is represented by a photograph which the other partner holds. After the wedding, couples tend not to live together for some time, so that they are free to continue with their work for the organization (see e.g. Chryssides, 1990/1991; also Barker, 1984).

However, the flip side of this dynamic is that some NRMs do not go global or extend their activities to a worldwide scale, even if their rhetoric states the opposite and lays claims to universal applicability or validity. Language may be a barrier, despite English being the *lingua franca* in most cases and despite efforts to provide translations of the original message into a range of languages. Here, too, a process of inculturation is involved, as translations are usually carried out by members—most of them untrained in translation. Their somewhat 'amateur' approach, combined with their insider perspective and own understanding/interpretation of the message refracts and colors the material as it is seen through particular cultural and personal lenses. Just a superficial comparison of a given group's national websites will illustrate this point.

Some NRMs do not develop into global ventures because they cannot inhabit the cultural niche they seek to occupy or because they cannot adapt and adjust enough to occupy even a small cultural niche in a given society or because they have no ambition to reach beyond their

immediate spheres. Had Sekuyo Mahikari, a Japanese new religion, which was founded in 1959 and came to Europe in 1971, persevered with its initial efforts to gain a following in Northern Europe, it might never have succeeded in attracting more than a mere handful (see Cornille, 1991). The wider the cultural gap between the culture of origin and the culture in which a group seeks to embed itself, the more bridging needs to be done. There is to my knowledge no research which compares NRMs which have a global network with those that do not. Such research could reveal the combination of factors necessary for globalization to happen. It would also reveal which aspects of a given group, in terms of teaching and practice, are emphasized in which cultural context and the development of such emphases over time. Other aspects of NRMs include the degree of strictness (see Stark and Iannaccone, 1997) in keeping or attracting members, the resources they have at their disposition, their organizational drive, and the kind of structures to which they need to adjust in the host society.

In the media, Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group which declared war on the government of Uganda in 1987, is rarely discussed in terms of any religious or spiritual motivation, but in terms of a violent, political movement which causes untold hardship through brutal attacks and killings and prevents the country from settling into peace. This stands in contrast to reports on the movement of the late Alice Auma Lakwena, Uganda's self-proclaimed prophetess and leader of the defunct Holy Spirit Movement, who had launched an armed rebellion against the then nascent government of Yoweri Museveni in July 1986, but was defeated and forced into exile (see e.g. Nnyago, 2007; Namazzi, 2007). Yet Joseph Kony claims to have been instructed by the Holy Spirit and once said he wanted to govern northern Uganda according to the Ten Commandments. The reference to the LRA as 'cult-like' relates to Kony having reportedly issued 'increasingly bizarre' orders to his followers: anyone caught riding a bike should have their feet cut off, all white chickens should be killed, and no farming should be done on Fridays (Crilly, 2006). The coverage of the LRA is in contrast with that of Aum Shinrikyo and its former leader, Shoko Asahara, which has focused on the teachings which led to the sarin attack on the Tokyo underground in 1995 and the fortune of the members since then. The emphasis in the media thus depends on the take they adopt on a given group, which in turn shapes the

construction of the group in question. Once a particular frame has been established within which to circumscribe the group, it tends to serve again and again as a boundary marker.

All of the above intensifies the processes as well as the effects of globalization: what affects or happens in one NRM has consequences for other NRMs, because news can and does travel. Therefore, the reactive elements in the communication process occur much faster and with greater effectiveness, while being subject to the vagaries of communication, in terms of selectivity, coincidence, access, etc.

The presence and development of NRMs on the global scale is not just determined by communication and communication technologies. Some NRMs operate and behave like modern businesses or transnational companies in the global marketplace and thus have a significant stake in the financial and commercial networks of the international economy. In this respect, they are of course not different from other religions. David Chidester (2005: Ch. 7) points out that multinational corporations conduct their cross-cultural business like religions and that economic production in transnational mode is increasingly de-centred and de-centralised. His statements also apply to NRMs, but in reverse order: they are religious organizations which behave in many ways like corporations and most of their activities are directed from central headquarters.

However, unlike other religions, NRMs strive to constitute themselves in the global market and to become established (world religions). In this respect, too, we encounter the question of boundaries—the boundary of what is considered 'mainstream' and/or *bona fide* and what is considered 'non-mainstream' and thus potentially suspect. The question of boundaries is all the more important when the 'commercial' activities of NRMs are perceived to be tightly interwoven with other activities, for example, when profits from businesses support and sustain the organization and its influence or position of power—as is, for example, said to be the case with the Unification Church whose various business ventures (some of them global enterprises) subsidize its 'cultural' and political branches. It is unlikely that the Unification Church would be able to continue operating the *Washington Times*—reported to be a loss-making venture—or offer all expenses-paid conferences to participants without resources from other areas of its operations; or when beliefs and practices involve considerable cost for those engaged in them, thus turning the 'religious' organization into a commercial venture. The latter case

highlights the fact that NRM members are also consumers, purchasing objects related to the movements (clothes, pictures, books, electronic media, etc.) and services (courses, meetings) and investing considerable sums in travelling to gatherings, events or places of pilgrimage. In this way they partake of consumerism in the technologically advanced world and form at least part of their cultural and social identity through selective consumption (see also Lyon, 2000: Ch. 5).

Scientology in Germany is often accused of disguising its business activities behind a façade of religious teachings and to be wholly motivated by the aim of making money (from the sale of expensive courses and accompanying paraphernalia, together with other businesses, such as real estate agencies and consultancy firms). This view also touches on the question of whether the Church of Scientology is truly religious, another aspect of the boundary between what is *bona fide*/truly religious and what is not.

Apart from building a global presence, which is partly achieved by creating an international community, both in real and virtual terms, the ambition to become established requires accoutrements of legitimacy. These can be attained in various ways, for example, by NRMs attaching themselves to world religions, claiming roots in venerable traditions, and engaging in charitable, political or educational activities. Some NRMs have sought links with international organizations of high repute, such as the United Nations, for example by establishing a presence in or near UN headquarters and organising events attended by UN officials. Some NRMs have achieved NGO status, an undisputed cachet of legitimization, which works both ways: while NGO status legitimizes NRMs, the UN is seen to be inclusive. Once this status is achieved, it offers means of access and privileges which would otherwise be denied. This also feeds into the way NRMs present themselves, employing a vocabulary which legitimizes—all typical modern forces of bureaucratization and institutional structures.

However, NRMs compete with structures and institutions in the (ostensibly) secular social systems, because they seek to encompass all aspects of life and seek to permeate these as part of a comprehensive way of life. Hence, for example, the close connection with political parties (e.g. Soka Gakkai in Japan or the reported links between the Unification Church and the Republican Party in the US; see e.g. Parry, 2006), the development of educational programmes for use in state schools, the creation of educational institutions, etc. If successful,

such structures embed NRMs more firmly into the mainstream and allow them to move away from the social margins towards wider social acceptability.

While the number of core NRM members are thought to be receding (establishing precise figures for membership is a notoriously precarious, if not impossible, undertaking), the internationalization and global networking permit NRMs to overcome the 'problem' of having relatively small memberships. Given the relative ease with which individuals and groups of individuals can move around, members can be sent where needed, for whatever length of time they are needed. Small memberships are also offset by the existence of the virtual community, which links members across nation-states and continents. Members are aware that they are part of 'global family' and often remark on the ready-made connections they can call upon as and when needed, regardless of whether personal contact has actually been made.

Readily available and relatively cheap transport across the globe make it easy for NRM leaders to establish their authority in person, while also enabling them to be present in any given location via satellite link. This is relevant to the point made about territoriality; the physical and virtual are able to blend in with one another, as and when required. Physical boundaries can be overcome in cases where leaders are prevented by state authorities from crossing national borders, as has been the case for Reverend Moon (who has been refused entry visas to the UK and Germany—see e.g. Rosenbaum, 2006; *International Herald Tribune*, 2006) or Claude Vorilhon (known also as Raël), the leader of the Raël Movement (renowned for its claim that it had successfully cloned human beings), who is not allowed to enter Switzerland (see *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, 2007). The blend of the physical with the global networks is also a way of establishing uniformity and preventing local groups from becoming too powerful or independent by developing structures based on their own interpretations of the teachings. Scientology is reported to guard against any such idiosyncratic outcrops. However, some leaders, for example Sathya Sai Baba of the Sri Sathya Sai Service Organization, choose not to travel at all, preferring instead to be globally present in other ways. The Sai Baba organization's physical headquarters in Puttaparthi, Andrapradesh, India, have become a place of pilgrimage for the devotees. They are the globe-trotters, not their leader. Moreover, images of Sai Baba can be found on various websites and in every devotee's home, thus ensuring a global presence in this way. Sai Baba is also known for being present in devotees' lives in other, although for

them, no less direct ways: he is reported to appear in devotees' dreams, to be able to be in more than one place at a time, and to communicate in other supernatural ways, including the appearance of *vibhuti* (holy ash) on photographs of him displayed in devotees' homes.

Instant communication also transforms the global politics of religion, by facilitating alliances and counter-alliances, as indicated above. Despite global means of communication and readily available (re)sources of information, however, there are still individuals (often people in public positions, including politicians) who are ill-informed about NRMs and thus form what they consider, with the benefit of hindsight, to be mis-alliances with NRMs or affiliated branches—organizations whose names suggest no connection with anything but a worthy and deserving cause. Few people would, for example, link the 'Citizens Commission on Human Rights', which campaigns against psychiatry and drugs prescribed to help patients with depression, anxiety disorders and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), with the Church of Scientology. Hence the attendance of a senator at a ribbon-cutting event for an exhibition organized by the Commission (see Larrabee, 2006). In other cases, congressmen or ministers of state are not sufficiently informed about the issues involved in occasions to which they are invited or causes which they are asked to endorse. Hence the unwitting attendance of some US congressmen of Reverend Moon's 'coronation', held in March 2004 on Capitol Hill. Rep. Danny Davis, D-Ill., one of the congressmen present, is reported as saying that he had thought the ceremony was an attempt to 'bridge gaps' between different religions and did not learn until later that Moon interpreted the crowning as a symbol of his religious and political ascendance (see Eng & Jackson, 2006). Hence a German Minister of State donating copies of a book to schools, not realizing how controversial the author's status is among critics of Scientology in Germany (see Brückner, 2006). In some cases, those in public office inadvertently step into precarious connections and liaisons, such as the US senator who sent 'inappropriate' emails to a White House aid who, it was revealed, had links to Scientology. The apparent lack of information is of course due to what has been pointed out already: the selectivity which is part and parcel of the way communication 'works' in everyday life.

Globalization looks as if it exposes NRM membership and NRMs to surveillance, but can also be used to protect the 'true' identity of groups (e.g. affiliated or 'front' organizations). A network of affiliated organizations, which may also be connected in various ways with

international and local companies, can turn the web of associations and connections into a tangle, so much so that it becomes impenetrable. For example, the Unification Church's array of organizations and its multi-layered business and media empire prevent anyone from untangling the different strands with ease. When this is coupled with political and other interests, the mesh becomes a maze. Robert Parry, an investigative journalist, has taken a closer look at the UC's political interests and how they are intertwined with financial and commercial pursuits (see Parry, 2006; 2007). That groups/movements cover up their true identity when they feel it is opportune to do so, and create smoke-screens in order to achieve particular objectives is such a well understood phenomenon that it has found its way into fiction (see, for example, Dan Brown's *The Da Vinci Code* or Max Ehrlich's *The Cult*). The conspiracy theories which underlie such works point to the 'dark side' of religions/NRMs.

The possibility (and actuality) of deception (through the way communication is channelled, but also through the kind of information communicated) is one of the themes which has marbled allegations against NRMs from the very moment they began to be noticed as a new social phenomenon. There is the idea that, despite the level which technology has achieved, if there were even more sophisticated means available, they would allow us to get a better handle on things. And yet, as already mentioned, there are religious groups—undoubtedly a minority—that do not engage with complex technology or means of communication, do not maintain an Internet presence, let alone build a worldwide network of contacts, whether physical or virtual. Such groups seem to be very much rooted in the local or regional. Groups like *Fiat Lux* and *Universelles Leben* in Germany, although they have web pages and thus seek to reach an international audience, seem mainly anchored in the geographical area where they originated. There is most likely a spectrum of engagement with means and skills of communication among NRMs, ranging from the most to the least sophisticated. This is undoubtedly also linked to the interaction between NRMs and their use of the media and the general media. Again, there is currently no research to shed more light on this question. However, increased visibility means increased competitiveness and politicization. Everything is more on display and can be challenged, creating a situation which allows, paradoxically, for both transparency and veiling or obscurity.

Finally, what has been said about communication with regard to NRMs can also be said about 'anti-cult' groups—a range of organizations whose very label suggests their purpose: they are against NRMs (their beliefs, teachings, the way they recruit and treat members, etc.) and their agenda thus seeks to counteract what NRMs believe and do—at whatever level. The existence of 'anti-cult' groups, which in turn engendered the formation of 'anti-anti-cult groups' highlights the fact that the debate about NRMs is a contested field, at times a fiercely contested one. Discussions about what can and cannot be said about NRMs, allegations and controversies, etc. have (pre-)occupied many a channel of communication and contributed to the complexity of arguments and positions. This has added to the multi-dimensional interaction mentioned above.

Boundaries

Questions of boundaries and the problem of demarcation have beset the study of New Religious Movements and are thrown into sharp relief by NRMs. Defining what should be an NRM has so far defied the academic community studying them, and no generally agreed definition has been arrived at to date (see Arweck, 2006). There is well-nigh no criterion or set of criteria which would bind the category of NRM, despite various attempts to devise typologies which could accommodate the range and variety of groups and movements subsumed under the NRM banner. If we take NRMs' teachings, for example, despite the reference to 'new', most NRMs can be found on closer inspection to borrow from 'established' traditions or to share general beliefs and teachings with them. In some cases, such as the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), there is a deliberate positioning of the movement within a well established religious lineage—a point which ties in with questions of legitimacy and legitimization. The efforts of the Vatican dicasteries to accommodate NRMs in existing categories can be seen as attempts to harness the continuities in NRMs instead of treating them as a wholly novel phenomenon, but is also closely related to its linguistic and conceptual conventions (see Arweck, 2006). Further, in some instances, NRMs deliberately yoke themselves to established tradition, claiming that they are only a continuation of long-standing and respected practice and observance. If we look at the way in which

NRMs are organized, parallels can be drawn with other religious groups and radical politically active organizations. Hence the tendency to 'bundle' NRMs together with other sectarian or non-mainstream religious groups and, especially since the events of 9/11, the conceptualization of NRMs as 'fundamentalist' groups which harbor political ambitions and pursue these by violent means, alongside such groups as Al-Qaeda. Such conceptualization can be found in both journalistic and academic accounts. There has thus been, and remains, ambiguity about the category of NRM, an ambiguity which is also reflected in the terminology used. Depending on speaker, context (social, political, cultural, national, etc.), specific issue, and purpose of analysis, this ranges from 'NRM' to 'cult' and 'sect' (see Arweck, 2006). Hence also the practice, in some quarters at least, of discussing and treating groups like the Jehovah's Witnesses or the polygamous strands of Mormonism like 'cults' or NRMs. The case of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Germany and their drawn-out court procedures to be recognised by the state as a 'body under public law' (*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*) further illustrates the ambiguity of the NRM category (see Arweck, 2006: chapter 1). The issue is further complicated when the self-understanding and self-definition of such groups are taken into account. This point relates to the discussion above about NRMs contesting and challenging constructs of them. The greater the 'gap' between the perspective(s) of the insider(s) and the perspective(s) of the outsider(s), the greater the potential for challenge and disagreement. Also, the greater the range of perspectives (both inside and outside a given group), the more difficult it is to reconcile these. The case of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Germany revolved around issues related to the way the organization perceives itself and the way in which it is perceived by outsiders. The very fact that the Jehovah's Witnesses applied for recognition as a body under public law in Berlin (which forms one of the states or *Länder*) indicates that they believed that they had a case—in other words, from the JW point of view, the organization fulfilled the criteria required by the law. However, this point of view needed to be tested in the courts, with legal experts examining the claims which the JW made about themselves with regard to its teachings, the way it treated its members, its attitude towards the state and state authorities, etc. This led to the involvement of other 'experts' who contested JW claims about itself, also with reference to the international dimension of the organization. The protracted proceedings, involving all legal instances, points to a wide gap between inside and outside perspectives. Another crucial factor in the debate

was the fact that a precedent would be set: if the JW were recognised in Berlin, this would make it most likely that other states (*Länder*) would have to follow suit and also grant the JW this status.

Conventionally, the chronological definition suggested by Clarke (e.g. 1992: 58; 1997), which identifies NRMs as groups which have emerged in North America and Europe since 1945, has found some general acceptance (see e.g. Beckford and Levasseur, 1986: 31; Barker, 1985: 37), but the boundaries have been contested and are continuously redrawn, depending on who is speaking about NRMs and in what context (see Arweck, 2006: chapter 3). Usage has also varied over time. For example, in general, academics studying NRMs used to make a point of referring to 'New Religious Movements' rather than 'cults', to indicate their specific approach to the topic and to distance themselves from the 'anti-cult movements' and the media; but some of them have come to use the terms interchangeably. NRMs themselves have had their own views about the various labels attached to them, in most cases rejecting the term 'cult' and requesting that their particular organization should not be lumped in with others. On the other hand, the term 'Moonies' was initially a somewhat pejorative term which described members of the Unification Church (in reference to UC's leader Reverend Moon), but was adopted by them with the slogan 'I am a Moonie and proud of it', which some of them wore on a badge.

While roughly subscribing to the chronological definition, this chapter has treated the notion of NRM with some flexibility at either end of the spectrum, thus keeping much closer to the way the media and the general public tend to use this category. However, in the light of globalization, different usages, reflecting different conceptualizations, apply in different countries, with, for example, the term 'sect' being more prevalent in the debate about NRMs in Continental Europe following the usage of the Catholic Church. Given international connections and communications, ideas and concepts have crossed borders so that some Anglo-Saxon usage has seeped into some of the literature in Germany and France. Marat Shterin has argued that the 'cult controversies' in the West have to some extent been 'exported' to Eastern Europe, with conceptual models influencing social responses and actions by the state. This is most notable in the case of the 'anti-cult movements' with regard to legal provisions in Russia (see Shterin and Richardson, 2000).

Another important facet which concerns the question of boundaries is the diachronic aspect: the movements and groups which emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s are in many ways very different from

the movements and groups as they currently exist. The emergence of the New Age and Neo-Pagan movements in the late 1980s changed the NRM landscape and the thinking about them, as well as the reporting of other unknown (new?) groups all over the world. NRMs have obviously evolved over time, with modifications effected by both internal and external events and developments. Some do not exist any more, such as Heaven's Gate, the Solar Temple, the Branch Davidians, and the People's Temple, except for just a handful of survivors. No comprehensive list can be offered here of the factors which have fed into what might be called the maturation process of NRMs. Major internal changes, such as change in leadership (either due to the death of the leader or as a result of power struggles), but also more gradual transformations, such as new generations of members growing up, different approaches to recruiting members, shifts of emphasis in the teachings, have brought about alterations. Among external factors are the responses of the various sections of society, some underlying the 'cult controversies' already referred to, including the response of the parents (their cause originally the motive of the 'anti-cult groups'), politicians, the churches, the state authorities, the legal system, the academic community studying them, etc. (see Arweck, 2006). Having obtained their new status, the Jehovah's Witnesses in Berlin have certainly entered a different phase in their development: being a body under public law grants a religious organization certain privileges and thus alters its relationship with the state. Given the mutations which the groups and movements have undergone over time, the category of NRM looks different now compared to what it was when they first emerged, not least because of extensive academic study and research (both by outsiders and those on the inside).

Insertion into Local Contexts

The notion of globalization can be understood in the sense that it refers to a situation in which available goods and services or social and cultural influences gradually become standardized in all parts of the world. This results in uniformity and the homogenization of various aspects of life, including culture and ideas. This concept of globalization applies to NRMs to a certain extent. NRMs tend to think 'global' in the sense that they believe their worldviews to be globally applicable and universally true. At least some NRMs extend their ambitions to

encompass the whole world on a global scale in that they see their social orders as blueprints for society in general, their soteriological agenda as being indispensable or even imperative to mankind, their precepts and practices as solutions to all social ills and the unfailing path to world peace. The claim to universality (wholeness) and to universal applicability makes the world the 'natural' arena for NRMs' ambitions and activities. However, just like other 'players' in the global market, NRMs need to contend with the *local* conditions just as much as they do with the *global* conditions. While operating with concepts and mechanisms which generally are (and should be) transnational and thus easily transferable from one cultural context to another, NRMs still have to insert themselves into any given host society. This means dealing and engaging with nationally, regionally and/or locally specific conditions. These may present cultural and political obstacles which prevent effortless accommodation or embedding in particular contexts. On the other hand, these can also open up new avenues and opportunities—as, it could be argued, is the case in Germany when religious movements are recognized as bodies under public law. Adjustments may be required, whether changes to the way a group presents itself or its message in a given cultural context, where it lays the emphasis on its activities, the way it operates, etc. Barriers generally arise from significant cultural differences and are often not anticipated or even well understood by the leadership or membership of a given NRM. Its activities may be directed from central headquarters, either directly or through tiers of hierarchical layers. Scientology in Germany is a case in point which illustrates the extent of cultural 'misunderstanding' or 'misinterpretation' involved. The way in which Scientology has sought to establish itself in Germany has clashed significantly (and repeatedly) with prevailing cultural and political sensitivities to the point of triggering defence mechanisms at the disposal of state and society on the national and regional level. These sensitivities mainly relate to Germany's Nazi past, in particular the rise of what revealed itself to be a nefarious (and disastrous) ideology under the guise of politics and *Weltanschauung*, and the state's duty to protect its citizens against potential danger from within. Linked to this is a range of other issues, mostly the question of what constitutes a *bona fide* religion and the relationship between religion(s)/the churches and the state. Given the experiences of the Third Reich, the German state authorities are extremely conscious of their duty to practise unceasing vigilance. This impels the authorities (at any level) to scrutinize, take preventative measures, and above

all err on the side of caution. Hence the long-standing, and at times heated, debate about Scientology's charitable status, its commercial activities, and observation by the state authorities—issues which have exercised Germany's legal system and courts, with particular cases running through all the instances up to the highest court in the country, the *Bundesverfassungsgericht*, the court which arbitrates on constitutional matters. (Interestingly, while the weight and authority of this court used to be invoked only in exceptional cases which exceeded the limits of the other courts, the call upon the *Bundesverfassungsgericht* has increased over the years as plaintiffs have argued their cases on constitutional grounds.) The question of surveillance by the state is the culmination of contestations surrounding Scientology. Only groups and movements which are perceived to present 'clear and present danger' to the constitutional state and/or to undermine or threaten the democratic structures on which the state is based are placed under surveillance. Extreme political groups, or any organization which is suspected of harboring terrorist motives against the state, would come under observation. The way in which the Church of Scientology has been perceived to embed itself in Germany—whether with regard to its 'deceptive' recruitment practices (the sale of expensive courses and equipment, at times to vulnerable individuals, at times resulting in personal bankruptcies), its treatment of members, the estrangement of members from their families, its efforts to 'infiltrate' public authorities, schools, and businesses, or its accusations that the German state persecutes the Church of Scientology in the same way as the Nazi regime persecuted the Jews, etc.—has struck at the very raw nerve centers which alert Germans to past experiences which must never be allowed to be repeated. This case reveals as much about the way in which the Church of Scientology is trying to insert itself into the German state, as it does about the way in which the German state understands and deals with religion. The sensibilities involved tend to be unknown, if not incomprehensible to outsiders, especially those whose constitutional provisions take a very different approach to religion and its role in society. Hence, the critical references in the US State Department's annual "International Religious Freedom Report" to the way in which Germany treats the Church of Scientology.

Where NRMs have mechanisms in place which allow them to adjust their message or the way in which they convey it to the particular cultural context in which they seek to embed themselves, barriers and obstacles may be overcome. The case of Mahikari's efforts to find a following in Europe may be cited as an example. Its initial 'strategy'

to simply transplant its original message from the country of origin (Japan) to Europe met with meagre success. This changed after Mahikari adjusted the message and presented it with a shift of emphasis (see e.g. Cornille, 1991). Therefore, like other religions, NRMs face the challenge of inculturation and of keeping the balance between national, regional and local adjustments on the one hand and the preservation of the center (both in physical and meta-physical terms), on the other. The process of inculturation is the very opposite, or perhaps the flip side, of the process that movements arising out of a local context need to undergo if they have national or global ambitions. Different states have different systems with regard to education, health, etc. which affect NRMs and are affected by NRMs. Stephen Kent (1999) discusses Scientology in terms of a transnational corporation. A comparison between the French and German states in the way they provide openings for NRMs and have dealt with them would show marked contrasts. France has devised a kind of black list of 'sects' and, in 1996, put in place an inter-ministerial office—now called the *Mission Interministerielle de Vigilence et de Lutte contre les Dérives Sectaires* (MIVILUDES)—whose role consists of following developments, collating information, and reporting to the French Parliament so that 'the protection of the individual, the free exercise of personal freedoms and the defence of human dignity in the strictest sense of the freedom of conscience and thought can be assured' (see MIVILUDES, 2005: 3; see Beckford, 2004a for a more detailed discussion of the French state and NRMs and Richardson, 2004 for further case studies in other countries). Using two case studies, the Sivananda Centers and Siddha Yoga, Véronique Altglas (2005) demonstrates how two Hindu movements have spread internationally and how they have adapted to the legal and cultural climate in France. There is no uniformity about the boundary/boundaries between state and religion, which also vary across time, and depend on how determined NRMs are to test existing boundaries (e.g. the case of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Germany), how politically ambitious they are, etc.

When NRMs insert themselves in different host societies, their activities can be disseminated instantly, so any authorities or organizations who take an interest in these can be alerted and mobilized, if need be. The case of Scientology's plan to set up major centers across Europe has been made public in the German media and has thus allowed city councils and other public authorities to formulate their responses and strategies. The insertion of NRMs in national states takes on yet a different dimension, when placed or debated within transnational contexts

and their respective legal systems, such as European-wide structures, especially the European courts, which tend to override national legislation. This is especially pertinent when human rights are invoked. There is a dearth of research and literature on this topic (but see Kent, 2003 with regard to Scientology).

Conclusion

The literature on the globalization of new religious movements is not vast (see e.g. Hexham and Poewe, 1997; Kent, 1999; Beckford, 2004b; Clarke, 2006). However, where authors have discussed this topic, the issues considered above have formed part of their expositions. Irving Hexham and Karla Poewe (1997), for example, very much see NRMs in relation to traditional world religions and folk religions and set them within cross-cultural contexts, thereby demonstrating that 'new' religions are not so new, but also highlighting the issues surrounding the question of boundaries. Lester Kurtz (1995: 191–209), too, sees NRMs in relation to the major world religions and places them within the wider context of multiculturalism as phenomena resulting from religious syncretism. He also sees the history of religious life in the United States—the continuous struggles of religious communities to coexist within a particular polity and geographic area—as anticipating and exemplifying aspects of the process which the global village has been experiencing. James Beckford's chapter on "New Religious Movements and Globalization" (Beckford, 2004b) argues that, despite truly global ideas and aspirations, the modes of operation of many NRMs remain 'merely transnational'. He also points out that the particular cultures from which NRMs have arisen clearly shape their ideas and images of globality, while the facilities offered by the Internet are a 'mixed blessing' for NRMs, with the advantages the Internet affords them most likely outweighed by the opportunities for anyone opposing NRMs to find a forum (2004b: 261–262). The last point ties in with the point made earlier about communication being 'double-edged'.

In the light of the above, NRMs may be regarded as both good and not so good examples of globalization processes. On the one hand, the development of some NRMs and their affiliated organizations follows some of the patterns identified as defining characteristics of globalization: the growing movement and exchange of 'goods' (be they material or immaterial) and people, the potential of information technology for

communication, the replication of practices and activities, the growth of transnational organizations, and processes of inculturation (see also Beckford, 2004a: 254). As already pointed out, Chidester's discussion of transnational businesses employing 'religious' content to make their goods culturally relevant and acceptable is pertinent to NRMs' activities in the global marketplace, when NRMs are seen as religions employing the commercial strategies of the 'secular' market. On the other hand, the distinctiveness of NRMs' cultural origins and backgrounds and the consequences this has for their successful insertion in other cultural spheres are potential barriers for NRMs going global. Some NRMs, as indicated, do not reach audiences beyond the regional or national boundaries within which they have sprung up, even if they claim their teachings to be of universal importance. Further, the internal dynamics of NRMs and their attitudes towards wider society and the world may militate against expansion on a global scale. The People's Temple retreated to a remote area of Guyana, establishing a compound removed from the world, as did the Branch Davidians and Aum Shinrikyo. While declaring their brand of communitarian living as blueprints for society at large, the tension between the group and the world makes at times for uneasy relationships. Again, a question of boundary. Groups like the ones just cited may feel threatened by wider society—a perception which can, as dramatic events have demonstrated, lead to violent confrontation, vicious attacks, and deadly destruction.

Further, although globalized environments make it hard for NRMs to hide, there is still the issue of a potential lack of transparency. This applies more generally to any complex international networks, but remains a particularly problematic aspect in relation to NRMs. Despite the possibilities offered by global communication in terms of available information, there is still the question of how much we 'really' know about (some) NRMs. In some ways they have a public and a private face—an aspect which researchers have (had) to contend with, sometimes at cost (see also Arweck, 2006). NRMs continue to, and in some ways are successful in, controlling the kind of information that is available about them, including their 'strategy' to contest what is said about them, to remove information from the public domain, and to add their own fodder to the rumor mills. The inbuilt partial access to communication we all have is conducive to restrictions on information. Therefore, as James Beckford (2004b: 258–261) points out, there are advantages and disadvantages which the impact of globalization has on NRMs. It will be interesting to follow the lines along which these

will unfold in the light of NRMs evolving further over time and more empirical research in this area becoming available.

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RELIGION AND PHASES OF GLOBALIZATION

George Van Pelt Campbell

Since about 1980, "globalization", Roland Robertson says, has "rapidly became one of the most employed and debated concepts of our time. But it has also acquired buzzword status, invoked in a broad range of contexts and for a large number of purposes" (Robertson, 2003: 1). In this chapter I will define globalization, examine models of the phases of globalization and then propose my own model. Having established the phases of globalization and their characteristics, I will turn to describing religion in each phase.[1]

Defining Globalization

Conceptions of globalization vary widely. Skeptics maintain that globalization is a myth (Held et al., 1999: 5–7).[2] Others maintain that although globalization is not a myth, much that is discussed under the topic is 'globaloney' (Veseth, 2005). One popular introduction to the subject even says "globalization is everything and its opposite" (Friedman, 2000: 406).[3] We must begin, therefore, by defining the term.

Globalization is often defined monolithically, as being synonymous, for example, with the worldwide expansion of western capitalism, or as a kind of western cultural imperialism (Robertson, 2003: 15–19).[4] While there is some truth in such conceptions, globalization is far broader. Robertson defines it as a concept that "refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a

[1] I am grateful to Gary Scott Smith, Roland Robertson, Mark W. Graham, and the editors for suggestions on a draft of this chapter.

[2] Those who consider globalization a myth typically define it in strictly economic terms. See Scholte's rebuttal of this argument in Scholte, 2005: 93–101.

[3] To be fair, Friedman actually defines globalization this way: "it is the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before. . . ." (Friedman, 2000, 9).

[4] For a thoughtful evaluation of the cultural imperialism thesis, see Tomlinson, 1991.

whole"[5] (Robertson, 1992: 8). He further states, "the world has become increasingly characterized by (1) *extensive connectivity*, or interrelatedness and (2) *extensive global consciousness*, a consciousness which continues to become more and more reflexive" (Robertson, 2003: 6). Drawing from Robertson, I define globalization as *increasing extensity of world interdependence and increasing intensity of world consciousness*. The term "increasing" highlights that globalization is an ongoing process, not a static state of affairs, and that its tendency is to increase over time, although the process has been uneven and has involved reversals.

Key in my definition is the focus on consciousness. Changes in thinking that occur as a result of global interdependence are every bit as important as other factors affected by it, such as political or economic ones.[6] Globalization profoundly influences norms, values, religion, and other ideas and beliefs. I also assume that globalization involves political, economic, social and cultural dimensions (Robertson, 2003: 3; Robertson and White, 2005), although it is neither adequately nor predominantly defined as any particular one of these.

Existing Models of the Phases of Globalization

I now turn to the historical trajectory of globalization. How long has globalization been occurring, and through what phases of development has it passed? I will survey three models of the phases of globalization and then propose my own. I must acknowledge, as Jan Aart Scholte does, that "any periodization is artificially neat. In practice socio-historical developments cannot be divided into wholly discrete phases.... Nevertheless, the historical shorthand of periods provides helpful general bearings" (2005: 86).

Types of Models

Conceptions of the chronology of globalization come in three basic types (Scholte, 2005, 19–20): cyclical models, linear models, which give

[5] Consciousness of the globe is not highlighted in Scholte's definition of globalization, although he discusses it repeatedly (e.g., Scholte, 2005, 73, 89–90, 99–101, 116). Held et. al., do not include it in their otherwise useful definition (Held et al., 1999, 16).

[6] I have developed a theory of one such effect on consciousness, the relativizing of tradition, in Campell, 2005.

globalization a long history, and linear models which give globalisation a short history. Differing definitions of globalization naturally result in different criteria by which to measure its advance, and thus lead to these different understandings of its history.

Defining globalization in economic terms (sometimes including also human migration) can lead to seeing it as cyclical. However, some who define it economically see 'globalization' as being a myth, believing that there is nothing distinctive about contemporary trade except for its volume. My definition of globalization precludes a cyclical view.

Another type of economic approach sees globalization as linear and recent. Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, etc.), for example, equates 'the modern world-system' with the rise of 'the capitalist world-economy', which he sees as beginning only in the 15th century. But those who define globalization more broadly are critical of Wallerstein's narrow focus, in spite of his substantial depth (Beyer, 1994: 15–21; Robertson, 1992: 61–84).

My definition of globalization sees it as linear and as having a long history. It is models of this sort which will be analyzed here.

Robertson's Minimal Phase Model of Globalization

Robertson proposed a model of the phases of globalization over time in his pioneering work *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (1992). This model grows out of his definition of globalization as involving global interdependence and consciousness. Thus the criteria for the determining phases of globalization are increases in interdependence and global consciousness. While he holds that the globalization process has been proceeding for many centuries, his model traces "the major constraining tendencies which have been operating in relatively recent history" in regard to what he calls the "global field" (1992: 57). Robertson's global field is composed of four "reference points" around which globalization is constructed: individual selves, national societies, the world system of societies, and humankind (1992: 25–31). Robertson also properly emphasizes the self-limiting nature of globalization by introducing the concept of 'glocalization' (1992: 173–4), describing the reciprocal effects of the global and the local upon each other. He proposes the following model (1992: 57–60):

Phase I: The Germinal Phase (1400–1750 in Europe)
Phase II: The Incipient Phase (1750–1870s mainly in Europe)

Phase III: The Take-Off Phase (1870s–1925)
Phase IV: The Struggle-for-Hegemony Phase (1925–late 1960s)
Phase V: The Uncertainty Phase (late 1960s–early 1990s)[7]

The Global Transformations Phases of Globalization

Another model of the phases of globalization has been proposed by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton in *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (1999). They define globalization as "a process (or set of processes) which embodies transformations in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact—generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power" (Held *et al.*, 1999: 16). By 'extensity' they refer to roughly what Robertson means by 'interdependence' (15). By 'intensity' they mean the (degree of) regularity of interdependence, which over time tends toward greater intensification. 'Velocity' refers to "the speeding up of global interactions and processes as the development of worldwide systems of transport and communication increases the potential velocity of the global diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people" (15). 'Impact' refers to the reciprocal effects of the global and the local upon each other (what Robertson terms 'glocalization'). Based on these considerations (and several other elaborate distinctions not detailed here) they propose this scheme (414–44; 432–35, 438–39):

Premodern Globalization (c. 9,000–7,000 BCE to c. 1500 CE with the rise of the West)
Early Modern Globalization (c. 1500–1850s, the rise of the West)
Modern Globalization (c. 1850s–1950s, rise of the nation-state)
Contemporary Globalization (1950s to present)

Scholte's Phases of Globalization

Scholte proposes another model in his *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (2005). He defines globalization as "the spread of transplanetary—and in recent times also more particularly supraterritorial—connections

[7] I understand that Roland Robertson is currently working on formulating a new phase of globalization which begins with September 11, 2001 [see his chapter in this volume].

between people" (2005: 59). He elaborates, "Globality in the conception adopted here has two qualities. The more general feature, transplanetary connectivity, has figured in human history for many centuries. The more specific characteristic, supraterritoriality, is relatively new to contemporary history" (2005: 60). "Supraterritorial relations are social connections that substantially transcend territorial geography", such as the instantaneous global links possible through telecommunications (Scholte, 2005: 61). His phases of globalization (87–117) are:

Intimations of Globality: to the Nineteenth Century
Incipient Globalization: to the mid-Twentieth Century
Contemporary Accelerated Globalization: mid-Twentieth Century to Present

The three models compare this way:

Robertson	Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton	Scholte
	c. 9,000 BCE–CE 1500 Premodern Globalization	To 19th Century Intimations of Globality
CE 1400–1750 Germinal Phase	1500–1850s Early Modern Globalization	
1750–1870s Incipient Phase		To the mid-20th Century Incipient Globalization
	1850s–1950s Modern Globalization	
1870s–1925 Take-Off Phase		
1925–late 1960s Struggle For Hegemony Phase	1950s–Present Contemporary Globalization	Mid-20th century forward Contemporary Accelerated Globalization
Late 1960s–early 1990s Uncertainty Phase		

A Proposed Model of Religion and the Phases of Globalization

The following model of the phases of globalization is based upon my definition of globalization as *increasing extensity of world interdependence and increasing intensity of world consciousness*. Thus 'objective' interdependence and 'subjective' consciousness of the world are the principle criteria used to determine the phases of globalization. I use names that reflect the particular world consciousness which distinguishes each phase.

Religion is defined here substantively rather than functionally, following Christian Smith: "*religions are sets of beliefs, symbols, and practices about the reality of superempirical orders that make claims to organize and guide human life*.[8] Put more simply, if less precisely, what we mean by religion is an ordinarily unseen reality that tells us what truly is and how we therefore ought to live" (Smith, 2003: 98). Religion functions to establish *personal identity*—a sense of meaning and belonging in social groups (Smith, 1998, 2003). It also contributes to *societal order*, that is, to the effort to define the contours of 'the good society'. This impulse has motivated attempts to improve society, and not infrequently involved it in power struggles and sometimes persecution when it seems a threat to established power.

Religion's functions are affected by pluralism. Since each new phase of globalization represents a new phase of interdependence with others and consciousness of others' ideas, the phases of globalization involve exposure to alternative ways of thinking and believing. Such exposure can *relativize* people's tradition, their way of seeing the world. Relativization is suddenly seeing one's own beliefs differently as a result of exposure to other beliefs, such as when a Christian, suddenly acquainted with Islam, begins to wonder if Christianity is 'true' or actually just a particular 'viewpoint'. The result is a sense of threat and insecurity because fundamental beliefs are called into question (Campbell, 2005; Beyer, 1994; Robertson, 1992). Predictable reactions to relativization

[8] Smith depends upon George Thomas, who, in turn, draws from but modifies Roland Robertson (Smith, 2003: 98, note 4). I use this definition because it is concise. For precision I prefer Robertson's original definition: "Religious culture is that set of beliefs and symbols (and values deriving directly therefrom) pertaining to a distinction between an empirical and a super-empirical, transcendent reality, the affairs of the empirical being subordinated in significance to the non-empirical. Second, we define religious action simply as: action shaped by an acknowledgment of the empirical/super-empirical distinction" (Robertson, 1970: 47).

are many (Campbell, 2005: 83–91), ranging from vigorously defending one's tradition, to skepticism out of despair of finding truth.

The following model of phases of globalization will describe each phase's characteristics, and then examine aspects of religion which reflect the characteristics of the phase. Also noted will be such features as religion as a globalizing force and as a contributor to global culture, global violence by and against religion, and religious and anti-religious movements influenced by global forces or as reactions to globalization's relativizing of traditions.

The Inhabited World Phase: Beginning to 1400 CE

Defining the Phase

Widespread interdependence and consciousness of the world existed in ancient times. A term commonly used by the Hellenistic Greeks and also later by the Romans to signify this was *oikoumene*, which means 'the inhabited world'. Robertson and Inglis call this pervasive consciousness of an interdependent world the 'Global *Animus*' ('global spirit'), and they provide abundant primary source material documenting the global *animus* among "Greco-Roman social elites from the Hellenistic period onwards through to the height of Roman imperial power in the first two centuries after Christ" (2004: 39, 47; 2006). Diogenes, the fourth century BCE Greek, is famous for saying, "I am a citizen of the world" (*kosmopolites*). This 'cosmopolitan' outlook was a routine feature of the Hellenistic world created by Alexander the Great and among the Cynics and Stoics, and is thoroughly attested in the ancient historian Polybius (Robertson and Inglis, 2004: 40–41; Inglis and Robertson, 2005; 2006). Ancient empires often saw themselves as masters of the entire inhabited world, even though they also recognized that there were others outside of their empire. Mann (1986: 238–39) documents this consciousness in the Persian Empire, which began in 550 BCE. The Romans, from the 2nd century BCE to the 3rd century CE, called this their *imperium sine fine*, "imperial power without [territorial] limit" and considered it to encompass the *orbis terrarum*, the "whole [orb-shaped] world", symbolizing it with a globe (Graham, 2006: 29–35). By the end of the 4th century CE this Roman rhetoric had been absorbed into Christian conceptions of a universal Christian empire (Graham, 2006: 159). Muslims of the eighth and subsequent centuries called their vision of a transworld Islamic community the *umma* (Scholte, 2005: 87–88), illustrated in the later portion of this phase in the travels of

Ibn Battuta (Dunn, 1986). Robertson and Inglis correctly conclude that "by attending to ancient evidence as to 'global' attitudes and 'global consciousness', one may begin to overcome the presentism implicit in many contemporary accounts of globalization" (2004: 38).

Though this phase falls short of the modern extent of globalization, the expansive territorial interdependence, and the widespread consciousness of a unified 'world' symbolized among the Romans by a globe, justifies considering this as the first phase of globalization, containing the elements which are prerequisite for the globally-extended 'globalization' of modern times.

Religion and the Phase

Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton comment, "the key agents of globalization in this epoch were threefold: political and military empires, world religions, and . . . migratory movements . . ." (1999: 415). They continue:

> the era witnessed the emergence, expansion and stabilization of what have come to be known as world religions. Their universal messages of salvation, the capacity to cross and unify cultural divisions, their infrastructure of theocracies and widely circulating holy texts constituted one of the great episodes of interregional and intercivilizational encounters. However, while their reach exceeded that of nearly all early empires, world religions remained initially confined to one or two regions or civilizations.

Held *et al.*, observe, "in terms of their impact, there is little doubt that the world religions are among humanity's most significant cultural innovations. World religions have furnished religious and political elites with immense power and resources, be it in their capacity to mobilize armies and peoples, in their development of transcultural senses of identity and allegiance or in their provision of the entrenched theological and legal infrastructure of societies" (1999: 333).

'World religions' founded in the era include Hinduism (c. 2000 BCE), Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Shinto in early in 2nd millennium BCE, Buddhism, Jainism, Confucianism and Taoism in the 6th century BCE, Christianity in the 1st century CE, Islam in CE 622.

Religion served as a globalizing force in this phase by stimulating travel. Lewis writes, "in all accounts of ancient travel religion is accorded the largest role as a motive for travel, even among the poor" and these pilgrimages also served as a major source of news and of global consciousness, particularly after the 4th century (Graham, 2006: 117).

Religion served as a source of integration and identity in numerous ways. After the collapse of Rome in 410, Christianity "provided an *ecumene*, a universal fellowship across Europe, within which social relations were stabilized even in the absence of political unity" (Mann, 1986: 463). Meanwhile, by 715 Muslim rule extended from Spain to India, and all across the Mediterranean shores of North Africa. The cultural peak of Islam was reached during the transcontinental Abbasid Empire in the years 750 to 1258. After the collapse of Rome in the 5th century, law was deeply influenced by Christianity, since the church was the most viable institution to maintain social order. Church law also served as a major source of civil law, though there were other influences as well, such as the Visigothic and Salic law codes. Between 1075 and 1122 secular law arose in the West, typically by removing religious specifics from Christian canon law (Berman, 1983).

This phase saw the birth of universities at the impetus of religious faiths. Pride of place goes to Al-Ahzar in Cairo, the world's oldest university, founded by Muslims in CE 972. In Europe, writes Stark, "The university was a Christian invention" (Stark, 2003: 62), arising in Paris and Bologna in the mid-12th century and in Oxford and Cambridge around 1200, and multiplying in the 13th and 14th centuries.

Religious violence was a prominent feature of this phase, the Christian Crusades (1095–1270) perhaps being the leading example of this. Stark argues that they were partly the result of the inner logic of monotheism, and articulates a theory which offers an explanation for why the period of the Crusades is also the period in which Christian anti-Semitism and heresy-hunting became prominent, and that also accounts for why Muslim persecution of Jews coincided with Christian anti-Semitism (Stark, 2001: 115–72).

Violence against religion also marked the phase. Well-known are the persecutions of Christians by Nero (64–68 CE) and Diocletian (303–13) due to the perceived threat of Christians to the Empire. Less known in the West is the persecution of Christians in Persia 339–41 CE by Sha Pur II, which produced deaths estimated to be from tens of thousands to 190,000 (Irvin and Sunquist, 2001: 196; Moffett, 1998).

The World Exploration Phase: 1400–1815, mainly in Europe

Defining the Phase

This phase is dated to coincide with the beginnings of the Renaissance, since together with the sixteenth century Reformation and the eighteenth

century Enlightenment, it produced in this period new senses of global interdependence, of consciousness of global interdependence, of the individual and of 'humanity'. The Renaissance slogan *ad fontes* ('back to the sources') captures the spirit of a time when Greek, Roman and Patristic sources were revived as sources of inspiration, eloquence and education. The phase is named for the great global voyages of exploration which began in the mid-15th century, and which created an expanded global consciousness. Of these voyages' effects, Norman Hampson writes of the "growing tendency to see European (i.e., Christian) civilization in a world (i.e., pagan) context. The sixteenth century [was] excited by discovery, as the limits of the known world were driven back" (1968: 25). This is the period of the "rise of the West" (Held et al., 1999: 418), of the invention of printing in the West (1450s), of the European 'discovery' of the Americas, and of the spread of the Gregorian calendar.

Religion and the Phase

World exploration coincided with the exploration of nature through science. Religion contributed to global culture by contributing to the rise of science in the Western world, traditionally dated from 1543 (Copernicus' heliocentric theory). Stark (2003: 121–99) demonstrates the formative influence of Christianity in the rise of science, pointing out that it arose out of incremental developments in the Scholastic universities, and also that it "could only arise in a culture dominated by belief in a conscious, rational, all-powerful Creator (Stark, 2003: 197). Stark constructed a data set of the 52 'scientific stars' from Copernicus' generation to those born in 1680, limiting the list to active scientists who made significant contributions, coding the individuals for nationality and religious devotion (devout, conventionally religious, skeptic), among other things. Stark's conclusion: "those who made the 'Scientific Revolution' included an unusually large number of devout Christians—more than 60 percent qualified as devout and only two, Edmund Halley and Paracelsus, qualified as skeptics . . . these data make it entirely clear that religion played a substantial role in the rise of science" (2003: 163).

Devoted to the Renaissance slogan, *ad fontes*, and sustained by the recent invention of printing, the Protestant Reformation stimulated book printing and circulation, and Luther and Calvin were early advocates of universal education and general literacy (for both sexes).

Violence by the religions figured prominently in this phase. The Spanish Inquisition began in 1478. The European Wars of Religion lasted from 1562 until 1648. The Christian witch-hunts developed in this period, beginning at the start of the 14th century, but flourishing from about 1450–1650, and dissipating after 1750. Stark offers a theory for why Christian monotheism alone produced witch-hunts (and for when and where it did so), and for why Islam never did (Stark, 2003: 201–88).

The 18th century Enlightenment, though not uniformly anti-religious, launched a secular intelligentsia in the West partly in response to the widespread religious violence of the period. Deism appeared in the 17th and 18th centuries as an attempt at rational religion.

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War and introduced a nascent form of religious tolerance.

The International Relations Phase: 1815–1870, mainly in Europe

Defining the Phase

As a result of the "rapid changes brought by the Industrial Revolution" and its resulting urbanization, even in the more backward regions of Europe "from the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards many had the sensation of riding a roller coaster to the edge of chaos" (Mosse, 1988: 12). The period of peace, which began in 1815 after the termination of the Napoleonic Wars, experienced such change and innovation that it has been called "the birth of the modern" (Johnson, 1991), requiring "an adjustment of human consciousness" (Mosse, 1988: 13). The proliferation of zoos in this phase contributed to global consciousness, and newspapers became popular from the late 18th century, increasing global awareness and relativizing traditions (Mosse, 1988: 14; Turner, 1985: 47–8). The railroad (1830s–1840s), and the growing use of the bicycle seemed to give a new speed to time (Mosse, 1988: 14). Nation-states became firmly established and global interdependence was perceived in terms of 'international relations'. International agencies developed international regulations and international exhibitions. Greater consciousness of 'humanity' developed, as well as a new concept of 'rights' identified especially with the American Revolution. Confidence in human 'progress' became common currency, a secularization of Christian 'providence' (Turner, 1985: 35–43).

The phase spawned two broad reactions to the upheaval of the Industrial Revolution: rational reactions, which sought to apply Enlightenment

principles to transform society (such as liberalism and Marxism), and irrational ones (including nationalism and Romanticism) which sought community through finding reality beneath the appearance of things (Mosse, 1998).

Religion and the Phase

Both the rational and the irrational approaches that became prominent in this phase effected religious results. Romanticism gave impetus to a Christian renaissance, which continued throughout the century as both Catholics and Protestants attempted to respond to the problems of the age. Over the century Christians became increasingly preoccupied with social questions (Mosse, 1988: 251). The rational kind of reaction is expressed in a new religious movement which arose about 1805: Unitarianism. The beginning of a broad religiously liberal movement, Unitarians sought to create a rational Christian faith by abandoning the apparently irrational doctrine of the Trinity (Hutchison, 1992: 3).

One response to the widespread sense of chaos was that, "motivated by Christian principles . . . the modern, organized world peace movement began in the United States in 1815 and in England one year later" (Wallbank, *et al.*, 1969: 2:444). The second phase of the movement began in the 1860s, was more secular, and sponsored, among other things, the 1889 Universal Peace Congress.

The new ideas about human rights found expression in 1789 in the US Bill of Rights, the first provision of which was to separate religion from state sponsorship and to guarantee religious freedom. These innovations proved boons to religious strength, in contrast to the moribund state-sponsored religion approach characteristic of medieval and modern Europe (Stark, 2003: 33–36; Stark and Finke, 2000).

Reflecting the new consciousness of the rights of humans, Christianity contributed to two global movements expressing commitment to human rights: the abolition of slavery and defense of the poor. Stark writes (2003: 291),

> Just as science arose only once, so, too, did effective moral opposition to slavery. Christian theology was essential to both. This is not to deny that early Christians condoned slavery. It is to recognize that of all the world's religions, including the three great monotheisms, only in Christianity did the idea develop that slavery was sinful and must be abolished.

Proposing a theory which accounts for why polytheisms, Islam and secular philosophy failed to effectively oppose slavery, Stark (2003: 291–365)

points out that the success of the Western abolition movement set the global modern standard against slavery.

New ideas relativized Christian tradition, as reflected in Schleiermacher's *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (1799), which combined Romanticism with pietism and argued for an accommodation of traditional Christian beliefs to the newer views of science and rationality (Mosse, 1998: 51–2). The first Vatican Council (1869–70) positioned the Church against the *Zeitgeist*.

The Modern World Phase: 1870–1914

Defining the Phase

The period beginning about 1870 was a 'watershed' in the public consciousness of Europe (Mosse, 1988: 23) and in the USA (Lears, 1981), forming "a period during which the increasingly manifest globalizing tendencies of previous periods and places gave way to a single, inexorable form" of globalization, leading Robertson to dub this globalization's "Take-off Phase" (Robertson, 1992: 59). During this period, cultural patterns were established which persist in the West into the 21st century. Lears describes the patterns as "consumer culture", an anti-modern reaction characterized by "the shift from a Protestant ethos of salvation through self-denial to a therapeutic ideal of self-fulfillment in *this* world through exuberant health and intense experience" (Lears, 1981: xvi; Rieff, 1987).

During this period consciousness of the 'modern world' developed. 'Modernity' was a major interest of the growing academic discipline of sociology in its classical period (c. 1880–1920), and was attended by a sense of social upheaval and a reaction to 'mass society' (Mosse, 1988: 11–27, 251; Lears, 1981). The urbanization that had characterized the 19th century increased dramatically in the last three decades of the century, reflected in Tonnies' *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887). Global communications sharply increased with the invention of the wireless telegraph and the telephone (1876), and together with new technology including the automobile seemed to accelerate time and to abolish space (Mosse, 1998: 14). World time was established, international competitions and events such as the modern Olympic Games (1896) and the Nobel Prizes (1901) began. There was a growing concept of mankind, stimulated in part by great human migrations.

Religion and the Phase

During this period the Protestant liberalism which began in the early 19th century became prominent in American Christianity (Hutchison, 1992). Hutchison defines "the modernist impulse" by three characteristics: (1) conscious adaptation of religious ideas to modern culture, (2) belief that God is present in and revealed through cultural progress, and (3) belief that human society was moving toward realization of the kingdom of God (Hutchison, 1992: 2). The relativizing of Christian tradition by cultural ideas was met by adaptation to the new cultural commitments to progress and rationalism.

The increasing preoccupation with social questions, which began in the early 19th century, continued in the transcontinental 'social gospel' movement in Protestant liberalism, which paralleled secular social concern in this period and issued in what Smith has called a "search for social salvation" (Mosse, 1988: 251–66; Smith, 2000). The Roman Catholic Church issued *Rerum Novarum* in 1891 affirming solidarity with the poor and the working class, continuing a response to the results of the Industrial Revolution which began after 1848 (Mosse, 1988: 251).

The therapeutic impulse became manifest in a new form of Protestantism with the founding of Pentecostalism in 1901 (Synan, 1971). Highly emotional, the movement was deeply committed to intense personal religious experience including direct revelations from God, the seeking of miracles and its best-known hallmark, 'speaking in tongues', believed to be an immediate experience of the divine in which God speaks through the recipient.

Global religious consciousness led to attempts at accommodation: Christians created the Ecumenical movement, and clashed over accommodation in the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy. American Reform Judaism began in Pittsburgh in 1885, and in 1893 religious leaders from around the globe convened at the first Parliament of the World's Religions.

Another reaction to the times was the despair of finding truth, which came to expression in the work of Nietzsche and the establishment for the first time in Western history of a critical mass of unbelief, both agnosticism and atheism (Turner, 1985; Mosse, 1988).

The World Conflict Phase: 1914–1968

Defining the Phase

This phase is named for the world-wide conflict for dominance of the modern world order, and the attempts to mediate it, which was a dominant concern in the period. World War I painfully focused world attention on the interrelatedness of the entire globe and ended the 'isolationism' from world affairs so popular among Americans. The League of Nations was formed (1920–1946) to prevent future wars and its failure was signaled by the Second World War. The United Nations succeeded the League in 1945. The 'Cold War' between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated global relations from 1947, peaking and declining after 1968, the high-water mark of the Vietnam conflict, the most notable of the 'proxy wars' between the great powers. Spurred by the Holocaust, the concept of 'humanity' crystallized in this period, expressed formally in 1966 in the United Nations' 'International Bill of Human Rights'. Global consciousness was expressed by reference to First, Second and Third worlds. Finally, the relative influence of the nation-state began to wane after the mid-twentieth century (Scholte, 2005: 185–223; Rudolph and Piscatori, 1997; Robertson, 1992).

Religion and the Phase

In a period characterized by anxiety, and coterminous with the weakening of the nation-state as a source of identity, many turned to religion. Throughout this phase, Protestantism grew exponentially in Latin America (Martin, 1990), Africa and Asia (Jenkins, 2002; Sanneh and Carpenter, 2005), signaling the transfer of the center of Christian gravity from the North to the global South. Christianity has also grown rapidly in China, though there are no reliable figures (Tu Weiming, 1999). Pentecostalism accounted for the lion's share of the growth, popular in the West for its therapeutic appeal, and at least in part in Africa, due to its resonance with animist culture.

Another important reflection of the conflict of the period is the creation of American 'fundamentalism'. Marsden writes of the year 1919 that "An overwhelming atmosphere of crisis gripped America during the immediately [sic] postwar period. The year 1919 especially was characterized by a series of real as well as imagined terrors" (Marsden, 1980: 153). Relativized moral standards, fear of foreigners, the Red Scare, the disorientations caused by war and its end, and other social

problems produced an atmosphere of alarm. He continues, "This perception of cultural crisis, in turn, appears to have created a greater sense of theological urgency. Therefore, fundamentalist theological militancy appears intimately related to a second factor, the American social experience connected with World War I. . . . These ideas, and the cultural crisis that bred them, revolutionized fundamentalism. More precisely, they created it (although certainly not *ex nihilo*) in its classic form" (Marsden, 1980: 141, 149).

The year 1959 also saw the birth of neo-Pentecostalism (or the 'charismatic' renewal movement), another therapeutically-oriented form of Protestantism more adapted to the middle classes than working-class Pentecostalism. Whereas Pentecostals had formed a series of denominations, neo-Pentecostalism took the Pentecostal experience into established denominations. Beginning in the Episcopal Church, by 1962 the renewal had spread to the Church of England in Great Britain, and by 1967 the Roman Catholic charismatic movement had begun. Growth of the movement was aided by its emphasis on personal experience of God, a corresponding de-emphasis on formal doctrine, and its ecumenical spirit (Quebedeaux, 1983).

The 1960s' US was host to an explosion of religion. Some strands were counter-cultural, while others were consistent with the therapeutic ethos of America. Imports from around the world proliferated, such as the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (1965). New religious movements (NRMs) also sprang up, such as Ron Hubbard's Church of Scientology (1953). Even Europe experienced new religious fervor, giving birth to the Wicca movement in 1954.

Partly in response to the violence directed against the Jews in the Holocaust, the State of Israel was founded in 1948, generating heightened religious tension and violence in the Middle East, as well as against the US for being a friend of Israel.

Arab nationalism grew in this period as a reaction to colonialism and its marginalization of Islam.

Growing global recognition of rights was reflected by the American Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, led by Christian ministers. It became a major change-agent in American life and consciously drew on religious themes, including the Biblical story of the exodus of Israel out of slavery in Egypt to freedom (Smith, 1991).

Religious groups also worked to respond to the *Zeitgeist* and to ameliorate conflict. Protestants founded the World Council of Churches in 1948 to foster global Christian cooperation. The Roman Catholic

Second Vatican Council (1963–65) brought dramatic changes within Catholicism and also a marked reorientation to an irenic spirit toward both Protestants and the world religions.

The Global Consciousness Phase: 1969 to 2001

Defining the Phase

The United States' 1969 moon landing symbolized the heightened 'global' consciousness which had begun in the late 1960s. Global environmental consciousness and concern for global overpopulation grew from seeds planted in the 1960s. The number of global institutions, corporations, movements and advocacy groups sharply increased, as did the regularity, speed and impact of global communications through communications satellites and particularly through the internet. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 generated talk of a 'new world order' and the perceived global victory of democracy was proclaimed as the 'end of history'. Marshall McLuhan discussed "the global village" in 1960, and early academic discussions include Wilbert Moore's, "Global Sociology: The World as a Singular System" (1966) and Roland Robertson's "Interpreting Globality" (1983).

Religion and the Phase

Global consciousness relativized traditions, leading to a sense of threat that is reflected in numerous religious developments in this phase. Perhaps the most dramatic is the emergence of global religious terrorism onto the world stage. In the late 1990s, 26 of 56 recognized terrorist groups in the world were religious (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 6). While terrorism is a prominent feature of radical Islam, it is also present in numerous other world religions. Partly a reaction against the encroachments of global culture and partly motivated by a desire to advance a particular approach to global order, terrorism is often justified as self-defense by those who perceive themselves as the victims of hostile forces (Juergensmeyer, 2003). Muslim (and other) terrorism is also motivated by antipathy toward changes in the West that have developed out of the Enlightenment and other modern forces, changes which have made the West different from what it once was and different from what is still highly valued by many people less shaped by these changes. Western culture, although in part admired and sought after, is also widely regarded as barbarian because of those perceptions of it as embodying disregard for religion, sexual promiscuity, and lack of

honour, among other things (Pearse, 2004). There have also been Muslim attempts to articulate Muslim alternatives to terrorism (An-Na'im, 1990, Wickham, 2005).

Global consciousness stimulated the Second Parliament of the World's Religions in 1993 in Chicago. An overarching concern of the conclave was for world peace and the part that religion plays in that quest—for good or for bad. One major result of the Parliament was the signing of a document entitled, "Declaration Towards a Global Ethic" (Küng and Kuschel, 1998). It is based upon the convictions that (1) there is no peace among nations without peace among the religions; (2) there is no peace among the religions without dialogue between the religions, and; (3) there is no dialogue between the religions without investigation of the foundations of the religions.

The global consciousness characteristic of this phase is evident in the approach to religion of the Dalai Lama. An active participant in the 1993 Parliament of the World's Religions, he is deeply devoted to peace. For his extensive efforts to advance peace in Asia he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. He is also intent on advancing peace among the world's religions, which he compares to items on a menu. Religions are our spiritual nourishment, he believes, and as people have different tastes in food, so people have different tastes and needs in religion. Thus he does not suggest that Americans and Europeans become Buddhists. Instead he recommends that they stick to their own religious traditions, seeing religion as a matter of personal choice (Peterson, Wunder and Mueller, 1999: 73). Global consciousness (of the potential for religious conflict) has relativized the absoluteness of the Four Noble Truths.

Another effect of globalization's consciousness of other religions has been a dramatic change in American religion in this phase. Wuthnow characterized it as a shift from dwelling in established corporate spiritual homes to 'seeking' one's own style of religious experience, cafeteria-style (Wuthnow, 1998), and shows that it has molded established religions and helped establish newer ones. Roof described the new "spiritual marketplace" where redrawn religious boundaries facilitate a spiritually questing generation (Roof, 1999). Wolfe summarized by saying "we have reached the end of religion as we have known it" (Wolfe, 2003: 264).

Religion continued as a source of identity and a resource for social order in a world rife with pluralism and diversity. Mormonism's growth in the 20th century brought it to the brink of being the newest world religion (Stark, 2005b). The Iranian Revolution (1978–79), the South

African Anti-Apartheid movement (1983–90), Poland's Solidarity Party (began 1980) and the American Christian Right represent religiously motivated attempts to change or reconstitute social order (Smith, 1996). This phase experienced the appearance of Liberation Theology in Latin America, a radical Roman Catholic identification with the poor which promoted social and economic justice and opposition to governments which denied it (Robertson, 1986; Smith, 1991).

Global environmental consciousness has stimulated religious environmentalism (Beyer, 1994: 206–24). Beyer writes, "ecological issues have shifted from the margins, both in the religious system and in the broader global society" (Beyer, 1994: 206). In 1989 Pope John Paul II issued, "Peace with God the Creator, Peace with all of Creation", the first papal statement devoted exclusively to ecology. In 1990 the World Council of Churches entitled their global conference in Seoul, Korea, "Justice, Peace and the integrity of Creation". Beyer concludes, "As these examples show, the centre of gravity of religious environmentalism has been very much among Christians and Christian organizations, but certainly not to the exclusion of actors from other traditions" (Beyer, 1994: 207).

The Global Governance Phase: began 2001

Defining the Phase

The terrorist attacks upon the United States on September 11, 2001 may have inaugurated a new phase in the globalization process. Dispelling the hope for declining world conflict which flowered after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it initiated the 'global war on terror'. There seems to be growing recognition of the need for 'global governance' as the only viable means to address this new threat (and others). Scholte summarizes it succinctly: "globalization could not unfold without governance arrangements. . . ." (2005: 140). What seems likely is that the next phase will be characterized by a growing recognition of the need for global governance.

Robertson raised this issue in 1992 in his discussion of "images of world order" (75–83). He elaborated four possible arrangements, which he denominates *Global Gemeinschaft I* and *II* and *Global Gesellschaft I* and *II*. I propose that the most likely shape of this future global governance is his decentralized version of *Gesellschaft II*, a global federation of nations, but one stronger than the current United Nations.

Conclusions

Religion has been ubiquitous in human history, has influenced and reflected numerous social trends, and has contributed much to human societies, for good and for ill. It has competed for power, stimulated social movements, generated violence, sustained social reform, contributed to the common good and justified the most egregious evils. It has brought out of humanity its most noble and most degraded characteristics.

It has also been intimately related to the phases of globalization, and an important influence on social order. Globalization is bringing the West's conviction, borne out of bitter experience, that religion is best separated from government, face-to-face with Islamic and other ideas about how to create the good society. Samuel Huntington (1996) seems correct about at least one thing: whatever clashes the future involves as we seek to negotiate the challenges of a global community, religion will certainly be at the heart of it.

The recent phases of globalization have brought the world religious terrorism and Mother Teresa. Religion produces both. Juergensmeyer may be right to conclude his study of religious terrorism by saying, "In a curious way, then, the cure for religious violence may ultimately lie in a renewed appreciation for religion itself" (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 240).

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PART THREE

KEY ISSUES IN THE RELATION OF RELIGION, GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE

RELIGION AND ECOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

Laurel Kearns

While most scholars of globalization focus on the economic, political, communicative and cultural realms of 'the world becoming one place', many also mention, at least in an aside, environmentalism as a 'natural' vehicle for this growing awareness (Robertson, 1995; Tomlinson, 1999). Relatively few, however, discuss religiously based environmentalism (Beyer, 1992; 1994), the topic of this chapter, although it is a clear example of what Barber describes as one of the imperatives of globalization, or of the "shrinking of the world and diminishing the salience of national borders" (Barber, 1992: 54).[1] In the language of one of the founders of the discussion on religion and globalization, Roland Robertson's description of globalization as "the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole" is an apt description of the role played by the religious environmental discourses explored below (2004 [1992]: 8).

Scientific reports of finding soot in the Arctic, generated thousands of miles away, or of remote species carrying industrial pollutants serve to reinforce the growing (and in these instances, insidious) understanding of the connection of everything on the planet. Shifting weather/climate patterns which then shift the availability of natural resources, also shift the politics and economics of regions around the globe, from the increasing desertification of Northern Africa (central to the conflicts there such as in Darfur) to crashed fisheries-based economies off northeastern North America. In other words, the interconnectedness and interdependence of eco-systems, or the 'environment' (a term that denotes all of the bio-physical around the human), is busy asserting 'itself' into the world of humanly constructed social systems. Zygmunt Bauman (2006) in *Liquid Fear* talks about the cascading consequences of

[1] In addition to an ecological imperative, Barber lists three other imperatives of globalization that lead to this shrinking: a market imperative, a resource imperative and an information-technological one.

environmental disasters in such an interconnected world, thus emphasizing the underside of realizing that the world is one place. International efforts to address concerns over global warming, by definition, reinforce the interlinking of places and actions around the globe, and invoke the economic, political, communicative and cultural aspects of globalization. The image of the 'fragile planet', as seen from space, became the potent symbol for the anti-nuclear and environmental movements. It is the paramount environmental statement of the "global human-species condition" (Robertson, 2004: 76). For both movements, this potent symbol of 'earth-as-our-only-home' embodies how they are obvious carriers of discourses that heighten the awareness of the world as one place, one planet, which is an essential aspect of processes of globalization, as Robertson (1992) emphasizes.

Bringing environmental discourses, movements, and physical realities into the discussion of globalization heightens awareness of the difference in the various meanings of globalization, and the different aspects of the various, interdependent processes labeled as such. Robertson's (1995) turn to the use of 'glocalization' to replace many discussions of globalization is particularly relevant to an examination of environmentalism. Headlines of the signs of global warming reinforce the global/particular poles of globalization, as what happens in one particular place (melting of ice caps and glaciers, for example) has local implications even as it is an indicator of global climate change and has global implications and becomes part of the universalizing discourse of global warming. This is clearly an example of glocalilty, as Robertson uses the term to invoke both the recognition that phenomena are both local and global, and the mutual interconnections between these levels. The invocation to 'think globally, act locally' is frequently heard in environmental discourse and further reflects this simultaneously universal/particular intertwining of environmental awareness.[2] Environmentalism, therefore, is an excellent example of the simultaneous presence of these seemingly opposite poles in its focus on the interconnectivity of eco-systems, and its discourse about bio-regionalism. Environmentalism both promotes the growing awareness of global "complex connectivity", as Jon Tomlinson (1999: 2) points out, while advocating a return to being connected to 'place'. Yes, global warming is a universal threat; but how the various dynamics of eco-system effects play out in very particular and local ways varies

[2] Malcolm Waters begins his introduction in *Globalization* (1995) with this slogan.

widely, as does the discourse on how to respond to that threat. These poles of environmental discourse resist the reduction of globalization to the economic system, as well as the discourse on globalization as homogenization, which is also the concern of Robertson (1995) in adopting the term 'glocalization'. It is a clear carrier of the globalizing discourse of holism.

As previous scholars (Beyer, 1992) have pointed out, this discourse of holism, of the planet as a single place, makes it fertile ground for religious resonances, connections, and movements. Further, as Peter Beyer (1994) comments, the environmental crisis "concretizes the problematic effects of the global societal system more clearly than others". As such it elicits a religious response, for "the nature of the environmental crisis is therefore just the sort of problem religion addresses: it is virtually religious" (208). Even in its primarily secular variations, environmentalism, or even more so, ecologism (defined as the value system implied by ecology), has religious-like concerns and functions (Kearns 1996). More explicitly, religious systems attempt to give meaning, stimulate moral responses, and encourage individuals to act within a framework that transcends the immediate and individual. Thus, religious environmentalism brings in the additional dialectic of the immanent vibrating with transcendental significance, as Beyer (1994) further comments that the "unintended and unforeseen are in this mode indicators of both the necessity and the reality of the transcendent" (208). It is the focus on the immanent that so marks much of Christian environmentalism, for Christian thought in particular has often been criticized for putting too much emphasis on the transcendental and escaping the materiality of this world.[3] Despite these obvious resonances, both religious and environmental actors have been slow to realize this, often seeing each other as inconsequential, a hindrance, or even the enemy, as will be explored below. I do not, however, systematically document the history of the various manifestations of religion and ecology, which range from indigenous traditions and earth-centered new spiritualities to efforts by some portion of all major religious faiths to address environmental concerns (Gottleib, 2006; Kearns, 2003). Instead, I will give a brief description of a range of organizational efforts in two case studies. I

[3] Bauman (2000) points out that the growing presence of cyberspace presents a similar threat of transcendental escape from the material world. Cyberspace does make the world 'a smaller place' but it too imagines itself to be above and beyond the social and environmental deterioration that results from globalization.

wish to explore the intertwining of religion and environmentalism in efforts related to global climate change and to the Fair Trade movement, each demonstrating how that intersection touches on multiple aspects of globalization, both furthering it and acting to counter some of the dynamics of the realms of globalization described above. Religious environmentalism is an excellent example of how globalization is not just about economic, and therefore political systems, as many scholars reduce it. Nor is being critical of the global economic system necessarily anti-globalization.[4] What this closer examination of religious environmentalism and its religious opponents reveals, is that the conflict is in large measure about what is good about globalization.

History of Religious Environmentalism

Religious (here read as primarily Christian) environmentalism, while making news headlines more frequently, is not as new as it may seem to many. In the 1940s Walter Lowdermilk, in Israel, penned the 11th Commandment which begins "Thou shalt inherit the holy earth as a faithful steward, conserving its resources and productivity from generation to generation".[5] The World Council of Churches has addressed the issue at least since the Nairobi Assembly in 1975 and it became central with the Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation (JPIC) theme proposed at the 1983 Assembly in Vancouver for the 1990 Seoul Convocation and the 1991 General Assembly in Canberra. In the U.S., denominational statements were issued in the 1970s and denominational offices/staff working on the issue appeared in the 1980s, as did

[4] Admittedly, many religious environmentalists, such as Ruether (2005) and Eaton and Lorentzen (2003) use the term globalization to refer to the global economic system.

[5] Walter Lowdermilk is credited with the first formulation of an Eleventh Commandment. In a speech on Radio Jerusalem in June 1939 entitled "The Eleventh Commandment" he defined it as: "Thou shalt inherit the holy earth as a faithful steward, conserving its resources and productivity from generation to generation. Thou shalt safeguard thy fields from soil erosion, thy living waters from drying up, thy forests from desolation, and protect the hills from overgrazing by thy herds, that thy descendents may have abundance forever. If any shall fail in this stewardship of the land, thy fruitful fields shall become sterile stony ground and wasting gullies, and thy descendants shall decrease and live in poverty or perish from off the face of the earth" as quoted in Nash, 1989: 97–98. In the 1980s, an eastern Orthodox group formed who called themselves the 11th Commandment Fellowship. They later joined others in founding the North American Coalition on Christianity and Ecology (NACCE). See Kearns, 1996, Kearns and Immergut, 2004.

internationally known 'centers of practice' such as the evangelical Au Sable Institute under Cal DeWitt in Michigan and the liberal Catholic Genesis Farm under Sister Miriam McGillis in New Jersey. Leaders of world religions, called by the WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature), met in Assisi, Italy in the mid-1980s to draft statements of concern and in 1995 formed the Alliance of Religion and Conservation (ARC), which now has representatives of 11 faiths (Palmer 2003). The Islamic Foundation for Ecology and Environmental Sciences (IFEES.org) was also founded in the mid-eighties. Thus from the early beginnings of sustained religious attention to environmental issues, participants have encouraged the conversations to take place in a global, multi-religious context. The level of activity heightened in the 1990s, stimulated in part by major world religious leaders. Pope John Paul II made it a priority for Catholics in his 1990 World Day of Peace speech and in subsequent pronouncements, evangelical leader Billy Graham stated that the environment was the most pressing world problem, and in 1997, the 'Green' Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Orthodox Christians declared that the wanton destruction of nature was a sin. He still convenes annual 'floating' conferences of religious leaders to address various water related issues (in 2006, the meeting 'site' was the Amazon River) (Woodard, 2003). Another major stimulus was the Joint Appeal in Religion and Science in 1991 in response to an 'Open Letter' from 34 internationally known concerned scientists in 1990, who called upon the religious sector for a moral response to the environmental crisis. The current decade has been dominated by increasing efforts to get faith groups, governments and citizens to take global warming seriously, as well as a variety of energy-related issues. The increasing lack of access to potable water, as well as the privatization and selling of drinking water is emerging as a major issue, in addition to the ever-present realities of species extinction, habitat loss, and spreading pollution. While this brief summary gives only a glimpse, several other developments will be mentioned below.

In earlier work, I identified three emerging 'ideal types', or ethics, that captured the spectrum of Christian environmentalism in the U.S.- Christian stewardship, eco-justice and creation spirituality (Kearns, 1996). Others have found this typology useful in other contexts (Beyer, 1994; Pesonen, 2004). Whereas these types still name dominant clusters or emphases, there is far less clear separation, and individuals and groups that embody or reflect aspects of all three are easily found. This is especially true of the embrace of eco-justice or environmental justice

concerns by those involved in religious environmentalism, a concern that places religious environmentalism in one of the key cultural values discourses of modernity—*equality*. This is also a key discourse of movements, concerned with, in Habermas' language, the consequences of invasions of the life-world, or what Beyer names as concern over the "inherent contradictions between systemic effects and systemic values" of the global system (Beyer, 1992: 5).

Not only does this focus on justice enable religious environmentalism to intersect with other new social movements, but the focus on justice also provides a clear authoritative religious mandate for work that often is deemed suspect within religious circles. Whether it is suspect because of 'pagan' overtones and fear of 'worshipping the creation', or viewed as less important than issues of religious persecution, poverty, evangelism or other competing group priorities, environmental issues are still struggling to become a part of the main agendas of most religious groups. The justice discourse is a major carrier of global connectedness, whether it is in emphasizing consumption habits of the north Atlantic countries that lead to the destruction and degradation of eco-systems and local cultures in the rest of the globe, or that pollution and waste generated in one place adversely affects those located both near and far from the site of generation.

The advent of the world wide web, which enables greater communication and ease of access to information, has accelerated the heightened sense of the global interconnection of issues and groups, as well as helping groups to share strategies and stories, gain constituents, and often leverage pressure from a larger global audience on local issues. A variety of NGOs, such as those mentioned above, have played a part in the globalization of discourse and action on environmental problems, as solutions are called for that cross national boundaries and require international governmental cooperation and agreement. Two of the leaders of global conversations are the World Council of Churches (see Hallman, 1997 for WCC statement on climate change) and the United Nations (the United Nations Environmental Program has issued publications such as *Earth and Faith: A Book of Reflection for Action* aimed at religious audiences). The gatherings related to the United Nations on concerns such as development, health, and population all have environmental aspects, and the discussions often have religious overtones or direct support from religious groups.

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janiero (as well as the one ten years later in Johannesburg) had a very large global gathering of religious groups concerned about the environment, and participation in that 'unofficial' part of the Rio Summit proved a catalyst to religious environmentalism worldwide (Granberg-Michaelson, 1992). The gatherings of the G8 or the World Trade Organization (WTO) are always now accompanied by environmental protests and concern over the sustainability (like globalization, this term has many definitions with both positive and negative connotations) of cultures, eco-systems and planetary life-support systems. Many religious groups concerned with ecological sustainability have joined protests against the WTO because of the growing realization that the existence of the World Trade Organization effectively means the lack of political autonomy for governments to make decisions regarding the protection and consumption of natural resources within their borders.[6] For example, there was substantial Catholic and Protestant support in the planning and hosting of the major protests against the WTO when it met in Seattle, and the protest coordination center was a United Methodist Church. The specific critique of the role of the WTO in undermining environmental regulations (such as dolphin-free tuna) is tied in with a larger religious critique of the globalization of the market, and with what is viewed as the subsequent promotion of consumerism (Cobb and Daly, 1991; Hallman, 1997; McFague, 2000; Ruether, 2005). At the same time, not all are critical of the global financial institutions; the WWF has teamed up with the World Bank in sponsoring religious conservation efforts around the globe as part of the Alliance of Religion and Conservation (www. arcworld.org), which has projects in places such as Mongolia (ARC's international president is the Prime Minister of Mongolia), India, China, Indonesia, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Africa and Latin America.[7]

All of the responses discussed so far reflect the dual nature of religious environmentalism—a positive focus on the global, planetary nature of

[6] The World Social Forum and the EATWOT (Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians) gatherings are other major venues of religious discussion of and critique of globalization that also have specifically environmental dimensions.

[7] An ARC-related group, the African Muslim Environmental Network, works with Muslims to help them recognize the firm Islamic grounding for an environmental ethic.

concerns that calls for a religiously plural, coordinated effort, along with a critique (except in a few instances such as described below) of the globalization of the economic order and a particular concern over local manifestations and consequences. Religious groups often view globalization, and what is seen as the accompanying promotion of western values—including the consumption of internationally produced goods, high tech and energy consumptive lifestyles, and conceptions of individualism at the expense of the common good—as antithetical to the religious belief of the group (WCC, 2001). For example, in a series on globalization called "Globaleyes", the Mennonite Central Committee in Canada stated:

> Our Christian faith means we need to recognize that the world's resources are a gift from God to be shared equitably. As stewards of the earth and advocates of the poor, we can take steps in hope and discipleship . . . we need to become conscious of how our consumption of these resources implicates us in a vicious cycle of violence, exploitation and degradation of God's creation.[8]

As a response, many religious groups are quite active in promoting fair trade, locally-grown and produced food and goods, or the 'simplicity' and 'take back your time' movements that seek to change consumption patterns (as demonstrated in Earth Ministry staff Michael Schut's, 1999 & 2002 books).[9] As will be seen below, this is not always a critique of capitalism, but rather of the global nature of the market where natural resources are sought at the lowest possible cost—which frequently means harvesting relatively intact eco-systems where labor and access/ownership is cheap and where extraction is relatively unhindered by governmental restrictions. But this critique of the current globalized economic order is often then viewed by opponents as an attack on capitalism (see examples below). There is definite conflict within Christianity concerning globalization, as much of conservative evangelical, Pentecostal and fundamentalist Christianity is seen to promote westernization and/or

[8] From "Conflict and natural resources" by Bruce Guenther. www.mcc.org/economicglobalization/viewpoints/perspectives/globaleyes/engagement.htm. Accessed April 4, 2007. The Globaleyes series is a good illustration of the type of nuanced Christian critique of globalization—it also discusses climate change, local food sourcing, water issues, the rights of indigenous people, and the WTO.

[9] A good example is the LOAF campaign of the Christian Environmental Link in the UK—Locally produced, Organically grown, Animal Friendly and Fairly Traded. www.christian-ecology.org/uk/loaf/htm accessed April 4, 2007.

a 'prosperity' gospel that implicitly advocates economic acquisitions as a positive goal and explicitly promotes laissez-faire capitalism. Both Harvey Cox and Dwight Hopkins describe this constellation of beliefs as a religion of the market or of globalization (Cox, 2002; Hopkins, 2001). However, environmental concern also often puts conservative Christians at odds with each other as will be explored below.

Thus, even as religious environmentalism encourages and embodies some forms of globalization in its discourse of global interconnectedness, it also often reflects the critique of other aspects of globalization that may not seem as directly related: the loss of heterogeneity, the loss of political autonomy, the dominance of the economic order so that even the genetic information of indigenous peoples can be owned, the energy consumption of moving trade goods, particularly food, globally, a western culture of consumerism and excess, and westernization as a form of cultural imperialism (Wellman, 2004). Just as environmentalists are concerned over species extinction and the loss of bio-diversity, religious environmentalists are concerned that a globalized media-promoted mono-culture destroys (makes extinct) both local ecological knowledge as well as the particular (diverse) strands of religious traditions or indigenous religions that may provide a religious ecological ethic and salvific ecological knowledge.

In this sense, religious environmentalists do participate in the critique of globalization as homogeneity. Yet they want to link this local knowledge and insights into a global(-ized) religious/spiritual consciousness that promotes a recognition of the need to value the interconnected life systems of the planet. For some, the latter is aptly named Gaia, or the sense that the global life system of the planet is more than the sum of individual parts. Opponents charge many religious environmentalists with trying to promote environmentalism as a religion, or of wanting to dissolve the uniqueness of religious faiths in emphasizing a global earth-centered spirituality. And this, as for many movements that both promote and critique globalization, is a difficult balance: how to promote a globalized discourse of connection while also recognizing diversity and particularity. It is important to recognize that this is a very different response than that of fundamentalism, which Lechner (1990) has described as a dedifferentiating response, and one that wants to assert exclusive particularity on a global scale. Yet religious fundamentalism, such as the most conservative streams of Christianity, itself depends on a discourse of global interconnectedness and globalized systems

of communications in their own fight against various evils, in which environmentalists, and especially religious environmentalists, are often a target (Ammerman, 1994; Bretthauer, 2001; Lechner, 1998).

While it works to raise awareness and concern for the global interconnectedness of environmental problems and solutions, religious environmentalism also heralds particularism, from grounding responses in particular religious traditions (to avoid accusations of being 'new age' or a 'new religion') and particular locales, to urging followers to 'think globally, act locally' (borrowing a slogan from the peace movement). The two case studies below illustrate the oscillating strands within religious environmentalism as both a carrier of globalization, and an ardent critic of economic globalization. While addressing environmental concerns that are global in scale and that relate to the global economic order, they often focus on individual consumer behavior, and provide religious motivation for action.

Religious Global Warming Activism

Many connect religious environmental concern over climate change directly with globalization, as in the Bangalore Statement issued at the "Earth is our Home" World Council of Churches gathering on climate change in Asia: "We share the view that climate change is as much about inequality in patterns of trade and consumption as it is of increase in greenhouse gas emissions."[10] Religious groups have been working on this issue for over 15 years (the WCC's first publication, *Accelerated Climate Change—Sign of Peril, Test of Faith* came out in 1994 {Hallman, 1997}). My research has focused primarily on the U.S. because of its refusal to sign the Kyoto Accord, and because its 25% share of global warming emissions is frequently cited by activists around the globe (see Kearns, 2007 for more detail than the discussion below). The topic in itself demands that people think globally, for actions at any given place in the world have consequences that go far beyond that particular area; the results of global climate change will be locally

[10] "Search for a better tomorrow". http://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-programmes/justice-diakonia-and-responsibility-for-creation/climate-change-water/15–07–00–search-for-better-tomorrow.html. See Hallman, 1997 for further World Council of Churches discussion of economic globalization and climate change.

felt but global in scale. This issue demands that people think in ways to which many are unaccustomed, for they cannot assume the natural world around them is a given, nor can they project current conditions into the future, for it is unclear how great the consequences will be or if they can be undone. Further, the effects of global climate change have implications for agriculture, health, species preservation, water availability, and the global economic order.

Several campaigns (U.S. examples will be discussed in more detail below) illustrate the type of organized religious activity aimed at global warming. Generally, the most obvious are those that promote awareness of the realities of global warming. Part-and-parcel of these campaigns has been religious pressure on government officials to admit that global warming/climate change is a) happening, b) human-caused, c) not desirable or beneficial, and d) an issue that demands immediate governmental response, and not just voluntary actions. They put direct pressure on governments, such as those of the United States and Australia, to sign the Kyoto Accord or join other international efforts to cut the rate of CO_2 emissions. Other campaigns aimed at governmental action concern raising emission standards on cars and trucks (which usually means higher miles/gallon or liters/100 kilometers ratios), regulating CO_2 emissions by industry, promoting alternative energy technologies and energy efficiency, and preventing coal mining or oil and natural gas drilling and exploration in ecologically sensitive areas. Given the difficulty and lack of success of the campaigns to put pressure on governments, many groups have focused on voluntary actions, such as changing the energy consumption of religious institutions, investing in alternative technologies, or promoting alternative transportation (such as share a ride or bike to church days). Finally, there is a wide variety of efforts to convince individuals of the same set of issues, in the hope that they will be motivated, out of religious concern, to change their own consumption habits and put pressure on government officials at all levels to take action.

An early effort in the mid-nineties to put pressure on the United States to sign the 1997 Kyoto Protocol was led by the U.S. National Council of Churches Eco-Justice Working Group (the NCC-EJWG includes mainline Protestant, Orthodox, and Historic Black churches). Although unsuccessful, activists feel that their campaign, of petitions containing hundreds of thousands of signatures and television ads leading up to the Kyoto meeting, influenced then Vice-President

Al Gore to modify the U.S. stance.[11] Another U.S. group, Religious Witness, in addition to leading acts of civil disobedience over oil drilling in the Alaska National Refuge, staged a 2003 five-year post-Kyoto educational 'witness' through the coordination of visits at the United Nations in New York City. One-hundred fifty interfaith 'witnesses' made educational visits to various UN member offices, for example, to put pressure on Russia and the United States or to learn from the example of Canada (whose commitment to Kyoto has changed somewhat since then), or to hear the stories of many of the Pacific small island states, such as Tuvalu, who will be the most affected by rising water. Defying stereotypes of the environmental movement, the interfaith group then gathered together on a street corner for a stirring service and sermon from an African-American Unitarian-Universalist minister, the Reverend Rosemary Bray McNatt.

The members of the National Partnership for Religion and the Environment—founded in 1992 between the NCC-EJWG, the Evangelical Environmental Network (EEN), the U.S. Catholic Conference of Bishops (USCCB), and the Coalition on Environment and Jewish Life (COEJL)—have continuously worked on the topic of global warming, as it was the priority issue upon which they could all agree. Constituent members have organized conferences around the theme 'Let There Be Light', and NRPE helped fund almost twenty state-wide Interfaith Climate Change groups or networks, and an equivalent number of Interfaith Power & Light initiatives. These groups, like the National Council of Churches EJWG, have coordinated denominational and statewide efforts, provided education and training for youth (including the selling of compact fluorescent light bulbs as both conscience and money raisers), organized letters signed by religious leaders addressed first to U.S. President Bill Clinton and then George W. Bush, and

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[11] James Ball, now head of the Evangelical Environmental Network, writes in his *Planting a Tree This Afternoon: Global Warming, Public Theology and Public Policy* (1998: 69) that the Christian Environmental Council, representative of over forty evangelical Christian organizations, also presented then President Clinton and Vice-President Gore with a resolution calling for the United States to take a leadership role. Efforts continue by religious groups to influence the global deliberations on the Kyoto Protocol. Over 80 persons accredited by the World Council of Churches, as well as another dozen or so U.S faith groups were present. A "Spiritual Declaration on Climate Change" was issued at the 2005 United Nations Climate Change Conference (referred to as UNFCCC-COP11 meeting) in Montreal. See the Montreal Climate Change Conference report at http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/jpc/climatechange-cop11–report.html, accessed April 2, 2007.

compiled and distributed educational and worship materials with a goal of reaching 100,000 congregations. More recently in the U.S., the Regeneration Project (the overarching association of Interfaith Power and Light organizations) coordinated over 4,000 congregational viewings of former Vice-President Gore's film on global warming, "An Inconvenient Truth" or another film, "The Great Warming."[12] These showings often have a substantial impact. For example, the Reverend Gerald Durley, pastor of an African-American Baptist church, went back to his congregation and preached on climate change, showed it to his congregation, handed out compact fluorescent light bulbs so that 90% of his congregation now uses them, invited ten other prominent black preachers in Atlanta to see it in his boardroom, and later challenged fifty to preach an Earth Day Sermon.[13]

In 2003, the EJWG and the NRPE organized a visit to U.S. automakers in Detroit by Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant leaders in a fleet of hybrid cars driven by Catholic nuns. The action-alert email on Faith and Fuel Economy from the Interfaith Climate Change Network (ICCN) that accompanied this campaign asked: "Have you heard the one about the rabbi, the priest, the pastor and the Toyota Prius? No, it's not a joke. And neither is global warming."[14]

The EEN's 2003 "What Would Jesus Drive?" (WWJD) campaign (www.whatwouldjesusdrive.org) was connected with this larger NCC-EJWG/COEJL effort to pressure U.S. automakers mentioned earlier.[15]

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[12] The Regeneration Project's campaign regarding "An Inconvenient Truth" was carried out with the help of local affiliates. In New Jersey, GreenFaith organized 116 showings at local houses of worship. Although not a part of the Interfaith Climate Change Network because they predated it, they have also worked on climate/change energy issues since their founding in 1992, including solar installations on 25 Christian or Jewish houses of worship. Information on GreenFaith's Lighting the Way program can be found at www.greenfaith.org.

[13] Personal interview, March, 2007. He also helped organize, and will speak at, an African-American Environmental Summit in April 2007 featuring noted black politicians, Representative John Lewis and Senator Barack Obama.

[14] A related website asked "If God is With Me All the Time, Does that Include the Auto Dealership? As people of faith, we use religious convictions to determine the movies we see, music we listen to, and activities we participate in. If we bring God to the movies, why do we leave God behind at the Auto Mall? There is no reason to drive gas-guzzling, climate-changing cars when there are options that give us freedom and reduce the impact on our environment. Because it's not just about vehicles, it's about values." "If God Is With Me All the Time, Does that Include the Auto Mall?" available at http://www.gbgm-umc.org/NCNYEnvironmentalJustice/transportation.htm. Accessed April 4, 2007.

[15] A recent campaign aimed at Detroit took place in September 2005. Some hope that it played a role in Ford announcing the production of hybrid vehicles for a

Their campaign drew a great deal of national and international publicity and in many ways prepared the way for the 2006 U.S. Evangelical statement on climate change (discussed below).[16] The basic claim of the WWJD campaign was that a 'love your neighbor' personal-ethics approach grounded in the New Testament demanded that one see the connection between an individual's auto emissions and air-quality issues as part of a larger evangelical focus on health (McCarthy McMorris, 2003). Jim Ball, the head of EEN, toured parts of the country in his hybrid car to promote awareness of auto emissions and their relationship to climate change.[17] Because of its exclusively Christian focus, the WWJD campaign obviously could not be an NRPE-wide campaign, and Jewish groups responded with campaigns (or joked in discussions) based on the messages 'What Should the Rabbi Drive?' and 'What Would Moses drive?'

In the U.S., the Evangelical statement on climate change (www.christiansandclimate.org) has garnered an immense amount of coverage (leading to many 'discovering' that religious groups have something to say on the issue), coverage that often ignores the long work of some evangelicals and the more liberal denominations on this topic. This statement was initiated at an international gathering in Oxford, England in 2002 and the introduction of Richard Cizik of the National Association of Evangelicals to Sir John Haughton of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Although the goal of an unanimous statement from the National Association of Evangelicals failed, it is far more significant that the February 2006 "Climate Change: An Evangelical Call to Action" statement was signed by over one hundred key evangelical leaders in the U.S., ranging from the popular evangelical leader and author Reverend Rick Warren (2002) of the 22,000 members Saddleback Church in Lake Forest, California to the heads of many important evangelical colleges and seminaries, and to several of the staff at the popular conservative U.S. Christian magazine, *Christianity Today* (Goodstein, 2006).[18]

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significant proportion of their models. With their financial troubles mounting, however, it remains to be seen if Ford will really follow through on this commitment.

[16] See Berkeman, 2002, for an example.

[17] See Goodstein, 2007 for more details about Jim Ball, a PhD graduate of Drew University. See Kearns, 1997 for an examination of evangelical environmentalism in the eighties and mid-1990s.

[18] Warren is very influential in the evangelical world and is the author of *The Purpose Driven Life*, which has sold nearly 14 million copies. For a listing of all of the

Internationally, other special purpose groups have worked on initiatives related to responding to global warming. The Religious Campaign for Forest Conservation in California (which was inspired by the Redwood Rabbis trying to protect old growth forests) and Target Earth both work to protect existing forests and encourage more tree planting at home and internationally in an attempt to counter the alarming global rate of forest destruction.[19] An outstanding example is the international linkages among Catholic 'green sisters' (Taylor, 2007) whose orders have been retrofitting their buildings and properties to use alternative energy or to make their compounds energy efficient and examples of sustainability by building straw-bale housing, collecting heirloom seeds to protect seed diversity, promoting community supported agriculture, and hosting 'earth literacy' programs such as those at Genesis Farm in New Jersey.[20] In the United Kingdom, Operation Noah is the name for a concerted effort by Christians on global warming. In India, the ARC has helped establish the Sikh Gurdwara Project to reduce the amount of energy consumed in their efforts to feed people. In Delhi, eight of the largest gurdwaras (they feed over 10,000 people a day) will have solar panels installed to help reduce energy consumption by

signatories, see www.christiansandclimate.org. Ironically, Richard Cizik was forced to take his signature off the statement as it was not a consensus position of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). Key conservative Christian leaders, ironically not members of the NAE, publicly called for the dismissal of Cizik, but were ignored.

[19] The frequently cited website for the Religious Campaign for Forest Conservation (RCFC), founded by Fred Krueger (Kearns and Immergut 2004; Humphreys, 2004), www.creationethics.org, has been defunct since some time in 2005. However, the World Stewardship Institute (www.ecostewards.org) lists RCFC's work as one of their projects. Krueger is also associated with Opening the Book of Nature, whose website, www.bookofnature.org, has not been updated since early 2005. Krueger and both organizations continue to be active as of April 2007, supporting tree planting in Mexico and Guatemala, and planning a visit to the U.S. White House in April 2007 (personal correspondence). TargetEarth (www.targetearth.org) is another Christian organization which works on forest preservation and reforestation in many countries through its Eden Conservancy Program (the primary target seems to be Belize). The Asian Buddhist Network, (www.arcworld.org/projects.asp?projectId=1, accessed April 3, 2007) affiliated with the Alliance of Religions and Conservation, is working on reforestation and development issues throughout Asia with assistance from the World Bank, as well as teaching people the Buddhist foundations for this work. Other ARC projects on reforestation and religious-owned forests, such as those in Sweden, France, and Japan, can be found under their "Faith and Forests" or "Sacred Lands" projects.

[20] Sister Miriam Therese McGillis is the key figure at Genesis Farm (www.genesisfarm.org) and has spoken to audiences all over the world for over 20 years. Genesis Farm was one of the first beneficiaries of the solar power GreenFaith program. See Scharper, 2007. Life Section, p. L10 for more information.

15%.[21] Long time environmental activist John Seed of the Rainforest Information Centre, which works globally, has given over a hundred climate change and despair workshops in Australia and the U.S. alone (Australia has also refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.)[22]

In the U.S., these efforts have provoked a conservative religious backlash by religious 'free-enterprise' groups such as the Acton Institute for the Study of Religion and Liberty (DeVous, 2002). Acton, which focuses on theology, business, and the environment, often as it relates to economics, has published many critiques of the types of Christian environmental activism and organizations discussed above (Whelan, Kirwan and Hefner, 1996) as well as several 'climate skeptic' books. It also played a role in the rejection of the Evangelical Climate Initiative discussed above. The usual factors in the conservative Christian dismissal of the need for Christians to respond to environmental concerns are certainly at work in this type of critique of Christian environmentalism: the argument that the central focus of Christianity should be on salvation and saving souls; the perceived threat of worshipping creation and not the Creator; a concern that religious environmentalism is 'New Age'; a dismissal or distrust of the science of climate change as just a 'theory';[23] an apocalyptic focus on the End Times; and the accusation that environmentalists are socialists bent on undermining of the current global economic system. But it is also the fact that the globalizing discourse of religious environmentalism, which seeks interfaith and

[21] www.arcworld.org/projects.asp?projectID=138, accessed April 2, 2007.

[22] Personal correspondence with John Seed.

[23] This dismissal of climate change, and evolution, as 'just a theory' is very related to the promotion by some very conservative Christians of creationism as a 'theory' that thus should be taught in schools along with evolution. Yet there is recognition of the larger cultural respect of science in the frequent climate skeptic references to the "Oregon Petition" signed by 17,000–18,000 'scientists' questioning the scientific consensus on global warming ("Petition Project" www.oism.org/pproject, accessed April 2, 2007) The vast majority of those scientists range from specialists in hydrology and mining to high-school biology teachers and pesticide industry public relations personnel to non-scientists, even non-persons (Drs. Frank Burns, Benjamin Pierce, and B. J. Honeycutt of the television show *M.A.S.H.* are listed), but extremely few are recognized and respected climatologists. James Schlesinger's (former Secretary of Defense and Director of the CIA under Richard Nixon and Secretary of Energy under Jimmy Carter) 2005 *Wall Street Journal* editorial against any action on climate change at the G-8 Summit in Scotland, backs up his claims by referring to the Oregon Petition. Schlesinger also used another common tactic, referring to "the theology of global warming". This tactic is discussed later in this chapter. See Kearns, 2007 for a much longer analysis of the strategies of climate skeptic groups.

intergovernmental cooperation, threatens the particularity and exclusivity of more fundamentalist Christianity.[24]

Acton accomplishes this critique in part through a related group, the Interfaith Council on Environmental Stewardship, which was founded around the signing of the "Cornwall Declaration".[25] The Cornwall Declaration, written in response to the "Evangelical Declaration on the Care of Creation" (EDCC), affirms private property ownership and market economies, while the Evangelical Declaration promotes "lifestyle choices that express humility, forbearance, self-restraint, and frugality" and "godly, just, and sustainable choices".[26] The Cornwall Declaration argues that free-market forces can resolve environmental problems, and denounces the environmental movement for embracing faulty science and a gloom-and-doom approach. In contrast, the Evangelical Declaration encouraged Christians to become ecologically aware caretakers of creation. Other differences revolve around the place and privileges of humans relative to nature, issues of biblical interpretation of key passages in Genesis, definitions of stewardship, God's sovereignty in solving environmental problems, as well as the charge that saving the earth is replacing the central Christian emphasis on saving souls. These disagreements are not just about internal Christian theological disputes (Wright, 1995). The Cornwall Declaration reiterates the 'wise-use' emphases[27] on the continuing improvement of the environment through human technology, the abundance of resources put here for human use, and the critique of the view of more-than-human nature as an idyllic, harmonious state that must be preserved (the latter picks

[24] Note I did not say evangelical Christianity, which is obviously interested in interfaith cooperation. They are often confused with farther right and highly particularistic Christians.

[25] ICES board members E. Calvin Beisner (1997) and Robert Royal (1999) have published influential books, which warn of "the use and abuse of religion in environmental debates" and are critical of evangelical involvement, such as that of Cal DeWitt and the EEN.

[26] All quotes are from the web-posted versions of these two documents, available at www.stewards.net/CornwallDeclaration.htm and www.creationcare.org/resources/declaration.php

[27] See Kearns, 2004b for a small article on the wise-use movement in the U.S. Helvarg (1992) offers a more comprehensive look at the wise-use movement (Helvarg states on pg. 100 that in Canada, wise-use groups often are called share groups), as do many other books on environmental backlash. The Mountain States Legal Foundations, founded by the infamous James Watt, is an example of a secular wise-use organization. Later U.S. Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton under the second George Bush presidency is also affiliated with MLSF.

up on the postmodern criticism of the social construction of nature, for which William Cronon (1996) and others received much criticism for unwittingly aiding and abetting anti-conservation forces).

When it comes to global warming, the response is even more specifically about the threat to the global economy, and several forms such as it takes accusing global warming activists of promoting socialism, or a one-world government, and that global warming is a theology or religion. Here we see why it is important to discuss the many religious globalizing discourses, for one is about global environmental consequences, and the critique/challenge is about global economic consequences. This campaign focuses on challenging the science of global climate change, calling it instead "belief in the religion of global warming". In general, it is the conflict of differing 'belief systems' regarding the current economic system that arouses some of the strongest global warming-as-religion comments, as illustrated in this quote from Tom De Weese in *Capitalism* magazine (February 16, 2005):

> Global warming is nothing more than a euphemism for redistribution of wealth from the rich, development [sic] nations to jealous dictatorships who refuse to allow their citizens the right to gain their own wealth through free markets. It's about political redistribution from strong, independent, sovereign nations into the hands of a power-hungry global elite cowering in the United Nations. The truth is there is no man-made global warming. There's only the scam of an empty global religion designed to condemn human progress and sucker the feeble-minded into worldwide human misery. I rest my case. Amen

A non-U.S. example of this approach can be seen in an editorial by Terrence Corcoran in the Canadian *Financial Post* aimed at discrediting the Canadian Environment Minister, Christine Stewart:

> In another statement quoted by the *Herald*, Ms. Stewart gave another reason for adopting the religion of global warming. "Climate change [provides] the greatest chance to bring about justice and equality in the world." Here she gets closer to the core motivation of some of the leading global warming activists. Where socialism's attempt at a global redistribution of wealth ended in economic catastrophe, global warming is being wheeled in as the next new economic crusade (Corcoran, 1998).

Global warming as a religion is clearly a major 'talking point' for conservatives. These talking points—in this case linking global warming with religion, faith, and belief—become what feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith calls an "ideological code" that prompts the reader to a series of connected thoughts. As Smith states:

> An ideological code operates to structure text or talk... Ideological codes don't appear directly; no one seems to be imposing anything on anybody else; people pick up an ideological code from reading, hearing, or watching, and replicate it in their own talk or writing (1999: 175–177).

At its most extreme form, the critique of religious 'anti-global warming' (so to speak) proponents is based around an apocalyptic focus on the 'End Times', negating the need to worry about the current state of the planet on the rationale that a new earth will replace it. Additionally, environmentalism is often viewed as being associated with the Anti-Christ because religious environmentalism seeks to unite religions in responding to environmental crises. In many end times scenarios, the Anti-Christ seeks to bring about a one-world government, and environmentalism, in seeking global environmental accords, is frequently presented as wanting a global government.[28] Environmentalism is also often linked to communism, and portrayed as desiring a one-world government, as in this example from a far right radio evangelist, Texe Marrs and his "Power of Prophecy" end-times ministry in a screed entitled "Radical Environmentalists use Churches to Cram United Nations Treaty down America's Throat" written in reaction to the NCC-EJWG campaign related to signing the Kyoto Protocol in 1997:

> The hidden agenda of the environmental elite involves nothing less than the destruction of American freedoms, erection of a totalitarian world government, and the end of God and His church on earth.[29]

A much earlier article by Tom Weese is used to back up the claims made by Marrs, in which he charges that environmentalists are communists. In this scenario, it is precisely the globalizing discourse of religious environmentalists that threatens the vehement particularism of certain strands of apocalyptic Christianity.

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[28] The book *The AntiChrist and a Cup of Tea* (Cohen, 1998) goes so far as to determine that Charles, Prince of Wales is the AntiChrist, in part because of his work on environmental issues with the WWF (from the evidence on its website, www. panda.org, it seems that WWF no longer stands for anything, such as the World Wildlife Fund, but is the group's name). Cardinal Biffi, the Archbishop of Bologna, Italy, who was a very conservative contender for the papacy, declared that a vegetarian Anti-Christ, who also espouses pacificsm, environmentalism and animal rights, and is a prominent philanthropist is "walking among us." *London Times* (March 7, 2000).

[29] www.texemarrs.com/071999/environ.htm. Accessed April 5, 2007.

Religion and the Fair Trade Movement

Another, much less overarching example of the religious responses to globalization is the fair trade movement that aims to counteract free-trade agreements and the results of free-market capitalism.[30] In this sense, it is part of the movement that is critical of the globalized economic system. Anthony Giddens (1994: 5) points out that this type of activism is an example of the local/global dialectic in which "local lifestyle habits have become globally consequential". It is another clear example of glocalization, where the local has global implications and linkages. By its own definition, fair trade is about the interconnectedness of people's consumption patterns and eco-systems. The principles of a fair price to workers, ecological sustainability, and democratic cooperatives are key to the movement's stated values. The ability to promote ethical actions that promote justice and environmental concerns have made promoting the fair trade movement very appealing to religious groups, although not always primarily because of environmental concerns. Perhaps the best-known fair trade organization is the Mennonite Ten Thousand Villages stores and catalogs. The goal of the movement is to skip many of the middle people involved, thereby cutting down the price to the final consumer, raising the price paid to the producer, while encouraging sustainable farming practices that protect the consumer, producer and larger eco-system. Cocoa, chocolate, tea, bananas, clothing, artisan products and other items are available through fair trade organizations but coffee is, by far, the biggest seller (and probably the most well-known in this context).

A little background may help. Coffee is, by many estimates, the second largest traded commodity after oil, with worldwide sales of $55 billion (Neuffer, 2001). With one in every two people drinking coffee, the U.S. drinks more than its share of coffee each year: an estimated 400 million cups of coffee each day or about 25% of the world's coffee imports are consumed by Americans annually (Burwinkel, 2003). Small farmers in equatorial regions around the globe produce much of the crop. Some estimate that between 20–25 million people are affected by the coffee

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[30] The fair trade movement has its roots in Europe, and for quite a while, there existed a variety of fair trade certifiers, but recently, there has been an international standardization of fair trade labeling. The International Fair Trade Association represents over 300 Fair Trade organizations representing 70 countries (www.ifta.org, accessed April 4, 2007).

economy. Coffee is seen as a great example by those who critique free-trade agreements and the globalized economy: small farms are replaced by large, highly mechanized farms, thus undermining local economies and jobs. Coffee production had been regulated until the demise of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989. Since then, the bottom has dropped out of that economy driving coffee prices lower than in the past 100 years because of the introduction of an oversupply of cheap, sun-grown, highly mechanized, lower quality robusta beans from Brazil and Vietnam, whose production, encouraged by the World Bank as export crops to service debt, grew 200% and 300% respectively in the last decade. Prices dropped from 1.20/lb in the 1980s to the current price around $0.50/lb, after reaching a low of 41 cents (Moll, 2003). The influx of cheap coffee meant that farmers/growers of higher quality, more labor intensive arabica coffee (most often shade grown, thus keeping a forest canopy intact), such as has been grown in Central America, could not compete.

In Guatemala and elsewhere, coffee trees were burned, uprooted or abandoned because they weren't profitable. When the *fincas*, as the large coffee plantations in Central America are called, closed or converted, thousands and thousands who earned their income farming and harvesting the beans, often living on the property, were displaced and unemployed.[31] Almost half of Guatemalan child laborers work in the coffee industry (Neuffer, 2001). The World Bank estimates that 600,000 workers in Central America lost their jobs during the downturn causing many to migrate looking for work (Smith, 2003). They could no longer afford education or health care. Thus the first principle of the fair trade movement is to guarantee a fair price for each pound of coffee.[32] In 2003, Equal Exchange, credited with being the first fair trade organization in the U.S., paid more than $2.2 million dollars in above market prices. Furthermore, fair trade organizations try to work directly with farmer cooperatives, guaranteeing the price, so that farmers can plan ahead, and are no longer at the mercy of the ups and downs of the market, or of the middlemen ('coyotes' as they are known in Latin

[31] Coffee was once the largest source of income for El Salvador; however, there was a boycott of Salvadoran coffee in the 1980s because it was being used to fund the civil war. Now the largest source of revenue in many Central American countries is people sending money back from working abroad—primarily in the U.S.

[32] Currently the fair trade price is set at $1.26/lb for conventional coffee, $1.41/lb for organic. This price has been the same since in the 1980s despite the fluctuations of the commodity price.

America), who are always looking to pay the least amount possible. Another principle of fair trade is to empower coffee farmers/workers through education and democratic cooperation among farmers, including active participation by women, so that they can form and run their own cooperatives and improve their communities.

Finally, the fair trade movement emphasizes sustainable coffee farming, particularly shade grown and organic coffees. Not only does organic growing bring in higher prices, but the absence of pesticides (which additionally are expensive to buy) is beneficial both to the humans and eco-systems where coffee is grown.[33] Thus coffee becomes a global environmental issue. In contrast to the cheaper robusta coffee such as that grown in Brazil and Vietnam, where rainforest was cleared to produce coffee, shade grown coffee benefits both community and wildlife by providing essential native species habitat, soil conservation, firewood and other forest 'products' from the larger trees.[34] In many regions, shade-grown groves represent some of the last forested area.

In sum, the basic assumption of the fair trade movement is to make direct economic connections between consumers and providers, allowing consumers to participate more 'directly' in the global economy and to purchase products with 'values added'. It is the 'values added' and justice aspect that makes fair trade appealing to religious groups, in addition to the ability to erase the anonymity of the global market place. It also enables religious actors to address the systemic effects of the global economic system in a direct way. Although many individual churches and religious organizations such as Catholic orders have been individually buying fair trade, organic or shade grown coffee through natural food stores or fair trade organizations, in the U.S. there are two organizations, Equal Exchange and PuraVida, actively soliciting the involvement of churches and denominations in a faith-based fair trade coffee movement.[35] A brief look at each one is revealing of the

[33] Not all fair trade coffee is organic, in part because of the costs of certification, and the length of transition time needed to meet organic standards.

[34] In Central America, biologists have found a 95% drop in the songbird population (birds that North Americans tend to think of as 'ours' such as warblers, orioles, etc.) between shade grown/forest canopy coffee, where up to 150 species of birds may live, and sun-grown coffee (Wille, 1997). The loss of their habitat in Central and South America, where they spend the winter and are just as native, is a significant factor in songbird decline.

[35] In the U.K, Christian Aid has been promoting fair trade since 1992 as part of a goal to eradicate poverty. Although Christian Aid also works on climate change, again in relation to poverty, nowhere on its website does it mention environmental issues in relation to fair trade. (www.christianaid.org/uk Accessed. April 4, 2007). This is not

undercurrents regarding the global economic system that criss-cross religious environmentalism, for they are quite different in their origins, approaches and missions. Yet, just as in the instance of Christian activism on global climate change, their critique of the current economic system brings a sharp response from other Christians, for whom the global economic order is, in a sense, part of their faith.

PuraVida, in contrast to most fair trade organizations, started as an explicitly religious organization that soon developed secular clients. It was started in 1998 by Chris Dearnley, the pastor of the evangelical non-denominational Vineyard church of Escazoe, near San Diego, as a Christian non-profit organization to raise funds through the sale of coffee to help at risk children and families in Costa Rica. As regional sales director Michele Wunsch commented in an interview, "(t)he company started trying to sell good coffee to churches for a good cause". (Everyone agrees that one of the benefits of the movement is that those churches which participate are serving better coffee in the process.) Commenting on the name, which literally translates as 'pure life', Dearnley sums up the connection: "We believe this coffee is about pure life; offering the life of Christ to people who are struggling" (Alford, 2003). *Christianity Today* sums it up as "Java For Jesus" (Moll, 2003).

PuraVida is an explicitly evangelical Christian organization, whose mission started out to 'help the kids'. It has grown more complex with time, and unlike much of conservative Christianity, which is seen to whole-heartedly embrace free trade capitalism, its mission includes the reform of capitalism. Like Equal Exchange, they want to "provide living wages for farmer producers" and "educate and motivate consumers to take action". But just as central to their mission is:

> believing in a different approach to business. One driven by good rather than greed. One that sees capitalism as an agent for compassion and faith as an engine for action. We embrace Christ's call to serve the poor and reduce inequity.[36]

PuraVida's website also emphasizes commitment to the environmental aspects, including a 'testimonial' by a farmer about the effects of

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that unusual in a fair trade website. In contrast, however, Kairos: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives (www.kairoscanada.org) and all U.S. religious fair trade sites, including the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism (www.rac.org), not discussed below, mention environmental aspects.

[36] PuraVida mission statement, reviewed on November 16, 2006, www.puravidacoffee.com/work/work_body.asp

pesticides on his family's health. Both organizations, then, see fair trade coffee as part of promoting global connections, and in doing so, transforming global capitalism, and as such they are subject to reactions from the Christian right.

Although the evangelical publication, *Christianity Today*, ran an extensive article promoting fair trade, particularly highlighting PuraVida, it is not surprising that the Acton Institute, to the political right of many evangelicals, should also attack fair trade. The Acton Institute charges that

> these campaigns rely on guilt-tripping people who drink coffee, rather than arguing from sound economic principles. Such artificial and arbitrary measures fly in the face of economic reality. The law of supply and demand is a major player in regulating the price of coffee (Ballor, 2004).

Finally, after evoking the invisible hand of the marketplace, which Harvey Cox (2002) states is often seen as a 'god' in itself who should not be interfered with, Ballor builds up to his theological grounds for opposing religiously promoted fair trade coffee, quoted here primarily for the religious legitimation of the just workings of the market as a better way to help the poor:

> Most troubling is the fact that the fair trade movement effectively pits the poor against the poor... The Apostle calls us to live godly lives, to "keep these instructions without partiality, and to do nothing out of favoritism" (1 Ti. 5: 21 NIV). This stems from our proper reflection of God's holiness and justice, "For God does not show favoritism" (Ro. 2:11 NIV).... Religious groups especially should reevaluate their position with respect to fair trade in the interest of true justice. The fair trade movement needs to take into consideration the poor who are left out of their arbitrarily constructed system of privilege.

This is just one of countless commentaries on the Acton website concerning free trade and globalization. The overall message can perhaps be best summed up by Reverend Gerald Zanstra, a senior fellow at Action:

> For America, championing free trade in the world has the same moral imperative as our support for freedom and democracy. We have supported those values because we consider them morally just and believe that they offer a better way of life for all the people of the world (Zanstra, 2001).

Equal Exchange, begun in 1986 in the U.S., is built on almost the opposite premise, and hence is equally threatening. Erbin Crowell,

director of the Equal Exchange Interfaith program and a worker-owner member of their board, in an interview demonstrated the goals of the organization to highlight economic and environmental interconnections for the religious groups in their program:

> I really see our work in this program as an attempt to create a truly empowering economic model that speaks to our collective desire for social, economic and environmental justice on multiple levels. We are always trying to meet folks where they are—but then try to make connections between where they are and other issues. If they come to Fair Trade because of the birds, we want to support that and help them understand the key role of the farmers and their communities in preserving the environment. If they come because they want to support small farmers, we want to help them understand the impact of chemicals on farming communities and the connection with a healthy environment. If they are encouraged by mainstream businesses taking on some of the attributes of Fair Trade, we want to share our enthusiasm for economic democracy and cooperative business here in the North where so much of the economic power lies. We want to expand the concept of justice, but do it in a way that makes sense to the folks we're talking with and supports them in their journey.[37]

Equal Exchange's first "faith partner" was Lutheran World Relief, which began a campaign in 1997.[38] In 2003, the Lutheran church announced a 90-ton challenge, more than double the sales of the previous year and in the end 4,100 Lutheran churches in the United States bought over 99 tons of fair trade coffee. Lutherans joke that coffee is a third sacrament for them, and their campaign slogan was "Pour Justice to the Brim" (Lodbell, 2004). Still, that figure represents a minority of the total denomination. The group with the highest rate of participation is the Unitarian Universalists with over 50% of affiliated congregations

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[37] E-mail correspondence.

[38] In addition to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America, Equal Exchange works with the United Church of Christ, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), United Methodist Church, the Church of the Brethren, Roman Catholics, Quakers, Mennonites and Unitarian Universalists. The model for Equal Exchange is to work with whatever individual church agencies deal with, ideally, both domestic and international justice issues. So, for the United Methodists, they work with UMCOR, the United Methodist Committee on Relief; with the U.S. Catholic Church, it is through Catholic Relief Services. EE then works with each group to hone the message so that it resonates with their particular tradition and culture. They help construct websites, brochures and literature, and handle the sales. Some percentage of the sales is then donated back to the host organization; additionally, local congregations often sell the coffee as a fundraiser for their own projects. Furthermore, EE is interested in working with the various international projects to help improve conditions in areas where coffee is purchased.

participating. Overall, more than 210 tons of coffee, tea and cocoa were purchased by faith groups in 2003 and the figure for 2004 is nearer to 335 tons.[39]

It appears that ecological concerns are more central in the selling of PuraVida coffee than of Equal Exchange's faith partners. In a survey of local U.S. newspaper and religious media articles, which are far more focused on Equal Exchange, as well as conversations with many involved, the emphasis that comes across with Equal Exchange faith partners is that of economic justice. This may be in large part because EE's faith partner organizations are relief/aid organizations within their denominations, and are not necessarily linked to the environmental efforts/agencies within the same denomination, a telling story in itself about the peripheral place of environmental concern within most denominations. But it is just as much about the centrality of justice as a dominant religious theme. This appears to be true elsewhere. In the U.K., Christian Aid has been promoting fair trade since 1992 as part of a goal to eradicate poverty. Although Christian Aid also works on climate change, again in relation to poverty, nowhere on its website does it mention environmental issues in relation to fair trade.[40]

Although I have focused on coffee, the idea of connecting fair trade concerns to items involved in the life of the church has spread, with a relatively recent movement promoting the purchasing of 'eco-palms' for Palm Sunday in Christian churches in the U.S. (Lacey, 2007).

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[39] In the first five years of the program, over 11,200 congregations, schools, retreat centers, camp and community organizations have been involved in the Interfaith Program: sales in that program grew 7,000%. Overall, in 2002 Equal Exchange imported over 1,000 tons of coffee; sales in 2003 were $13 million and more than 8,800 were active (ordering fairly traded products for service, fundraisers and community outreach) over 2003–04. By 2005, total sales for EE (which go beyond the Interfaith Program) were $20,797,000 and provided $1,700,000 in credit to producers. TransFair estimates that in 2003, U.S fair trade coffee purchases totaled 19 million pounds.

[40] www.christianaid.org/uk Accessed April 4, 2007. Adhering to the principles of fair trade, which include environmental sustainability, the World Council of Churches petition to the World Trade Organization keeps environmental sustainability in their statement on fair trade, as does Kairos: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives (www.kairoscanada.org) and most U.S. religious fair trade websites including the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism (www.rac.org), although this emphasis doesn't seem to always come across in how it is promoted at the congregational level and in literature to hand out.

Conclusion

What we see with these two case studies are two different strands of religious environmental discourse and activism that clearly participate in the promotion of seeing the world as one place. Religious groups that would differ on many other issues find themselves making common cause and cooperating globally on environmental issues and in their critique of economic globalization. Many understandings of globalization would term these movements anti-globalization because of that critique. I have tried to show how this is not the case; rather, religious environmentalism demonstrates a complex case study of what Robertson terms glocalization. Each embodies the dialectic of the local and global, for it is the global aspect of environmental issues that pushes religious traditions to reorient toward international cooperation and communality, and away somewhat from the more exclusivist expressions of those traditions. Yet the fears of losing cultural identity and religious particularity are calmed by the focus on local ecosystem or bioregional action, and religious environmental groups often seek to heighten a sense of global connectivity through a focus on personal lifestyle and consumption.

Many U.S. Christian local participants, however, in either religiously based global warming or fair trade campaigns often downplay the critique of aspects of economic globalization in terms of capitalism *per se*, and prefer to talk about the religious mandate for justice. This seems safer ground and less open to critique, for their most vehement opponents are religious conservatives (and not-so-conservatives) for whom Christianity is linked with a globalizing discourse of prosperity, health and wealth that embraces the 'market' as the arena of justice, fair play and reward; and who label any critique of the global economic order by religious environmentalists as anti-capitalist, un-Christian and even communist. At the farthest right, the emphasis on global cooperation associated with environmentalism or the United Nations is suspected of being linked with New Age religion and the Anti-Christ. Yet conservative to far right Christianity is also not anti-globalization. Ironically, for these conservatives, the spread of Christianity and a globalized market economy are bound together and serve as proof of the success of a certain form of Christianity—a success defined in global terms. For these religious conservatives, it is the critique of both their fundamental religious conceptions of God and God's role in the universe and the uniqueness of Christianity, as well as the critique of a globalized

market economy, that is precisely what makes the international, cross-religious cooperation and discourse of the earth as one place, and our only place, so threatening. What is at stake, then, in these portraits of religious environmentalism and their religious opponents, are two competing understandings of what is 'good' globalization.

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RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION TO GLOBALIZATION

William A. Stahl

> Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned....
>
> Karl Marx and Frederick Engels
> *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 1848

> Globalization puts everybody's culture into an industrial strength blender.
>
> Gwynne Dyer
> *The Bomb Under the World*, 1995

On 30 September 2005 the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published twelve anti-Islamic cartoons mocking the prophet Mohammed, in what has come to be known as the 'cartoon crisis'. In October, protests by ambassadors from Islamic countries were ignored by the Danish government. After a Danish Muslim cleric carried the cartoons to a conference in Beirut, demonstrations began in several Middle-Eastern countries. In response to these, right-wing media in Europe and North America began reprinting the cartoons, wrapping themselves in the mantle of 'freedom of the press' and vigorously pushing a 'clash of civilizations' ideology (e.g. Malkin, 2006). By February 2006 the crisis had grown into perhaps one of the worst confrontations between the Islamic world and the West in many years. Riots and demonstrations ranged from Nigeria to Indonesia, several embassies were burned, economic boycotts cost Denmark up to €1,000,000 a day, and scores of people were killed.

A crisis such as this is, of course, complex and can be analyzed from many perspectives. In this chapter, we will analyze it as both an *expression of* globalization and a *protest against* it. On one hand, the crisis

is an expression of globalization. What began as a few racist cartoons* directed against a local immigrant population was quickly spread worldwide by satellite TV and the Internet. In turn, the televised reactions from around the world were used by extremists on both sides to organize further local responses (indeed, some pundits called the cartoons a gift to Al Qaeda). In some ways, the crisis was a nightmarish parody of the Global Village (McLuhan & Fiore, 1968).

Of more interest, and a good deal more complex, is the crisis as a protest against globalization. That such a seemingly small provocation should trigger such a massive response indicates that a good deal more is going on beneath the surface than is indicated by an insult to the Prophet. In this chapter we will concentrate on religion as a source of opposition to globalization. We will begin with a few brief comments on five dimensions of globalization, and then examine religious complaints against globalization from two diametrically opposed perspectives: Islamism, which has been successful in rallying opposition to globalization, and liberal Christianity, which has not. As different as these two complaints are in style and substance, they are structurally similar. Religious opposition to globalization is based on demands for justice and a defense of tradition.

Five Dimensions of Globalization

Globalization theory is notoriously complex, with at least four or five incommensurable traditions of analysis (cf. Berger & Huntington, 2002; Beyer, 1994; Ellwood, 2001; Freidman, 2000; Giddens, 1990; Hamm & Smandych, 2005; Ritzer, 2004a; Robertson, 2001). There is a tendency, even by some sociologists, to describe globalization in abstract structural terms—as an inevitable, universal, and irreversible process, from which the actions of real people have been removed. What is too often overlooked is the importance of human agency, especially, in our case, how people use religious symbols and narratives to mobilize others.

In this chapter we will rather arbitrarily draw some boundaries to frame our discussion. As used here, globalization will be understood as the most recent stage of modernization, in which the processes that have

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* The stereotyped depiction of Arabs in the cartoons bears a striking resemblance to the stereotypes of Jews in Nazi cartoons of the 1930s. See: "Characters from *Der Stürmer*."

transformed western civilization over the past 400 years have spread to the entire planet. There are five dimensions of globalization which are relevant to our analysis. These form a constellation in which each, while thoroughly interlinked, has its own dynamics and can neither be reduced to nor determined by the others.

First is the revolution in communications and transportation technology. Although television and jet-travel began in the 1950s and 1960s, these technologies became truly revolutionary with the advent of mass air travel, cable and satellite TV, cellular telephones, computers, and the Internet in the 1980s and 1990s. The 90s also saw the rise of global all-news TV networks—CNN and its rivals, not least of which is Al Jazeera—and the institutionalization of the 24/7 news cycle. Paradoxically, increased concentration of media ownership has meant that there are fewer viewpoints expressed within any one country, at the same time as technology has allowed a greater number of voices at the global level. However, perhaps more important than the flow of information itself, are the effects that these technologies have had on behavior (Meyrowtiz, 1985). Modern communications end cultural isolation and confronts even the most traditional people with other values and ways of life—especially western materialism and titillation. Global media tends to relativize, and thus undermine, local values.

The second dimension is the political and military. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War began what many expected to be a period of U.S. hegemony. The much-discussed New World Order never materialized, however. American attempts to secure domination of the world's major oil reserves has led to a series of disastrous military adventures, widespread violation of human rights and civil liberties, increased instability, and the undermining of international law and institutions. As imperial overreach leads to American decline (Kennedy, 1987; Dyer, 2004), China and India are rising as major economic and military powers, regional powers like Iran are asserting themselves, and non-state movements like Al Qaeda have grown in significance. Instead of the expected unipolar hegemony, globalization is increasingly characterized by geo-political fragmentation.

The third dimension is economic: the rise of transnational corporations and the international infrastructure (the International Monetary Fund [IMF], the World Bank, the World Trade Organization [WTO], etc.) that supports them. The IMF and World Bank were created by the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944 to bring stability to the post-war economy. Their direction was sharply changed in the early 1980s,

however, by the decision of the Reagan and Thatcher governments to use these institutions to foster 'free market' ideology—the so-called Washington Consensus (Stiglitz, 2003). The result was an enormous concentration of power and wealth as the transnational corporations came to dominate the global economy. This led in turn to the formation of a militant anti-globalization movement (cf. Klein, 2000).

The fourth dimension is the precarious state of the environment. Population growth and unconstrained technological and industrial development have pushed the Earth's environment to its carrying capacity. The collapse of fisheries, widespread deforestation, protracted drought, and increasingly violent weather have already brought hardship to many parts of the world. Further, the world seems to be at, or near, peak oil production (Deffeyes, 2005), raising the prospect of economic instability and conflict as competition increases for ever-dwindling energy supplies. And, like the anti-globalization movement, environmentalism has arisen as a global social movement in response to the crisis.

The fifth dimension of globalization is religion and culture—the places where globalization is most acutely felt and experienced by most people. There is an unfortunate tendency by many analysts to identify globalization with a single dimension (especially the technological or economic) and to either ignore religion and culture or to subordinate them to something else (as when culture is reduced to 'culture industries'). But far from being just another dependent variable, religion and culture are active forces in their own right (*sui generis*, as Durkheim would say). As the cartoon crisis demonstrates, religion retains an enormous ability to mobilize people. Nor should religion be understood as a passive or reactionary force, merely 'responding' to the pressures of globalization. On the one hand, imperialists have always brought their culture with them and, deliberately or not, imposed it upon the conquered. Throughout history religion itself as often been a globalizing force (cf. Beyer, 2005). At the same time, religion has frequently been at the centre of resistance to imperialism, either through maintenance of cultural traditions in the face of colonial domination or through various revolutionary hybrid forms, which Lanternari identified as "the religions of the oppressed" (1963).

None of these dimensions of globalization are, in and of themselves, new. Some people used to boast that the 'the sun never set on the British Empire'. Transnational corporations are as old as the Hudson's Bay and East India companies. Even global electronic communication can be traced back to the Atlantic cable of the 1860s. What is distinctive

about globalization today is the congruence and over-determination of all five of these dimensions on a planetary scale. Very few places in the world have not been penetrated, very few not reconfigured to a greater or lesser degree. Sociologists have long commented on the high price the industrialized countries have paid for modernization (e.g. Bellah, 1976); now the same processes are affecting everyone, with the addition that many perceive globalization to be an alien and hostile force being imposed upon them by the West. And just as religion was a major source of resistance to colonialism, it remains a potent basis for opposition to globalization.

Complaints Against Globalization

Religious people engage with globalization in a variety of ways. Some support globalization and identify with the hegemonic culture. Others blend elements of globalization with indigenous tradition, creating hybrid forms. The bulk are passive or indifferent: only a minority oppose globalization.

Religious anti-globalists tend to make two complaints: a demand for justice and a defense of tradition. To focus our analysis, we will look at two specific but very different complaints. The first is that of Osama bin Laden, who exemplifies the kind of opposition voiced by Islamists in particular and religious fundamentalists more generally. The second is that of Dwight Hopkins, who exemplifies the liberal Christian dimension of the anti-globalization movement.

Osama bin Laden's Complaint

Establishing texts for bin Laden is always problematic. I will use two texts, his "Letter to America" of 24 November 2002 and "Resist the New Rome" of 6 January 2004. The former appeared on an Islamist web site, the second was an audio-tape broadcast by Al Jazeera. Both were translated in Britain and published by the *Guardian/Observer* newspapers and both are generally believed to be authentic.

Bin Laden's central argument in both these texts is a demand for justice. "Why are we fighting and opposing you?" he asks. "The answer is very simple: because you attacked us and continue to attack us" (2002: 1). The conflict is portrayed as a defensive and just struggle against the forces of imperialism and aggression: in Palestine, in Iraq, in Somalia, in Chechnya, in Kashmir, in the southern Philippines. In

particular, bin Laden denounces the imposition of corrupt and tyrannical regimes throughout the Muslim world; governments which do not institute Shariah law, steal the community's resources and sell them "at a paltry price" (2), and make peace with Israel. The very length of his list is significant. Throughout the document, bin Laden speaks of "us," "our Ummah" (the community of the faithful), and "the Islamic Nation," that is, he claims to speak for the community of all Muslims, everywhere in the world. What is depicted as global aggression will be met by a global response. The rhetoric in "Resist the New Rome" portrays this "religious-economic war" (2004: 1) as a continuation of not only the Crusades, but of the struggle between the Byzantine Empire and the initial rise of Islam. Here bin Laden appropriates powerful symbols for himself and Al Qaeda while framing the conflict in world historical terms.

While bin Laden's central argument is addressed to the political-military dimension of globalization, in the second part of "Letter to America" he speaks to the economic, environmental, and cultural dimensions as well. He defends Islamic tradition against what he sees as the decadence and corruption of Western civilization. Again his indictment is lengthy: usury, the use of intoxicants and drugs, all forms of sexual immorality, degradation of women, destruction of the environment, political corruption and hypocrisy. For example, he says:

> You are a nation that exploits women like consumer products or advertising tools calling upon customers to purchase them. You use women to serve passengers, visitors, and strangers to increase your profit margins. You then rant that you support the liberation of women (2002: 4).

He concludes that "you are the worst civilization witnessed by the history of mankind" (4). Note that while bin Laden castigates corporate theft of Muslim wealth and the American refusal to ratify the Kyoto Accord, most of his complaint is directed toward individual behavior. Sexual immorality is high on his list; exploitation of the poor is not. Running through both his arguments is a strong streak of anti-Semitism.

Osama bin Laden does not differ significantly in either his analysis or rhetoric from other Islamists or, in his defense of tradition, from many other forms of fundamentalism (cf. Armstrong, 2001; Lincoln, 2003; Ruthven, 2004). Indeed, there is little in his analysis that was not first said by Sayyid Qutb (2006/1964), one of the founders of militant Islamism, while many of his denunciations of modern decadence are echoed by fundamentalists of other faiths (see, for example, Falwell,

1980; Parsley, 2006; Sheldon, 2006). What sets him apart is his mastery of communications technology. The image broadcast to the world of a lonely ascetic in a cave defying the global power of his enemies—which he identifies as the enemies of Islam itself—has enormous symbolic power and appeals to many people. Al Qaeda is thus not so much an organization as an idea. It provides local Islamists all over the world with symbolic resources (and only occasionally with training and materiel) to mobilize people to act against the local manifestations of what they perceive to be the alien and hostile forces of globalization.

Dwight Hopkins' Complaint

By comparison with bin Laden, the complaints of most liberal Christians are one-dimensional, in that they focus almost exclusively upon the economic dimension of globalization. They are also far less successful. Dwight Hopkins is fairly typical of the kind of response that liberal Christians make to globalization (see, for example: Hawkin, 2004; Stackhouse & Paris, 2000; Stackhouse & Browning, 2001), or critics of globalization from other groups (see, for example: Kelman, 1999; Russian Orthodox Church, 2006; Stackhouse & Obenchain, 2002). His complaint is also a demand for justice and a defense of tradition, although what he means by each is very different from bin Laden.

Running through Hopkins' essay is a strong demand for justice. Globalization has meant the grotesque accumulation of wealth and power into a few hands and the concomitant exploitation of the world's poor. He notes that:

> The richest 225 individuals in the world constitute a combined wealth of more than $1 trillion. This is equal to the annual income of the poorest 47 percent of the world's population. And the three richest people on earth own assets surpassing the combined gross domestic product of the forty-eight least developed countries. (2001: 10–11).

This has led to wholesale corruption of politics and, by curtailing the power of the state, has undermined democracy. This wealth is purchased at the expense of the environment. In saying this, Hopkins' complaint does not differ from secular critics of globalization.

Where he does differ is in his defense of tradition. Globalization, he charges, is idolatry, a false religious system that threatens to supplant Christianity. Any religion, he argues, is a system of beliefs and practices comprising a god, faith, religious leadership, institutions, a theology, and revelation (9). Globalization is characterized by all of these. For

example, a god, he says, "is the ultimate concern of a community of believers. This god is the final desire and aim that surpasses all other penultimate realities, dreams, wants, and actions" (9). He goes on:

> The god of globalization embodies the ultimate concern or ground of being where there is a fierce belief in the intense concentration, in a few hands, of monopoly finance capitalist wealth on the world stage (9).

Similarly, the small group of families who own the corporations form globalization's religious leadership, the WTO and IMF are its institutions, and neo-liberalism its theology. The aim of this new religion is to promote a theological anthropology, which redefines what it means to be a human being. Globalization "seeks a homogenized monoculture of the market to transform people being valued in themselves to people being determined by their dependency on commodities" (13). Using the mass media and culture industries, the religion of globalization seeks to propagate itself "throughout every possible nook and cranny of the world" (28).

Although both bin Laden and Hopkins demand justice and seek to defend tradition, at first reading, there are more differences than similarities between them. Bin Laden is a leader in an international revolutionary movement; Hopkins is an academic with little, if any, following among an anti-globalization movement, which is itself small and fitful. Bin Laden's manifestos are—literally—a call to arms; Hopkins makes a brief and undeveloped reference to liberation theology at the end of his essay. Bin Laden is fully prepared to kill civilians in pursuit of his totalitarian version of Islam. Hopkins' liberation theology calls for "a new spirituality of resistance to domination and a sustained struggle for freedom and justice, anchored in the plight of the poor but yielding a full humanity for all" (29). But as different as their analyses are, both share one thing in common with the protestors during the cartoon crisis—they ground their opposition to globalization in religion. However differing in details, religion makes its riposte to globalization in the call for justice and the defense of tradition. On the surface, though, these two complaints at first appear to be paradoxical. The demand for justice is a universal cry that transcends globalization; the defense of tradition is protection of the particular. We will examine both.

Globalization and Justice

Opposition to globalization is not uncommonly dismissed in the literature (cf. Friedman, 2000) as backlash by those who either cannot compete in the new world system or by those whose identities cannot transcend purely local attachments. While a backlash to globalization undeniably exists, it would be a serious mistake to trivialize religious opposition in these terms. When religious opponents of globalization demand justice, they are not speaking merely about local grievances but voicing a universal cry that transcends globalization.

Both bin Laden and Hopkins ground their demand for justice in their understanding of God. There are, of course, dramatic differences in their understanding. Bin Laden declares that, "Allah, the Almighty, legislated the permission and the option to take revenge. Thus, if we are attacked, then we have the right to attack back" (2002: 3). Hopkins calls for "the coconstitution of a new human self with the God of freedom for the oppressed" (29). But for both, justice is a universal principle, which transcends every society, nation and socio-economic system.

The key to both their understandings of justice is what, in sociological terms, is called agency. Justice demands agency, that is, individuals have to be aware of, and take responsibility for, their actions. To call for justice is to insist that people matter and that they exercise moral self-determination. In contrast to those apologists for globalization who echo Thatcher's dictum that "there is no alternative", both bin Laden and Hopkins see globalization as a conscious exercise in power and not a disembodied, universal and inevitable system. They say that there are *always* alternatives. People must "take an honest stance with yourselves", as bin Laden tells Americans (2002: 5), and change the way they, and their societies, act.

The effect of this demand for justice is that it empowers individuals in two ways. First, it links their specific suffering and struggles to a universal, transcendent principle. They are not left to face an impersonal, overpowering system alone—the Word of God stands with them. Further, their particular struggles are symbolically linked to the struggles of others, creating a strong sense of solidarity. Second, it gives a human face and name to those who are oppressing them. They are the victim not of anonymous forces about which nothing can be done, but of wicked people against whom action can be taken.

Thus a religious demand for justice is a powerful means for mobilizing people to a cause. This, in part, helps us to understand the cartoon

crisis. Millions of people in the Islamic world live in hardship and anxiety, filled with growing frustration and anger, and with real and perceived grievances against globalization. The clerics who organized the demonstrations and boycotts were able to mobilize people by tapping into this anger, focusing it around the insult to the Prophet, and directing it towards an identifiable target. In general, Islamists—bin Laden in particular—have been much more successful in using the symbolic resources of their religion to mobilize people than have liberal Christians.

Globalization and Tradition

If the demand for justice is an appeal to a universal principle that transcends globalization, the defense of tradition is protection of the particular. Note that 'the particular' is not the same as 'the local'. All traditions are particular, even if they may be international.

Globalization threatens traditional meaning systems. According to both Karl Marx (1974/1848) and Max Weber (1958/1905), modernity was incompatible with tradition. The capitalist, industrial world was one of continuous change (Marx) and ever-greater rationalization (Weber). Since at least the work of Joseph Schumpeter (1950) and W.W. Rostow (1960), the dominant economic theories in the industrialized countries have seen tradition as an obstacle to economic development. Many theorists have echoed Schumpeter (1950: 81ff.) on the "creative destruction" inherent in capitalism and industrialism. But for many people on the receiving end of policies based on those theories, the promise of future economic development is not worth the present disruption of traditional ways of life. Defense of tradition can be a potent basis for mobilizing people against globalization.

Each of the five dimensions of globalization can threaten tradition in various ways. Invasion and occupation is direct and brutal. There is very little left of traditional life in places such as Grozny or Fallujah. Environmental destruction may, in extreme cases, be just as dramatic, for example when refugees flee drought and famine. More often it is insidious, as when traditional communities are displaced or are no longer viable, forcing people into dependency or migration. Cities throughout the developing world are crowded with people displaced from the countryside.

Most of the attention in the debate over globalization, however, has been focused on the interplay of the technological, economic and cultural dimensions. The exact relationship between these three dimensions has, of course, been a central question of sociology since its beginning. The current discussion has frequently centered on concepts of "McDonaldization" (Ritzer, 2004b), homogenization, and Americanization (cf. Ritzer, 2004a; Robertson, 2001), none of which are very helpful in understanding the question at hand. Nor does it help our understanding that many religious critics of globalization (bin Laden in particular) focus on symptoms rather than the underlying causes of what it is that they are complaining about. When we look closely at bin Laden's and Hopkins' arguments, we can see a constellation of four factors that form the basis of their complaints: disembedding, relativism, displacement, and commodification.

Disembedding

The first factor is what Anthony Giddens (1990) and Charles Taylor (2004) call 'disembedding'. Giddens defines 'disembedding' as "the 'lifting out' of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space" (21). Both he and Taylor see it as a central characteristic of modernity. In traditional society individuals were embedded in their communities, that is, people's identities were shaped within the bounded context of religion, authority and view of the cosmos. As Taylor puts it, "From the standpoint of the individual's sense of self, [embeddedness] means the inability to imagine oneself outside a certain matrix" (55). The long, complex process we call modernization is in large part a process of disembedding which, according to Taylor, "involved the growth and entrenchment of a new self-understanding of our social existence, one that gave an unprecedented primacy to the individual" (50). But it would be a mistake to see disembedding as just "secularization" or the loss of community, Taylor argues. The process of disembedding involves substituting a modern moral-order for a traditional one, complete with new forms of solidarity, authority, and trust.

The significance of disembedding for our discussion is that a process which began in Europe hundreds of years ago—and which still continues in all of the industrialized societies—has now spread to the rest of the planet. The difference is that processes which took centuries in

Europe and North America have been telescoped into decades in the rest of the world, with two results. On one hand, there are millions of people, often young, usually urban, frequently educated, who are strongly attracted to the freedom, individuality and higher standard of living promised by global culture, but who all too often are caught in the alienation and anomie which form the dark side of disembeddedness. On the other hand, those remaining in traditional culture, particularly those in authority, feel profoundly threatened at what they experience as dissolution, immorality and loss of control.

Relativism

The second factor, relativism, both draws from and reinforces the first. It is frequently associated with the development of global communications technology. It is a truism that media, especially its advertising, not only conveys information but promotes beliefs, norms, and values. While there has been a great deal of attention paid to the content of the media, Meyrowtiz (1985) cautions that is not sufficient, that we also have to attend to the structural affects media has on behavior. In our context, these take two forms.

First, global media end cultural isolation. There are few places on the planet that are not linked into global communications media. Even the most remote villages in developing countries often have communal TV sets. However, while much of the media's content originates in the industrialized countries, the United States in particular, relatively little that is shown in the West is produced in the developing world. This uneven flow of information leads some to see globalization as cultural imperialism, Americanization, or Westernization. But what an attention to content alone overlooks is that *all* countries are affected—the West as well as the developing world. Whatever its content, from whatever source, global media present beliefs, norms and values that will differ from those of any particular culture. This means *everything* will be compared to, and at least implicitly challenged by, value and belief systems from outside the particularity. When people have knowledge of many moral systems, it becomes increasingly difficult to see as absolute any particular one. The effect is a tendency to relativize all systems of meaning. Those still living within traditional belief and value systems experience this as antinomian chaos. Thus bin Laden charges:

> You are the nation who, rather than ruling by the Shariah of Allah in its Constitution and Laws, choose to invent your own laws as you will

> and desire... You are a nation that permits acts of immorality, and you consider them to be pillars of personal freedom (2002: 4).

Yet, as many of the debates over moral and social issues in the developed countries demonstrate, no one is immune from this tendency towards relativism.

A second structural aspect is what Meyrowitz calls the revelation of back stage behavior. He explains:

> While we tend to think of our group affiliations simply in terms of "who" we are, our sense of identity is also shaped by where we are and who is "with" us. A change in the structure of situations—as a result of changes in media or other factors—will change people's sense of "us" and "them." An important issue to consider in predicting the effects of new media on group identities is how the new medium alters "who shares social information with whom". (1985: 55)

Following Goffman, he argues that in everyday life our behavior is divided into "front stage", where we put on a performance in accordance with the roles we are playing, and "back stage", where people can relax, plan strategies, and engage in behavior that may not be in keeping with their public roles. While information in the front stage may be controlled, that in the back stage is usually concealed from those outside the particular group. What electronic media have done is blur the distinction between front and back stage. In particular, media tend to reveal the back stage behavior of the powerful and privileged. By changing the relations of "who shares information with whom", Meyrowitz argues, media may affect the power relations in society in ways quite different than analysis of media content alone may indicate. "Traditional distinctions in group identities, socialization stages, and ranks of hierarchy", he says, "are likely to be blurred by the widespread use of electronic media" (92).

Globalization has spread this phenomenon worldwide. One consequence of this makes it increasingly difficult for any group to portray its publicly professed norms and values as the 'real' basis of its actions, when everyone is privy to its "back stage" behavior. To those trying to live in a traditional context, in which front and back stage behavior are typically strongly separated, global society appears both immoral and hypocritical. As bin Laden charges Americans: "Let us not forget one of your major characteristics: your duality in both manners and values; your hypocrisy in manners and principles. All manners, principles and values have two scales: one for you and one for the others" (2002: 5).

Displacement

Intertwined with disembedding and relativism, is the third factor—displacement. Displacement is the loss of a 'sense of place', that intricate web of social relationships, symbols, and institutions which ground identity and form the basis of community. Globalization creates displacement by assaulting those institutions and cultural forms that maintain a sense of place. To take an example from the developed world, when Wal-Mart or other 'big box' stores move into a town, small businesses are frequently forced into bankruptcy, eliminating the careers which were the mainstay of the local petit-bourgeoisie and replacing them with part-time, low-wage labour (cf. Klein, 2000). The loss is more than just economic. The elimination of the local petit-bourgeoisie removes community leaders, whose roles are not replaced by the managers of distant and indifferent corporations. The institutional basis of the community is displaced. Meyrowitz describes a parallel effect of electronic media on cultural forms:

> Electronic media destroy the specialness of place and time. Television, radio, and telephone turn once private places into more public ones by making them more accessible to the outside world. And car stereos, wristwatch televisions, and personal sound systems such as the Sony "Walkman" make public spaces private. Through such media, what is happening almost everywhere can be happening wherever we are. Yet when we are everywhere, we are also no place in particular. (1985: 125)

Every culture has different symbolic boundaries of public and private space, different ways of signifying sacred and profane time, different ways of designating that which is important from that which is not. But whatever those particular boundaries may be, globalization tends to displace them, without necessarily putting anything in their place. From the standpoint of traditionalists, globalized society lacks a centre.

Commodification

The fourth factor is commodification, the process by which globalization transforms everything into a commodity in the marketplace. "The superiority of the market order" proclaimed by Friedrich von Hayek in his Nobel Lecture (1974), has become an article of faith in the dominant economic theories today. Revealingly, Hayek added, "when it is not suppressed by the powers of government, it [the market] regularly displaces other types of order". This is precisely the point that both bin Laden and Hopkins attack.

Bin Laden, as we saw above, charges Americans with reducing women and sex to commodities. Hopkins sees free markets, privatization, and deregulation as the threefold dogmatics of neo-liberal theology. But Hopkins' analysis also goes deeper, to see in this blind faith in the market another agenda:

> The new religion not only wants people to purchase products. It also desires for people to reconceive of themselves as people. To change into something new, people must, in addition to redirecting their purchasing habits, refeel who they are in the present and reenvision their possibilities differently in the future. People are baptized into a lifestyle to fulfill the desire for commodities and to follow further the commodification of desires.
>
> Globalization relentlessly pursues this refashioning of the new man and woman throughout the globe. It seeks a homogenized monoculture of the market to transform people being valued in themselves to people being determined by their dependency on commodities (2001: 13).

Globalization, he charges, has "become the vehicle of cultural invasion" (27). It is a project to destroy democracy by reducing citizens to consumers and ultimately "to remake the world in its own image" (28).

Now, some globalization theorists would take issue with Hopkins' depiction of "a homogenized monoculture of the market", arguing instead that "the production and promotion of goods and services on a global scale requires close, ongoing attention to cultural differences" (Robertson 2001: 464). To such theorists, homogenization does not happen because global marketing and advertising are aimed at differentiated market niches. But, Hopkins might reply, that is a superficial understanding of the nature of the market. Hopkins takes Hayek seriously when he says that, left alone, the market would replace every other institutional order in society. This is because markets only recognize exchange value, everything else—from the environment to culture—are externalities and therefore without value. On the surface, there may appear to be enormous heterogeneity as more and more commodities appear in the marketplace. However, beneath the surface the "homogenized monoculture of the market" grows because all commodities are alike in being commodities.

Thus these four factors—disembedding, relativism, displacement and commodification—interact together to destroy traditional meaning. In modern society, as Marx said: "All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned" (1974/1848). Or as Gwynne Dyer put it: "Globalization puts everybody's culture into an industrial strength blender"

(1995). This is not to say that global society lacks culture or meaning, only that *traditional* meaning is no longer possible. "Tradition, in this sense," Ruthven argues, "consists in not being aware that how one lives or behaves is 'traditional', because alternative ways of thinking or living are simply not taken into consideration" (2004: 16). Under globalization, culture becomes a hodgepodge of imported elements, local innovations, and hybrids, in which tradition is only one more option, one more choice among others. For those who wish to remain in traditional culture, globalization requires them to consciously *choose* to be traditional and act in traditional ways, which negates the very idea of what 'traditional' is.

Religion Against Globalization

As we have seen, religious people respond to globalization in a variety of ways. Millions find the stimulation, freedom, individualism and standard of living offered by globalization appealing. Many more are indifferent, busy pursuing other agendas. But some find globalization intolerable. We have looked at two examples, the Islamism of Osama bin Laden and the liberal Christianity of Dwight Hopkins. While very different in style and substance, their complaints against globalization reveal some structural similarities, in a demand for justice and a desire to preserve the particularities of their traditions. We have also noted that Islamism has been much more effective in opposing globalization than has liberal Christianity. The cartoon crisis, while not completely a phenomenon of Islamism, demonstrates the continued ability of religion to mobilize people.

The difference in effectiveness between the two groups raises a final issue. Following Bruce Lincoln's typology (2003), the past few decades, which have seen the rise of globalization, have also witnessed the transformation of liberal Christianity from a *religion of the status quo* towards increasingly becoming a *religion of resistance*. Their ineffectiveness results, in part at least, because liberal Christianity is itself a modern movement and therefore has few means with which to resist globalization. Six decades ago, liberal Christians dominated their churches and spoke with confidence to presidents and parliaments. Today, in part because of the four factors we have been discussing, they are a decided minority in societies that no longer share their assumptions.

At one level, analyses like Hopkins' are emblematic of a group of people who are coming to realize that they no longer speak for a majority. They begin to define themselves, as Lincoln argues, "in opposition to the religion of the status quo [in this case the "religion of globalization"], defending against the ideological domination of the latter" (85). But as liberal Christians self-consciously move from shepherding the dominant culture to resisting it, they find it increasingly difficult to use their symbols to mobilize people.

In Lincoln's typology, Islamism is a *religion of revolution*. Unlike a religion of resistance, which opposes an ideological hegemony, religions of revolution take direct action against "the dominant social faction itself" (85). Islamists violently oppose globalization, those Western nations they identify as fostering it, and those Muslims whom they see as collaborators, in the name of a tradition which they perceive to be under attack.

Paradoxically, Islamism, like other forms of fundamentalism, is itself a modern phenomenon. It is, in large part, a product of the very processes of globalization that it protests against. Islamism draws its strength primarily from displaced urban masses, not from peasant villagers still embedded in traditional society. As globalization erodes away traditional systems of meaning, it leaves, as Ruthven says, "an emotional vacuum to be filled by iconic, charismatic figures such as bin Laden" (2004: 211). Using the mass media, Islamists employ the symbols of tradition to mobilize people for their revolutionary project. Islamism is an attempt to recreate lost meaning by force of arms.

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RELIGION AND EXCLUSION/MARGINALIZATION GLOBALIZED PENTECOSTALISM AMONG HISPANICS IN NEWARK, N.J.

Otto Maduro

Introduction

Pentecostalism has been understood with many prejudices (including through dominance of simplistic secularization assumptions) but when we understand how people actually use Pentecostalism, not only do we get a different impression, but the link between Pentecostalism and the experience from below of global migration and marginalization becomes that much clearer. Pentecostalism for Latina/o populations in countries of origin and countries of migration illustrates how globalization works through religion from below. Globalization means, indeed, different things to different people. For some, it opens an exciting, promising world of opportunities and choices: a world of communication, travel, learning, expansion of networks, trade, acquisition, consumption, investments, and/or profits—a brave new world of freedom, science and technology, wealth and progress. This is the case for many among the young, urban, college-educated, upwardly mobile investors, businessmen, and professionals, especially in the industrialized countries of the North Atlantic.

For others—a growing and increasingly impoverished majority across the planet—globalization entails almost the exact opposite of what it involves for the fortunate few: rising prices (of food, housing, transportation, education, and health care, among others), declining salaries, longer working hours, less rest and sleep, unstable and unsafe jobs and living quarters, shrinking opportunities for saving, investing, or advancement (including for the schooling of their offspring), evictions, forced relocations, and the disbanding of their neighborhood, kinship, professional, and friendship networks. For this growing section of humanity, globalization is daily associated with impoverishment, insecurity, nobodyness, doom and gloom: it clearly means the end of their world.

Facing such a predicament, no wonder that human bodies follow the global trail of merchandise and profits, generating the most massive migratory movements in human history. Such is, among others, the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, and, albeit some countries (like Chile in 2007) experience a lesser brain and body drain than others (like Dominican Republic or Mexico in the same year), the fact is that migrating—often first to the capital cities of their county, state, or country, if they do not already live there, and then later abroad, either northbound toward the U.S. or Canada, eastward to Spain or Italy, or even westbound to Japan—appears for more and more people to be the only sensible choice for either advancement or mere survival.

In these migratory movements in search of a better life for themselves and/or their own the U.S. appears as *the* place of choice for millions of Latin Americans: it is in their same region, closer than Europe or Japan, and constantly present, in variegated forms, everywhere; it has been cast for decades (above all by an overwhelmingly U.S.-supplied media industry) as *the* must-go land of freedom and plenty; it is where relatives, neighbors, and friends are nowadays living; for most immigrants to the U.S. (i.e., Mexicans), it is also the land of their ancestors, taken by force in the 18th century by the pallid immigrants from the northeastern British islands and their colonies; and it is the country from where remittances come, often as the main, or even the sole, income to millions south of the Rio Grande, frequently accompanied by alluring job offers from businesses in places with exotic names—the Carolinas, Idaho, New Jersey, Alaska!

Thus, the excluded and marginalized from the globalized economies of Latin America and the Caribbean are moving northward by the hundreds of thousands a year, regularly carrying with them, indeed, their religious traditions (Roman Catholic for the most part), but also leaving behind the environments and ties that made it difficult at home to consider crossing religious borders as well. And because or in spite of their religious traditions, these multitudes—fleeing conditions in which they are increasingly treated like gear, irrelevant, inconvenient, or worse, like waste—are simultaneously pursuing the dream of a life worth living, meaningful, blessed. Once in the U.S., new fears and hopes, needs and encounters, linkages and prospects, emerge—often leading to one of the few sites in the vicinity where the mother tongue is sung, shouted, and spoken, where the Hispanic immigrant is welcome, recognized, and unforgettable: the makeshift, storefront Pentecostal congregation.

Such is the context where I encountered, a few years ago, a budding array of Latina/o Pentecostal congregations in the city of Newark, New Jersey—and where a wide range of biases I did not even suspect I had in their regard slowly began to unravel.

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In the autumn of 1999 I formed a research team—with three Drew University students and a Brazilian Ph.D. candidate in an exchange program with our university—to carry on a sociological study of the Latina/o Pentecostal congregations in the city of Newark (New Jersey, U.S.A.).[1]

In the monthly meetings of this team we started to realize the many diverse preconceptions that we had, unknowingly, internalized about Pentecostalism and its role among Latina/o immigrant communities in the United States.[2] Such prejudices and preconceptions ranged from assuming that behind the Hispanic Pentecostal growth were lurking powerful economic and political interests, to the conviction that this growth was, at best, a superficial, passing phenomenon, with a rather debilitating impact among immigrants in difficult situations (eliciting further divisions, conflicts, and isolation among them, as well as stimulating purely individualistic and other-worldly initiatives and concerns among them), with particularly negative effects among immigrant women.

In this chapter, I present a provisional synthesis of some of the things I have learned (or at least intuited) since that first Newark research experience in 1999–2000 about the dynamics characterizing the encounter between Latin American immigrants and the Pentecostal

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[1] Supported by the Ford Foundation, this was a sub-project within the larger *Newark Project*, a research, field education, and community advocacy program founded and directed from within Drew University (Madison, New Jersey) by Karen McCarthy Brown. The team, led by Otto Maduro, included Samuel Cruz, Ricardo Ramos, Charles Perabeau, and Orivaldo Lópes. I thank the Henry Luce Foundation and the Association of Theological Schools for the *Henry Luce III Fellows in Theology* grant that allowed me to pursue this research during a second sabbatical year, 2006–2007.

[2] Two of the team members grew up in Puerto Rican Pentecostal families, and were by now ministers in non-Pentecostal denominations (one Reformed, the other Methodist). The other two students were born and raised in Protestant denominations where they were now ministers as well (one U.S. Nazarene; the other Brazilian Baptist) and both had some familiarity with Pentecostals. Myself, the only layperson in the team, was born and raised in Venezuela, in a Roman Catholic culture, and had only a cursory knowledge of Pentecostalism. Lyanna Ríos interviewed nearly one third of the Latina/o Pentecostal ministers in Newark.

movement in the United States. Seven years later, these now seem a bit clearer, broader and deeper, thanks to the light thrown by convergent studies carried on by many scholars in other places.[3] May the writing of these thoughts, and the reading by other people equally interested in the topic, serve at least the purpose of eliciting critiques revealing further biases underlying our observations, thus contributing to a richer appreciation of the Pentecostal phenomenon both in Latin America and among U.S. Hispanics.[4]

On the Latina/o Population in the U.S.

One of the most significant demographic trends at the onset of the 21st century in the United States is the relative and absolute growth—by both immigration and fertility rates—of the population of Latin American origins. In a nation that now numbers over 300 million inhabitants, the Latina/o population is officially already above 43 million (over 14% of the total population, not counting Puerto Rico), a number that is greater than the population of all but two Latin American countries.[5] The total U.S. population is in fact growing ever more slowly in this beginning of the new millennium: only 1% per year. 49% of that slower

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[3] I am alluding to the works on Latin American Pentecostalism not only by Emilio Willems (1967) and Christian Lalive d'Epinay (1968) but, more recently, among others, those of Francisco Cartaxo Rolim (1980), Regina Reyes Novaes (1985), David Stoll (1990), David Martin (1990), André Droogers et al. (1991), Luis Scott (1991), Felipe Vázquez (1991), Carmelo Alvarez (1992), Cecilia Mariz (1992), Carlos Garma (1992), Pablo Wright (1992), Jean-Pierre Bastian (1993), Maria das Dores Machado (1994), Matthew Marostica (1994), Patricia Fortuny (1994), Manuel Gaxiola (1994), Alejandro Frigerio (1995), Renee de la Torre (1995), Elizabeth Juarez (1995), Ari Pedro Oro (1996), Leonildo Silveira Campos (1996), Douglas Petersen (1996), Daniel Míguez (1997), Edward Cleary and Hannah Stewart Gambino (1997), Frans Kamsteeg (1998), Pablo Semán (1998), Patricia Moreira (1998), Ricardo Mariano (1999), and André Corten (1999); and, in the case of U.S. Hispanic Pentecostalism, those of Eldin Villafañe (1993), Manuel Vásquez (1999), Gastón Espinosa (1999), Daniel Ramírez (1999), and Samuel Cruz (2005).

[4] In this, as in several other points, I am inspired by Pierre Bourdieu's work, especially by his sociological epistemology (1991), with the Durkheimian insistence on sociological knowledge requiring a deep disposition and an endless effort to discern and critique the preconceptions hindering and substituting for an approximate, provisory knowledge of the social context.

[5] http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2006/nationalracetable3.pdf (accessed 6/29/06). Brazil, with 188 million, and Mexico, with over 107 million inhabitants, are the two largest Latin American countries. Colombia, with a bit over 43 million in 2006, would then be fourth.

growth, however, is actually, in the last years, Hispanic growth, thanks to the birth and immigration rates of Latinas/os,[6] mostly of Mexican descent.[7] The other side of this growth is that the European-origin majority is slowly declining: less than 60% of the school-age population (of which near 19% are Hispanic), under 70% of the active labor force (of which 13.3% are Latinas/os), but more than 83% of the elderly (65 years or older, of which only 6% are Hispanic).[8] The estimates are that Latinas/os will be near 103 million by 2050 (24.4% of the total U.S. population), African Americans near 61 million (14.6%), and Asian Americans very close to 33 million (8%). In the meantime, the European-origin population (64% in 2000) will become the nation's "largest minority" in a country without a majority; but, because of its low fertility rates and consequent aging, it will become—with less than half of the total population, an annual negative growth, and a very high median age—a minority long before 2050 in both the active labor force and the school-age population.[9] In a clear sense, the hope for renewal and rejuvenation of the U.S. intellectual and manual productivity rests increasingly with the Hispanic segment of its population.

These changes, of course, have cultural and linguistic dimensions: one of every 10 people in the U.S. speaks Spanish as their first language (30 million people or 75% of the Latina/o population),[10] whereas almost 3 million Hispanics speak it as their sole language.[11]

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[6] http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/statemap.cfm# (accessed 6/29/06). Near 60% of the 44 million Latinas/os are born in the U.S., whereas 40% are immigrants from Latin America (84% of these immigrants are legal U.S. residents; only 16% of the total are 'undocumented' immigrants). See http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=19 for further data on the 'undocumented' (accessed 6/29/06).

[7] 67% are of Mexican origin, 14% Central- and South American, 9% Puerto Rican, and 4% Cuban. See http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2003/cb03–100.html (accessed 3/14/05).

[8] http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/img/cb04–98–table1.xls http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/PROJ_PIO-tab1.xls (accessed 6/29/06) and http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/aging_population/006544.html (accessed 6/29/06).

[9] http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/population/001720.html (accessed 6/28/06).

[10] http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=D&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_QTP16&-ds_name=D&-_lang=en (accessed 6/29/06).

[11] http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=D&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_QTP16&-ds_name=D&-_lang=en (accessed 6/29/06). Samuel Huntington, the conservative thinker who proposed in the 70s the "national security" doctrine, and most recently, the "clash of civilizations" between Islam and the West, has

There is, too, a political component of this trend, whose most visible facets are the courting of the Latina/o vote by the traditional parties, Republican and Democratic—a phenomenon which turned ever more complex around the debate on immigration legislation—and the growing number and proportion of Hispanics among the candidates for office in the ballots, as well as among those elected or appointed as public officials.

Simultaneously, however, there is a gloomy political dimension to this phenomenon, no doubt fostered by the triple insecurity of an aging 'white' majority that is growing ever more slowly; that is suffering increasing economic uncertainty as a consequence of the neo-liberal economic policies implemented at both global and domestic levels; and that increasingly resents, especially after 9/11, the ever more visible presence of people of unfamiliar traits—physical, cultural, religious, and linguistic—in spaces traditionally monopolized by the WASP population. Among other ominous outcomes are an increase in several forms of both haphazard and organized harassment, abuses, persecution, and violence perpetrated against people 'of color' in general, the apparently 'foreign' segment of that population in particular, and, more specifically, people who look Latin American, Arab, or Muslim. These include vicious attacks privately initiated against Hispanic individuals, groups, and homes (with widespread impunity or minor penalties for their perpetrators);[12] the formation of volunteer civilian posses for the detection, hounding, terrorizing, capture, beating, and expulsion—if not outright assassination—of immigrants crossing the Mexican border into the U.S;[13] increasingly harsh and more frequent measures in a growing number of states and counties against migrant workers, including more and longer detentions, forced separations of parents and children, physical and psychological abuse, and forced deportations; the creation of anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and racist organizations, some of them

now come forward to interpret U.S. Hispanic growth as the main threat to the unity and security of the nation. See his article "The Hispanic Challenge" in http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1084558/posts (accessed 6/29/06).

[12] The case of Farmingville (in Long Island, New York) even resulted in a film, whose webpage might be a good starting point for anyone interested in issues of immigration to the U.S. http://www.pbs.org/pov/pov2004/farmingville/about.html (accessed 6/29/06).

[13] http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?pid=418 (accessed 6/29/06).

heavily armed;[14] the gradual inclusion in political campaigns, ads and speeches of an explicitly anti-immigrant discourse (often cloaked under denunciations of the dangers of 'overcrowding and stacking'), calls for 'closing the border', 'immigration reform', and so forth; and, little by little, new decrees, ordinances, and laws making it ever more difficult for immigrants to enter, stay, assemble, find a job, keep it, study, rent, buy a home, form a family, get a driver's license, or obtain car insurance, health insurance or health care in the U.S.[15]

These are but a few aspects of the lives of those pushed toward immigration to the United States by the radical upheavals elicited by the processes of globalization—in Latin America and elsewhere in the 'two-thirds world'—during recent decades, aspects which only increase the uncertainties and fears of a large percentage of the Latina/o population north of the Rio Bravo—and not just of its 'undocumented' segment.

Latinas/os and Pentecostalism in the United States and Newark

The U.S. religious landscape is being deeply transformed by this continuous Hispanic immigration, both within the Latina/o population itself and throughout the religious institutions with which it enters in contact around the entire nation.

The Roman Catholic Church, with 22.9% of the country's population, has been for years the largest Christian denomination in the U.S. Latinas/os may now be almost 40% of American Catholics. Apparently, 71% of the U.S. Roman Catholic growth of the last 40 years has actually been Hispanic growth, and Latinas/os, despite all changes and appearances, continue to be in majority Roman Catholic (between 77% and 50%, depending on the source).[16] There are almost 4,000 parishes

[14] See report in http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?sid=175 (accessed 6/29/06).

[15] See reports, critiques, and other information in http://www.nelp.org/iwp/index.cfm (accessed 6/29/06).

[16] For more information on Hispanic Catholics see the webpage of the Secretariat for Hispanic Affairs of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops: http://www.usccb.org/hispanicaffairs/demo.shtml#2 (accessed 6/29/06). See Stevens-Arroyo (2003) for a less optimistic version of the percentage of Latina/o Catholics in the U.S., and, more recently, Espinosa (2004) for very complete data and an acute analysis of the different estimates of the religious affiliation of U.S. Hispanics.

with a Hispanic ministry in the country, and ¾ of these have a Latino priest at its helm.[17] Paradoxically, however, the most significant portion of those leaving the Roman Catholic Church consists of Latinas/os abandoning the church of their ancestors.[18]

The Protestant churches, on the other hand, constitute 52% of the U.S. population or over 153 million people. Several surveys place the number of Hispanic Protestants at about 10 million or possibly 7% of all U.S. Protestants, and between 16% and 25% of the Latina/o population (Vásquez, 1999; Stevens-Arroyo, 2003; Espinosa, 2004). As a matter of fact, as in Roman Catholicism, the main source of growth of U.S. Protestantism in general—and of U.S. Pentecostalism in particular—is the Hispanic population, both immigrant and native born. There are in the U.S. an estimated 10,000 non-Catholic Latina/o Christian congregations (in their overwhelming majority headed by Hispanic ministers), although only 1,441 (14%) of these are mainstream Protestant churches (Espinosa, 2004: 311f.). Most of the other 8,500-odd are Pentecostal congregations.

As in the rest of the world, Pentecostalism in the U.S. is also the form of Christianity that has grown the fastest since the mid-20th century. This is equally true among Latinas/os. The most recent studies suggest that about 42% of Roman Catholic Hispanics who convert to a different form of Christianity, convert to Pentecostalism (Espinosa, 2004: 308). Close to 36% of non-Catholic Christian Latinas/os consider themselves Pentecostal (Vásquez, 1999: 618). However, if we add up Pentecostals *stricto sensu* and Charismatics (Roman Catholic as well as mainstream Protestant) among the Latina/o population, we might be speaking already of 28% of the total U.S. Hispanic population, more than 12 million people.[19] In this and several other senses, therefore, we find ourselves before a significant Pentecostalization of U.S. Latinas/os,

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[17] http://www.usccb.org/hispanicaffairs/demo.shtml#2 (accessed 6/29/06).

[18] The well-known Roman Catholic sociologist of religion Andrew Greeley, on the basis of the *General Social Survey*, affirmed in 1988 that nearly 60,000 Latinas/os a year abandoned the Roman Catholic church in order to join Evangelical and Pentecostal churches (1988: 61f.), an estimate repeated by him in 1997; whereas Edwin Hernández (Maldonado 1999: 216) echoes the opinion that this might be the most significant change of religious affiliation since the Reformation. See again Espinosa (2004) for a critical analysis of such statistical estimates.

[19] "Si l'on met tout ensemble, les catholiques et protestants hispaniques qui se rattachent au courant pentecôtiste/charismatique représentent actuellement 28% (9,2 millions) de l'ensemble de la population hispanique aux États-Unis" (Espinosa, 2004: 312).

not less than facing a considerable 'Latinization' of both U.S. Christianity in general and U.S. Pentecostalism in particular.

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Newark is located on the west bank of the Hudson River, facing New York City. As in many large urban centers, the 'Anglos' (i.e., the European American population) in Newark have also become a minority since the 1970s. Of the city's 273,546 inhabitants, 53.5% are African American, 29.5% Hispanic (over 80,000 Latinas/os), and 14.2% 'Anglo'.[20] In New Jersey overall, 13.3% or 1,117,191 are Hispanic (700,000 more than in 1990); and 51% of New Jersey's growth in the last decade has been, as in the nation as a whole, Latina/o growth. As in the state and nationwide, Hispanics in Newark are the main source of growth of Roman Catholicism, mainstream Protestantism, and Pentecostalism as well.

Founded in 1665, by the beginning of the 20th century Newark had become a predominantly Roman Catholic city thanks to working class European immigration.[21] At the end of the 1960s, the Euro-American majority of the city made the typical 'white flight' to the suburbs, in response to the African American resistance to racism and the repression and counter-responses this repression elicited. While religious statistics for the city are difficult to find, it is likely that the Roman Catholic population is currently around 35%.[22] Its majority is Latina/o, probably at least 60%. What is certain is that, of the 29 Roman Catholic parishes in the city, more than half hold weekly services in Spanish, and some have two or more of these Spanish weekly services. Our earlier research showed about 5,200 people attending the 26 weekly masses in Spanish by 2001.[23]

As in the rest of the country, Protestant churches, and above all Pentecostal congregations, are multiplying rapidly among Newark's growing

[20] http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=n&_lang=en&qr_name=DEC_2000_PL_U_QTPL&ds_name=DEC_2000_PL_U&geo_id=16000US3451000 (accessed 6/29/06).

[21] A good sample of what Newark was religiously at the beginning of the 20th century might be obtained by just a cursory glance at this website: http://virtualnewarknj.com/churches/index.htm (accessed 6/30/06).

[22] http://www.rcan.org/planning/index.htm (accessed 6/29/06).

[23] Only two of the priests celebrating these 26 weekly masses in Spanish were actually native speakers of the language themselves, and both were from Colombia, the Latin American country with one of the highest rates of ordinations to the Roman Catholic priesthood.

Hispanic population. Unlike the Roman Catholic parishes, which are generally led by 'Anglo' clergy for a largely 'Anglo' constituency, these Protestant and Pentecostal congregations are for the most part founded and pastored by Hispanic ministers, with a mostly Latina/o constituency. Although average attendance at their services is smaller (20–200) than in the case of Spanish Roman Catholic masses (often 300 or more), the overall number of people attending both types of services is similar.

In the context of our research, we found 16 Roman Catholic churches with Spanish masses, and 68 non-Catholic Spanish-speaking Christian churches, 54 of which were Pentecostal. One of our team members (Orivaldo Lópes Júnior) made a similar census of all the religious services for the Portuguese-speaking population, finding 21 non-Catholic Luso-Brazilian Christian churches, 16 of them Pentecostal, and 5 Roman Catholic churches with 13 weekly masses in Portuguese (two of these explicitly Brazilian).[24]

After conducting intensive qualitative research especially among Spanish-speaking Pentecostal congregations in Newark, our research team felt compelled to reverse the questions with which we began the project back in 1999. At that time, we asked, why do so many Latin American immigrants to the U.S. abandon the church of their ancestors (especially the Roman Catholic Church) to join Pentecostal congregations? Less than a year later, we were asking ourselves why not more Latin American immigrants to the U.S. were abandoning the church of their ancestors to join Pentecostal congregations?! In particular, we found that Hispanic Pentecostal congregations offer resources to save the lives of immigrants living under duress, resources otherwise rarely accessible for Spanish-speaking immigrants in the U.S. These might help the onlooker understand how much sense it makes for so many immigrants to become and stay Pentecostal.

The phenomenon of Pentecostal growth across the board, as well as specifically among Latinas/os both within and outside Latin America proper, is an increasingly indisputable reality, which many have tried to

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[24] Newark has a Portuguese community with a history dating back at least to the mid-20th century. From the 1990s on, the Portuguese neighborhood (the Ironbound) started receiving a growing Brazilian immigration. The Luso-Brazilian community in Newark in 1990 constituted almost 10% of the city's population (21,342) and about 5% of the Portuguese-speaking community in the entire country. At about one quarter the size of the city's Spanish-speaking population, the Luso-Brazilian community is nonetheless served by half as many Roman Catholic masses and not less than ¼ as many non-Catholic Christian churches (information collected by Orivaldo Lópes, Jr.).

understand from a variety of disciplinary and theoretical perspectives since Emilio Willems and Christian Lalive d'Epinay published their studies back in the 60s. The limits and intention of this essay do not allow us to examine such attempts in detail, though. What I want to suggest, instead, is that among the several plausible dynamics behind such phenomena is the discovery made by more and more Hispanics—when their paths happen to cross with those of a Pentecostal congregation, preacher, missionary, friend, relative, colleague, and/or neighbor—that Pentecostal Christianity allows for much more freedom, flexibility and support for building communities and services that resonate with the customs, hopes and values of the Latina/o population, than what is typical of most churches and other agencies upon which Latinas/os stumble in their daily lives as immigrants in the U.S.

It is this discovery by Hispanic immigrants of their own hitherto unknown, unexplored, and promising capacities in their encounters with Pentecostal Latina/o congregations—that radically new way for Latinas/os of imaging, doing and being church—that has most forcefully captured my attention, and that, in my view, such congregations seem to render feasible in a unique, matchless fashion. This is the main focus of this particular essay.[25]

What do Latina/o Immigrants do with Pentecostalism?

What do Pentecostal churches allow, incite, or extol which, by contrast, is rarely tolerated, stimulated, and even less applauded in most mainstream or 'respectable' churches, be they Protestant or Roman Catholic? What does a large portion of the immigrant population miss, seek, or badly need, which Pentecostal congregations regularly provide as a possibility? What do Latina/o immigrants succeed in achieving in and through Pentecostal churches which would be, if not unlikely, then certainly much harder to attain through other private or public

[25] I am by no means suggesting that Pentecostal Latina/o congregations (in Latin America or the U.S.A.) are free from conflicts, asymmetrical relations, dynamics of domination, collusion with the powers that be, or reproduction of the dominant relations in the larger society (in terms of gender, class, race, sexuality, etc.). I just want to emphasize in this essay *one* of the multiple aspects I see as important to understand the Pentecostal growth among Latina/o immigrants in the U.S. I can only wish that other researchers critique and complement this approach with analyses of these and other aspects which I have deliberately glossed over in this essay—and which I recognize as being at least as important, if not more, than those highlighted by me here.

agencies, religious or otherwise? What is in Pentecostalism that attracts, suits and holds immigrants together?

Let me list some dimensions and dynamics I have observed in Hispanic Pentecostal churches—especially in Newark, but also in other places in the U.S. and Latin America—which seem crucial for the attraction, retention, and support that such churches exercise for an ever larger number of immigrants in the Americas, and which echo the findings of several other researchers on Hispanic and Latin American Pentecostalism in recent years.[26]

Much more than most other varieties of Christianity, the Pentecostal tradition stimulates the acceptance that the believer might be called by the Holy Spirit, at any point in her/his life, to any ministry whatsoever (preaching, education, mission, church planting, healing, etc.), regardless of the moral, educational, economic, ethnic, racial, professional, or linguistic traits or background of the believer, and independently of her/his gender, marital status, offspring, or criminal background. This feature renders much more plausible the fact that, with uncommon frequency, the *leadership* of Hispanic Pentecostal churches are people from lower social, economic and educational backgrounds, similar, therefore, to the majority of those both in the surrounding Latina/o neighborhood and among the membership of the congregation. The ways of dressing, talking, and relating to each other; the tastes, educational and income levels, types of jobs outside the church, lodging, forms of transportation; the concerns and difficulties of the church leaders, all of these mark the congregational leadership—objectively and subjectively—as familiar, similar to the ordinary immigrant, and quite different from the officially appointed, college-educated, middle class pastor of the mainstream churches or the expert from other social agencies—thus eliciting an identification that nurtures not only the self-esteem of the congregants, but also the awareness that, "if somebody like me can do that, I might be able to as well!"

The *language* of the services, testimonies, prayers, *coritos* (little choruses), and homilies in most of these churches is not the idiom of the sophisticated priestly elites, but, rather, the daily speech of the working class Latinas/os of the neighborhood. Where the legitimate and prestigious dialect is never that of the new immigrant, Pentecostal churches are almost the only accessible places where the most regular

[26] See note 3 above.

and appreciated fact is that people speak to God, express their innermost feelings, and talk among themselves, not in the official language of the nation or region, but in their own mother tongue (which for Hispanics might in fact not be Spanish, but, for instance, *garífuna*, quichua, aymara, creole, or *guaraní*)—a fact that promotes the pride, continuation, and transmission of the ancestral language to the next generation. Although some Latina/o non-Pentecostal churches in the U.S. have Spanish as the usual language of the congregations, the prevailing trend is for more 'established' churches to shift toward English as the language of choice, together with a professional, seminary-trained pastorate, much more so in the cases where the mother tongue of the pastor happens to be English and not Spanish.

The instruments, rhythms and melodies of the traditional *music* of immigrant communities, often despised by the elites and the mainstream churches, find a space for reinsertion and reinterpretation among Hispanic Pentecostal churches, giving congregants a unique occasion to revive their musical traditions, tastes and gifts, and to experience these not just as acceptable, but, beyond that, as sacred.

The very cultic *space*—usually located in a modest neighborhood, and, at least during its first years, in a cheap storefront—turns many a Pentecostal church into an odd sign of the presence of the divine in the socially least expected and customary place: the neighborhood, homes and stores of the poorer immigrants; places usually neglected and overlooked by the powers that be, mainstream churches and public agencies. As in many other respects, Pentecostal churches help the flock to make 'virtue out of necessity'. What 'the world' (elites, mass media, schools, mainstream culture) seizes and despises as primitive, lowly, backwards, and/or distasteful—because it is typical of the daily lives of those with lesser means—the congregation transmutes into something sacred, chosen and blessed by God. And, while a certain resignation might be nurtured thereby, pride and self-esteem are cultivated too, and thus an increased ability to counter the destructive effects of the predominant elitism and racism.

The *body*—including the exploited, exhausted, sweaty, smelly, and humbly clothed body of immigrants returning home from a long and strenuous journey—occupies in the Pentecostal service a conspicuous and privileged site, unusual in any other socially respectable milieu. Dancing in the Spirit, laying on of hands, moving to the cadence of *coritos*, falling down in convulsions when slain in the Spirit—these are some of the ways in which bodily expressions of women and men,

ordinarily equivocal in other contexts, acquire a sacred significance in the Pentecostal setting.

With and through the body, the Pentecostal tradition—similar in this to many African American churches—encourages the spontaneous expression of a wide array of *emotions* rarely acceptable in middle class circles, religious or otherwise. Panic, alarm, gratefulness, hope, desperation, guilt, shame, confusion, love, fragility, doubt, despair or sheer joy—sentiments not easy to express in public, least of all for adult males—are commonly articulated in the midst of Pentecostal services through screaming, moaning, loud simultaneous prayer, fits of laughter, personal storytelling, wildly running through the temple, wailing and sobbing while embracing other congregants, frantic dancing, speaking in incomprehensible words, or fainting—at times all of these happening at once. As noted by Cheryl Townsend Gilkes in reference to the Black churches (1980), such latitude turns into a therapeutic resource for the prevention and healing of a wide array of physical and emotional ailments. Many such ailments are in fact all the more frequent among people subject to the stress, anxiety and tensions attendant upon financial, housing, food, employment, health, educational, legal, family and/or socio-cultural troubles—as is often the case with many immigrant workers, especially if undocumented. And when, to make things worse, the customary resources to deal with such ailments are steadily denied to some sectors of the population, the flexibility of the Pentecostal tradition becomes all the more welcome and useful for people in such dire straits.

That presence of the body and of emotions in the religious service gains a particularly sacred character in the rites of *divine healing* which are so central in Pentecostal churches, where the gamut of acceptable and encouraged expressions of all that can ail body and soul is exceeded only by the variety of ways in which the participants attempt, within and beyond the temple, to help their sisters and brothers eliminate the tribulations tormenting them. From the anointing with oil or saliva to bring back the sight to the physically blind, through entire nights in collective prayer for a family affected by the violence of an alcoholic father, and the visits to console and sustain those in prison or in hospitals, up to the creation of a free clinic to treat drug addicts, the range of demons that Pentecostal churches endeavor to exorcise from the daily lives of immigrant communities is much broader than what most public or private health services are able to fathom, let alone to

care for in a personable, kind, free-of-charge way . . . and in the foreign language of the immigrant, to boot!

One of the traits of Pentecostal congregations which is most valuable for the recently arrived in a foreign, unwelcoming city, is the warm, resilient *welcome* which they customarily give the immigrant from the moment s/he spontaneously enters the temple or is met somewhere else by a member of a congregation in the vicinity. In contrast with most mainstream institutions, Hispanic Pentecostal churches demonstrate that they seldom judge anyone negatively because of the state or quality of their attire, the accent of their language, the color of their skin, their smell, physical handicaps, or any other observable qualities: from the first contact, the individual feels her/himself as respected, cared for, and taken seriously—even after acknowledging, or after it is known, that s/he was recently divorced, has a child out of wedlock, has been unemployed for months, is illiterate, has an addiction, has no legal documents, or just came out of prison for a crime committed in the past. The congregants will ask her/his name only once, upon first contact, and they will recall and repeat it in each meeting afterwards. If s/he misses one or more services, one or more congregants will soon seek him/her to inquire for the reasons of the absence and to see if there is anyway that the congregation can help. If the individual moves (or lives) a bit far away, it wouldn't be uncommon that the welcoming efforts include the pastor offering him/her a weekly ride—even a 50-mile one—to church and back home in the congregational van.

As a matter of fact, these religious centers constitute for many an immigrant the first and only hope of *community* after having left or lost the one in their mother country (if they ever had one there). As W. E. B. DuBois suggested in reference to the Black churches in the U.S. (Zuckerman, 2000), Latina/o Pentecostal congregations tend to multiply those services required for a dignified life, at times 'duplicating' those kept by non-religious institutions in the larger society, but which function in ways so inaccessible for immigrants of lesser resources that, in truth, it is as if they were there only for others.

Frequently, Pentecostal churches work as *information and networking* centers: among the very few that function as a continuous, free-of-charge basis, in the very language of the neighboring immigrants, and staffed by other immigrants who see their service—and let it be felt—as an altruistic, chosen, friendly service, a sacred duty joyfully undertaken. There, repeatedly, the recently arrived find all sorts of orientation and

help to obtain housing, a job, transportation, food, a school for the kids, affordable health care, counseling, legal aid and police assistance. For those who arrive without the money, language, contacts, expertise or employment necessary to survive the impact of daily life in an alien and inhospitable environment, the leads and contacts accessible through the church represent, literally, their salvation.

If there is, however, something life-changing for new immigrants arriving into a Hispanic Pentecostal congregation in the U.S.—beyond everything pointed out up to here, but all the more so when taken *together* with all of the previous aspects—it is the confidence, expectation, and encouragement received from the new coreligionists to immediately embark on at least one of several possible sacred *ministries* of the congregation. Once again, Pentecostal churches might be the sole agencies (religious or otherwise) with a tradition rendering not simply thinkable, but rather inescapable, that a barely known newcomer (including one with traits unseemly for the ordinary mores) be trusted and entrusted with critical responsibilities—relying on the Holy Spirit to help her/him face the challenge of turning overnight into capable preachers, missionaries, teachers, healers, counselors, church planters, or even pastors.

In this, and in several other senses, Pentecostal Latina/o churches in the U.S. operate, often without anybody noticing, as *leadership schools*, consistently inspiring in their members aplomb, poise, self-esteem, courage, as well as the exercise and development of a wide array of their own abilities and inclinations—conferring upon these the quality of divine gifts and calls, and thus reinforcing them as mandatory and holy. This might be the main reason why Pentecostals and former Pentecostals are overrepresented among Hispanic political leaders in the New York region, Latina/o pastors in mainstream Protestant churches, and Hispanic professors and students in graduate programs in religion and theology across the U.S., as revealed by a cursory, informal survey exploring the religious journey of the same.[27]

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[27] While we were doing our research in Newark in 1999–2000, the Rev. Samuel Cruz (then a doctoral candidate at Drew) did an informal survey among Hispanic pastors in his denomination, the Reformed Church in America, discovering, to his utter surprise, that, like him, the overwhelming majority of Latina/o pastors in the RCA had been Pentecostal at least through their childhood. A subsequent survey of Hispanic political leaders in New York City, revealed to him a similar pattern: despite a Roman Catholic majority among New York Hispanics, half or more of the Latina/o leaders in New York politics are either Pentecostal or former Pentecostals. My own familiarity with various

Immigrant *women* from Latin America (more clearly in the case of those facing financial, family, employment, educational and/or legal hurdles) find in Hispanic Pentecostal congregations one of the rare places where they are likely to find consistent respect, attention, and support. That enables many Pentecostal Latinas to offset and eventually surmount some of the disadvantages of being, not only a woman in a sexist society, but in many cases also an immigrant, undocumented, unemployed, single mother, dark-skinned, non-native speaker, and/or illiterate person—with the added advantage of simultaneously developing communicational and leadership abilities, self-esteem, and the ability to survive creatively in the new homeland.[28]

Concluding remarks

For those excluded and marginalized by the upheavals of globalization in their native Latin America, and then again by the dynamics of transnationalization of the labor force, Pentecostal Latina/o congregations in the U.S. fill a most important role, that of promoting and cultivating among immigrants a deep sense of being recipients, carriers and providers of a *sacred mission*; a mission that precedes, supersedes, and is higher than anything else that may be of value in the surrounding culture (be it money, studies, job, attire, possessions, diction, dwelling, vehicle, last name, skin color, connections, national origin, legal or marital status); a sacred mission to be enacted daily, for the remainder of one's life, first and foremost among one's own and in one's own language. From being an 'alien', an 'illegal', an 'undocumented', a 'wetback', 'suspicious', or worse, an invisible 'nobody', the born-again experience in the Pentecostal church turns the immigrant into more

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academic programs and settings geared to Latina/o students has allowed me to carry on parallel informal surveys in such contexts with very similar conclusions.

[28] One of the most pervasive preconceptions about Hispanic Pentecostal churches among middle class researchers without a Pentecostal background is their supposed patriarchal, anti-feminist character. My provisional, tentative conclusion in that respect is that this is no worse in Latina/o Pentecostal churches than in the larger culture or the mainstream churches (with the probable exception of some 'liberal' white middle class congregations). For immigrant working women—and women of 'lower' social, economic, educational or ethnic background—Hispanic Pentecostal churches often tend to be, on the contrary, *less* patriarchal or 'anti-feminist' than most other institutions in the larger U.S. society. These churches, for instance, when the partner is not a regular member of the congregation, can provide women in abusive relations with more consistent support than they would likely get in more 'mainstream' churches.

than just 'somebody': she/he is an absolutely unique, important person, chosen, called, elect, pushed, blessed, and protected by God—somebody with a more important mission than many a millionaire, politician, movie star, doctor, professor or CEO: that of showing to whomever does not know it the path toward eternal salvation.

A decisive mark of Pentecostalism in the history of Latin American Christianity lies indeed in its daily demonstration that 'anybody' can do, be, build and lead church. There is no need for a license from the powers that be or any consecration by ecclesiastical elites: the Spirit blows where It will and can call and ordain as God's minister any immigrant that God wants. Little does it matter to the Holy Spirit if the chosen person shares none of the traits that make somebody respectable in the eyes of the world. After all, doesn't Scripture say somewhere that the first will be last and vice versa? If proofs were required, maybe we could find them among those excluded and marginalized by the dynamics of globalization, and now flourishing in Hispanic Pentecostal congregations.

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RELIGION AND GLOBAL FLOWS

Michael Wilkinson

Introduction

In 1980, Eusabio Perez was invited by the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada (PAOC) to go to Toronto and pastor the newly-formed Iglesia Evangélica Hispana. The growing congregation was meeting in a United Church facility on St. Clair Avenue with approximately one hundred and fifty Spanish-speaking Christians in attendance. Life for the congregation was changing quickly. Initially, they were a small group of Spanish-speaking Christians who began meeting in the 1960s through the efforts of Rev. Paul and Dorothy Sorensen, former PAOC missionaries in Argentina. By 1970 they were attending the Danforth Gospel Temple so that their children could learn English in Sunday School, while the parents attended a Spanish-speaking class and worship service. The small group consisted of people from diverse backgrounds religiously (not all were Pentecostal but identified themselves as evangelical) and from various countries in Central and South America. Several issues challenged the congregation including cultural diversity, theological distinctions, and social and political differences. In 1977 they moved toward resolving some of these issues by seeking and approving a motion for affiliation with the PAOC. Yet, their diversity would still continue to challenge the congregation.

Perez was a pastor in Cuba for eleven years before escaping his country of birth. He made his way to the USA and found himself working in a congregation in New Jersey with the Assemblies of God. He was not in the USA very long when he received an invitation from the PAOC to lead Iglesia Evangélica Hispana, illustrating the role of transnational networks for securing ministerial services. Through his leadership the congregation flourished and in 1982 they purchased their own building from a German PAOC congregation that moved to the suburbs. The purchase of the building coincided with their anniversary celebration and the beginning of what they now call the 'Parade of Nations'.

Iglesia Evangélica Hispana is a Spanish-speaking congregation but it is not culturally homogeneous. Rather, it is a multicultural congregation with members from over twenty different countries. In the late 1990s when I visited the congregation, they were still dealing with cultural and social differences. Perez explained that much of his time is spent helping parishioners deal with conflict over language, politics, and religion. Many are very loyal to their countries of origin. They are also especially proud of what they have accomplished in Canada and particularly what they have accomplished with their congregation. The 'Parade of Nations' is an invention of Perez, which serves to link Spanish-speaking Pentecostals with each other, their home countries, and the new country where they live. Each year the congregation celebrates their anniversary with an event that is over three hours long. Each group in the congregation will march into the auditorium carrying the flag of their country and singing its national anthem. This will continue until every country represented in the congregation has had their flag paraded, and the national anthem sung. On the weekend that I visited Iglesia Evangélica Hispana the congregation was extremely excited about this event. There was a special speaker, Rev. Jerónimo Pérez originally from Latin America and now in the USA, where he resides in Florida. His radio broadcasts are sent back to Central and South America from his new base. The musical guests were from Mexico and added to the cultural and global quality of the celebration.

The climax of the event was the actual Parade, when flags from twenty-two countries were waved and members from the community and the congregation rose to their feet to sing their national anthem. During the event many cried, clapped, shouted, sang, and saluted. Eusebio Perez, originally from Cuba, shouted "Viva la Cuba" as he waved to the flag and cried. At the conclusion, children came marching into the auditorium waving banners reading "Jesus is Lord" and singing "The Lord Reigns". Perez explained that this is an important time when they can thank God for the country they were born in, the new country that they now live in, and the world that needs revival. Many Spanish-speaking Pentecostal congregations in Canada have adopted the tradition as they plant new congregations throughout the country.

The 'Parade of Nations' illustrates a hybridization of religion, culture, and politics. It illustrates how globalization impacts upon migrants, and the role that religion plays in the social spaces that are 'betwixt and between'. The event has no cultural origin in any one Spanish-speaking country. It is a site where the flows of migration and religion converge to

create something that does not exist elsewhere. It is an event that spills over the traditional boundaries of congregation, community, country, region, and globe. I have written about the impact of immigrants for the PAOC elsewhere (2006). What follows in this chapter is an attempt to explain further the social meaning of sacred landscapes and how these religio-cultural flows shape social life in global society. More specifically, I examine a selection of the literature to illustrate one way in which identity is constructed and transformed within the social spaces of transnational global flows, paying particular attention to religion. The 'Parade of Nations' represents a social space for the transformation of multiple identities, cultures, and political views into a translocal identity largely, but not solely, shaped by religion. In this case it is Pentecostalism, a hybridization of sorts itself, that emerged in the twentieth century as a coalescing of several strands within Christianity.

Global society is increasingly characterized by social networks, a series of interactions and exchanges that are referred to as 'flows' because of the way in which they move back and forth, over and under, betwixt and between, the traditional borders of societies. Networks are structured in particular ways, which in turn localizes social relations in important ways. Yet, they are also global or 'glocal' in Robertsonian terms. The relationship between the various nodes is characterized by cultural interaction or a series of flows. What happens in these spaces though is controversial. Not all agree on the outcomes of cultural interaction in global society. What goes on in these spaces? In what ways are global flows transforming? While some view the process of interaction as producing locality or unique local conditions, others view the process of interaction as homogenizing while expanding uniformity across the globe. The view taken here is that much of what happens in these spaces is the negotiation or construction of new realities, identities, and social relations that can be characterized as a process of hybridization. Religio-cultural hybridization will be elaborated upon with a discussion of the origins, development, and contemporary situation of Pentecostal and charismatic movements later in this chapter.

Social Theories of Space and Global Flows

Manuel Castells provides several important ideas for understanding the transformation of the world and the preoccupation with identity, meaning, and alienation. His primary focus is on the globe as a network of

networks, which is a new form of social relationship between economics, politics and culture. Global flows of money, power, and images crisscross traditional boundaries, move back and forth between the old and the new, and create new symbols of meaning, all of which contribute to an increase in social and cultural unease as humanity ponders questions of change, meaning, and identity. Social groups are increasingly alienated from one another, fragmented, experienced as stranger, and other. It is in this context that religion emerges as a prominent marker of identity whereby the alienated regroup around a central source of meaning. Castells makes it clear that the nation-state and technology both play a significant role in the network society. So religions, for example, regroup, re-emerge, expand, and re-politicize in new configurations within and among nation-states utilizing new technologies to spread their message according to their own history, culture, and institutions. The focus of his theoretical orientation is on religion as fundamentalism and the spread of discontent. Religion in its alienated form may be one important type of religious expression in global society, but we should not limit or reduce religious expression to its conservative forms. Liberal responses to global change are exemplified through other kinds of responses including religious environmentalism, feminist theologies, and liberation theologies (see Beyer 1994). They may even be responses to the perceived or actual alienation from the mainstream power of a new global order. While religious responses to social change in a 'network society' are important to understand, other questions about the ways in which religious traditions and cultural expressions combine and recombine in the spaces of global flows need to be examined.

Castells' idea about the role of space in relation to the network society deserves some attention (407–409). His main point is that space and time organize the network society so that the notion of space is redefined around the concept of flows and not simply places. Modern and traditional views of space are rooted in geography, or place. Place is now transformed through the movement back and forth of people, ideas, symbols, money, and information, so that these flows now become the dominant form of power and function in global society. As societies undergo structural transformation, new spatial forms emerge—the logic being that space is the expression of social practices. The space of flows is the material organization of social practices that work through flows: purposeful exchanges and interactions between social actors in the economic, political and symbolic realms of society. The content of social flows, according to Castells, is characterized by the

following: first, electronic exchanges like telecommunications, broadcasting systems, and information technologies; second, a structural logic constituted by nodes and hubs that link together specific places that are social, cultural, or physical; and third, the more controversial view that the space of flows is asymmetrically organized around the interests of dominant managerial elites, the technocratic, financial, and managerial elite (440–446). Castells' view leads to the conclusion that global society is structured asymmetrically around social spaces dominated by elites reflected in the tendency towards uniformity and homogeneity. Global flows delocalize social relations. People live in places and elites live in flows—networks that transcend place, a parallel universe that does not meet the space of places but transforms them. I say this is controversial because it can be demonstrated that global society is not simply a top-down process (see Simpson, 1996). Furthermore, there is much social activity that bypasses the observant eyes of researchers that is countercultural, grassroots, and somewhat quotidian that needs to be considered in our understanding of global flows. Castells also privileges the perspective of the elite in global flows that ignores the local, suggesting sameness or the single direction of power over the local. There is no room for protest, difference, and syncretistic activity, or simply the ignoring of elites, unless it is in the form of some kind of 'fundamentalism'. Still, of value for the purposes of this chapter is the notion that global flows follow a different logic of space that requires one to come to terms with its structure and content. Global flows are transforming global society and they consist of economic, political, and cultural networks that need to be understood as spaces for exchange and interaction. Furthermore, the way in which religion and religions are transformed in a global society can be enhanced with a 'space of flows' view, but one that considers the local another way than Castells and comes to different conclusions.

Arjun Appadurai offers one such way in which to think about locality (1996). Appadurai thematizes the cultural aspects of globalization, focusing on media technology and migration. Important in his work is the juxtaposition of migration and media in the quotidian—the immigrant experience of living daily life away from home and at home in the same location. For example, he talks about Pakistani taxi drivers in Chicago who listen to cassettes of sermons recorded in mosques in Pakistan. Recorded sermons become an important resource for migrant identity in a global world. Imagination is significant for it is not limited to the elite, but part of everyday life for the expression of the symbolic

in art, myth, and ritual in the immigrant experience. Imagination is consequential in its collective form, motivating migrants and migrant communities to consider alternative ways for social life. Individual and collective imagination is experienced in that social space referred to as a transnational community because it is not limited to state borders but shifts or flows in multiple directions.

The disjuncture of global culture, as Appardurai likes to speak of, is witnessed in the various relationships among five dimensions including ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes (33). "Scapes", according to Appadurai, suggest the fluid and irregular features of landscapes. Each scape is a building block for multiple imagined worlds of individuals and communities in global society. For example, the ethnoscape refers to the landscape of persons in a variable world of tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, workers, and other moving groups. As migrants move they regroup in new locations and in the process they reconstruct their histories and reconfigure their future goals. The process is not confined to a spatially bound territory. Rather, Appadurai speaks of deterritorialization as the loosening of holds between people and place (49). Furthermore, his focus is on the local and the meaning of locality as a relational and contextual space that is not simply shaped by the scalar or spatial. Locality is a fluid space characterized by quotidian interaction. These in-between spaces are the result of the circulation of cultural forms across regions and their domestication into local practice. Appardurai gives us some vital ideas including the importance of the daily actions of everyday actors in a space that is translocal. These spaces are characterized as flows that are transnational yet consequential especially for the local. What is still missing is the link between the global and the local and even more so what exactly happens culturally within these flows and between the various nodes of global society.

This is precisely where Roland Robertson addresses the question about the relationship between the global and local and his idea of glocalization, which is helpful for understanding the social meaning of cross-cultural interaction and global flows (1992; 2001). Robertson's main concern is to capture the simultaneity of global and local relationships and the idea of difference within sameness. Another way to view this is from the perspective that glocal brings into alignment the universal and the particular so that the production of locality, in Appadurai's words, is also the production of globality. Some may prefer the localization of the global. Regardless, glocal, as cumbersome

a word as it is, conveys the importance of understanding the role of networks in the structuration of global society (Castells) and the cultural dimensions of locality (Appardurai). Glocal best conveys that idea of the relationship between the two, or more specifically, the interpenetration of each domain. Cultural interaction and exchange are best conceived as a transformation of space and human action, whereby global flows of people, power, money, and symbols move back and forth and across traditional boundaries. It is a process that does not bypass anyone. All people are engaged in the negotiation of new realities, the construction of social relationships that are transnational and translocal, marginal and central to social life. What might be some of the implications of this transformation? How exactly are social relations transformed? What might the consequences be for religions as new identities and relationships are transformed in global context? Space is both local and global—it is structured by networks—and there is cultural interaction between the various nodes. All together these concepts highlight the way in which flows are structured and the relationship between the nodes, but what is still needed is an idea to explain what happens during the interaction. It is the concept of hybrid and the process of hybridity that best explains what transpires. The planet is transformed so that a new conceptualization of space is needed. But social spaces are also transforming.

Global flows, transnational relations, and translocal identities all raise questions about boundaries and borders. The concept of hybridity problematizes boundaries and the emergence of new social relations, global forms of partnership, intercultural interactions, and religious interface. Jan Nederveen Pieterse provides a detailed discussion of the process of hybridization, or more specifically, what happens in the space of flows; the hybridizing activity, exchanges and interactions that do not eliminate the other but transform the local and the global, the stranger and the other. Hybridity emphasizes the mixing of culture out of the interaction of the global and the local. It is a perspective in cultural globalization that emphasizes the increasing diversity of global culture as opposed to the homogeneity associated with some views of globalization. Like Robertson and Appadurai, Nederveen Pieterse emphasizes the unique social spaces that emerge as new cultural realities through the interaction of cultural flows producing new and distinctive forms. Other related terms include creolization, crossover, and *mélange*. Syncretism is another interesting term often used in reference to new religions or religious mixing that is considered unorthodox. I will return

to this point later. For now it is important to recognize that the social spaces of flows consist of cultural interactions that are transformative. Consequently, cultural interaction may result in the development of new social arrangements that are a synthesis of cultural mixing which are also open-ended and include ongoing mixing in global society. Cultural practices are separated from previous forms and recombined in new forms as the 'Parade of Nations' illustrates. These in-between spaces are often occupied by migrants, travellers, or inhabitants of cosmopolitan cities. The mode of communication is the networks nested in 'scapes'. These spaces allow for a wide-range of hybrid formations in the global landscape including transnational relations and translocal identities. Hybridization reorganizes social spaces structurally and culturally. There are two important ways, among others, in which space is transformed. One is through the migration of people. The second is through religion and the flow of ideas.

Migration, Religion, and Hybridity

Migration has increasingly become a focus in numerous areas including sociology, history, anthropology, geography and many other disciplines. The focus in sociology of religion is among the so called 'new' immigrants arriving in North America that supposedly represent the transition from modern to global societies or in some cases the globalization of modernity. For example, two important studies have focussed on how new immigrants are adapting to life in the USA. One important study is the "New Ethnic and Immigrant Congregations Project" which resulted in the publication *Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration* edited by R. Stephen Warner and Judith G. Wittner (1998). The volume is a collection of ethnographies that explores how new immigrants have interacted with American cultural institutions. The researchers argue that new religious communities are adopting the congregational model as they adapt to life in the USA. The book fails, however, to recognize the ways in which the current trend in migration is related to a longer historical process of globalization and migration. It also neglects to recognize the ways in which migrants develop important links with 'home' and how this in turns transforms life in the USA. It also does not examine how translocal identities emerge and develop in global society.

A second and important project is the "Religion, Ethnicity and New Immigrant Project", which explored in greater detail immigrants and religion in the city of Houston. The findings were published in *Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations* (Ebaugh amd Chatetz, 2000). The theoretical focus of this project is how ethnic identity is maintained as some sort of fixed idea that continues its religious practices, social events, and cultural activities, while being incorporated into American life. Occasionally some of the case studies talked about transnational relations but not in any consistent manner. Again, the assumption is that there is something new and unique about this current phase of migration (mostly that the migrants themselves are new, not the process of cultural interaction) in which the migrants themselves must adapt to a new life by adopting an American way of life. Ebaugh and Chafetz acknowledge this problem and attempt to correct it in the book *Religion Across Borders: Transnational Immigrant Networks* (2002). In this book the authors examine the transnational links between home and host country as flows and remittances among migrants. That transnational links exist and form important networks for immigrants is an important component for understanding religion and migration. The purpose of this chapter is to push the discussion in the direction of understanding how those links operate as social spaces for the construction of translocal identities and the important role religion plays in this transformation.

Some of the most thorough research on religion and transnational practices is the work of Peggy Levitt (1998; 2004). Levitt identifies how transnational practices among migrants transform social life between Boston and the Dominican Republic. She argues that migration reconfigures religious social space and its relationship to other spheres of global society on a macro and micro level. Transnational links are important social practices among migrants that illustrate the ways in which religion is reconfigured and transformed. Rijk Van Dijk (1997) also examines the ways which transnational practices amongst Ghanian Pentecostals creates a new social space for the migrant who lives in a world that is no longer Ghanian and not simply European. Yet, the social space which these migrants inhabit is not characterized by alienation or anomie. It is a social space where the work of prayer facilitates the migratory journey. This space is a religio-cultural bridge between two worlds or a third culture (Featherstone, 1995: 90–91), which becomes a practical means of dealing with cross-cultural interaction or the realities of cultural flows in global society. Levitt and

Glick Schiller (2004) further argue for understanding the simultaneity of living in different social spaces, which are not contradictory but do require a reformulation of the concept of society. These examples are not representative of the literature but do serve as illustrative for the key points being made in this chapter.

The mixing of many cultural practices and the post-modern emphasis upon pastiche, disjuncture, syncretism or fragmentation, is not a contemporary phenomenon but can also be illustrated with previous historical cases of migration and cultural interaction, including the colonial period where perhaps the first global, multicultural cities were Rio de Janeiro, Calcutta or Singapore (see Featherstone, 1995: 118). Migrations are not new and a longer historical perspective reveals that migrations have in fact always been 'global' in range (see Castles and Miller, 2003). In our contemporary period globalization, and migration results in increased transnational behaviour. In the nineteenth century many people migrated from Europe to North America and settled in urban centres becoming industrial workers. Many came as agricultural peasants and continued to farm in the Prairies. In the twentieth century migration shifted to non-European sources like Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Increasingly, migration was less tied to agricultural or industrial employment but to service workers and professionals. The state played an important role in migration including establishing policy and assessing the status of immigrants and minorities. The importance of ethnicity in any society is partly influenced by state policies and other activities like the protection of minority rights. States are increasingly concerned with security and protection. In some cases cultural and legal recognition is granted to migrants as in Canada.

While this is the commonly held story of migration to North America, migration is not limited to this region or to the past one hundred years. Between the seventeenth and the nineteenth century it has been estimated that between fifteen and twenty million people were transported from Africa into slavery. In the nineteenth century about sixty million people left Europe for the Americas, Oceania, and South and East Africa. Ten million left Russia for central Asia and Siberia. One million went from Southern Europe to Northern Africa. Another twelve million Chinese and six million Japanese left for East and South Asia. One and half million people left India for South East Asia and South and West Africa. In the twentieth century globalization impacted upon migration so that more people and more countries experienced migration at a quicker pace than was experienced before. Most recently it

is estimated that international migrants range between eighty and one hundred million people. About 20% of one hundred million migrants (1.7% of the world's population) are refugees or non-voluntary migrants as reported by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). International migration is a transnational revolution—it is reshaping societies, politics, economics, culture, and social practices. It is also contributing to globality, or the problems associated with global society. This transnational revolution is accelerating, becoming more global, and creating new transnational communities (Castles, 2003).

With the migration of people there is also the transporting of religious beliefs and practices. David Lyon examines the relocation of religion in global society and adds to Appadurai's 'scapes' view the concept of sacred landscape, to examine the flows of religious beliefs and practices (2000: 100). Lyon argues that glocalized religious activity is increasingly significant. While the 'great' religions have always had a world outlook and missionaries of many kinds carried their messages across borders and boundaries, earlier flows in many instances encouraged homogeneity while denying local distinctiveness. The contemporary period, however, is increasingly characterized by cultural patterns which are incongruous with the past. To say so does not mean that hybridity is a new phenomenon, only that the particularities of contemporary religion, migration and culture need to be examined for their specificities. Today's religious flows are diverse, glocal syntheses of religio-cultural interaction. Hybridity is one such term that explains the relocation of religion and its reconfiguration. Religion does not just move from place to place. It changes in the sacred flows of time and space. Pentecostalism is a good example of how religion is transformed under the conditions of globalization. It illustrates well what happens when flows of people and religious ideas mix and mingle, cross borders and boundaries, and interact and construct new social spaces for the expression of sacred activity.

The Emergence and Formation of Pentecostalism

The story of Pentecostalism is wrapped up in the story of globalization, migration, religious reconfiguration, and hybridity. Pentecostalism is a movement within Christianity with numerous origins. It is rooted in many cultural contexts throughout the world. It is a religion of the Spirit shaped by globalizing processes and is also a contributor to the

globalization of religion. What follows is a brief description of how this type of Christianity emerges and forms as a global phenomenon that illustrates cultural and religious interaction.

Pentecostalism is the term used to capture the various idioms of religious experience like dreams and visions, healing, speaking in tongues, and prophecy as expressed within Christianity. Historians generally agree that Pentecostalism emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but the debates over its origins are intense. At stake are those who argue that Pentecostalism emerged in the USA and then spread throughout the world, generating a global culture of shared beliefs, values, and a particular way of life. Sameness or similarity is often pointed to as evidence of the worldwide spread of this distinct form of Christianity from the USA. Where there is difference there is debate, and the tendency to question the orthodoxy of another movement may lead to claims of heresy or syncretism. Syncretism is an interesting term when employed by those within a movement, for it suggests that the intermingling of traditional African practices, for example, and traditional Christian beliefs is anathema for the true believer (see Meyer, 1996). Yet the evidence of religio-cultural interaction points to the pragmatic ways in which religions have always been constructed through the engagement of ideas and practices. While the borders are pushed and boundaries debated, Pentecostalism is an excellent example of the process of hybridity. Pentecostalism is not simply an American export (see Brouwer, Gifford and Rose, 1996). While the Azusa revival meetings held in Los Angeles between 1906 and 1909 had a significant impact on Pentecostalism, even the Azusa meetings are not simply a product of the USA. William Seymour, the leader of the three-year revival was himself an African-American, the son of former slaves. One cannot underestimate the African origins of American Pentecostalism (see Hollenweger, 1972; Lovett, 1975; MacRobert, 1988). Yet, the transporting of an oral African primal religion to North America during the slave trade, together with missionary activity, contributes to the contemporary indigenous experiential movement within Christianity. Spirit possession, dance, speaking in tongues, shouting and pragmatism characterize the movement. The slave-trade origins of this type of Christianity, however, reflect its character as a product of hybridization, not just a local movement that subsequently spread around the world (see Wallerstein, 1974; Meyer, 1980). Furthermore, what made the early onlookers of Azusa so hostile was not their religious fervour, but their

cross-cultural, multi-racial interaction. How could it be that God would bless whites, blacks, Latinos and Asians all together in one place?

In turn you have the reverse flow of Pentecostal spirituality with its consequent impact on the development of independent African churches which are often thought of as examples of syncretism and hence not orthodox. This illustrates how these sacred spaces of the margins are debated as to whether they are 'authentic' or not, and if they should be included in the 'fold' or excluded. Ongoing flows of Pentecostalism continue in a world of global migrations with each exchange increasingly transforming the character of Pentecostalism, a process described by globalization scholars as glocalization and hybridization. The ongoing interaction among Pentecostal and charismatic Christians highlights what happens in these spaces when flow upon flow interacts and counters. They also illustrate how religion and religions in global society are transformed as they are structured along the lines of other institutional changes on a global scale (Beyer 2006).

Hollenweger rightly identifies the many roots of Pentecostalism including the African oral origins, the Catholic, evangelical, the critical, and the ecumenical (1997). His analysis, however, stops short of indicating how these various streams have influenced or shaped each other to construct something that contains those roots but cannot be reduced to any one particular element. Anderson recognizes this problem and calls for the story of Pentecostalism to be retold from a multicultural perspective that recognizes the importance of Pentecostalism outside of the USA (2004). Anderson's work is substantially pointing to the ways in which researchers have argued too much over whether Seymour or Parham, both Americans, should be credited with the origins of Pentecostalism. Lost in the story are the contributions made by those outside of the USA. Anderson goes on to argue for the inclusion of the many independent African Pentecostals that are often excluded by theologians in the USA (237). Furthermore, you have a story that does not recognize the effects of globalization on the emergence and development of one of the most significant changes in Christianity since the Reformation. Pentecostalism is, correctly, a movement that represents the emergence of religion in the sacred spaces between borders and boundaries. It is a Christianity that is a hybrid. The globalization of Pentecostalism is not simply about the spread of Pentecostalism from the USA to the rest of the world. It is also about a social process that shapes and reshapes this type of Christianity.

The 'Parade of Nations' illustrates well the logic of global flows within the structure and content of the network society. It is a site for the construction of new identities. Secondly, the 'Parade of Nations' is also about locality where participants witness a transformation of community through the experience of individual and collective memory in symbolic form. It serves to transform multiple imagined worlds into a transnational community in global society. The liminal character of the event has a loosening effect from several spaces including time, culture, history, politics, borders, and place. Individuals are transformed through a process that forms a new community. Thirdly, the 'Parade of Nations' is a glocal event. It cannot be reduced simply to a local experience among Spanish-speaking Pentecostals in Toronto. It is a site where the identities, experiences, and memories of participants meet to cross a number of borders. It is a glocal space where participants are brought together from multiple sites, but one in which they are sent back as well into a world that, according to Perez, needs God. The 'Parade of Nations' serves another purpose—the worldwide mission activity of the local congregation. Perez himself leads many in his congregation back to Latin America for mission activity and support of local congregations. Finally, the 'Parade of Nations' is a hybrid. It is not just about the homogenization of cultures. The event celebrates unity and diversity. For a moment it is religion that unites but also sends out again into the world. The 'Parade of Nations' represents a new cultural reality. It is a religious activity that relocates and reconfigures the migrant experience as well as Pentecostalism itself. It is a diverse glocal synthesis of religio-cultural interaction.

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RELIGION AND THE STATE: THE LETTER OF THE LAW AND THE NEGOTIATION OF BOUNDARIES

Lori Beaman

The relationship between church and state must begin, in some measure, with a consideration of the ways in which a state legislates the activities of religious groups within the borders of the nation. However, an examination of state declarations of religious freedom without pushing beyond what are usually grand constitutional statements is almost meaningless. To fully appreciate the ways in which states deal with religion, one must push past what is stated in law and explore the ways in which these declarations play out in day-to-day life. This may mean exploring the symbols of religious groups as they are or are not visible in public, or it may mean examining the ways in which courts interpret constitutional provisions around religion. So, for example, while the United States has a clear separation of church and state in its constitution, an examination of cultural symbols reveals that church and state are intertwined to the extent that politicians frequently invoke the name of god to assist in state matters. The relationship between church and state is not solely a matter of internal law and politics, however. Church-state relations are influenced by, and themselves influence, global forces which may take the shape of international human rights declarations, the activism of internationally organized groups, or broader cultural vectors such as events that are worked up to create a culture of fear or which demarcate a social phenomenon as a 'cause for concern'.

If we accept that a component of globalization is the increased flow of people across nation-state borders, and that they take/bring with them their cultural capital, including their religious beliefs, then we can begin to appreciate the ways in which new pressures are being built on church-state boundaries. In Canada, for example, population stability and growth is now in the hands of immigrants, who often come from 'non-Christian' nations. The religious texture of many nations is shifting, and in this process there are new pressures to think about, not only the ways in which a state is to mediate relations between church and state, but also its role in mediating relations between religious groups. Who is allowed a defining voice and how loud is that voice permitted to be?

Following Beyer's assertion that globalization is not a new phenomenon, but only newly named (2006) and Michel Foucault's notion of demarcation, I use the framework of globalization somewhat cautiously, employing the moderate social constructionist approach described by James Beckford. The deployment of a globalization framework poses a particular discursive context in which some issues are demarcated as being of analytical importance, while others are excluded from communicative possibilities. While acknowledging this as a limitation, it is offered more as a caution in reading any assertion of global patterns, flows, etc. as somehow existing as social facts. Rather, globalization is used here in a critical manner to suggest possible ways of thinking in the exploration of cultural processes.

In this chapter, I will draw on a Canadian example as case study through which the notion of the 'global' shall be examined. Using the example of the regulation of polygamy through the criminal code, the following questions will be examined: how, or have, state boundaries become fluid in the global context in relation to religion? How do local events impact on the global? Where do the local and the global intersect? Do nation states remain impervious to the 'global gaze' in negotiating the church-state relationship? Is there a hegemonic (Christian?) global gaze in relation to religion? I am conceptualizing church and state broadly in this chapter, moving away from what I consider to be a rather narrow definition of this field that has emerged primarily from scholarship in the US, to a more global perspective that has somewhat fluid definitions of both church and state. This may be rooted in my own particular cultural circumstances: Canada has no official separation of church and state, and thus the relationship between these realms is complex and amorphous, as is illustrated by the religious freedom clauses of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The preamble pays homage to the 'supremacy of God', section 2 guarantees freedom of religion, section 15 guarantees that one will not be discriminated against on the basis of, among other things, religion. The Charter reinforces the guarantee of funding for religious schools (Catholic and Protestant) in certain provinces at the time they entered Confederation, and section 27 states that the Charter shall be interpreted 'in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians'. The provisions of the Charter set out the framework within which church-state relations are framed in Canada, and clearly involves an intertwining of issues of religious freedom, multiculturalism, and the historical presence of religion in Canada.

Polygamy: Criminalization and Globalization

Polygamy raises to the foreground questions about the interplay of rights and freedoms set out in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and human rights as a global phenomenon. Key questions include: how do we balance religious freedom and other human rights claims? How do we conceptualize agency and freedom in questions about the definition of rights and freedoms? What values do we import into the process of determining human rights claims, and what do they tell us about our vision of Canadian society? Understanding the historical context of polygamy in Canada is key to gaining an appreciation of its place in Canadian and global human rights construction.

Latter-day Saints have a long and tenuous relationship with the practice of polygamy (Quinn, 1991; Mazur, 1999), which was a practice that commenced with Joseph Smith's revelation of Celestial marriage. Both Mormons and outsiders alike contested the practice (Ivins, 1991), but "Latter-day Saints accepted it as a commandment of God and non-Mormons fought it by passing legislation" (Embry, 1987: 16). How many of these post-revelation Saints actually lived in polygamous relationships remains an unknown (van Wagoner, 1989). Although Latter-day Saints attracted a great deal of attention because of this practice, they were not the only group experimenting with forms of intimate relationships at the time. The United States Congress responded to public and state concern about polygamy in 1862 through the enactment of the *Morrill Act*, which banned polygamy (Campbell, 2001). Enforcement was uneven and it was not until 1870 that the law was challenged and upheld by the Supreme Court as being a justifiable limit on freedom of religion. Subsequent court decisions affirmed the limits on religious freedom in relation to polygamy. Pressure on the church to end the practice was strong. Moreover, as a relatively new religion, the church was negotiating its place in the nation. By 1890 polygamy was officially ended as part of the teachings of the church. This did not stop the practice of polygamy though, which remains a central practice of fundamentalist Latter-day Saints to this day.

In some measure Canada offered a sanctuary for polygamous Saints. However, too quickly this country took a legal stand on polygamy by shoring up laws that prohibited and criminalized it. It was made known to Mormons that they would not be allowed more than one wife in Canada, and to reinforce this stance the Canadian government increased the penalty for polygamy from two to five years (Embry,

1987). That the 'problem' was felt to be a pressing one is evidenced in the 1890 parliamentary debates about the Criminal Code amendment: "Section 9 deals with the practice of polygamy, which I am not aware yet exists in Canada, but which we are threatened with; and I think it will be much more prudent that legislation should be adopted at once in anticipation of the offence, if there is any probability of its introduction, rather than we should wait until it has become established in Canada." There was a great deal of ignorance surrounding the Mormon religion and their practices. They were recognized as ideal citizens in many ways—industrious and frugal—but the polygamous practices caused alarm. As one member of Parliament put it, "we are here trying to prevent what may become a serious moral and national ulcer". Another member stated: "I think it is not the class of population which we desire, and the history of the United States proves that it forms an element which the American people would be glad to be rid of." There were endorsements of them as "first rate" settlers, but there remained a concern that they would engage in practices which indulged their "Mormon inclinations" if they were allowed to settle, despite the assurances of their leader, Ora Card. The 1906 Criminal Code specifically criminalized polygamy and specified, "what among the persons commonly called Mormons is known as spiritual or plural marriage". There was a tension between the need for immigrants to populate the Prairie Provinces and the concern over "Mormon inclinations" (Palmer, 1990: 110).

Sarah Barringer Gordon locates the polygamy issue in its historical context, arguing that polygamy became a symbolic beacon around power struggles of a broader nature, including religious freedom and nation building. Central to anti-polygamy arguments were the notions that Christian monogamy and the welfare of the country were intertwined (2002:30); that liberty and mainstream Protestantism were linked (33); and that polygamy could only be supported by theocracy, which eliminated the distinction between church and state (34–35). Anti-polygamists framed their arguments in relation to the anti-slavery movement, appealing to "the emotional suffering created by a system of oppression" (49). This connection also "provided a blueprint for constitutional rights consciousness" (51). In short, polygamy was constructed as being fraught with harm and risk of harm at multiple levels, not least of which was the jeopardization of an entire nation and the values the majority of its citizens held dear (or so went the rhetoric).

There is no evidence that there is any influence other than that from the United States on these issues during the Canadian parliamentary process of constructing polygamy as a criminal act, although one can speculate that there was a certain amount of colonial smugness in the process of working up polygamy as an evil to be regulated in a 'civilized' nation. The problem of polygamy was cast as more or less one that was being imported from the United States. There was a clear sense that a proper Christian family took a specific form, and, we might speculate, the degree of church-state unanimity was quite strong on this particular issue. The Latter-day Saints were the religious outsiders or minority in this particular discussion. The legal context was such that the notion of religious freedom was virtually undeveloped in Canada, and in the United States any attempt to use religious freedom arguments met with failure.

Contemporary examples of this sort of regulation are common, particularly in European countries that require religious groups to register for official religion status (see Richardson, 2004). While superficially this does not amount to state endorsement, the ability to register is decidedly exclusionary of new or marginal religions. Only those who are registered can do 'business'. Thus, even states that claim to endorse religious freedom often limit that freedom to recognized religions. By declaring certain groups eligible for registration and excluding others, a restriction of religious symbols in public allows a constellation of *de facto* state religions to remain untouched. Which groups are eligible and when is a matter of social and cultural context, which are intricately linked to global context.

The polygamy example in Canada provides further fodder for thought on the church-state issue, as it has in the last decade emerged again as a pressing social issue. The Mormons receded quietly into the background, and even though polygamy was criminalized, fundamentalist Latter-day Saints settled in Canada and established a polygamous colony in Bountiful, British Columbia. The colony lived in relative obscurity, although occasionally media reports brought it back into the public eye. Most importantly, police and crown prosecutors chose not to pursue prosecution under the criminal code, even though polygamy is clearly illegal in Canada. However, reports of child abuse, marriage of very young girls and internal political strife within the community have once again brought them into the public spotlight. This has also happened at a time when the definition of family is perceived by some as

being under attack. The lament 'what next, polygamy?' was expressed by some religious groups during debates over the legal provisions for same-sex marriage. Moreover, at the same time there are perceived threats to the fabric of the nation through immigration and the fear of Islam and Muslim immigrants, some of whom practice polygamy in their country of origin. This synchronicity of events has gradually increased the profile of this issue, which has remained largely outside of public discourse for almost a century. In part, it is the intensification of global flows that have reopened the polygamy discussion, and shifted the context in which it is being debated. Thus, while each nation negotiates religious freedom within its own boundaries, these negotiations are subject to global influences, as was noted in a report on polygamy issued by Status of Women Canada in 2005: "given the diversity within the global community of women in polygamous marriages, it is extremely difficult to draw a single, unqualified conclusion as to how women experience polygamy. While some women might suffer socially, economically and health-wise as a result of polygamous life, others might benefit" (Campbell, 2005: ii).

In that report there was some discussion of polygamy in terms of its decriminalization (Campbell, 2005; Bala et al., 2005; Bailey et al., 2005), but there are critical aspects of issues around polygamy that need to be addressed by situating the discussion both within the specific cultural and social context of Canada, while at the same time considering the issue of polygamy from a global perspective. While the articles in the report tried to maintain a balance of sorts, some of the authors relied on global data that is based on a condemnation of polygamy as a family form. That condemnation was globally situated—i.e. it drew on the notion of a global community of women and a global human rights discourse. Such a dialectal process allows for a better understanding of the human rights implications of the practice of polygamy, but the global assessment is problematic in that it disconnects polygamy from its cultural context, reconstitutes it as a global and 'neutral' issue, and then imports it back to Canada. Although many claims are made about the inherently harmful nature of polygamy and its dehumanizing impact on women and girls, the supporting evidence relies on sweeping claims, gross generalizations, limited information and one-off horrific events not representative of the whole. There is a serious paucity of contemporary social scientific research that illuminates the day-to-day realities of life in a polygamous relationship (Landes, 1937, briefly discusses it in Ojibwa communities, for example).

As a case study, polygamy reveals the ways in which truth claims about community values enter into social, legal, and policy decisions. Specifically, the criminalization and social control of polygamy has the potential to be used as a mechanizm for filtering out the 'undesirable other'. Its control is directly linked to the process of determining those to whom Canada offers the opportunity of citizenship, and to, ultimately, notions of nationhood and identity. The assessment of polygamy as a religious freedom issue is tied to questions of immigration, in which the state has a clear interest.

When religious minorities are assessed as being somehow harmful to society they are controlled through laws that are seemingly 'neutral' (e.g. legislation about door-to-door soliciting that affect only a group like Jehovah's Witnesses), but that have an adverse impact or a disparate impact on certain religious groups. Judicial or administrative tribunal application of legislation may have a similar effect. More difficult to examine are those everyday practices that are carried out by state officials like immigration officers, those issuing building permits, etc. Interpretive practices shift according to the social cultural climate, which is increasingly influenced by global flows that identify particular groups as dangerous or desirable. The boundaries of religious freedom undergo subtle shifts in this process. For example, in the post-9/11 culture of fear, there is a hunkering down of sorts, which has seen a shift in rhetoric from nation-building to preservation of nation. This has taken an interesting turn with global influences about who 'we' are. In this context, polygamy acts as a marker of 'them' in the realm of filtering immigrants in a manner that is similar to that of the management of Latter-day Saints in the 1800s.

John Roth notes, "in a crisis, a secularized equivalent of the division of mankind into the elect and the reprobate could easily become a controlling image" (1997: 187). The notion of the elect has renewed 'us' rhetoric around nation preservation that flows over into social relations. These social relations are in some measure defined by global definitions of 'us' (European and what is racially defined as white) and them (anybody else). In the midst of this, is a religious profile of 'us' as Christian and 'them' as especially Muslim, but also other marginal religious groups who are mostly not Christian. In a repeat of history, we see the flow of immigrants articulated as a shared concern for the United States and Canada. These problematic 'others' mandate an increased control and monitoring to minimize or eliminate harm. Mormons presented a similar threat to nationhood in the late 1800s

as do present day immigrants who do not share 'our' values. Religion serves as a marker of distinction between 'us' from 'them'. Polygamy is one issue that raises the red flag of 'harm' and presents an opportunity to keep out the 'undesirable other'.

Religion as an 'issue' takes a variety of forms depending on social context, which include global flows of people and ideas. Moreover, by focusing on Canadian examples I don't mean to suggest that this analysis doesn't extend to other countries. For example, the public display of religious symbols in France has been the subject of heated debate. Ultimately it is part of the tension around nation-preservation and the discursive working up of the 'other' (usually immigrant, often Muslim) who is targeted as the cause for social and cultural erosion or disintegration.

Much of the sorting of immigration cases takes place behind closed doors, in the context of the creation of files embedded in a power-knowledge matrix that eludes external examination. Further, immigrants are excluded from mechanizms of access to justice to a much greater extent than are those who have the status of citizen. Fear, lack of knowledge of the legal and bureaucratic systems, language barriers and limited financial resources contribute to the parameters of power relations in this context. The case of the Latter-day Saints offers an interesting beginning point for analysis because we have, in some measure, historical distance that may facilitate a better place from which to see the strands of narrative in the working up of polygamy as an issue of nation-building. While this same historical advantage is not available for an analysis of polygamy in the current context, the late 19th century experience with Latter-day Saints opens up a space from which some comparisons can be made.

A review of reported immigration cases offers some preliminary glimpses into the ways in which polygamy is considered in law. The legality of polygamy per se is often not considered, rather, issues such as conflict of laws or the availability of support payments for polygamous wives is often the focus. Nonetheless, judicial comments reveal interesting insights into the legal construction of family forms. In *R.* v. *Moustafa* (1991) the judge notes, "If I recall the Old Testament correctly, polygamy was a prevailing type of marriage arrangement in biblical days and is still in some countries permitted, although it certainly seems to be a type of marriage that is on the wane". The data the judge draws on for this conclusion is not mentioned. The defence council responds "It's too expensive, your Honor." While the court notes that

polygamy "surfaced" in earlier times in North America in the Mormon church, it goes on to state that "it is not a kind of marriage that has been practiced in Canada. The defendant is from Egypt, and "of the Moslem religion". In 2002 in *Gure* v. *Canada (Minister of Immigration)* the applicant, who married a Somalian woman and later a Saudi Arabian woman was denied permission for permanent resident status based on his previous polygamous status. He had divorced one of the women, but the court notes his separate applications for permanent residence with each woman, and the fact that he was married to two women at the time of his application, as reason to exclude him from the legislative parameters of "member of the family class" for the purposes of sponsorship. In *Ali* v. *The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration*, (1998) the Federal Court upheld the decision of an immigration officer, which refused Ali's application for permanent residence in Canada because the officer "was of the opinion that there were reasonable grounds to believe the applicant would practice polygamy in Canada." The existence of polygamous relationships in Canada, and the fact that they have been here for a century, is overlooked by the courts.[1]

Both Mormon Fundamentalists and present-day immigrants share a status as minority religious groups. There are parallels between these groups that are not accidental. In its control of the religious practices of minority groups the law imposes a particular vision of 'the family', which is drawn from a hegemonic conceptualization from mainstream Christianity as it intersects with western patriarchal culture. A core motif is the 'harm' caused by polygamous relationships, which allows for the monitoring of those who would, through their beliefs and actions, challenge the dominant cultural narrative of family and religion, which is inevitably tied up with citizenship and nation.

The determination of harm is not something that can be arrived at by a formula, and in this light it is important to examine the ways in which those who live in polygamous relationships conceptualize their

[1] Jeremy Gunn notes that these sorts of legal tribunal decisions commonly misinterpret or misunderstand religion. He notes, "In a study prepared for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Karen Musalo presented a detailed examination of religious persecution in refugee cases decided in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Musalo's examination of the adjudicators' decisions revealed, in many cases, serious misunderstandings not only about how "religion" is defined, but what religion is. Indeed, the adjudicators often appear to have made assumptions about the meaning of religion on the basis of their own experiences as members of the educated elite in western, industrial societies."

own lives. Failure to do so is as patriarchal as some people argue that the very existence of polygamy is. The employment of a risk of harm test can act "as a veritable joker card[s] that can serve completely different purposes depending on the context" (Valverde, 1999: 184). The state may cite risk to women and children as a mechanizm for preserving a particular form of family relations. Some may argue that polygamy is a patriarchal practice that only serves the interests of men. Polygamous women may argue that it is the criminalization of polygamy that is harmful. The fluidity of the concept of harm means that it can, as Valverde argues, be deployed by a variety of groups in the service of a number of arguments. Often underlying these is a moral stance about what is good or desirably in society.

The fluidity of the concept and measure of harm is intertwined with the confluence of many streams, including nation-building, preservation, the targeting of the "other" as "threatening" or "risky" and the deployment of a global Christian code of "the good" (see Beyer, 2006: 80–82). Where, then, are we left on the question of polygamy, its criminalization, and its use as a filter in the boundaries of citizenship and nation? A consideration of harm must inevitably ask—harm by what criteria, and from whose perspective? Integral to such an inquiry is an examination of global flows. In the case of polygamy, there are numerous currents in the global tide. Fear of 'the other' and nation preservation are two; another is the 'protection of women' as a human rights issue. In the following section I explore the notion of women's agency and its (perhaps surprising) links to global context through a Supreme Court of Canada decision.

Agency, Freedom and Women's Voices

In December 2005 the Supreme Court of Canada in *R.* v. *Labaye* overturned a conviction for indecent criminal conduct. The activity in question involved the running of a club in which people participated in sexual activity with multiple partners—a 'swingers' club. In reviewing the facts, the Court noted:

> A number of mattresses were scattered about the floor of the apartment. There people engaged in acts of cunnilingus, masturbation, fellatio and penetration. On several occasions observed by the police, a single woman engaged in sex with several men, while other men watched and masturbated. Entry to the club and participation in the activities were

> voluntary. No one was forced to do anything or watch anything. No one was paid for sex. While men considerably outnumbered women on the occasions when the police visited, there is no suggestion that any of the women were there involuntarily or that they did not willingly engage in the acts of group sex.

The Court found that such activities did not cause harm to a degree that impedes the proper functioning of society. This case raises questions about the circumstances in which agency is constructed as existing (or not). Why is a woman having sex in a room with a group of men masturbating constructed as exercising her agentic capacity, while a woman who lives in an ongoing familial and committed relationship with other women and a man constructed as being brainwashed or without agency? This example reveals the fluidity of concepts like 'harm', 'agency' and 'freedom' and raises questions about the global flow of values, symbols and the ways in which they become sedimentations of power relations and the manner in which those play out in a variety of settings, including law.

I would like to challenge the assumption that a woman engaging in activities like those described in the *Labaye* case is somehow more 'free' or more likely to be exercising agency than her polygamous sister. Despite the ease with which the court determined the voluntary nature of the participation of women in the activities described above, the line between choice and force is not clear, and the determination of the location of the boundaries is a delicate balance. Discussions of polygamy seem to take as a given women's lack of agency and victimization, and it is this presumption that this research seeks to challenge. Both the presence of agency and the presence of harm are culturally and socially situated. There is sometimes a fine line between paternalistic approaches to women and laws and policies that ensure that women can exercise their agentic capacity (see Barker, 2004; Sonntag Bradley, 2006 for a discussion of patriarchy as a structural limitation on women's agency in the context of polygamy).

As was the case in the 1800s, the legislation of polygamy is today presented as a matter of the protection of women and children and as a matter of human rights. This global context was noted in the Status of Women Canada (2005) report on polygamy, which was a collection of essays working through the issue of polygamy and its social, legal and cultural implications. At the heart of these issues is a belief that there are transportable human rights that should be both globally applied

and that must be identified and defended locally. Polygamy has been discussed using the following assumptions: that we can compare polygamy in Canada with polygamy in African countries (for example); that polygamy is inherently harmful to women no matter what the cultural and social context; that the Christian-inspired so-called nuclear family is a preferred model for familial relations (and that it does not have the inherently abusive possibilities of polygamous arrangements) and that women who live in polygamous relationships are suffering harm.

Other issues are similarly situated and are located at the intersection of religion and globalization: sharia law, the wearing of the hijab, female circumcision, and even the presence of Canadian troops in Afghanistan is framed in terms of a human rights battle for Afghanis generally, but especially Afghani women. Each has its own social and cultural location, which makes generalizations impossible, but I take seriously Himani Bannerji's (2000) comment that "what we have come to call globalization is both an economic and a cultural imperialism" (3). Whether we agree with Bannerji or not, her statement is a call to think reflexively about the manner in which cultural imperialism enters into assessments of religious practices as they cross the borders of nation-states. Specifically, it is important that we are aware of the discursive working up of particular practices as harmful under the guise of human rights and state intervention for their protection. The banning of the wearing of the hijab as a form of equalization or protection of women, for example, calls for a deeper analysis that recognizes the complexity of that particular symbol and practice for women. First and foremost is a need to listen to women themselves as a point of departure. Second, there is a need to ask hard questions about measures of freedom and calculations of harm. Third, we need to think seriously about how religion as a concept is worked up, and whether hegemonic conceptualizations are embedded in the imagining of religion as it plays out in places like law. Finally, the use of religion as a distinguishing characteristic of difference and as a marker of diversity needs to be interrogated.

Debates about religious freedom almost always involve some discussion of human agency, which takes us to a central debate spanning a number of academic disciplines, including sociology, philosophy, and political science, which is as yet unresolved. How do we define human agency and at what point is agency compromised or non-existent? Studies of women in so-called fundamentalist religious groups provide interesting food for thought on this issue. Studies of Orthodox Jewish women (Kaufman, 1991), Latter-day Saints (Beaman, 2001), and

the Amish (Olshan and Schmidt, 1994) for example, demonstrate the complexity of the agency question. More recently, questions about Muslim women and whether they 'really' want to wear the hijab have engendered some excellent scholarship which illuminates the nuance of women's agency and the various strands that play into women's decisions about the hijab (see Hoodfar, 2003 and Ruby, 2005). From all of this work we are left wondering who is qualified to assess whether women are 'really' choosing.

This problematic notion of choice has been explored by Rebecca Johnson (2002) and Robin West (2003), who have separately interrogated the notion of an independent, free-choosing citizen. Each insists that choice must always be contextualized in social relations. 'Choice' cannot be abstracted into neat little liberal thought experiments that do not conceive of the society and culture in which it is embedded. In Johnson's work then, the 'choice' to have children must be situated in the material reality of women's bodies. Stated simply, only women can bear children. Agency in this context is complex and full of nuance, not absent. This way of thinking about choice is also better able to account for the 'glocalization' of issues like polygamy, the wearing of the hijab, and the use of shari'a law.

Inextricably linked to these considerations is the very definition of religion, which plays an important role in working up the boundaries of state support of and intervention in religion. How religion 'looks' is shaped by global ebbs and flows which are complex in themselves. For example, international women's groups may work to frame issues in a manner which reshapes notions of religion or religious practices. Religious groups may participate in the process as well. Global activists can be mobilized to respond to issues which would seem to pertain only to those within the boundaries of nation-states, but which have been transformed into issues of global concern or human rights. Here the example of the Anglican church comes to mind, which is experiencing a moment of crisis precipitated by what might be considered to be a reversal of global flows. As the African church has taken a stand on the issue of same-sex marriage which has escalated into potentially schismatic results, the shape of the Anglican church is being affected.

But, the discussion of rethinking how religion looks and is defined is more profound, even, than the above example. McGuire (this volume) points to the need to radically restructure how we think about religious life if we are to understand its working in the day-to-day lives of people. Thinking about definitions of religion and the state reveals

the extent to which religious experience and practice are excluded from state purview, persecution and protection. On this theme, though, state persecution of particular religious groups is also embedded in global flows of definitions of 'good' and 'bad' religion. But these too are not static, resulting in a complicated weaving through of shifting definitions and a resetting of the boundaries that demarcate 'diverse' groups. We need only think here of the insistence in France that the hijab is a religious and not a cultural symbol. And, of course, for some it is, but for others it is less about faith than it is about modesty or cultural markers. However defined, it becomes a marker of 'diversity' or 'the other' whose meaning and the response to it shifts depending upon time and place. State establishment of rules regarding religious groups and the degree to which religious freedom is supported are integrally bound with ideas about agency, harm, nation preservation and the dangerous other. The social construction of the other is embedded in global vectors as well as in local context.

In this chapter I have used the example of polygamy as an entry point into the issue of the state, religion, and globalization to make the argument that the local is implicated in the global, and vice versa. Further, the very definition of religion is affected by global flows and that the ways in which we define or think about what constitutes religion is implicated in the ways that states respond to groups and individuals who engage in particular practices as part of their faith.

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RELIGION, LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

James T. Richardson

Introduction

Jack Donnelly, in "The Social Construction of International Human Rights", says (1999: 84):

> There is nothing natural, let alone inevitable, about ordering social and political life around the idea of human rights... Contemporary conceptions of human rights reflect a long process of social and political struggle that might easily have turned out differently.

This essay will briefly examine from a social constructionist perspective the development of the concept of human rights, focusing specifically on the evolution of the relatively new right of religious freedom. The social construction of religious freedom will be delineated, building on my own recent related work (Richardson, 2003; 2004; 2006c), and other writings on the topic of the religious freedom of minority and new religions such as that by Phillip Lucas (2004). This analysis will be used to make an assessment of the overall context of religious freedom in today's world, especially for minority religious groups and participants.

History of Human Rights

Human rights for individual citizens is a new concept that has evolved over the past 100 years into an international norm with enforcement nechanisms that can, in some circumstances, override national norms and laws. This new conception has overcome a rigid focus on state power that had held sway for several hundred years. That focus incorporated a realist notion of national interest with a rigid legal positivist conception of sovereignty (Donnelly, 1999). Nations were expected to retain total power over their citizens, even to the extent of being able to kill them with impunity. Other nations were expected to refrain from interference no matter the egregious nature of the offences being committed against individuals and groups within a given society. Only

if a nation's national interest was threatened would it even comment on another nation's actions toward its own citizens, much less consider interfering with those actions. To do anything else would be considered a serious intrusion into the affairs of another nation, something that was *verboten* in the historical context of the times.

Efforts to end slavery in the 1800s and campaigns to protect workers' rights and ethnic minorities in the early 1900s might be considered precursors of the contemporary interest in human rights, but Donnelly (1999: 71) considers those actions more anomalous than the beginning of a major international movement. He notes (1999: 73) that the charter for the League of Nations that developed in the aftermath of WWI does not mention human rights at all! It was only the horrors of WWII that finally made human rights a matter of concern for the international community. As the systematic genocide of many peoples by the Nazi war machine came to be known, concern grew, even if fitfully, about human rights. That concern managed, once the full extent of Nazi atrocities became known to the general pubic after the war, to partially overcome the idea of state sovereignty that had allowed the massive genocidal excesses of the Nazis to be carried out.

President Franklin Roosevelt spoke as early as 1942 about the "Four Freedoms" that the war was supposedly being fought to protest. Those freedoms included freedom from want and fear, but significantly for our purposes, Roosevelt also named freedom of speech and worship. In June, 1943 the U.S. State Department had already drafted a document that would serve as the basis for the United Nations, with the writers including an International Bill of Human Rights in the draft. When the United Nations was formed after the war, it moved quickly to codify some of the major concerns that had grown out of the war experience, adopting The Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948. However, the eruption of the Cold War as well as nationalistic concerns by member states deterred serious efforts to enforce the idealized normative human rights statements promulgated by the UN.

The UN, because of pressures by newly independent states in Africa and Asia, did attempt in the 1960s to establish a number of other human rights through such official documents as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Donnelly (1999: 74) lists 38 human rights that are contained in one or more of these three key early documents which spelled out the position of the UN on the issue

of human rights. It is significant that "freedom of thought conscience and religion" appears in two of those documents, but note that religious freedom was only one of more than three dozen human rights listed in these major statements. Hubert Seiwert (2006), in a sobering effort to place religious freedom in a broader context, points out that Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which deals with the rights of freedom of thought conscience and religion, is preceded by 17 other articles and followed by an additional 12.

The UN also began a gradual process in the 1970s and 1980s of moving beyond simply adopting a normative position in favor of human rights, and started making efforts to document violations. There were even tentative movements toward enforcement of some rights, but those usually foundered on the shoals of the still dominant philosophy of state sovereignty. The human rights movement gained impetus during the 1970s by a number of developments, among them the election of Jimmy Carter as President of the United States. Carter made human rights a major theme of his presidency, a development which helped fuel the growing influence of some major NGOs such as Amnesty International. Concern about religious freedom was usually demonstrated in these efforts, even if such issues were not paramount in efforts by the UN and other entities.

The UN was, of course, not alone in expressing concern for human rights. Some nation-states in the West were championing human rights and even integrating those concerns in their foreign policy. The Carter years in the United States demonstrate this kind of early involvement of nations in the promotion of human rights. There were also very important regional developments related to human rights, especially in Western Europe, where the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) evolved over years of meetings on human rights issues in Helsinki (Gunn, 2002). The Council of Europe was formally established in 1950 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was formally adopted in 1953. Quite significantly, the Council of Europe established an enforcement mechanism for promotion of the provisions of the European Convention. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was given authority over the member states, and could declare national laws and even constitutional provisions of member states null and void if found to be in conflict with provisions of the European Convention. The ECHR has become perhaps the most important enforcement body in the world in terms of human rights. Its decisions carry considerable

authority within the expanding Council of Europe and also have persuasive authority in other regions of the world.

Religious Freedom as a Human Right

Donnelly (1999) points out that in the last century there has been a movement toward expanding human rights considerations to include women, racial and ethnic minorities, and religion. This assertion concerning religious freedom is illustrated by the inclusion of religion in various official documents of the UN and the Council of Europe referred to above. Donnelly's treatment, however, does not dwell on development of religious freedom. He mentions a growing concern about religious fundamentalism, and leaves an impression that he believes certain kinds of religion are a growing threat to human rights in general. Dunn and Wheeler (1999: 12) also raise this type of concern, as they discuss Koranic punishments in Islamic societies. Amputation of the right hand of a thief may be acceptable in certain Islamic societies, but is counter to Western concerns about torture that have become embodied in international covenants sponsored by the UN and other organizations. Evans (2004: 41–44) notes concerns about 'religious extremism' expressed by the UN's Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief.

> Religious extremism has been one of the key areas of focus in the Rapporteur's reports. The Rapporteur is vigorous in his condemnation of the phenomena, describing it as an 'ever-growing and all-pervasive menace to peace that breaks of society and poses a particular threat to vulnerable groups (women and minorities)'.

Concern about the acting out of religious values that are counter to the western oriented human rights tradition, is seen also in the conflict over individual versus collective or societal rights that often is a focal point of efforts to expand human rights. Western individualistic oriented approaches are not fully accepted in collectivistic oriented societies such as China. As Dunn and Wheeler (1999: 13) note, "Chinese culture has developed a very different set of moral and communal relations emphasizing hierarchy, deference, and interdependence..." They then discuss the famous "White Paper" entitled "Human Rights in China", which was published in 1991 by the Chinese government. That document argued that China, "...a developing country with limited resources and a huge population", had to avoid social turmoil, "which could threaten

the people's most important right, 'the right to subsistence'". Dunn and Wheeler conclude: "The implication of this position is that the state has a moral responsibility to curtail individual freedoms and political participation in the name of the higher good of the community". This posture certainly has implications for religious freedom in China and aids understanding of the severe actions taken against the Falun Gong, actions which have been of grave concern in the West (also see Edelman and Richardson, 2003; 2005; Richardson, 2005).

China is not alone in defending a more collectivistic orientation, as this philosophy characterizes a number of societies in Asia, as most nations in the region have historically eschewed the individualistic, competitive cultural values of the West. Also, there are nations where historical, cultural, and nationalistic influences are dominant, which can lead to efforts to curtail religious freedom of minority groups that would challenge the historical hegemony of certain religious traditions. This is well illustrated by developments in some former Soviet countries in Eastern and Central Europe (Shterin and Richardson, 2000; Richardson, 1995). Peter Danchin and Elizabeth Cole (2002) focus on the protection of religious minorities, especially in Eastern Europe. The chapters in their edited volume reveal much about the role of the United Nations and the European Community in promoting religious freedom in Western Europe and globally, and offer some grounds for optimism about the state of religious freedom in the modern world, a point to which I will return.

The UN has, in recent decades, shown more concern about religious freedom, issuing reports expressing concern about treatment of religious and ethic minorities in some countries. Evans (2004) notes that the first Special Rapporteur in this area was appointed in 1987, but she notes that this position, while making considerable progress, has been chronically under-funded and lacking in authority since its inception. The Council of Europe has also become engaged in a number of discussions concerning religious freedom and the rights of minority religious groups (Beckford, 1985; Richardson, 1995; Wah, 2001). These discussions have usually been promoted by those opposed to new and minority religions, and have resulted in battles between those opposed and those more supportive of recognizing religious pluralism in modern European societies. However, to date, the Council of Europe has not taken any major effective actions toward minority faiths.

The judicial arm of the Council of Europe, the ECHR, has issued rulings in recent years that are supportive of religious rights for minority

religions. One provision of the European Convention, Article 9, dealt with religious freedom, but it was not until 1993 that a violation was found of this provision (Richardson, 1995). Instead, the ECHR almost always deferred to the member states, allowing a 'margin of appreciation' for those states to regulate the religious affairs of their citizens, a position that has engendered strong criticism (Gunn, 1996; Evans, 2002). The 1993 violation in the *Kokiknakis* case was against Greece for its treatment of a Jehovah's Witness member convicted of the criminal offense of proselytizing. However, the decision was only by a six to three vote of the ECHR judges, and one dissenting judge used the term 'brainwashing' to characterize the proselytizing efforts of the Witnesses in Greece. Thus, although the ECHR has expressed some reservations concerning enforcement of religious freedom rights, the Court began in the early 1990s to recognize this important part of the European Convention. Violations of Article 9 have since been found by the Court in rulings against Greece (which criminalizes proselytization) and some newer member states of the former Soviet Union, including a very recent (April, 2007) decision in favor of Scientology against Russia. This new pattern suggests the possibility of a 'double standard' operating which favors older Member States, allowing them more of a 'margin of appreciation' as they deal with religious concerns of their citizens (Richardson and Garay, 2004). Nonetheless, at least the ECHR is implementing Article 9 to some extent, which can then have repercussions on the older Member States.

Contemporary Status of Religious Freedom for Minority Faiths

Assessing the current level of religious freedom for new and minority religious groups around the globe is problematic for several reasons. Included are: (1) temporal nearness, making assessment difficult for lack of complete information and sound analysis; (2) the many variations across nations on this issue; and (3) rapid changes that can occur on this issue.

One impressive attempt to overcome these problems has been offered by Phillip Lucas (2004), in the last chapter of the edited volume done with Tom Robbins (Lucas and Robbins, 2004). His analysis is based on information contained in chapters in the volume describing the situation of new religions in many societies around the globe, and also

is informed by the impact on the freedoms afforded NRMs and other minority faiths caused by significant global political developments. While my own analysis offers some critique of the conclusions of the Lucas chapter (see below), his work deserves respect and will be summarized herein.

Lucas claims that five major global developments have had negative impacts on religious freedom for minority faiths. Indeed, his assessment is quite pessimistic and does not suggest any major developments that have promoted more religious freedom for such groups. The five elements he discusses include:

1. "The end of the Cold War and the emerging clash of religiously based civilizations" (pp. 343–344);
2. "The attack on the World Trade Center and the 'War on Terrorism'" (pp. 344–346);
3. "Sensational episodes of violence in NRMs and public perceptions of the growing threat to public order posed by new and minority religions" (pp. 346–350);
4. "The internationalization of the anticult and countercult movements and the lessening influence of academics in NRM debates" (pp. 350–352); and
5. "Resurgent nationalism and the simultaneous efforts of traditional 'national churches' to regain cultural hegemony" (pp. 352–354).

Lucas claims that the end of the Cold War between East and West, or atheistic communism and religiously sanctioned capitalism, has resulted in "disorientation and uncertainty" (p. 343). That uncertainty has resolved itself into what Samuel Huntington (1995) calls a "clash of civilizations" between Christian-based, Islamic-based, and Chinese-based civilizations. Within such a global context, limitations on religious freedom within those different civilizations may seem to be demanded in the interest of national security, thus stifling religious freedom of those with beliefs and practices different from the dominant tradition within the three major civilizations.

The growing "clash of civilizations" situation has been greatly exacerbated by the events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing 'war on terror'. The war on terror has resulted in the loss of freedoms by many in Western societies, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, but also in former Soviet nations and other societies. The loss of freedoms has resulted, Lucas claims, in limitations on religious freedom

in Western nations especially for Muslim groups, and severe repression of religious minorities in countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan under the guise of the war on terror. In China, the events of 9/11 led to a re-labeling of the Falun Gong as a terrorist organization instead of just an 'evil cult'. Lucas states that "concerns for domestic security will increasingly trump concerns for religious freedom even in societies with long histories of religious toleration…" (p. 346).

Major and well-publicized violent episodes involving contemporary NRMs have added to concerns about the long-term prognosis for religious freedom. The Peoples Temple tragedy of 1978 was an extremely sensationalized event that has influenced reactions to NRMs in the U.S. ever since (Hall, 1995). In Europe, the Solar Temple mass suicides galvanized public sentiment in France and Belgium, contributing to repressive legislation in both nations. The deadly attacks by Aum Shinrikyo in Japan garnered global attention and concern about newer religious groups. In China, sensational accusations by the Chinese government had similar effects on public sentiments, leading to repressive actions toward the Falun Gong and other unofficial religious groups.

Lucas then discusses the internationalization of the anti-cult movement, using modern means of communication and travel to spread the message that NRMs, or 'cults and sects', are dangerous to individuals and to society, if left unchecked. Coupled with this development is what he describes as a 'lessening' or even total silencing of academics who have done research in the area and thus could help counter the one-sided promotions of the anti-cultists. He cites Richardson and Introvigne's (2001) comparative study of official reports on minority faiths in Europe as evidence of how pervasive notions of 'brainwashing' or, as the French say, 'mental manipulation' are around the world, and how those unscientific ideas are being used to undergird public policy toward minority faiths in that region.

As his last point, Lucas focuses on the growth of rampant nationalism in parts of the world, especially former Soviet countries, and the confluence of this sentiment with the efforts of formerly dominant churches to reassert themselves into the life of those societies as they emerge from domination by the former Soviet Union. He discusses at some length the case of Russia, where the Russian Orthodox Church has regained a powerful position within Russian society, sometimes by using minority faiths as straw entities defined as a danger to Russian society (see Shterin and Richardson, 2000). Other former Soviet coun-

tries such as Georgia, Belarus, and Turkmenistan are also discussed, as is France, with its unofficial but dominant Catholicism.

Lucas has built a persuasive case that religious freedom is retrograding in some parts of the globe. His examination focuses to considerable extent on former communist countries and China. However, he also includes some Western European nations such as France and Belgium, as well as the post 9/11 United States and United Kingdom. Japan is included in his discussion, as well, because of the Aum affair.

A More Optimistic View of Religious Freedom of NRMs

My own analysis suggests that some important qualifications are needed to the overall quite pessimistic view espoused by Lucas. It is worth noting that others would also disagree with his conclusions. For example, a recent four part series in the *New York Times* (Henriques, 2006a; b; c; d) makes a strong case that religion and religious groups in the United States wield too much power, and that this is contrary to the overall public good. Marci Hamilton (2005) has argued forcefully that religion occupies too much public space in America, and, that its purview should be more limited. Therefore it seems timely to examine the arguments being made by Lucas, to see how they mesh with what appear to be counter-arguments.

The qualifications I would suggest to Lucas' assessment derive from some aspects of a theoretical analysis offered in a recent article, "The Sociology of Religious Freedom: A Structural and Socio-Legal Analysis" (Richardson, 2006c), as well as from my own research on some of the nations Lucas discusses (Richardson, 2004). The theoretical scheme includes a focus on the degree of *religious pluralism* present in a society, as well as the *pervasiveness, centralization, type* (adversarial versus inquisitional), *degree of autonomy,* and *amount of discretion* that characterize the legal and judicial system of a society. The theoretical elements also include key variables from the sociology of law offered by Donald Black (1976; 1999), including *status, intimacy*, and *third party partisanship*, and focus, as well on crucial processes such as the *social production of evidence* highlighted by Mark Cooney (1994). While the article's entire theoretical scheme is germane, the concept of autonomy of a society's judicial system is viewed as particularly crucial to protecting religious freedom, as is the role in legal battles over religious freedom of what are called "third party partisans" (Black and Baumgartner, 1999).

Focusing on these theoretical elements suggests some grounds for a more optimistic view of religious freedom for minority faiths in at least some contemporary societies. I will discuss each element in turn, before drawing some final conclusions about the state of religious freedom for minority faiths around the globe.

Pluralism

One key aspect of religion in most contemporary societies is the variety that exists when examining the religious character of those societies. Governmental leaders and dominant religious organizations may desire to define their society as more monolithic in terms of religious persuasion and affiliation. However, this is often a losing cause, given modern means of travel and communication. Short of outright violent repression, it is difficult to see how a society can stop the inexorable forces that are moving our world toward a more global society in terms of religious opportunities. Certainly repression is being tried, particularly in some former Soviet dominated nations, in some Islamic nations, and in China, but these represent exceptions that usually draw the ire of other societies and other international official bodies such as the United Nations, the European Court of Human Rights, OSCE, and NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Without Frontiers. It is clear that this international attention can have an impact, at least in some societies (Richardson, 2006a; b).

Characteristics of Legal and Judicial Systems

a. *Pervasiveness, centralization, and globalization of judicial systems*
Legal and judicial systems have become quite centralized and pervasive in many modern societies. Even societies such as Japan, where traditional methods of resolving disputes have not typically involved legal action, are seeing an increase in the use of the courts to resolve disputes (Kidder, 1983). Thus legal and judicial systems touch more aspects of the lives of citizens, including their religious activities, and if other important elements supportive of religious freedom are present, this centralized pervasiveness can promote religious freedom. It is this sort of characterization of the growing power of religion in American society that is criticized by Hamilton (2005) and referred to in the *New York Times* series mentioned earlier (Henriques, 2006a; b; c; d).

The growth of 'constitutionalism' in many societies around the globe has been discussed by a number of scholars (e.g. Arjomand,

2003; Scheppele, 2003; Go, 2003), some of whom have noted that this movement seems mainly motivated by a desire to protect human and civil rights of citizens in nations where such rights have not been recognized in the past. Indeed, the move of former Soviet nations into the Council of Europe has usually required that those nations establish constitutional courts. The role of such courts in protecting religious freedom for minority faith adherents in several modern societies has been documented (Richardson, Krylova and Shterin, 2004; Richardson, 2006b). Particularly noteworthy is that in Russia the Constitutional Court has ruled several times in ways that limit the effect of the very stringent new law governing religion, discussed at length by Lucas. In Hungary (Shanda, 2002; 2004) what Scheppele (1999) has called a "courtocracy" developed during the 1990s when the Constitutional Court was virtually in charge of the reconstruction of Hungarian society. The Hungarian Constitutional Court issued a number of rulings supportive of religious involvement in society during this decade and protective of minority faiths as well.

When societies such as those previously dominated by the former Soviet Union seek to join the Council of Europe, they are automatically agreeing to be governed by rulings of the ECHR, which means that the values of this powerful judicial system are being allowed to pervade those new member nations. As noted, this influential judicial system has not always supported religious freedom, but of late it has been enforcing such a value more frequently, even if it does sometimes defer to original members of the Council of Europe on the issue of religious freedom (Richardson, 1995; Evans, 2002; Richardson and Garay, 2004). The recent ECHR decision concerning the Salvation Army (SA) in Russia is a clear case of the impact of the ECHR on a former Soviet nation. The Russian government had banned the SA, a decision upheld by the Russian courts. However, the SA appealed to the ECHR, which ruled in favor of the SA and ordered compensation and registration of the organization. A similar case was just decided against Russia over refusals by the Moscow city government to allow Scientology to reregister and function within the city. Other rulings of the ECHR in favor of the Jehovah's Witnesses in appeals of cases from former Soviet nations also illustrate the impact of this judicial body on some nations that would otherwise limit religious freedom for minority faiths more than they are allowed as new members of the Council of Europe (Richardson and Garay, 2004).

b. *The spread of adversarialism*

The adversarial approach to legal dispute resolution has spread, as exemplified by the growing purview and power of entities such as the ECHR. When cases are brought to this court, an American style advocacy system operates, with experienced lawyers arguing cases through briefs that are reviewed by court officials to determine if a case is to be admitted, and by the justices who sit on the court once it is determined that a case will be heard. Thus, the ECHR itself might be thought of as a "third party partisan" (Black and Baumgartner, 1999) supporting the values of the Council of Europe (which include religious freedom) and with the power to intervene effectively in disputes within member states of the Council of Europe. Within the court procedures of the ECHR, the adversarial system also guarantees that a third party partisan in the person of an experienced attorney will be advocating the case for the minority religion member bringing the case before the Court. Thus, members of minority faiths can be allowed a hearing in this powerful forum, and the results can force changes in governmental policy toward minority faiths in those societies making up the Council of Europe.

c. *Judicial autonomy*

Perhaps the most important variable for understanding the impact of a judicial system on human rights is the autonomy of the system, which refers to the independence it has from, and the power it has over, other political and institutional entities. Tate and Vallinder (1995) have documented the growth of judicial power in recent decades, as have other scholars. In some societies other institutional interests, be they military, political, or a dominant church, may have enough power to dictate what judges and other legal authorities do as they perform their duties. In other societies the judiciary acts with much more independence, and with impunity. Examples of the former situation would be courts in Iran, which is now dominated by Islamic clerics (Arjomand, 2000), or China, a nation where the courts obviously serve a political agenda dominated by the Communist government (Edelman and Richardson, 2002). Examples of the latter more autonomous situation include the United States with its Supreme Court, but also Germany and Hungary during the 1990s. In Germany the Constitutional Court has, for example, recently issued a final ruling in a long-running case that grants a preferred status to the Jehovah's Witnesses in Land Berlin, a decision quite unpopular with many government officials and the general public. In Hungary, the Constitutional Court was the main instrument

in what Scheppele (1999) called a "courtocracy" that operated in that nation for a decade. Some of its decisions affirmed religious freedom, including for minority groups. In the United States, the Supreme Court has tremendous power, including power over the Executive Branch (the Presidency), and the Court can and does declare unconstitutional laws passed by Congress.

The recent unanimous decision by the U.S. Supreme Court to affirm the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in the face of strong governmental objection in the *Gonzales* case demonstrates the autonomy of the Court, and its support for religious freedom for minority faiths. The RFRA had been passed in 1993 by a nearly unanimous Congress after the 1990 *Smith* decision did away with the 'compelling interest' test that any governmental entity had to meet when enforcing a law that impacted on religiously motivated behavior (Richardson, 1999). However, the Supreme Court had then declared the RFRA unconstitutional as applied to states and local governments in the *Boerne* decision of 1997. But the new U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts ruled in 2006 in the *Gonzales* case that RFRA was still alive and well as applied to the federal government, and it also has affirmed a replacement statute for RFRA dealing specifically with prisoners' rights and land use that is applicable to state and local governments (Richardson, Chamberlain and Shoemaker, 2006).

Russia is a very interesting and changing nation in terms of judicial autonomy. Lower courts and even the Supreme Court in Russia have issued rulings that appear dominated by the Russian Orthodox Church and nationalistic oriented politicians (Shterin and Richardson, 2002). However, the Russian Constitutional Court, which was disbanded under President Yeltsin, has been revived and has issued several rulings supportive of minority faiths (Richardson, Krylova and Shterin, 2004). Even in China there are signs that the government officials recognize the importance of a more autonomous judiciary (Fa, 2004a; b), but the tradition of that institution being dominated by governmental interests is dying hard (Elliott, 2005). Obviously full autonomy for the court system in China is still in the future.

Of importance as well is the growing autonomy of regional courts such as the ECHR, which now exercises authority in the 46 nations making up the Council of Europe. Since this Court began enforcing Article 9 (freedom of belief, conscience and religion) it has been effective in defending the religious freedom of smaller faiths in this region, even if its decisions sometimes seem somewhat selective in application.

It is noteworthy that Lucas (2004) recognizes the operation of judicial autonomy, even as he appears to overlook its importance. In his discussion of the post-Aum situation in Japan, Lucas says (2004: 349): "It appears that in Japan at least, the judiciary is taking great care to limit infringements on religious freedoms by legislators and the public security agencies who may be overreacting to public pressures." Also, Lucas cites a case where the Anthroposophical Society, a group listed as a 'cult' in an official government study in Belgium, successfully sued—forcing removal of such statements from official government brochures.

d. *Discretion and discrimination*

All legal systems are characterized by considerable discretion, from the police on the beat, through the operation of public prosecutors, to the highest courts in the land. As noted in Richardson (2000), judicial systems can and do, in situations that allow it, exercise considerable discretion in rulings and other decisions that the courts are called on to make. Decisions of the judicial personnel are guided, if not directed, by the political and cultural context in which the courts operate.

If judges know that their decisions could cause severe repercussions for them personally, then they will operate differently than might be the case if the courts enjoyed full autonomy. However, even if judges feel independent of such material considerations as whether they will be paid, retained in office, or even harmed physically, they still operate within a set of cultural values and a legal structure. If those values include religious freedom as an important consideration, then autonomous judges can act on those values with impunity. Especially if there are constitutional or statutory grounds to affirm religious freedom, such decisions can be justified more easily.

However, if cultural values include strong negative evaluations of alternative religious organizations and beliefs, then decisions can be made that are very discriminatory toward minority faiths. Such decisions demonstrate clearly the *normative function* of the courts in a society (Richardson, 2001). The courts can be, and are, instruments of social control, and sometimes that which is defined as being in need of control is religious experimentation by citizens. The normative role of the courts is illustrated most clearly when courts are dominated by other institutions, and court personnel share the values of those in charge of those other institutions. Such an extreme context is well

illustrated by the way China has dealt with the Falun Gong (Edelman and Richardson, 2002).

e. *Status, intimacy, and third party partisans*

Donald Black (1976; 1999) has argued persuasively that the 'behavior of law' can usually be explained using key sociological variables such as the status of the parties involved and the degree of personal and cultural intimacy they share with judicial decision makers. Those with higher status usually win in legal actions, especially if they are 'intimate' with those making the decisions. If Black's characterization of how legal systems operate is correct, then it is easy to understand why small, unpopular minority faiths would usually lose when caught up in the legal and judicial system. Such groups are of low status, usually have few resources to direct to their defense, and those making the decisions may have difficulty understanding the values being acted out by the religious practitioner. Indeed, the judges may not even agree that the group is itself a 'real religion'.

When minority religions win legal battles, this requires explanation. Black and Baumgartner (1999) propose a concept—'third party partisanship'—to assist in explaining how low status parties with few intimate ties might prevail. This concept seems to fit some situations involving minority religious groups. In the United States, organizations such as the ACLU and Americans United for Separation of Church and State, as well as some scholarly organizations and individual scholars have become important third party partisans on behalf of religious freedom of smaller religious organizations. As mentioned earlier, the ECHR might be considered a third party partisan as well, given its independence and stature. Just filing a case with the ECHR has sometimes led to changes in governmental policy in nations from whence came the appeal. The concept of third party partisan can be expanded to include groups and individuals involved in legislation or other governmental action that deals with religious freedom.

f. *The production and admissibility of evidence*

In any legal action there are key decisions made that may be determinative of the outcome of the case. For instance, if a religious group is sued in a civil action and submits a summary judgment motion, the granting of that motion results in the case being terminated. If the motion is not granted, however, the case goes forward. Similarly, if a

religious group sues a party for defamation and the defendant submits a summary judgment motion which is granted, the case is over before it has started.

There are many such pivotal points in any legal action, but, assuming a civil case has not been dismissed on a summary judgment motion, perhaps the most important decisions made by the court involve the admissibility of evidence. As Cooney (1994) has pointed out, evidence is a social product, produced (or not produced) to serve the interests of a party in a legal action. Cooney, a former student of Donald Black, explains at some length how variables such as status and intimacy determine the amount and quality of evidence produced in criminal cases. Richardson and Ginsburg (1996) expand his theorizing to include civil actions, and apply this logic to civil actions involving religious groups.

In recent decades in the United States and elsewhere, a major issue has arisen concerning the use of so-called 'brainwashing' claims in actions concerning new religions (Anthony, 1990; Richardson, 1991; 1993; 1996; De Witt, Richardson and Warner, 1993). Such claims have undergirded many civil actions against NRMs, and have also been made in actions involving defendants in criminal cases. These claims have been allowed in many civil actions, but have had limited success as part of a defense in criminal cases. As Ginsburg and Richardson (1998) note, such claims do not meet usual standards for admissibility of scientific evidence, and such claims have in recent years usually been disallowed, with the cases based on them being dismissed.

For years the brainwashing-based claims were allowed, and with considerable negative impact for minority religious groups being sued by former members or others. Why such claims were allowed is a significant question, one that calls for the application of some of the concepts discussed above for a full understanding. Clearly the normative function of the courts seemed to be operating in those early cases involving brainwashing claims. Judges and juries often agreed that these deviant religious groups needed to be controlled in some fashion. Only after the intervention of significant third party partisans were some of these cases against minority faiths dismissed, and the impact of such popular but unscientific claims disallowed (Richardson, 1998; 2000). But it is noteworthy, particularly in light of Lucas' assertions, that such uses of unscientific brainwashing claims have been limited by court decisions within the United States, an assessment that may be spreading in some other societies (Richardson, 1996; Anthony and Robbins, 2004).

Conclusions

Some of Lucas' claims have considerable merit, but some also need some important qualification, based on recent work such as that of Hamilton (2005), and in the *New York Times* (Henriques, 2006a; b; c; d), as well as the analysis just offered of structural and historical features of the sociology of religious freedom. The 'clash of civilizations' element in Lucas' list seems applicable, particularly for new movements associated with the Islamic tradition in the West and with Christian movements in the Islamic world. Such minority movements could suffer harsh discrimination, and there is some anecdotal evidence that this is the case. This same point seems applicable to the impacts of the attack on the World Trade Center and the war on terrorism. It is clear that in the U.S. and other Western nations, Islamic groups are now suspect, and come under greater scrutiny than ever before. In Germany, the 9/11 attack was used as a justification to make it easier to dissolve religious groups suspected of terrorist activities (Seiwert, 2004), and profiling of Islamic groups and individuals is almost certainly taking place in a number of Western nations under the guise of national security measures such as the so-called Patriot Act in the U.S. However, there are limits to the extent of such controls in Western nations at least, as evidenced by recent court decisions in the U.S. and in the ECHR that affirm religious freedom for minority faiths, including even non-Christian ones.

Lucas' claim that the violent episodes involving some NRMs and other minority faiths around the world have contributed to a public perception that such groups are in need of control, seems somewhat problematic. Certainly the immediate impact of such episodes seems to illustrate Lucas' point, but over time, cultural values that favor minority faiths may prevail, again as evidenced by some court decisions in North America and in Western Europe. Also, it is worth noting that the Waco episode involving the Branch Davidians has resulted in severe criticisms of the actions of governmental agencies in that episode. The Solar Temple episodes arguably did have an impact in France and Belgium, but did not result in harsher new laws in Canada and Switzerland where some of the deaths occurred. Apparently more tolerant values in those societies overcame tendencies toward more efforts at social control. The same point is admitted by Lucas concerning Japan's reaction to the Aum tragedy. In the face of the greatest threat to public safety brought by any contemporary NRM, Japan's government acted in a restrained

manner, particularly when compared with the over-reaction in China to the Falun Gong (Richardson and Edelman, 2002).

The claim concerning the internationalization of the anti-cult movement, and the lessening influence of scholars in NRM debates, also seems questionable—but for an ironic reason. It is difficult to make the implied argument that scholars have ever had much influence in public debates involving NRMs. Van Driel and Richardson (1988) cite evidence that major print media were not attending to the work of scholars, and were nearly totally dependent for a time on representatives of the anti-cult movement for information and quotations. Other studies have found similar results for the early years of the 'cult wars' (Beckford and Coles, 1988). (Canada is one exception to this finding, with the Hill Report having an apparent lasting and positive impact on government treatment of NRMs. See Hill, 1980; Richardson, 2006b.) However, the same study that showed little impact by scholars on the debate (van Driel and Richardson, 1988), also showed that media representatives were being more discerning and critical of pronouncements of the anti-cult movement. Shupe and Bromley's (1994) study of the anti-cult movement overseas also contains several chapters demonstrating limitations of the reach of the international anticult movement. Lucas admits, as well, that in Italy, Denmark, and Germany the voices of scholars are being heard in the debates over NRMs. Germany is a very interesting case to examine, given the almost hysterical approach to Scientology in that nation. Even given this concern about Scientology, the German Enquete Commission sponsored considerable sound research and based some of its findings on results of that research, which showed little threat from NRMs (Seiwert, 2004).

Lucas' claim concerning resurgent nationalism and the efforts of traditional national churches to regain influence and power, particularly in former Soviet dominated parts of the world, has some merit. In Islamic nations that were a part of the former Soviet Union, it is clear that non-Islamic religious groups (and even some Islamic groups) are not being welcomed, and sometimes are being defined as terrorist groups. However, in Russia, despite major efforts by the Russian Orthodox Church to exercise influence over its religious competitors (Shterin and Richardson, 2000), some minority faiths have managed to prevail in the Russian Constitutional Court. And those that have not used that venue but have instead chosen to pursue claims in the ECHR have prevailed, as evidenced by the recent decision concerning Scientology. In Poland, long-dominated by the Catholic Church, anti-cult efforts

to exercise control over NRMs have not prevailed, and in Hungary, statutes and court decisions have overtly protected the rights of minority faiths. So, again it seems that the evidence is at worst mixed, and that in some nations cultural values favoring pluralism and religious freedom are prevailing.

Thus, overall, it seems that the view presented by Lucas is too pessimistic, and that there are grounds for some optimism concerning the state of religious freedom for minority faiths, even in today's tumultuous global situation. Indeed, there is, as has been noted, growing concern about the increasing influence of religion in some societies, an increase that may be accompanied with more protection for religious freedom values if the growth of influence does not tend toward exclusive religious extremism.

In conclusion, the forces of pluralism seem unstoppable without overt repression, something that is relatively rare in today's world, particularly in Western nations. In those countries, and others that are making themselves subject to regional legal systems such as the European Court of Human Rights, religious freedom values have what seems to be a growing influence, even in the face of developments such as those discussed by Lucas. If judicial systems can maintain or develop more autonomy, religious freedom will gain, particularly in societies with legal structures and cultural values that favor such freedoms. Decisions made by those involved in legal and judicial systems, including such mundane appearing matters as the production and admissibility of evidence, can favor religious freedom, particularly where other influential entities join in defending such rights.

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PART FOUR

REGIONAL PARTICULARIZATIONS

RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN A LOCAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: IMAGES OF THE PROPHET MOHAMMED SEEN IN A DANISH AND A GLOBAL CONTEXT

Ole Riis

With globalization people encounter a diversity of religions. Religious pluralism is a term that covers the evaluation of religious diversity (Riis, 1999, Beckford, 2003).[1] In a local context, religious pluralism may be described at a macro-level as public toleration of a multitude of religious organizations. At a meso-level it refers to acceptance by a religious organization of other varieties. At a micro-level it refers to a personal acceptance of multiple worldviews, which, combined with autonomy, opens the formation of a religious (or non-religious) identity to personal choice. The perspective changes when a global level is added. A local arrangement for religion can be challenged by referring to other arrangements. A local religious minority can become a majority and vice-versa in a global perspective. The following presentation aims to demonstrate such a change of perspective.

The international image of Denmark has been one of a fairytale country. Denmark considers itself a modern, pluralistic democracy. The Danish Constitution stresses religious freedom and toleration of religious communities. Furthermore, there have been discussions about the role of Denmark in a globalized world for decades. Most Danes think that they are cosmopolitan. Nevertheless, religious pluralism in Denmark has become an international issue.[2] The occasion which ignited the debate was the publication in a major Danish newspaper of a series of drawings of the Prophet Mohammed. This incident may be only a minor one in world history, however it demarcates a confrontation between a secularistic and a religious perspective on the global situation. The event is first presented in a Danish context and then in a global context. This leads to a discussion of the implications

[1] My usage of pluralism is as an evaluative term (Beckford, 2003: 78).

[2] The Danish debate has both an outward and inward profile. I try to give a fair presentation of the events and their background. My own opinion is indicated in my comments.

of religious pluralism, when the context is extended from a nation or a locality to global society.

The Danish Background to the Cartoon Strife

Since the beginning of the millennium, an unprecedented outsourcing has taken place among Danish-based firms. This has provided new jobs in the Danish service sector, but it has also made many non-skilled and semi-skilled workers redundant. Globalization has been widely discussed, and it was the key word on the agenda, leading to re-electing the right-wing government in 2004. The Prime Minister, Anders Fog Rasmussen, set up a committee on globalization, whose remit it was to advise on how to secure Denmark an advantage in the world market. Discussions narrowed down to technical and economic issues. Simultaneously, a general worry has arisen about whether the Danish welfare state can be maintained. Immigrants were seen as a burden for the welfare system rather than a supplement to an ageing population. The Danish agenda on globalization has focused on economic issues, whereas religious toleration has hardly been a part of it.

The limits of religious pluralism became a major theme in the 2001 election. The populist Dansk Folkeparti started a campaign against the liberal immigration policy in Denmark, focusing on Muslims.[3] Similar tones could be heard in Venstre, the dominant bourgeois party, which proposed to nullify the paragraph on racial discrimination as part of its election platform. The election resulted in a coalition government of Venstre and Konservativt Folkeparti, supported in Parliament by Dansk Folkeparti.

The Danish media have increasingly presented an ideological critique of Islam. In 2000/1, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), under the European Council, criticized the Danish debate. The government rejected this criticism as unfounded and outdated. Furthermore, many Danes have protested against the crass tone in the public debate on Muslims. This debate led to the establishment of a society for the freedom of the press.

Some Muslim groups appealed to laws against discrimination and blasphemy when Danish Television planned to present the film which

[3] Its leader, Pia Kjærsgaard, lost a libel case when she protested against being called a racist.

led to the murder of Dutch filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, because it criticized Islam. In reaction, parties on the political left proposed to discard the law against blasphemy. This was followed up with a proposal by Dansk Folkeparti to abolish the law (L103/20.3.2002). As the argument referred expressly to a critique of Islam, other parties refrained from supporting the motion.

Jyllands-Posten is a major newspaper in Denmark which is ideologically affiliated with the right-wing government.[4] On 30th September 2005, *Jyllands-Posten* presented a provocative series of cartoons depict-ing the Prophet Mohammed. The editorial argued that Western democracy and freedom of expression implies "readiness to receive mockery, insult, and ridicule" (J-P, 29.11.2005). The newspaper thus confronted efforts by "some Muslims" to "intimidate the public space" and create self-censorship among artists.

Danish Responses to Global Reactions

On 12 October 2005, 11 Muslim ambassadors asked for a meeting with the Danish Prime Minister. The letter referred not only to the sketches but also to derogatory remarks by Dansk Folkeparti and the Culture Minister. The Prime Minister refused a meeting since he could not take legal steps against the press,[5] adding that Danish legislation prohibits acts or expressions of a blasphemous or discriminatory nature.

The Egyptian government protested to the Danish government and raised the issue in the Arab League. Events accelerated after the cartoons were published outside Denmark. The great Mufti of Saudi-Arabia called for a boycott of Danish (and Norwegian) goods, and several Muslim countries recalled their ambassadors. Protests were organized in a series of Muslim countries, and eventually Danish (and Norwegian) embassies were attacked in Damascus and Beirut. Confrontations with Christian communities erupted in several Muslim countries. Denmark's reputation fell dramatically in Muslim countries

[4] *Jyllands-Posten* has argued that the incident did not change Denmark's international reputation, except in some Muslim countries. Free, democratic societies supported Denmark, they claimed. (J-P, 22.03.2006)

[5] Published in *Politiken* 19.2.2006. The detailed course of events is still held secret by the government.

such as Egypt and Turkey.[6] Danish people were increasingly described as dishonest and rude, while the Danish government was increasingly seen as unpredictable, sinister, or dishonest. In Denmark the media and the government held a delegation of Danish imams responsible for the global backlash.

The leader of Dansk Folkeparti, Pia Kjærsgaard, proposed to evict the imams. She stated that external and internal enemies are forcing Danes to abjure their democratic rights. "This is not about 12 funny cartoons of a prophet called Mohammed. It is about some immigrant extremist interpreters of Islam who will dictate what we shall and shall not do in Denmark".[7] The right to say just what one likes is fundamental. She accused Islamisk Trossamfund (Islamic Society of Denmark) of being a 'Trojan horse'. She further commented on Denmark's religious freedoms:

> Some believe in the Quran and Mohammed, but Muslims here must also respect that *our* rights to freedom are just as inviolable as *their* prophet. To feel a collective insult on behalf of the prophet is ridiculous… The strife is not about drawings; it is a struggle about values between a totalitarian, dogmatic Islamic way of thinking and free Western governments.

Dansk Folkeparti includes a group of vicars from the state church organized in a minority fraction called Tidehverv. However, the state church is divided on the issue of religious and ethnic pluralism. At Christmas 2005, a large group of vicars declared that their Christmas sermon would mention the issue of refugees and question whether Danish immigration policy corresponds with the Christian message of universal love. This action led the majority spokesman for Venstre, Jens Rohde, to leave the church of Denmark in protest against its 'politicization'.

In his speech to the nation at New Year 2006, the Prime Minister referred to "the debate on freedom of expression". He condemned "any statement, act or utterance that demonizes groups for their religion or ethnic background". He praised the Danish tradition of freedom of expression, and added, "it must be done in mutual respect and understanding". With a few exceptions from both sides, he found the tone proper. The tradition of criticizing authorities and using satire has been

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[6] Documented in an international panel study: Simon Anholt and GMI Inc., April 2006. The panel members are relatively well-educated.

[7] *Frø af ugræs*, DF, 6.2.2006.

a progressive factor in Danish society. "We have built our society on respect for the life and freedom of the individual, freedom of expression, equality between men and women, and a separation between religion and politics". And he appealed: "Let us stand together for a society where there is freedom for diversity. And a society where there is a strong agreement on the basic values".[8]

In an interview on Al-Arabiya television,[9] he made it a common responsibility to respect religious feelings, and he added that he personally regretted that many Muslims consider the cartoons as mocking the Prophet Mohammed. The chief editor of *Jyllands-Posten* published an 'apology', which nevertheless maintained that the 12 cartoons were 'sober' and that the intention was "not to offend, nor were they at variance with Danish law, but they have offended many Muslims for which we apologize". The editor stated that "we are strong proponents of the freedom of religion and because we respect the right of any human being to practice his or her religion, offending anybody on the grounds of their religious beliefs is unthinkable to us" (J-P, 8.2.2006). The Prime Minister followed this up with a public statement saying: "I want to emphasize that the Danish Government condemns any expression, action or indication that attempts to demonize groups of people on the basis of their religion or ethnic background. It is the sort of thing that does not belong in a society that is based on respect for the individual human being."[10]

Just after the publication, a Muslim organization reported *Jyllands-Posten* to the police. The matter was referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions.[11] The legal reference was to the Danish Criminal Code and to the European Convention of Human Rights. According to the Danish Constitution, any person is at liberty to publish (his) ideas subject to responsibility in a court of law. According to the European Convention, the freedom of expression carries the duty to avoid expressions that are gratuitously offensive. Simultaneously, members of a religious community cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism.

Drawings of the prophet Mohammed cannot be banned. The Director found only one of the drawings questionable, namely one showing the face of a grim-looking man with a turban shaped like an

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[8] Translated from *Statsministeriet*, Jan 1st 2006.
[9] Transmitted on 2nd Feb 2006.
[10] *Statsministeriet*, 31.1.2006.
[11] *Rigsadvokaten*., RA-2006-41-0151, 15th March 2006.

ignited bomb. This depiction might with good reason be understood as an affront and insult to the Prophet. However, it was not an expression of mockery within the meaning of the Danish Criminal Code. Furthermore, as the article in *Jyllands-Posten* expressly mentions 'some' Muslims, the text and the drawings could not be considered scornful towards Muslims in general. The Director added that it is not a correct description of existing law when *Jyllands-Posten* states that it is incompatible with the right to freedom of expression to demand special consideration for religious feelings.

The Danish population was deeply divided on the issue. Among the critics was the former leader of Venstre and former Foreign Minister, Uffe Elleman-Jensen.[12] Danish exporters called for a public apology for the cartoons, which made the PM criticize them for being unprincipled and spineless. When the dairy corporation, Arla, published an apology in the Arab world, a women's liberation organization criticized the firm for "disregarding the problematic conditions of women in Saudi Arabia".[13]

The event was commented on in the third European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) report on Denmark.[14] Regarding Muslims, the report said "ECRI notes with deep concern that the situation concerning Muslims in Denmark has worsened since its second report". And further: "ECRI regrets in this regard that the lack of a strong message that would be sent by consistently prosecuting those who breach Article 266b) of the Criminal Code has given some politicians free reign to create an atmosphere of suspicion and hatred towards Muslims". Regarding the cartoons it said:

> ECRI considers that the goal of opening a democratic debate on freedom of speech should be met without resorting to provocative acts that can only predictably elicit an emotional reaction. ECRI wishes to bring to the Danish Government's attention in this regard, that in its General Policy Recommendation No. 5 on combatting intolerance and discrimination against Muslims, it calls on Member States to encourage debate within the media on the image which they convey of Islam and Muslim communities and on their responsibility in this respect in avoiding the perpetuation of prejudice and biased information.

[12] He was criticized by Jens Rohde who simultaneously was caught at spreading false rumours about how a daughter of one of the cartoonists was threatened by Muslim men.

[13] Dr.dk 24.3.2006.

[14] Internet version: www.coe.int: ECRI 2006–18.

This report was subject to a public critique by the Prime Minister as based on undocumented gossip.[15] This was followed up by a full-page article in which the Prime Minister discussed the public status of religion.[16] He said:

> The Danish model is a free mind (*frisind*) which allows place for several religions in the public space. But survival of the model presupposes that all religious fundamentalism is subdued. That we can reach an agreement about things. And that religion generally fills as little as possible of the public space, so that religion, belief and religious injunctions first and foremost remain a concern for the individual.[17]

Muslim Reactions in Denmark

The cartoons were communicated to the Middle East just after the publication and protests arose. The ridiculed 'little brother' was able to mobilize support from powerful kinsmen who could threaten Danish interests around the globe.

Danish immigrants with a Muslim background have varied religious views.[18] Religious positions are influenced by different regional and cultural backgrounds. Most Muslims in Denmark have a very relaxed attitude to religion. Service attendance is generally irregular, as among their Christian co-citizens. However, the cartoon strife forced many moderate Muslims in Denmark to reconsider their religious identity (Kaarsholm, 2006) and the role of religion in Danish society. A committee of Muslims-for-Democracy was established. One of its prominent members was the Liberal (Radikale Venstre) MP, Nassir Khader, who argued for separating religion and politics.

Some Muslim congregations are characterized by religious fervour, which is often combined with frustrated hopes for integration. Such congregations have a high public visibility. They voice a criticism of both Danish society and Muslims who adapt to it, such as Khader.

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[15] The criticism was answered in detail by ECRI's Danish consultant, Eva Schmidt, professor of law.

[16] "Hold religionen indendørs" (Keep religion indoors), *Politiken* 20.5.2006.

[17] My translation.

[18] Rambøll Management made a survey among Muslims in Denmark for *Jyllands-Posten*. Detailed information about sampling and data collection procedures are not available.

On the surface, the Muslim community seemed relatively calm on the issue. However, a survey by Catinét Research[19] among Danish Muslims showed that about 81% of Danish Muslims were offended by the cartoons, 69% thought that the government should apologize publicly for the cartoons, and 47% 'understood' the reactions in the Middle East, such as boycotting goods, burning flags, and occupying embassies. 11% expressed their 'full understanding'.

Danish Attitudes to Religious Pluralism

The debates and surveys about the cartoons only scratch the surface of the question of religious pluralism. This can be illustrated by looking at the European project on Religious and Moral Pluralism (RAMP) (Gustafsson & Pettersson, 2000, Dobbelaere & Riis, 2003). The data are from 1998 and therefore the levels of the attitudes may have changed, but the patterns of co-variation are more stable.

Religion is not a matter of great concern to most Danes (Riis, 1994). Religion is not ascribed with much importance in people's major decisions or in their everyday life. Correspondingly, only a few want religion to have influence in society. Religion is seen to have some influence on politics, and most respondents want it to have even less impact. Measuring the influence of religion on politics on a scale from 1 to 7, the perceived influence was typically 3 while the accepted influence was typically 2.

Data from the European Values Study (EVS) confirm that most Danes want to minimize the influence of religion in society, relating to both politics and morality (Riis, 2000b). The issues where religion is awarded some influence are environmentalism and development aid. The impact of religion is thus limited to global issues.

Religious pluralism is widespread at an individual level, in the form of personal openness to a variety of religious views. According to RAMP, most Danes find that there are important truths in many or all religions (Riis, 2000a). Although the typical Dane is a member of the state church, its dogmas are questioned. Church members typically say that, although there is one true religion, important truths may

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[19] *Ugebrevet* A4, no. 10, 13.3.2006.

also be found in other religions. A minority maintains that there is only one true religion. Another minority discards all religious truth. An openness to many religious truths is often combined with stressing personal autonomy. Danes typically mean that even though one belongs to a certain religion, one is free to adopt teachings from other religions.

Two items in the RAMP study related to religious toleration. The first one stated that our culture is enriched by having more religious groups in society, while the second stated that multiple religions in our society lead to conflict. While Danes disagreed about whether the plurality leads to cultural enrichment, most agreed that the plurality may lead to conflict. Worries about religious conflicts are most pronounced among older respondents and respondents with low education. This corresponds with the finding that worries about immigration are related to age and education (Goul Andersen, 2002).





Respondents who stress religious privatization also tend to see religious plurality as a cultural enrichment (gamma = +0,25). However, there is no significant correlation between religious privatization and concerns about religious conflicts (gamma = −0,075). There is a clear negative correlation between seeing religious plurality as a source of cultural enrichment and as a source of conflict (gamma = −0,369). Since the statements seem contradictory, this correlation is weaker than expected. This is partially because a large group of respondents simultaneously finds that religious plurality is a source of cultural enrichment and also a source of conflicts. Religious plurality widens the options, but it may also be a source of segregation and conflicts.

Religious toleration can be expressed in several ways. One major issue in Europe regarding tolerating Islam has concerned whether schoolgirls should be allowed to cover their heads with scarves. Danes were profoundly split on this issue. Most Danes agreed that schoolgirls can wear headscarves, but quite a large group disagreed strongly. Responses to other questions about special rights for religious groups correlated highly with the above-mentioned one. For instance, some people who are against headscarves in school also did not accept that a nurse can refuse to participate in an abortion for religious reasons (gamma = 0,177). In many cases, forbidding headscarves in school

expresses a general rejection of religious prerogatives in the public sphere. However, the data also point to a xenophobic faction in society, which rejects foreign cultures, including Muslim ones. Those who are worried about religious plurality also tend to be worried about immigration. Also the Danish ISSP-study from 1998 indicated a relatively high level of islamophobia in Denmark, and a strong correlation between islamophobia and seeing immigration as a threat to the national identity (Goul Andersen, 2002).

This pattern can be clarified further by data from the European Values Study (EVS) (Halman & Riis, 2003). Respondents were asked to point out which groups were unwanted as neighbors. The xenophobic section of the Danish population pointed out a cluster of 'immigrants', 'Muslims', and 'persons of another race'. Respondents who rejected Muslims as neighbors also tended to reject homosexuals (Denmark, 1999: tau = 0,418). This indicates that islamophobia is not necessarily related to the religion, but it can express an avoidance of all deviations from the local standards.

This points to three response patterns. One group is worried about religious plurality, another group welcomes it, while the third group is ambiguous. Former studies of Danish attitudes to immigration have stressed their ambivalence (Gaasholt & Togeby, 1995). Survey studies cannot tell us how an attitude is related to a larger worldview. However, we may try to reconstruct different logics behind the attitudes. This involves how reactions to globalization combine with religious pluralism.

Globalization and Religious Pluralism

Globalization carries many associations. The world may have become 'a single place' (Robertson, 1989:43), but this does not necessarily imply an integrated entity. It is more than just a term for Western or American expansion. Beyer rightly points out: "Globalization… is more than the spread of one historically existing culture at the expense of all others. It is also the creation of a new global culture with its attendant social structures…" (Beyer, 1994:9). Globalization can imply both a progressive homogenization of cultures and a changing context for particular cultures.

Globalization can be characterized as a set of social processes including 1) extended human interactions based on enhanced means for

long-distance transportation and transmission, 2) comprehensive systems of political and economic interdependence, 3) extended encounters with other cultures and 4) an increased awareness of the global variety of cultural identities, and thus an increased awareness of commonalities and specificities. These processes have both centrifugal and centripetal tendencies.

One aspect of globalization is the struggle over cultural hegemony. World religions and secularistic ideologies, such as Marxism and neo-liberalism, contain potential claims for a global hegemony. With globalization, several worldwide ideologies confront each other. This may lead to conflicts, especially when worldviews express segmented interests between privileged and underprivileged populations in the global order. Thus, a neo-liberal stresses legal property rights to global resources, while a religious may stress that the divine act of creation gave the natural resources to all of humanity. The former position can maintain privileges in the global economy while the latter can form a counter-ideology of redistribution.

A local society may include both a majority and several minority groups who follow divergent worldviews. In order to maintain democratic legitimacy, the majority must respect the rights of the minorities. Both the majority and the minorities are obliged to argue rationally about their shared framework for co-existence. With globalization this duty is enhanced, as the local society is connected to a larger framework where the statuses of majorities and minorities change.

Popular reactions to the challenge of globalization vary. Some regard globalization as threatening familiar cultural patterns, while others regard it as opening up new possibilities. The former position can be characterized as localism and the latter as globalism. However, localism has a dual meaning in a setting characterized by mobility. It can refer either to a 'native' local perspective or to an immigrant perspective, which refers to the former locality. People who see globalization as leading to disintegration or anomie may react by supporting local sources of identity, including religious traditions. Localism may thus lead to supporting a particularistic religion.

Religious diversity may be evaluated positively or negatively. The latter can be based on a negative view on religion in general or on a particularistic religion, which sees diversity as a source of confusion and doubt.

Local arrangements for religious toleration depend on definitions of what 'religion' is and may do. The position and extent of religious

space result from debates and struggles within society. Several societal arrangements aim at ensuring religious toleration. Each society tends to regard its set-up as the right solution. For instance, Americans tend to regard religion in terms of a market and to see religious freedom as the customer's right to choose among the options. However, the American set-up is based on a particular legal arrangement, which is difficult to transfer to other societies. Other varieties of religious pluralism have been established across the world, such as the French *laïcité*, or the Dutch institutional pillarization. Some local arrangements stress the public toleration of religious organizations while others stress a personal religious freedom. In the Nordic countries, the state formalizes religious toleration by giving privileges to a series of recognized religious organizations. In order to obtain public recognition, they must fit into the accepted definition of religion.

Globalization confronts local set-ups with alternative arrangements. Inspired by these, some religious groups may challenge the locally established status of religion. For the local majority, such challenges question the proper status of religion and confront the entire set-up of institutional boundaries and relations.

Some local set-ups secure religious freedom by restricting religion to a specific set of issues. Religion may be regarded as a personal choice about an individual existential view, which relates to an ascribed 'private sphere'. Thereby religion is excluded from the discussion of 'public issues', especially political themes. For religious people, this type of 'religious freedom' imposes a redefinition of their view of life. They regard religion as a comprehensive worldview which determines all of life. Furthermore, such a restriction excludes religions from promoting their basic values and ethics. An individualized religious freedom can be seen by minorities as a policy of divide-and-rule. Some minority religions may strive to establish their own insulated community where they can follow their own rules. However, such a solution restricts individual religious freedom.

Immigrants have experienced globalization by moving from one society to another. Some react by welcoming the new opportunities, while others retract to their original local identity. Many immigrants see the new society as enigmatic. To get by, they rely on a network of immigrants with a similar background. They tend to affiliate themselves with a religious community which supports the internal bonds of solidarity. The majority may interpret this as an ethnic religion, while the minority group sees it as adherence to a global religion.

Reactions to globalization can be combined with religious pluralism in several different ways. The most relevant for the discussion are presented in the scheme below. All four positions can be found among persons who have a Christian or Muslim background. It is worth noting the formation of alliances and confrontations. An alliance of localistic and secularistic Danes may appeal to cosmopolitan or Christian Westerners. Among Danish Muslims, localists have become allied with Islamists who propagate the only true religion, and they appeal to both fellow Muslims abroad and to pluralistic cosmopolitans.

Conceptual scheme	**Economic globalization**	**Cultural globalization**	**Religious pluralism**
Localism	Defensive reaction	Reject	Reject
Liberal secularism	Fully accept	Accept as an instrument	Accept by privatizing and minimizing: secularism
Cosmopolitanism	Reserved positive. Critical towards some features	Accept as a value	Accept as a value
One world religion	Reserved acceptance as instrument; reject wealth as primary goal	Accept as a condition for world mission	A dialogue is possible, but only one religion is true

Danish Attitudes to Religious Pluralism in a Global Context

The attitudinal patterns traced above can be affiliated with different reactions to the challenge of religious globalization: localism represents a reaction against the challenge of globalization. In a Danish context, immigration is seen by some as a threat against the welfare state rather than a contribution to rejuvenating a stagnant population.[20] Danish localists fear that 'foreign' religions, such as Islam, may dissolve

[20] It is debated whether the mobilizaton of a restrictive immigration policy is related to welfare policy or prejudices. Goul Andersen (2002) summarizes this attitude as 'a provincial self-sufficiency'.

traditional Danish identity and its bonds of solidarity. The political right-wing ascribes to Islam authoritarianism and a suppression of women, while it proclaims to fight for 'our values'—which are only vaguely hinted at.[21]

Cultural cosmopolitans appreciate cultural variety, including a multitude of religious views. Human culture is based on religions, and religious pluralism allows for a wider range of selection and blending. Cosmopolitans may associate with one religion, but they are open to ecumenism and interconfessional dialogue. It is, however, necessary that the religions themselves be open to dialogue. Therefore fundamentalism, sectarianism or other particularistic religions are not acceptable.

Cultural cosmopolitanism may be based on a religious perspective. World religions transcend tribal, national or regional barriers. Furthermore, discourses among religious communities may lead to mutual respect and understanding, which can mend historical conflicts. A religious approach can imply a critique of some forms of globalization, which are seen as governed by cynical interests of power and profit. This challenge is seen by some propagators of secularism as irrational and anti-modern.

A global secularist position stresses the economic aspects of globalization, while seeking to reduce the impact of religion. In European history, secularism comes in a liberal and a socialist variety. Liberal secularism stresses free speech and personal choice, including religious freedom. The statement that 'religion is a private matter' indicates that each individual is free to choose their view on life and religious commitment. However, it may also restrict religion to a prescribed private sphere. The agenda of liberal secularism is focused on individualism and on formal procedures for formally rational decisions. In an individualized perspective, religion becomes a personal philosophy of life, but not a foundation for social values and ethics. Such a perspective excludes most of the Ten Commandments as political interference. In a utilitarian secularist perspective the market and international politics are the major unifying factors for the global entity while religion is a dividing and retarding factor.

Thereby, a new set of alliances and dividing lines emerges. The ambivalence described above can be associated with an unqualified

[21] The values ascribed to Muslims correspond with the values prevalent in 19th century Denmark.

secularism or with a cosmopolitanism which has some reservations about the limits of tolerance.

In Denmark, religion has been domesticated under the canopy of the state church. It represents a historical identity, and it forms a template for a national lineage of memory. Prayers are held for the nation, the royal family and the legal authorities. While it is accepted that the church takes up some global issues, it is not supposed to raise 'political' issues. An affiliation with the state church can be based on either localism or globalism. The church also represents Christianity as a world religion, and many active members of the Danish church are involved in third-world aid and intercultural dialogue.

The Danish Prime Minister represents a utilitarian, neo-liberal ideology. He accepts religious freedom and a state-supported church while he simultaneously regrets that religion fills too much space in the public sphere. His vision of globalization is mainly economic, and it misses the point that public space has been globalized. To call for a separation of religion and politics is to challenge global systems of power. However, liberalism can be combined with cultural cosmopolitanism. Personal religious freedom does not restrain people from drawing conclusions about social and global responsibilities based on religion.

The Prime Minister defended the cartoons by referring to a custom of teasing. However, there is a divide between friendly teasing and vicious ridicule in Danish culture. Mobbing is not allowed in Danish schools. Defenders of the cartoons saw themselves as the vanguard of the enlightened West confronting authoritarian Islam. Nevertheless, hardly any Western leaders accepted printing religious caricatures as a way of provoking a debate about the limits of freedom of expression. This freedom is seen as a tool for enlightened democracy but not as a goal in itself. It can be misused. The World Council of Churches said at its 9th council meeting in February 2006:

> As people of faith we understand the pain caused by the disregard of something considered precious to faith. We deplore the publications of the cartoons. We also join with the voices of many Muslim leaders in deploring the violent reactions to the publications.[22]

The crucial argument for publishing the cartoons was to maintain freedom of expression. A free press in a democratic society should oppose

[22] www.wcc-assembly.info/en/theme-issues/assembly-documents/plenary-presentations/committee-reports/public-issues-committee/final-report.html

any censorship or *fatwa*, which hinders an open and critical discourse. However, this argument evades the question about internal self-censorship. *Jyllands-Posten* would hardly challenge the self-censorship which is continually demanded by board members, advertisers, or customers. It is correct that a Danish Prime Minister has little legal control over the media, but there are indirect or moral means of control.[23]

For many Danes, ethnic religions act as a subcultural insulation which retards the integration process. This problem is enhanced by Islamism, which transgresses the space allotted to religion in society. Such a challenge endangers the local set-up for tolerance. Conversely, seen from the perspective of Sharia Islam, Danish society is intolerant through its practices of restricting religion. It is permitted in Danish society to think as a Muslim, but not to live in accordance with Islam. Advocates for both sides tend to take up extremist counter-positions. Secularists imagine and confront fundamentalists and fanatics as their counterpart, while religionists imagine and confront amoral materialistic Danes. Nuances are wiped out as the debate polarizes.

The cartoon strife contains a confrontation between visions of globalization. Its change of perspective threatens local cultural hegemony. The taken-for-granted view of the local majority is questioned, as the local minority appeals to a global audience. When the status of Muslims in Danish society is questioned, the burden of proof is placed on the Danish government, not on its critics.

Several efforts were made to establish a dialogue. The Turkish government proposed to mediate in the confrontation, but this was rejected by the Danish government. A delegation of prominent Muslims visited Denmark, and they apologized for the violent reactions to the cartoons in their region. However, they concluded that their counterparts could not understand their point of view. A similar problem arose when the Danish Prime Minister refused to talk with a group of Danish imams. Instead he invited a select group of Danish Muslims who had a modern, secularistic view.

[23] This may explain why confrontations were sharper in Denmark than in the other Nordic countries.

The Cartoon Strife in a Global Context

The case of the cartoon strife expresses an encounter between several modes of globalization. The Danish government mainly regards globalization as a world-wide market system. It may be described as a parochial version of McWorld (Barber, 1995), tied together by communications, information, entertainment, and commerce, all ruled by an invisible hand. Arguments for a free press fit into the global troika of media, advertising and consumerism. This version of globalization provokes reactions, such as radical Islamism. By setting McWorld up as the only answer to 'Jihad', people who find violent 'Jihad' abhorrent and McWorld unacceptable are left in a dilemma.

Other visions of a global society are presented by universal ideologies, such as Marxism. A materialist ideology rejects the capitalistic version of globalization as unjust, while it rejects religion as an illusory ideological solution to the real, material problems. From this perspective, the cartoons ought to be followed up by similar ones directed against Christianity.

The world religions are major historical carriers of a global vision. This also includes Islam, which aims at bringing all of humankind under the one God and uniting people in one ummah. As pointed out by Mustapha Kemal Pasha, Islamic social movements are both a movement *of*, and a reaction *to*, neo-liberal globalization (Pasha, 2000).

Like the other world religions, Islam includes self-sufficient and dialogical versions. The open and closed varieties can be historically illustrated by Hanbalites and Mu'tazilites, or the enlightened and tolerant Moorish regime in Spain versus the Almoravid or Almohad regimes. Also in the present global situation, Islam may be presented by an ideal-type of either a narrow orthodoxy, associated with Iranian conservative Shi'ism or Saudi Wahhabism, or by its modern, reflexive, cosmopolitan versions.

Cosmopolitan Muslims regard Islam as a world religion based on a belief in the single merciful God; a belief which transcends regional and cultural diversity and petty dogmatic strife. Among the many individual representatives of such views are Abdukkal Ahmed An-Na'im, Tariq Ramadan, and Muhammad Arkun. Such Muslims feel that their religion has very little in common with tribal or particularistic varieties of Islam. They are generally critical of the McWorld version of globalization, because it stresses material values and egoistic interests. However, they do not reject a global encounter between cultures and

religions. Such cosmopolitan Muslims are subject to criticism by radical Islamists who regard them as compromising the true faith.

The open and closed ideal types of Islam correspond with two stereotypes in the Western debate. The open one is a partner for an inter-cultural dialogue, while the closed version represents an opponent in a clash between civilizations. An open, hermeneutical approach to other cultures and religions calls for a foundation of knowledge. Such an approach is therefore more widespread in intellectual networks than within deprived communities.

When the Prophet Mohammed is associated with terrorism in Western media, they confirm the closed version of Islam and simultaneously put cosmopolitan Muslims in a quandary. Their religious identity is decried as invalid by both the Western media and by radical Islamists.[24] Therefore islamophobic Westerners may alienate potential partners for a peaceful global encounter and support the cause of radical Islamism.

A further variety of globalization is carried by cultural cosmopolitans. They embrace all of humanity, travel around the globe, and study foreign cultures and languages in order to understand people.[25] They appreciate the plurality and multitude of cultures, and therefore reject a global homogenization defined by the lowest common denominator of the worldwide market. Religion is embraced as a cultural vessel provided that it remains pluralistic. Islam is seen as a potential partner in a global religious dialogue, which may lead to an innovative fusion of worldviews. Seen in this perspective, the cartoon affair was an unnecessary provocation.

By presenting globalization in narrow utilitarian terms, its cultural aspect is bypassed. Such an approach also misses the point that a world market is not self-regulated. It depends upon a series of enabling conditions. One precondition for a stable and efficient market relation is mutual trust between the parties. The lack of cultural understanding demonstrated by the cartoons mobilized a series of cosmopolitan Westerners. They voiced another global vision based on cultural and religious diversity and dialogue. This vision raises intercultural hermeneutics as a major issue. Public ridicule such as publishing derogatory cartoons contradicts such efforts.

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[24] The majority of religiously moderate members of the state churches is the target of a similar critique from Christian virtuosi.

[25] While tourists look at other cultures as a global zoo, cultural cosmopolitans wish to understand them.

A cross-cultural dialogue seems to be necessary. However, such a dialogue rests on certain preconditions. In a dialogue, the parties are supposed to reason and listen to each other in order to reach agreement. They do not have to end up with a unified view, but they must actively seek out possibilities for co-existence. Such a dialogue does not presuppose secularism. Secularists cannot exclude religions from debates about basic values or ethics with democratic legitimacy. The religious source does not make value claims invalid per se, neither does it make them valid. Religions may participate in a dialogue about conditions for a global human co-existence. In this dialogue, they are subject to universal demands for open, rational arguments. Religions have to make their values open for public debate in a generally accessible language. A deliberative democracy in a religiously pluralist society depends, according to Habermas, on a "post-metaphysical thought", which "is prepared to learn from religion while remaining strictly agnostic". (Habermas, 2005: 20) A complementary learning process between religious and secular citizens is not possible if religion is banned or subject to public ridicule.

In a global perspective, the cartoon strife is a brief skirmish, which represents an ironic case of a universalization of the particular and a particularization of the universal (Robertson, 1992: 177). However, this incident has accelerated a larger confrontation between different visions of globalization and global religious pluralism.

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GLOBALIZATION AND RELIGION: THE CASES OF JAPAN AND KOREA

Nobutaka Inoue

Introduction

Historically speaking, the religious centre of East Asia was China, which greatly influenced Japanese and Korean religion by introducing Mahayana Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism to these countries. During the later nineteenth and early twentieth century, however, a reverse route of religious influence saw Japanese religion penetrating into China and Korea. This new relationship was basically of a different character, since it came about as a result of Japanese political control of Korea and the military invasion of China. As a result, most Shinto shrines, Buddhist temples, and local branches of sectarian Shinto established in China and Korea by the Japanese were destroyed or abolished after World War II.[1] In spite of this, some new religions continued their missionary activities throughout the twentieth century, gaining a certain number of foreign followers.

Since the 1980s, through the process of globalization, the religious situation in East Asian countries has begun to change. Mutual influences have increased rapidly and some sects or churches seem to have greatly increased the number of their foreign members. Soka Gakkai, as a typical example, presently has several hundreds of thousands of Korean members.

In the process of modernization, Japan and Korea were somewhat similar in the ways that traditional religions responded to modernity and new religious movements formed in response to the challenge of new social conditions. In the case of Japan, the quite unique *danka* system (the patronage system of Buddhist temples) was established already during the Tokugawa era and continues to this day. Yet the actual connections

[1] By contrast, Japanese religions established in Hawaii and North America at this time were able to continue their activities after World War II, functioning not only as foreign branches of Japanese religious groups, but also as community centres for Japanese Americans.

between each temple and the people in the local area have gradually become weaker over time. On the other hand, the connections between local shrines and *ujiko* or shrine parishioners deepened after the Meiji Restoration in the wake of government policy, which treated shrine Shinto as a national ritual system. After World War II, however, the new constitution enshrined the principles of the separation of church and state and of religious freedom. This resulted, to some extent, from Japanese people's self-examination of the negative effects of the deep connection between the state and shrine Shinto just before and during the war, but also from strong demands by the occupation forces after the war. Based on these principles, shrine Shinto was henceforth treated the same as other religions, resulting in a weakening of the commitment of people to local shrines.

While traditional religions had to respond to modern transformations, new religions appeared one after another in the course of modernization. By the latter half of the twentieth century, about ten percent of the Japanese population had links with new religions. Compared with new religions, the Christian population remains under one percent even now, and in spite of the fact that Roman Catholics and numerous Protestant denominations have been active in the country since the beginning of the Meiji era. Moreover, about twenty percent of Christians in Japan are members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, which is sometimes regarded as a new religious movement in Christianity, established in the USA.

In Korea, by contrast, no parallel *danka* system was established and the social influence of Buddhism was less than in Japan as the Chosun dynasty supported Confucian ideology as spiritual background. For the Korean people, Confucianism functioned as family ritual, without tight religious organization. While Confucianism gradually decreased in social influence during the course of modernization, Korean Buddhism was greatly influenced by Japanese Buddhism after the conclusion of the Second Korea-Japan Agreement in 1905. Some Korean Buddhist monks, under the influence of Japanese monks, married.[2]

While traditional religions were facing the problems of modernity just as in Japan, new indigenous religious movements also arose in Korea.[3]

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[2] In Japan, marriage of Buddhist monks became a matter of the individual monk's decision in 1872 by the order of the Ministry of Religion.

[3] In Korea, new religions are sometimes categorized as 'ethnic religions'.

The most influential of these were *Tonghak*, established by Ch'oe Che-u in 1860, and *Chungsan'gyo*, established at the end of the nineteenth century. Based on Confucianism and other religious traditions in Korea, they produced many new sects that separated from them. Their activities were strictly controlled during the period of Japanese political control from 1910 to 1945, but after World War II they were able to pursue their religious activities freely. Among them, Won Buddhism was established by Pak Chung-bin in 1924 and became a very large group, currently having about a million members. In sharp contrast to Japan, the Christian population increased hugely after World War II. Many censuses in Korea show that about thirty percent of the population are now Christians. Under these circumstances, the Unification Church, a new religion of Christian origin, was also established and started overseas missionary activities at the end of the 1950s. Some of the Korean Christian churches, mostly evangelical ones, have also become eager to establish churches in Japan since the 1990s.

If the foregoing can serve as a summary of religious responses to the modernization process in Japan and Korea since the nineteenth century, the recent progress of the globalization process requires a new perspective on religious developments in East Asian countries. We turn, therefore, to a discussion of how globalization has proceeded since the 1990s both in Japan and Korea, especially as regards the relations between the globalization process and religious changes. In this discussion, I will focus on two questions: the effect of changes in information technology in Japan and Korea; then, how the rapid progress of the information age has brought about borderless phenomena—one of the main characteristics of the globalization process—in every aspect of religion in the region.

Globalization and the Information Age

The process of globalization has a deep connection with the development of information media. These are important for promoting globalization as the rapid expansion of exchanges of and among people in the form of the popularization of mass culture, international travel, and the increasing speed and volume of international trade and commerce. The progress of information technology has also created many opportunities for promoting awareness in people of other and quite different cultures and life-worlds. Here, we briefly explain the recent history of media

development in both Japan and Korea in order to discuss the influence of globalization on religious phenomena in the two nations.

The information environment in East Asia changed rapidly after the 1980s. Until then, newspapers, journals and television had played the dominant role. These were to a certain extent controlled by the corporations or government, and their circle of influence remained confined within a single country. New media such as satellite broadcasting and the Internet can, however, easily transcend national boundaries largely free from government or corporate control. The Internet, especially, is basically a borderless medium that has had a revolutionary effect on the information environment in East Asian countries. How this situation will effect cultural transformation, including religious phenomena, is quite an urgent question in Japan and Korea.

In Japan, the national government-run broadcasting network, NHK, began satellite transmission in 1984 and twenty-four hour satellite broadcasting in 1987. In 1989, it started its first satellite world news program. Commercial satellite broadcasting began in 1991. Indicative of the new range of the NHK satellite broadcasts, some Koreans initially accused Japan of 'cultural invasion by electronic wave'. Yet information transmission beyond national boundaries progressed rapidly after Asia Satellite Telecommunications Ltd. in Hong Kong launched two satellites in the first half of the 1990s, thereby covering East Asian as well as Southeast Asian countries.

While satellite broadcasting now extends beyond national borders, popularization of the Internet has also boomed in East Asia since the second half of the 1990s. The trigger was, as in other areas of the world, the release of Windows 95 in 1995. An ever-increasing portion of the population began accessing information on the Internet in the late 1990s and especially during the first decade of the 21st century, and the expression 'IT Revolution' was widely used in the latter half of the 1990s in both Japan and Korea. The following table tracks the increase in the household Internet penetration rate in Japan (according to the data of *The Internet White Book* 2005, Japan):

Year	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*	*2005*
Rate of introduction	7.1	12.9	20.9	27.5	40.0	48.4	52.1	55.4
Rate of utilization	14.0	20.3	24.6	46.5	62.4	73.0	78.1	82.8

The rate of introduction means what percentage of families has access to the Internet, and the rate of utilization means what percentage of families has members who actually use the Internet. In the latter case, the number in 2002 is over 2.5 times greater compared to that in 2000. More than eighty percent of families gained access to the Internet by 2005. The Internet is presently one of the most popular means, among Japanese people, of obtaining information in daily life.

The spread of the Internet was remarkable in the same period also in Korea. According to data issued by the National Internet Development Agency of Korea, commercial usage of the Internet started in 1994 and the Internet population reached one million in 1997. It exceeded ten million in 1999, reached twenty million in 2001 and thirty million in 2004, only ten years after the start of commercial usage. The Korean rates of introduction and utilization of the Internet in 2001 and 2002 are as follows:

Year	*2001*	*2002*
Rate of introduction	58.7	63.0
Rate of utilization	52.9	59.4

When comparing figures between Japan and Korea, both the rate of introduction and the rate of utilization are higher in Korea than in Japan in 2001.

Such rapid changes in the information environment may have important effects on teachings, activities or methods of organization of religious groups in the near future.

Influences of the Information Age on Religion

With these developments in mind, what changes have actually occurred in religions in Japan and Korea since the 1980s? It is easy to suppose that the information age would influence how religious groups engage in missionary activities. The style of popular missionary work as is often observed in the USA, however, has not been widely accepted in Japan in the process of modernization. Even though the atmosphere for religious activities has been much freer than during the Edo period, proselytizing to strangers has been quite rare even after the Meiji Restoration. For

most of the new religions that appeared in modern times, the main method of recruiting has been through established social network such as family, relatives, co-workers and friends. And this method proved quite effective. Of course, there have been a few exceptional cases such as the Soka Gakkai, many of whose members used sometimes aggressive religious recruitment techniques called '*shakubuku*', trying to persuade strangers to join their group through uninvited home visits during the 1950s and 1960s. This sort of strategy evinced strong social criticism because it was not considered a proper way of inviting people into a religious group. To be sure, some Protestant sects in Japan have carried out missionary activities to strangers and have thereby obtained new followers, but the number of Japanese Christians is quite limited, and most Japanese do not look favourably upon this type of religious activity. In this social context, therefore, television, cable television and satellite communications have rarely been used for promoting popular missionary activities. People also seem to show little interest in religious broadcasting that uses new media. By contrast, there are in Japan, many programs about divination, spirit inspiration, and spirit readings, but most of their audiences regard them as amusements or entertainment—not as religious activities. If a program does contain a nuance of religious indoctrination, people tend to react rather negatively.[4]

After the late 1980s, some new religious sects began to broadcast important religious rituals on communications satellites, thereby enabling many members of a sect to watch these rituals simultaneously. Yet, the main purpose of this method is to communicate with existing followers, not to invite non-believers to the sect. One of the earliest examples is *Agonshu*, established by Kiriyama Seiyu, which began satellite broadcasting of their *homa* rite in 1987.

Although the transmission of religious information has become a common way for religious groups to use the new media, Japanese religions have not yet availed themselves of the capacity for satellite broadcasting to transcend national boundaries, using this medium mostly for

[4] Chapter 7, paragraphs 39–42 of the Broadcast Standards of the National Association of Commercial Broadcasters in Japan enjoin members: (39) not to broadcast programs slandering or criticizing other religions or sects, on the basis of respecting the religious freedom and the status of each religious denomination; (40) to be careful not to impair human dignity when treating religious rituals or broadcasting them; (41) not to disregard objective facts or contradict scientific findings when treating religion; (42) not to make donations to a specific religion. The existence of these standards is considered one of the reasons why few programs exist that deal with religious groups.

communicating with their domestic followers. Satellite transmission cannot therefore be said to be promoting the globalization process among religious groups in Japan.[5] Moreover, because satellite broadcasting is quite expensive and is subject to significant legal regulation, it is not so easy for smaller groups to access the system. The cheaper alternative, cable television, is, however, also not so popular.

As concerns the use of television for missionary activities, Korean religions on the whole do this more than Japanese religions. In 2006, for instance, Seoul had three religious channels, two Christian and one Buddhist. The Korean Christian population increased rapidly after World War II, largely because of extensive and intensive missionary activities. Evidently, postwar Korean society was more accepting of such proselytizing than Japanese society. Moreover, in all likelihood, Christian missionaries used television for this purpose even before the development of the multi-channel system, thereby creating an infrastructure and a certain familiarity with this medium.

The rapid spread of the Internet since the second half of the 1990s, however, has promoted the new development of religious activities both in Japan and Korea. As the entire society began more and more to use the Internet as its main tool of information exchange, religious groups could not help but be influenced by this transformation. Mutual cultural influences beyond national boundaries have arrived at a new stage, gradually promoting the globalization process in the field of religion as well. This globalization in the religious domain can be discussed in two ways, the first being in terms of the positive utilization of the Internet for missionary purposes, the second concerning how the appearance of the Internet is forcing religious groups to respond to new social pressures. The latter may be more serious for religious groups, because societal changes stimulated by information globalization are altering many of the ways that people think about them.

In the section that follows, I first look at examples of positive responses by religious groups, analyzing general tendencies among them, and then at how the spread of the Internet as a full-scale global information network has influenced them in Japan and Korea.

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[5] By contrast, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints has been using communications satellites to cover many areas in the world. Such a system has not yet been established in Japan.

Positive Responses by Religious Groups

The Japanese anthropologist, Umesao Tadao, once characterized religion as an information industry. This expression draws attention to the fact that each religion assures its continuation by transmitting its core beliefs from generation to generation. The Internet has provided an opportunity for spreading the central message to many people, even for smaller religious groups. This, in turn, has raised the question of whether traditional religions can survive if they rely on the older methods of information transmission, given that all religious groups are faced with a kind of revolution in the whole area of missionary activities.

As concerns the use of the Internet, one way of analyzing the extent to which Japanese religious groups utilize the Internet is to count the number of such groups that have established websites. Kurosaki Hiroyuki, who is researching religious information on the Internet, counted websites that were registered on Yahoo! Japan during the second half of the 1990s.[6] He discovered that from 1999 to 2000, the number had increased from 1,428 to 1,618. By April of 2006, that number had reached 2,891, almost twice as many as in 2000. In comparison with the rapid increase in overall Internet usage during this period, this cannot be said to be a huge increase. In analyzing these registrations in greater detail, Kurosaki found that Christian groups had 46.5%, Buddhist groups 35.9%, and Shinto groups only 8.4%. However, by April 2006, these proportions had shifted significantly, with 43.8% of registrations being Buddhist groups, 40.4% Christian, and 9.9% Shinto. As the total number of websites for each group increased, the number for Buddhist groups had increased the most.

This index focuses only on quantity. The quality of the content must also be considered. On this point, the substance of the websites of religious groups have gradually but noticeably changed. Until the 1990s, the content of most religious group websites was almost the same as those of the pamphlets that each used as a general introduction to the group. Around 2000, however, the quality of the contents on many Internet sites began to improve. Some began to try to use the Internet as a means for teaching their followers and recruiting new members,

[6] Kurosaki Hiroyuki, 2000. The book was translated into Korean in 2006. This might mean that Japan and Korea share similar problems concerning religious responses to the spread of the Internet.

and especially for bilateral communication and information exchange beyond national boundaries.

One of the most useful indices of whether a religious group transcends borders or not is to examine what language(s) it uses on its website. Most religious groups in Japan establish their website only in Japanese, although some include a partial component in English. Some new religions, however, use many foreign languages, reflecting in most cases the geographic distribution of overseas members. For example, the website of Perfect Liberty Kyodan[7] is available in English, Spanish, and Portuguese because they have members in the USA, Brazil, and other Latin American countries.[8] Reiyukai[9] too uses English, Spanish and Portuguese, because they have members in Latin America as well as some other Asian countries. On the other hand, Soka Gakkai, which has members in more than a hundred countries, uses only English. They would have to offer their website in many different languages if they were to take into account the cultural and language reality in every country. Therefore, we can assume that they have chosen to use only English. Soka Gakkai established an international organization entitled Soka Gakkai International (SGI) in 1975. The president of SGI is Ikeda Daisaku and their website provides links to related organizations in thirty-two foreign countries and areas including Japan (as of April 2006). Each of these sites presents its contents in the most popular languages in each country.[10] Tenrikyo[11] uses only English on their homepage, even though they had already begun overseas activities in the prewar period. However, explanations on the website of the headquarter facilities, called *Oyasato*, are offered in Arabic, Chinese, French, German, Italian,

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[7] P.L. Kyodan was established by Miki Tokuchika in 1946. It has overseas members mainly in North and South America. Refer to URL list (f).

[8] Unless otherwise stated, information on languages used on the websites of religious groups treated here is current as of early April 2006.

[9] Reiyukai was established by Kubo Kakutaro and Kotani Kimi in 1930. It is a new religion of Buddhist origin, presently with more than a million members. Refer to URL list (g).

[10] The thirty-two countries and areas are as follows: South Africa, India, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Iceland, Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, the United States, Mexico, Panama, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Argentina. Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Australia. Refer to URL lists (i) and (j).

[11] Tenrikyo was established in 1838 by Nakayama Miki, a female founder. Refer to URL list (k).

Korean, Nepali, and Portuguese, as well as English. Rissho Koseikai[12] uses only English, although they have more than one million members, the second highest after Soka Gakkai among the Japanese new religions. An exceptional case is Omoto,[13] which uses English, Esperanto, Spanish, Magyar, and Russian. It is not because they have members in areas where these languages are spoken, but because they claimed to be internationalist already in the pre-war period. Deguchi Onisaburo recommended members use Esperanto to communicate with people in every region of the world. Therefore, it can be said that the languages used on the Omoto Internet site express their doctrinal position, and their usage of multiple languages on the site is for symbolic functions, not for the practical purpose of communication.

On the other hand, most traditional religions, namely Shinto shrines and Buddhist sects, have gradually been introducing English sites. Jinja Honcho, which controls about eighty thousand Shinto shrines in Japan, has an English site (see URL list [c]). The Grand Shrine of Ise, where Amaterasu, the ancestral deity spirit of the Imperial family, is believed to be enshrined, publicizes their homepage in English, Chinese and Korean (see URL list [d]). They opened a Korean site on January 1, 2006, expressing their hope of friendship between Japan and Korea. Meiji shrine, where more than three million Japanese visit for the *hatsumode*, or New Years shrine visits, also has an English site (see URL list [b]). Yasukuni shrine and other famous shrines have also opened English sites.

Most to the main Buddhist sects have also begun to open simple English sites, including the Soto, Rinzai, Shingon, Jodo, and Nichiren sects, and the Buzan Shingon sect. In the case of Jodo-shin sects, which are the biggest Buddhist sects in Japan, both the Honganji schools and Otani schools have their homepages only in Japanese. Koyasan Shingon sect and Chizan Shingon sect also only have a website in Japanese. Generally speaking, the English sites of traditional Buddhist sects have much less information compared to their Japanese sites. In

[12] Rissho Koseikai was established by Niwano Nikkyo and Naganuma Myoko. Both left Reiyukai and established the new group in 1938. Refer to URL list (h).

[13] Omoto was established by Deguchi Onisaburo and Deguchi Nao in 1899 in the western part of Kyoto Prefecture. Refer to URL list (e).

the age of globalization, the main aim of English sites is apparently as a guide for foreigners.

Quite interestingly, in the case of traditional religions, it was often the case that local temples or shrines started to use the Internet well before their headquarters. This applies to most Christian sects in Japan. In the latter half of the 1990s, some local churches and individual members of Shinto, Buddhist, and Christian denominations tried to discover how the Internet would be useful for their daily activities. Sometimes, they tried international activities or the overseas launch of information by using the Internet. This also indicates one of the characteristics of the Internet compared to traditional media: it is much simpler for individuals to publicize information globally.

In conclusion, in Japan, many new religions started to use the Internet earlier than traditional religions. The former tend to construct their sites by taking into consideration the needs of overseas members. The latter, when they do open an English site, use it only as a substitute for information pamphlets or simple guidebooks. That is to say, they merely digitalize printed matter that existed before the introduction of the Internet. One might conclude that religious sects whose activities were formerly oriented to the globalization process tend to construct websites that correspond to the age of the Internet, while those whose activities are basically domestic tend to use the Internet for quite limited purposes.

The situation is similar in Korea.[14] The Chogye sect (*Chogye-jong*), the largest Buddhist sect in Korea, has their website only in Korean.[15] The Catholic Church in Korea and most Protestant groups also have their websites only in Korean. On the other hand, some new religions and Protestant sects engaged in overseas activities tend to construct their websites in English, Japanese and other languages. Won Buddhism, the largest new religion of Buddhist origin in Korea, opened a Japanese site as they have branch churches in Japan. Taejunchonrihe, the largest new religion of Confucian origin, publicizes their homepages in English, Chinese, Japanese, Spanish, Tagalog, Mongolian, and Russian, even though they do not appear to have many overseas members. The

[14] The following descriptions as also valid as the time of observation, April 2006.

[15] However, the Chogye Order of Korean Buddhism has opened an English site. Refer to URL list (a).

contents in foreign languages are generally uniform messages for foreign countries. The Yoido Full Gospel Church in Seoul, established by Cho Yonggi in 1953, is by contrast quite active in missionary activities in Japan and other foreign countries. Its website features online movies with explanations in English, Chinese, Japanese, Spanish, French, and Russian (see URL list [o]). Among Korean new religions, the Unification Church is quite assertive in delivering its messages globally through the Internet. Apart from their web site, which is offered only in Korean, it has also erected a site for "The Family Federation for World Peace and Unification," which appears in English, Korean, and Japanese. It is linked to other sites based in many countries in Europe, Asia, and other areas.[16]

Influences of Internet Information on Religions

Use of the Internet increased rapidly among the younger generations from around 2000, both in Japan and Korea. We carried out a questionnaire survey on religious consciousness and behavior among students between April and June of 2005 both in Japan and Korea.[17] The results in Japan show that only 3.1% of 4,252 respondents claimed that they did not use the Internet. 7.8% of respondents had their own website and 7.2% had a blog. In Korea, only 0.6% of 1,243 respondents did not use the Internet. As many as 39.6% had their own website, and 15.4% had a blog. It is clear that, in 2005, Korean students were using the Internet significantly more than Japanese students.

In neither country, however, can it be said that interest in religious sites is high. 2.2% in Japan and 4.3% in Korea had any interest in the websites of religious groups. In the case of Japan, the interest in websites related to mental healing or spirituality were much higher

[16] The following countries and areas are linked to the Japanese site of the Unification Church. (Confirmed in January 2007): in North America, the U.S.A. and Canada; in Latin America, Brazil, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Venezuela; in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific, Australia, Hong Kong, Iran, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Tanzania, and Turkey; in Europe, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Macedonia, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Switzerland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See URL list (l).

[17] The questionnaire survey was the third co-operative research project by sociologists of religion in both countries. The first cooperative research was carried out in 1999 and the second in 2000. The surveys of Japanese students only started in 1995, and were repeated every year until 2001. The eighth survey was carried out in 2005. The results of the seven surveys up to 2001 are to be found in Inoue, 2003.

than for websites of religious groups, amounting to 7.9%. By contrast, Korean students showed lower interest (2.9%) in websites of mental healing or spirituality than in those of religious groups. Interest in various kinds of divination is higher than these two categories both in Japan and Korea. The percentage among Japanese students is 23.7% and in Korea it is 9.3%. Although comparison between the two countries is difficult because the websites of religious groups are different in Japan and Korea, it does seem that on the whole Korean students show relatively high interest in websites of religious groups while Japanese students show higher interest in divination and peripheral religious phenomena.

In spite of these differences, the Internet is rapidly becoming the most important means for accessing religious information. This inevitably affects religious groups. One of the most remarkable developments is that the Internet has come to function as a major new method of criticizing and attacking religious groups.

A new bulletin board system called '*ni-channeru*' (2-channel) appeared in Japan in May 1999. *Ni-channeru* soon came to be used by many young people and almost every college student knows of its existence now. Every sort of genre is represented on this bulletin board, including religious topics. Over time, discussion threads have appeared that focus on major religious groups belonging to Shinto, Buddhist, Christian, and the new religions categories. The field of discussion on religious matters has thus expanded rapidly. Examining the content of *ni-channeru*, it quickly becomes evident that there are many more critical opinions about religious groups than there are positive ones. And critical opinions include unilateral claims unsupported by clear evidence or even logic. It is, moreover, difficult to identify who these critics are, and whether they have a particular grudge, or do this simply for the fun of it. It is because of these characteristics of the Internet (anonymity, unaccountability), that some, mainly traditional religious groups, were initially so cautious about the Internet, seeking first to protect themselves from (potential) attacks in this forum rather than searching for various ways to utilize it to their advantage. In this context, some religions decided at one point not to use the Internet, full stop; including not publicizing their websites, or introducing an email system. However, the more that people came to use the Internet, the more the negative campaigns tended to increase, regardless of attitude toward it. It soon became apparent that if religious groups did not open their websites to express

their official position, information from outsiders would dominate the web. Rejection of the Internet as a way of protecting oneself from criticism has proven quite ineffective.

A recent example of a global version of criticism against a particular religion on the Internet is Chinese cyber-attacks on Yasukuni shrine. When fourteen Class-A war criminals were enshrined at the Yasukuni shrine in October 1978, China and Korea strongly criticized the then Japanese Prime Minister for visiting the shrine. Since then, controversy over prime ministerial visits to the shrine has been a recurrent hot issue in Japan, particularly as to whether the visit violated the Constitution and whether their visits were official or private. Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo declared that his visit was a private one. Nakasone Yasuhiro visited once officially, but stopped after 1986 in light of the strong criticism from China and Korea. Other ministers also seemed to take the responses of other countries into consideration. More recently, however, Koizumi Jun'ichiro announced before his inauguration that he would visit the shrine as Prime Minister, an intention that he then carried out. This resulted in severe criticism in China, Korea, and other countries, as is widely known. In the age of the Internet, however, such criticism found another outlet. Chinese reaction to the Yasukuni issue, in particular, has been prominent on the Internet, and in general the number of visits to the Yasukuni shrine website is five times as many as that to the website of the Ise Grand Shrine, one of the largest and most traditional shrines.

In light of the Yasukuni case, it is to be expected that religious criticism on a global scale will increase in the future, especially with respect to matters concerning nationalism and patriotism. The seeds of this type of conflict remain even now among East Asian countries. Thus, for instance, accessing *ilbon* (Japan) and *jonggyo* (religion) on Korean sites using Google© produces about 1,690,000 hits; the combination of *ilbon, jonggyo*, and *sinsa* (shrine) produces about 960,000 hits, and together *ilbon, jonggyo, sinsa*, and *Yasukuni* produce about 240,000 hits (accessed January 2007). Thus Yasukuni accounts for about 14% of the hits containing Japanese religions, clearly showing the importance of Yasukuni in the Internet world of Korea. There are also many electronic bulletin boards treating the Yasukuni issue in Korea. While most of them are, quite naturally, filled with negative arguments and severe criticism, some discuss the reason and background of the problem. Therefore, on the one hand, disputes are deepened in these forums; but, on the

other, the most radical and aggressive stances are somewhat defused. The Internet age is thus encouraging different types of development when compared to the period before. In this light, it is quite interesting to note that, as a reflection of globalization, some of the Korean sites refer to Japanese sites that deal with the Yasukuni problem.[18]

New Development of Religious Activities in the Age of Globalization

The coming of the information age is influencing various aspects of the religious situation in East Asian countries. Religious groups and movements take advantage of the increasing ties among countries to exchange people, material and information. Regardless of its scale of organization, a religious group can obtain foreign members much more rapidly than before. Mutual influences between religious movements, regardless of their place of origin, are also increasing on this global scale.

A typical example in Japan has been the case of Aum Shinrikyo. As described above, some new Japanese religions obtained overseas members in many countries, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. Generally speaking, most of these new religions, including the Soka Gakkai, the Prefect Liberty Kyodan and Tenrikyo, started full-scale proselytizing activities among foreign people only after they had established a stable organization in Japan. It usually takes more than a decade after starting overseas activities to obtain thousands of foreign members. The case of Aum Shinrikyo is different. They started their activities in Russia when domestic membership remained under ten thousand. It is said that they obtained about thirty-thousand Russian members in the 1990s, only a few years after having started proselytizing activities there.[19]

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[18] For example, the following site is linked to many Japanese sites concerned with the Yasukuni problem from various viewpoints: http://www.anti-yasukuni.org/ (accessed January 2007).

[19] It is not so clear why Aum Shinrikyo chose Russia as their main area of foreign activity, instead of Korea, Taiwan, or other Asian countries where the Buddhist tradition would be accepted more easily. It may be that they found advantages in Russia, where there existed no influential religions just after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They started radio broadcasts using the state enterprise "Russian Voice" in 1992.

The reasons why some new religious movements are able, with ease, to cross national boundaries can be evaluated from a number of angles. In this regard, a new type of religious movement has appeared, especially after the 1970s, movements that have little connection with already established religious tradition in many countries, including Japan, the USA, and European countries. I call these 'hyper-religions' to make clear their difference from previous modern religious movements. The 'hyper' refers to the fact that they are largely free from main religious traditions in their mother country, for example, Shinto shrines and Japanese Buddhist sects in the case of Japan. Hyper-religions have little connection with traditional religions as to rituals, teachings and organizational aspects. Their appearance reflects changes in people's attitudes toward their own traditional religious cultures. In East Asia as elsewhere, an increasing number of people are becoming more and more indifferent as to whether they live in harmony with traditional religious cultures or not. They have therefore become less reluctant to introduce new cultural styles into their daily lives, including in the area of manners, marriage styles, or funeral services.

The word 'hyper' was chosen in parallel with computer-related terms such as 'hyper-card' or 'hyper-text'. It symbolizes a juxtaposition of elements from various cultural sources. The idea is that, especially among youth in the age of information and globalization, there is a greater willingness to adopt features of different cultures to make something new. This trend may be relevant for understanding the appearance of hyper-religion since it has become less important for some people whether a religious movement is rooted in a particular religious tradition in their society. A clear relation to, for example, only one of Christianity, Buddhism, or Shinto may no longer be required for newly-created religious movements to be successful, and this may help explain the rise of the 'hyper' type of religious movements. In consequence, it becomes quite acceptable for a new movement to teach a chapter of the Bible, worship Hindu deities and adopt certain Buddhist rituals without thereby appearing contradictory. Such hybridizations may, for instance, be constructed using psychological theories or methods of positive thinking, and it is these that allow the movements to recruit new members. Changes in people's consciousness and changes in religious movements are thus deeply interrelated with one another.

Explicitly hyper-religious movements are as yet not numerous in East Asian countries. While it is possible to find hyper-religious features in some new Japanese movements like God Light Association and Kofuku

no Kagaku,[20] it is difficult to find such movements with a significant following in Korea. There is, however, a marked tendency toward 'hyper' phenomena in both countries in the area of folk beliefs and practices. In Japan, more than ninety percent of funeral services are performed in the Buddhist style, but some people have begun recently to carry out quite different funeral services and burials without any traditional religious reference. This is called 'scattering bone-ash and burials in nature'. The result of the above-mentioned research survey among students in Japan and Korea shows that more than eighty percent of respondents in both countries said that they would honour their parent's wishes if they expressed a desire for the 'scattering bone-ash and burials in nature' style of funeral. And about thirty percent of respondents in Japan and more than fifty percent of respondents in Korea answered that they preferred this method for themselves. While this might be understood as the secularization of funeral services, it can also be understood as a 'hyper-religious' phenomenon with regard to funeral services: people no longer follow the traditional rituals but rather choose their ceremonies freely depending on their preferences.

On the level of folk beliefs, East Asian countries have much in common historically, for instance as concerns the importance and logic of divination and understandings about what brings good or bad fortune. As globalization increases, the folk beliefs of each country, which developed differently from similar origins, now come in contact with one another again and combine quite easily. For example, Japanese are going to Korean diviners to have their fortunes told, a practice that is becoming increasingly popular and is known as a 'divination tour'. Another example is the spread of geomancy, particularly Feng Shui (literally, "wind and water"). In East Asia, Feng Shui is a quite common way of deciding about the location of a building, the direction of a main gate, or the distribution of rooms within those buildings. Today it is not uncommon for a Feng Shui professional from Hong Kong to become famous in Japan, as Japanese think that Feng Shui originally developed in China.

It is entirely possible that, with the continued advance of globalization, people will become increasingly indifferent to indigenous religious

[20] Takahashi Shinji, the president of a computer terminal product company, established God Light Association (GLA) in 1969. Kofuku no kagaku was founded in 1981 by Okawa Ryuho, a one-time employee of Tomen, a large trading company.

teachings and practices. Testing for this hypothesis, however, is not always so easy. While tracking corresponding changes in identifiable religious movements and groups is comparatively straightforward, establishing effective perspectives for analyzing changes in folk beliefs is more difficult because the mutual influences amongst them are quite complex. As such mutual influences amongst religious phenomena in East Asian countries increase under the globalization process, both in religious movements and folk beliefs, one of the most urgent problems will be to establish methods for examining hyper-religiosity.

This chapter has examined some typical cases of how globalization of religions in Japan and Korea has been promoted mainly by the rapid increase in information technologies. New religions are generally more flexible than traditional religions in responding to this new situation. At the same time, it was also made clear that the influences of globalization will prevail among religions, regardless of whether they are traditional or new in origin. Appearance of a new group of religions in the area—called the 'hyper' type of religious movements—might correspond to such worldwide tendencies as incorporating various religious resources into new teachings and practices. Moreover, borderless phenomena within folk religion have been recently observed among East Asian countries. As they were originally deeply connected in terms of their religious development, a strong possibility of proceeding towards the rapid globalization of folk religion in the area exists.

URL list of English sites

(a) Chogye Order of Korean Buddhism: http://www.koreanbuddhism.net/
(b) Grand Shrine of Ise: http://www.isejingu.or.jp/english/index.htm
(c) Jinja honcho: http://www.jinjahoncho.or.jp/en/index.html
(d) Meiji jingu: http://www.meijijingu.or.jp/english/index.htm
(e) Omoto: http://www.oomoto.or.jp/English/index-en.html
(f) Perfect Liberty Kyodan: http://www.perfect-liberty.or.jp/index.html
(g) Reiyukai: http://www.reiyukai.org/
(h) Rissho Koseikai: http://www.rk-world.org/
(i) SGI: http://www.sgi.org/
(j) Soka Gakkai: http://sokagakkai.info/

(k) Tenrikyo: http://www.tenrikyo.or.jp/index.html
(l) Unification Church; http://www.ffwpui.org/
(m) Won Buddhism: http://www.wonbuddhism.info/
(n) Yasukuni shirine: http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/index.html
(o) Yoido Full Gospel Church: http://english.fgtv.com/

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THE GLOBAL MIGRATION OF SUFI ISLAM TO SOUTH ASIA AND BEYOND

Rubina Ramji

The relations between religion and globalization are complex from both historical and contemporary perspectives. In particular, religious traditions and religious movements have had a transnational dimension from well before the modern centuries, even though the ways that religions manifest their extraterritoriality today may be quite different when compared with the past. Religious traditions and movements have also had to face the challenge of 'localizing' themselves in different places and regions well before the contemporary period. In this chapter, I elaborate on this very general insight through an analysis of the historical emergence of Islam, within that of Sufi Islam, and within that of South Asian Sufi Islam, focusing on the specific case of the Chishti Order. My aim is to show the transnational origins of Sufism, its particularization in specific orders and those orders in specific regions, using primarily the example of the Chishti Order in South Asia. On this basis, I then move to an examination of how the contemporary globalization of Sufism, again with a focus on the Chishti Order, is in some ways repeating the translocal and localizing patterns of the past, and yet also demonstrating historically unique adaptations to respond to the different dynamics of present-day globalization.

Islam and South Asia

South Asia's geographic landscape is replete with the globalizing influences of a variety of religions. Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam prevail as the dominant religions in many of the countries in South Asia. Almost one third of the world's Muslim population of 1.2 billion followers lives in South Asia (Gregorian, 2003). The four nations with the largest Muslim populations are Indonesia (194 million), India (150 million), Pakistan (145 million), and Bangladesh (130 million). China also has a population of 39 million Muslims (Vaughn, 2005). Although it is generally assumed that Islam in Asia is peripheral in comparison to the population in the Middle East, Muslims are actually a majority in

Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in South Asia and Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia in Southeast Asia. There are also significant minority populations in Khazakstan, India, Thailand, and the Philippines. Sizable Muslim communities are also found in Sri Lanka, Burma, and Singapore.

The Islamic faith came to South Asia beginning around 664 CE, during the Umayyad Caliphate, when trade routes brought it into Southern Punjab, today part of Pakistan (Morrison, 1997). When trading routes closed overland, a complex maritime trading system emerged, connecting the Middle East, Persia and India with societies in East and Southeast Asia. Several centuries later, Islam spread across the Indian subcontinent. Along with trade and conquest came religion. The Sunni school of Islam spread into East Asia from India and the Middle East throughout the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries. Along with the orthodox teachings of Islam, Sufism entered into these countries through Islam's missionary aspects and easily blended into the existing mystical beliefs, thereby greatly facilitating conversion (Lockard, 1995). By the fourteenth century, Islam had become strongly established in northern Sumatra, and merchants spread the religion of Islam to China through Southeast Asia. The Islamic population of South Asia includes significant immigrations of the Arabs, Turks, Afghans, and the Iranians.

In its beginnings, Islam was first the religion of the peoples in Arabia. With the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE, it spread beyond the Arabian peninsula to conquer most of the areas from North Africa and Spain through to Inner Asia and to the borders of what is currently modern-day China and India. The successors of the Prophet, known as Caliphs, thereby established the *Dar al-Islam*, the abode of Islam, the territory controlled by Islamic rule.

The Development of Sufism as a Transnational Religious Movement

Sufism, known as the Islamic mystical movement, began as an ascetic movement in the seventh century (Esposita, et al., 2002). It started as a personal quest for spiritual enlightenment through the removal of luxury. As the Islamic community became solidified, the Umayyad caliphs centered their dynasty in Damascus and lived an imperial lifestyle

replete with material splendors. The early ascetics in various parts of the Islamic territories felt that God and submission to God's will was becoming too attached to the notions of power and wealth. They distanced themselves from these materialistic concerns to emphasize the centrality of God. Early Sufis focused on the impermanence of the world and desired a more faithful life of purity and simplicity as had existed during the life of the Prophet. For the early Sufi movement, Baghdad and the cities of Khurasan (north-western Iran) were the two great centers, where "like-minded people freely associated in loose circles rather than any formal organization" (Ernst, 2004: 11).

The notion of detachment from the material world evolved with the Sufi master Rabi'ah al-Adawiyya, who emphasized renunciation with an underlying devotional love of God (Ernst, 2004). Her selfless devotion to God can be seen reflected in her prayer: "Oh my Lord, if I worship Thee from fear of hell, burn me in hell, and if I worship Thee in hope of Paradise, exclude me thence, but if I worship Thee for Thine own sake, then withhold not from me Thine Eternal Beauty" (Smith, 1926: 30). Although Sufi mysticism followed the *Shari'a* as the outer path to God, its adepts also believed that there was an inner path called *tariqa*, through meditation, that led to the freedom from attachment to a union with God. One advanced through the inner path by remembering God both aloud and silently, in order to attain spiritual knowledge and experience God in a personal way.

The group structure of Sufism became solidified between the tenth and eleventh centuries, through the organization of brotherhoods (Lapidus, 1996). By the twelfth century the Sufi movement and its focus on the inner path began to clash with Islamic orthodox teachings. Some Sufi groups saw themselves as above the *Shari'a* to the point where they deliberately discarded the law, while others were considered blasphemous through their pronouncements of experiencing God. Among the orthodox, the Sufi path was considered contrary to the orthodox law of *Shari'a* (Ludwig, 2001).

Many Muslim scholars, known as the *ulama*, condemned Sufi mysticism during the ninth and tenth centuries, but the teachings of Muhammad Al-Ghazali (1058–1111) were able to reconcile the Sufi way with orthodox Islam. Al-Ghazali was an eminent religious scholar and teacher, but at the height of his fame he underwent a spiritual crisis which affected him emotionally as well as physically. In desperation he left his life and home and lived as a Sufi for the next twelve years. During this time, he wrote 'The Revivification of the Religious Sciences' which

reconciled the issues of Islamic law, theology and mysticism. Through his writings, Al-Ghazali was able to reunite the *ulama* and the Sufis, "producing a religious synthesis and integration that earned him acclaim as one of the great scholars of Islam" (Esposito, et al., 2002).

Sufism became a mass movement as Sufi masters began acquiring disciples and building residences so that they could teach, engage in missionary activities and perform charity work. These residences, where the disciples lived with the master and practiced the inner path, would become the home of organized brotherhoods. By the twelfth century, these brotherhoods could be found across much of the Muslim world. Sufi orders became the missionaries of Islam and, as they spread their message, their practices and orientations also became integrated into everyday practices and spirituality and they in turn integrated local indigenous practices. One well-known Sufi brotherhood was founded by Jalal al-Din al-Rumi (d. 1273), a famous poet and Sufi master. Rumi founded the order of the Mawlawiya—known today as the whirling dervishes—in Anatolia; they used song and dance to enhance the spiritual union with God. Another Sufi thinker, Ibn ʿArabi, spent many years traveling through Spain, Egypt, Anatolia and Baghdad, writing prolifically on the esoteric aspects of Islam before settling in Damascus to contemplate, teach and write. His writings focused on the ideas of unity with God—that all living creatures are manifestations of God—and love (Ludwig, 2001).

As noted, the Sufi movement did not remain confined within Iran and Iraq. Sufi masters migrated to various parts of the world. Through this transnational process, Sufis from the Arab Middle East built social domains which connected their countries of origin with their country of settlement. They were able to develop and maintain religious networks that extended beyond national borders (Basch, et al., 1993). For example, among the well-known Sufi founders, Shaykh Abu'l-Abbas al-Mursi was originally from Murcia in Spain and traveled to Alexandria in pursuit of his spiritual quest. Shaykh Muhiyʾud-Din Ibn Arabi, also from Spain, traveled to North Africa and then through the Arabian peninsula and finally settled in Damascus. Shaykh Muʾinʾ ud-Din Chishti went from Baghdad to Arabia, and then settled in the Indian sub-continent where he was buried. In this way, the Sufis transcended "ethnic, tribal and linguistic bias" (Haeri, 1990: 86). By the thirteenth century, Sufism had become a prominent movement in all of southwest Asia. The works and writings of Al-Ghazali, Ibn ʿArabi and Rumi greatly influenced the understanding of the inner path to God as it spread

across borders. In the fourteenth century, the famous world traveler, Ibn Battuta, visited a Sufi center in Spain and commented that the dervishes (Sufi adepts) there and from Iran to Hindustan conducted themselves "exactly along the lines of khānqāhs in those distant eastern countries" (Ernst, 2004: 14).

Sufism in South Asia: The Example of the Chishti Order

By the thirteenth century, the Sufi movement had progressed from loosely connected groups of ascetics and mystics to distinct hierarchical organizations, which spread throughout the Islamic world. Individual Sufis now began categorizing themselves as initiates or masters. As these groups became powerful, they became important institutions for social order in the towns in which they settled (Ernst, 2004). Originating from the town of Chisht in Afghanistan, the Chisthi order was first established in India, flourishing in Delhi around the end of the twelfth century. It would become the most influential Sufi Order in South Asia. By the early thirteenth century, another Sufi Order had established itself in northern India, the Suhrawardiya; they became influential in lower Punjab and Sindh and later in Gujurat.

Chishtis performed initiations for those who wished to join the Orders, but not for everyone. The master had to scrutinize the motivation of would-be dervishes to see if they were truly motivated by God or by the devil (Ernst, 2004). In terms of religious practice, prayer remained a fundamental activity in the Chishti tradition. Although the Chishti Order continued to view the five daily ritual prayers as obligatory and basic, the Sufi disciple also strongly focused on 'supererogatory prayers' which were performed at specified times, especially during the night, and also with chants, which were considered to involve special petitions to God (Ernst, 2004: 130). The Chishtis also followed practices based on the master-disciple (*murid*) relationship, such as performing pilgrimages to the tombs of saints and observing their death anniversaries. The center of life among the Chishtis was called the *jamāʾat khāna*, or the 'house of gathering', which was open to visitors. Unlike the large establishments of Iran and central Asia (often called *khānqāh*) supported by endowments, the *jamāʾat khāna* was used as a place for all disciples to take meals and sleep, as well as for basic teaching activities, interviews and rituals, denoting a sense of equality amongst all the disciples. The

Chishtis did not accept land grants, thereby preserving their independence from the state (Islam, 2002).

A very distinctive practice of the Chishtis was listening (*sāma*) to musical recitation or poetry as a form of remembrance (*zikr*). Bruce Lawrence defines *sāma* as "hearing chanted verse in the company of others also seeking to participate in the dynamic dialogue between a human lover and the Divine Beloved" (Lawrence, 1983: 72). Writings among the Chishtis declare the practice of *sāma* as the ecstatic core of their tradition, and highlight the practice of *sāma*, along with discipline of the carnal body, as means of uniting with God. The Chishti order stood apart from other Sufi movements in India because of the central feature of *sāma* in Sufi practices to the point that jurists petitioned for the outlawing of these Chishti observances during the Mughal era. The Chishtis and their supporters, however, defended the practice of *sāma* as permissible under Islamic law (Ernst, 2004).

Within this Indian environment, a certain amount of Indianization took place amongst the people from which the Chishtis drew their membership. Sufis found that the local language and imagery was suitable for the expression of their teachings. Also, within some of their practices, elements of India found its way into Chishti observance. Using betel leaf with acera nut and lime paste (*pān supārī*) as a masticant was universally practiced in South Asia, but the Chishtis began using betel within their own rituals. Overall, however, Chishti Sufism remained meticulously entrenched in an Islamic setting. The oral teachings of the Chishtis were explicitly founded on the diffusion of the Hadith of the Prophet. Their prayer life was based on the *Shari'a*, and their "personal devotions, psychological discipline and analysis of the interior life were all oriented toward the Qur'an and the prophet Muhammad" (Ernst, 2004: 245). There is a general consensus amongst Sufi scholars that the Chishti Order did not openly set out to convert Hindus to Islam, either through proselytizing or persuasiveness (Ernst, 2004: Islam, 2002).

In the late 1500s, Chishtis and other Sufi orders migrated from various parts of India and the Arab Middle East to Bijapur (in modern-day Karnataka), which had grown into an important Islamic center known for its 'intellectual liberalism' and the emergence of Sunni Islam as the state religion (Eaton, 1978: 70). During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Chishti Order there became centered on the tradition of a single familial lineage of Sufis, the family of Shah Miranji Shams

al-Ushshaq. They established themselves outside the city walls, and remained withdrawn from the lures of the court and urban society.

The Chishtis spent their time writing literature and poetry for the non-elite members of the population and for their fellow Sufis (Eaton, 1978). In order to reach the lower class of society, including women, they wrote their literature in the Dakhni, the vernacular language spoken by the Deccani Muslims and also understood by Hindus. Chishti literature thereby "formed a link between the mystic philosophy of Islam and the popular religion of a pir's devotees—many of whom were non-Muslims" (Eaton, 1978: 289). Eventually the Chishti tradition of literature transformed to *dargah* worship; the *dargah* being the tomb of a departed *pir*, or Sufi master. It would become the physical manifestation of the spiritual power of the Sufi master buried within the tomb. In this way, the *dargah* legitimated the hereditary lineage of the Sufi order, as the family member who would take over for the master also inherited the prestige and spiritual power of the deceased *pir*. Eventually the idea of spiritual merit in becoming a follower or *murid* declined, and only the belief in the power of the *dargah* institution was enough to be made a *murid*. Over time the *dargah* became a popular devotional site, attributed with legendary powers of the saints buried there. The Amin al-din *dargah* of the Chishti order in Bijapur continues today, and inducts *murids* into its organization through the issuance of a certificate which outlines the spiritual genealogy of the Chishti Order beginning in Delhi to the present day (Eaton, 1978).

Sufism and the Chishti Order in the Context of Globalization

Ernst and Lawrence (2002) describe the evolution of the Chishti Order through five stages. The formative period of the Order occurred from the seventh to tenth century, from the time of the Prophet Muhammad to its installation in Afghanistan by Abu Ishaq Shami. The foundational period occurred from the tenth to twelfth centuries before its transmigration to South Asia. Once in India, the literary tradition of the Chishtis began, and then the Order left Delhi for other parts of the Indian subcontinent. Eventually the Sufi orders began to decline as the British ascended to power in India and "Wahabi control of Arabia led to tensions over the internal reform of Sufism" (Aquil, 2005: 104). The last and current cycle of Chishti history began in the eighteenth century and includes the revival of the Order through

colonial and modern followers as well as the new forms of expression that have spread the teachings of the Order around the world (Ernst and Lawrence, 2002).

Just as the first Sufis came to South Asia by means of transmigration and Sufi Orders saw themselves as borderless, Sufism today remains transnational, creating a culture of *Dar al-Islam* through globalization. By the process of globalization, the world has become compressed and interlinked. Through this interconnectivity, Sufism has become a local and collective order (Tomlinson, 1999). Although the Chishti Sufis did not urge conversion to their Order when they arrived in South Asia, modern times compelled them to seek converts as British colonialism took hold in India. They also started participating in political campaigns more openly, specifically when they urged their followers to resist what they saw as Sikh transgressors in Punjab. This reaction to colonialism and globalization reflects the simultaneous pressure which encapsulates the global and the local: when the global undermines the distinctiveness of a group, the group in return reasserts its separate identity, which often leads to tension (Fisher, 1999). The drive of globalization pushed the Sufis to return to a way of life that expressed their own self-interest and survival. Modern Chishtis, in response to colonialism and modernity, appropriated innovative forms of communications such as print, sound recordings, television and film in order to reach out to new members. In recent years, the internet has become a dynamic source for Sufis to "contest the ideological challenges of Orientalists, Muslim fundamentalists and secular modernists" towards the Sufi movement (Ernst and Lawrence, 2002: 112). Known as Cybersufis, the Orders have taken their exclusive claim to the truth and extended it beyond geographical boundaries. Online Sufis are able to offer spiritual guidance and healing across the globe, without the need for pilgrimage to the *dargahs* or proof of spiritual merit. "Cybersufis have shifted the arena of combat with their opponents from towns (qasbas), localities (muhallas), mosques and graveyards (qabaristan) to the World Wide Web" (Aquil, 2005: 110).

Sufi Orders, through migration, have been able to organize themselves in Western countries in the past few decades. The transplantation of various offshoots of Sufi Orders originating from Pakistan and Bangladesh, such as the Chishtis, Qadiris, Mevlevis and Alawis, often run contrary to the larger Islamic *ummah*, or community, as they tend to demand loyalty of adherents to the *pirs* or *shaykhs* of the *dargahs*. Although the Chishtis have spread out from South Asia, they do not

wish to establish new *dargahs*, but rather maintain the exclusiveness of the Indian subcontinent *dargah* as the center of spirituality. For instance, the Chishti Order in Britain continues to focus its attention towards the tomb of one of the Order's founding masters, Muʾin al-Din Chisti, located in the Indian subcontinent. They continue to collect funds for the maintenance of the *dargah* centers and for the *shaykhs* who come to Britain to discuss the problems "in the subcontinent rather than organizing themselves in a British context" (Geaves, 2006: 143).

In the United States, Sufism arrived much earlier: a Sufi teacher named Hazrat Inayat Khan left India and founded the first Sufi Order in the West in 1910. Although trained in various Sufi Orders of South Asia, his primary teachings were based on the Chishti Order, blending the ideas of sacred music, or *sāma*, with the Islamic notion of uniting with God and Indian Advaita Vedanta (Webb, 2006: 87). Khan created Universal Sufism (the unity of all people and religions), an order that downplayed the fundamental notion of Islam so that it would be more accepting to contemporary Westerners searching for spirituality. This particular adaptation of Sufism in the West set precedents for Chishti masters, as well as other Sufi Orders, to begin accepting non-Muslims as disciples into their Orders. In the 1970s, Muhammad Raheem Bawa Muhaiyaddeen came to the United States from Sri Lanka and became an influential teacher and transmitter of South Asian Sufism—a young woman in Philadelphia learned of Shaykh Bawa Muhaiyaddeen from an anthropology student from Sri Lanka studying at the University of Philadelphia and implored him to come to America to help those looking for a spiritual teacher. When he established himself in Philadelphia and began his 'Fellowship', his followers at first did not see him as a teacher of Islam or even as a Sufi but rather a guru, counselor and ascetic (Webb, 2006). Eventually, in 1984, Bawa Muhaiyaddeen announced his plans to build a mosque so that Muslims "from any part of the world could worship there" (Webb, 2006: 94). Although some members left the Fellowship and conservative Muslims distanced themselves from the Fellowship because of its non-Muslim practices, the Bawa Muhaiyaddeen Fellowship would become a large religious community for both Muslims and non-Muslims.

Sufism's universalist teachings continue as they did in South Asia when it crossed the borders from the Arab Middle East, but the idea of it being an expression of Islam has changed to cultivate community life and continuity. The Fellowship, after the death of Wawa Muhaiyaddeen in 1986, continued to evolve as a community with other Sufi

and Muslim groups, while accommodating 'hybrid' and 'perennial' understandings of Sufism and non-Sufi Muslims who viewed the Fellowship mosque as an expression of traditional Islam. Interestingly, the community continues to grow as the Muslim population in the United States expands through immigration and conversion.

As the Sufi Orders migrated from the Arab Middle East to South Asia, they became Indianized in their own ways while also maintaining a sense of universal truth about Islam. As Sufism has become coopted into Western societies, Sufism continues its legacy of teaching the mystical dimension of Islam, while at the same time establishing its universalist notion of spiritual progress for all those who seek enlightenment through the exclusive teachings of the *shaykhs* and *pirs*.

Conclusion

Like all major contemporary religions, Islam has its own particular history of internal variation and transnational localization. Sufism and the various Sufi Orders are one example of how different currents developed under the umbrella of Islam and how they found particular and often contested expression in the original Middle Eastern heartland and beyond, including in South Asia. The Chishti Order represents one possibility among many, demonstrating both the general pattern of Islamic and Sufi development and expansion, and its integration into local contexts. The Chishti Order became particularly South Asian at one stage in its history, while not excluding its differential development elsewhere. Today, in the contemporary globalized situation, the order is once again embarking on a renewed transformation as it responds to new challenges. That response includes availing itself of the greater possibilities for global communication and global migration, yet this time maintaining its at least symbolic center in South Asia while making room for Western converts with quite different religious demands and tastes than members of the order had in the past, the South Asian past in particular. Thus what was previously a localization to the historical South Asian situation has itself become an element in the order's globalization. Continuities and discontinuities overlap with one another; what was global, or at least translocal, became local without losing its transnational character; what was local became global without abandoning its local specificity. At each turn, expansion or re-expansion brought

transformation. Yet what had solidified in the past and in certain places was not thereby lost, only recontextualized.

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HINDUISM, GURUS, AND GLOBALIZATION

Shandip Saha

According to the 2001 Census of India, Hinduism claims over 800 million adherents in that country alone.[1] Its history on the subcontinent also stretches back more than 4,500 years. The global spread of Hinduism, however, happened rather differently in comparison to other religions such as Islam or Christianity. Hinduism did move beyond the subcontinent already in the early decades of the Christian era, when Indian merchants brought Hinduism to Southeast Asia, where it enjoyed royal patronage into the twelfth century. Yet it was only during the nineteenth century, especially in the context of British rule and incorporation into the worldwide British empire, that significant expansion to other regions occurred. It was also in this context that different spiritual teachers (*gurus*) began to travel to Europe and North America. The successive waves of gurus that went overseas during the twentieth century, and the positive reception they received from both Hindus and non-Hindus alike ensured that Hinduism became a part of the global religious landscape as gurus became a regular fixture of Western popular culture, as did terms like 'yoga', 'karma', and 'reincarnation'.

This essay proposes to trace the pivotal role that gurus have played in spreading Hinduism beyond the borders of South Asia by outlining the reasons for their movements overseas, and the means by which they have successfully transmitted Hinduism to a global audience. In doing so, the chapter addresses two issues. The first is the effect of transnational capitalism on Hinduism, while the second issue is the effect that the globalization of Hinduism has had on defining Hindu identity in India and in the Hindu diaspora.[2]

[1] See http://www.censusindia.net/religiondata/Summary%20Hindus.pdf

[2] Standard transliteration standards for Sanskrit and Hindi terms have not been used in this essay. This is particularly the case for the proper names of different gurus. The names are transliterated according to popular usage as found on the gurus' official websites and publications.

II

For Hindus, religion is manifested or embodied in the continuing, successive presence of the guru. It is the guru who reveals the meaning of life and is the principal source of religious inspiration for Hindus. The word 'guru', in Sanskrit, means 'heavy' or 'weighty', and was used in early Hindu scriptures such as the *Vedas*, *Upanishads*, and *Dharmashastras* to refer to one who, on account of his special knowledge and function, was held to be of great power, prestige and weight (Gonda, 1985: 237–241).[3] The guru carried out a number of functions in Hindu society. He acted as political counselor to kings, he was the ritual specialist who used his skills to protect the spiritual health of a sovereign's kingdom, and he served as the educator to the upper classes of Hindu society in everything from religion and morality to mathematics and warfare (Gonda, 1985: 247–251).

The *Upanishads*, however, make it quite clear that education is not an end in itself. The acquisition of knowledge (*jnana*) is essential to the attainment of spiritual liberation (*moksha*), which is defined in the *Upanishads* as the realization of the non-duality between the self (*atman*) and Ultimate Reality (*brahman*). Therefore—as a living embodiment (*jivanmukta*) of this state of liberation—the role of the guru was to pass on his knowledge to qualified disciples (*shishya*) (Mlecko, 1982: 36–37). The philosophical tradition of Advaita Vedanta associated with the eighth century philosopher, Shankara (c. 788–820 CE), defines the guru as a dispassionate, calm, and compassionate individual free of passions and desires who has a deep knowledge of scriptures which he is willing to share freely with his disciples (Prabhavananda and Isherwood, 1970: 44–47, 153).[4] The disciples, in turn, are to listen intently to the guru, question him, and then proceed on the path of liberation—renouncing the world to contemplate and meditate upon their guru's teachings. The guru, in other words, is viewed as a realized soul who imparts knowledge in order to empower his disciples to find their own path towards religious salvation.

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[3] There is a large amount of literature about the position of the guru in Hinduism. In addition to Gonda, see also Brent (1974), Feuerstein (1991), Gonda (1947), Hara (1980), Kane (1942), and Mlecko (1982).

[4] This understanding of the guru is taken from two popular Sanskrit hymns attributed to Shankara entitled *Vivekachudamani* and *Prashnottaramalika*.

It is not surprising, then, that Hindu scriptures extol the guru in superlative terms. The guru is described in the *Upanishads* as being the source of all knowledge without whom salvation cannot be achieved. The *Upanishads* even state that the guru is to be approached with the same reverence that one would accord to God (Olivelle, 1996: 15). The devotional (*bhakti*) traditions of medieval India, however, would take this reverence one step further. While Advaita emphasized brahman as a formless conception of divinity, bhakti philosophers such as Ramanuja (c. 1017–1137), Madhva (c. 1238–1317), and Vallabhacharya (1479–1530) all stressed the importance of cultivating a deeply personal relationship with the Divine in the form of deities such as Rama and Krishna.[5] Salvation could only be attained for these philosophers by surrendering to God's will and subsisting on nothing else but divine grace, which could not be accessed without the mediation of the guru. Thus, in the bhakti tradition, the guru was considered to surpass God not because he was more powerful or because he was the very source of divine grace. It was because he possessed the knowledge and authority to dispense the grace necessary to set the individual forth on the path towards moksha. The guru, therefore, was worshipped with the same devotion and honor as God himself and was considered to be either a partial if not complete manifestation (*avatara*) of a particular deity (Mlecko, 1982: 46–48; Bennett, 1993: 60–63).[6]

The proclamation of one's liberation, however, was not enough to make one a guru. One's claim to be a realized spiritual teacher was only legitimated once the shishya accepted the guru's claims to divinity through careful scrutiny and questioning. Once this acceptance was made, the relationship between the guru and his disciple was formalized through an initiation (*diksha*) ceremony. The disciple then became part of the guru's larger religious community (*ashram*) where he underwent religious instruction and served his guru with unswerving devotion. The relationship between the guru and the shishya, in turn, became the basis for the formation of various religious communities (*sampradayas*), which were distinguished by the distinctive nature of their religious teachings. These teachings were perpetuated through a lineage of gurus

[5] For useful overviews of some of the key sampradayas within Hinduism, see Cenkner (1983), Colas (2003), and Flood (2003: 200–228).

[6] For studies concerning medieval bhakti communities and their gurus, see Bennett (1993) and Gold (1987; 1988), Rigopoulos (1998; 2005), Saha (2004), and Vaudeville (1987).

(*guru parampara*) with the authority of each guru being based upon the religious legitimacy given to the guru that preceded him.

The emphasis on religious teaching and the pursuit of moksha did not mean that gurus remained completely aloof from worldly affairs. The Hindu rulers of medieval India frequently gave their spiritual preceptors large tracts of tax-exempt land, thus turning many brahmins under their patronage into wealthy landowners who had control over sizeable portions of agricultural land. One sees a similar trend in the Mughal period of Indian history. Muslim rulers allowed the heads of sampradayas to petition the ruling emperor to consider their communities as charitable institutions which could receive tax exemptions and state support in the form of land upon which to build their temples. Thus, it was not uncommon for the leaders of devotional sampradayas like the Gaudiya and Vallabha sampradayas to actively court the favor of political and economic elites in order to support their religious activities. In the case of the Vallabha Sampradaya, the continued support of mercantile communities and both Hindu and Muslim royalty from the medieval period onwards transformed the community's gurus into wealthy noblemen who accumulated large amounts of property and money that were managed by trusts and financial institutions administered by their lay devotees (Saha, 2004: 26–31, 57–60, 85–89, 120–129, 214–218, 281–283).

III

Hagiographical texts from ancient and medieval India portray gurus from communities like the Vallabhite or Shankarite communities typically as 'world-conquerors' (*digvijayins*) who tour the earth (*prithvi parikrama*) for the purpose of winning converts to their religious communities. This was not quite the case. The 'world' in these texts always referred to the Indian subcontinent which religious leaders did traverse in their search for new followers.[7] Otherwise, there is no reliable historical evidence to suggest that Hindu spiritual leaders in the ancient and medieval periods showed any awareness of lands outside the subcontinent. Even if they did, they still could not go overseas if they desired.

[7] For an example of this genre, see Lorenzen, 1976.

The purity regulations within Hinduism forbid them from having close contact with any individuals who stood outside the caste system.

This changed in the nineteenth century. The intellectual encounter between east and west that emerged from the establishment of British rule in India sparked the journeys of intellectuals, such as Rammohun Roy (1772–1833) and Protap Chunder Mozoomdar (1840–1905) to England and the United States. It was, however, the spectacular success of Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902) at the 1893 Chicago Parliament of Religions that marked the beginning of Hinduism's exportation to the West.[8] Vivekananda was then followed by Paramahamsa Yogananda (1893–1952) who arrived in the United States in 1920 to teach kriya yoga in the United States. Yogananda's *Autobiography of a Yogi* went on to become a spiritual bestseller and helped pave the way during the sixties and seventies for the entry of more gurus into the West like the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, Swami Satchitananda, Amrit Desai, Rajneesh and Swami Chidavilasananda.[9] All presented Hinduism as a practical form of religion whose systems of yoga and meditation encouraged the personal pursuit of spiritual and physical transformation under the guidance of the guru.

The success of these gurus lay in their ability to adapt Hinduism to a Western context. Vivekananda, for example, went to Chicago for the purpose of acting as an apologist for Hinduism and to defend it against accusations of superstition and degeneracy. This seems to be the reason why he substantially altered the teachings of his guru, Ramakrishna (1836–1886). Ramakrishna was grounded in the tradition of Bengali shakta devotionalism and emphasized that all religious paths all ultimately led back to the universal mother in the form of the goddess Kali. Vivekananda, however, emptied Ramakrishna's teachings of its shakta devotional content because the iconographical representation of Kali as a blood-thirsty, skull wearing goddess with disheveled hair would hardly resonate with his Western audience. Vivekananda instead presented Hinduism as a religion whose teachings preached that all religious faiths led back to the same Ultimate Reality regardless of how it was conceived. The core Upanishadic teaching, concerning the

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[8] A recent and exhaustive study of Vivekananda's thought is Beckerlegge, 2006. Wessinger, 1995.

[9] See Paramahamsa Yogananda, 1950. For a useful review of Hindu gurus who migrated to the West from the 1950s onwards see Thursby, 1995. Forsthoefel and Humes, Eds. 2005.

essential unity between Ultimate Reality and the individual soul, was then transformed by Vivekananda into a life-affirming view of humanity that denied the doctrine of Original Sin. This reinterpretation of the *Upanishads* instead stressed the potential of individuals to realize their own inner divinity through the personal exploration of various spiritual techniques that were to be used as working hypotheses and theories that could be validated only through one's immediate experience of the Divine (Wessinger, 1995: 180–182).

This particular interpretation of Hinduism—known as Neo-Vedanta—became a popular framework, which subsequent gurus would use when traveling to the West. Hinduism was now presented as a religion that was rational and scientific in nature and could act as the perfect panacea to remedy the ills of a materially rich, but spiritually deprived, West. The Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's program of Transcendental Meditation, for example, was promoted as a spiritual path which equally had immediate benefits for one's physical and mental health while Swami Rama of the Himalayan Institute wanted to prove the scientific validity of yoga and use this as the foundation to create a type of holistic program to achieve total emotional and physical well-being (Thursby, 1995: 195–98).

The success of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON)—popularly known as the Hare Krishnas—does, however, provide an interesting contrast to the Neo-Vedantic perspective of many gurus who came to the West. ISKCON's founder, Prabhupada (1896–1977), came to the West as a missionary whose purpose was to convert Westerners to the teachings of the Bengali Gaudiya Vaishnavite movement which stressed that spiritual liberation could only achieved by one's total surrender to Krishna.[10] The Hindu reform movement known as the Arya Samaj made an unsuccessful attempt to make inroads into Guyana and Trinidad in an effort to reclaim Indians whose families were sent by the British to work as indentured laborers in the West Indies (Klass, 1961: 145–152). The Arya Samaj was ultimately superseded by the Bharat Sevashram in the 1950s. The Sevashram was founded by Swami Pranavananda for the purpose of regenerating a Hindu community which he believed had been weakened by centuries of foreign subjugation. Pranavananda wanted to create a global Hindu community

[10] For an excellent set of essays on the Hare Krishnas, see Bryant and Ekstrand, 2004.

and sent his disciples to Trinidad and Guyana to bring Hinduism back to those whom he considered to be 'lost' because they were distanced from their religion for generations.[11] The result was an aggressive program of Hindu evangelization that focused on the revival of Hindu rituals and the creation of a Hindu College in Trinidad, which West Indian Hindus could use as a rallying point around which to express their Hindu identity. The Sevashram's social welfare activities helped to solidify its influence in Trinidad and Guyana and eventually overseas, when the Sevashram's swamis began to move towards North America to visit their devotees in the West Indian immigrant community.

IV

The movement of the Sevashram's religious heads towards North America underlines how the globalization of Hinduism has not always been fuelled by either apologetic concerns or missionary zeal. Many gurus who travel overseas tend to focus their efforts on a limited group of individuals within the Hindu community who belong to or are at least sympathetic to the sampradaya to which these gurus belong. Thus, for these gurus, aggressive proselytizing is not much of a concern. The central concern for these gurus is to address the spiritual needs of their devotees who live overseas. Religious figures like Morari Bapu, Rameshbhai Oza, and Mridul Krishna Shastri, who are extremely popular for their week-long discourses (*kathas*) on the *Bhagavata Purana* or *Ramayana*, do not make an effort to reach out towards non-Hindu audiences when they travel to Europe or North America. They instead focus their attention squarely on members of the Indian community and deliver their discourses in either Gujarati or Hindi.[12]

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[11] There is very little mention of the Sevashram and its founder in scholarly literature. This information is taken from the Sevashram's official website, http://www.bharatsevashramsangha.net.

[12] Morari Bapu is based in Mahuva in the western state of Gujarat and has been known primarily for his lectures in Hindi and Gujarati on the sixteenth century Hindi retelling of the *Ramayana* entitled *Ramcharitmanas*. He has been known for traveling worldwide through Africa, Europe, and North America, and for giving his discourses in less conventional settings such as a specially outfitted jetliner and a cruise ship on the Mediterranean Sea. His written work is in Gujarati and Hindi, but a translation of one of his commentaries does exist in English. Rameshbhai Oza is also from Gujarat and runs the Sandipani Vidyalay in Porbandar, Gujarat. He is known for discourses on the Krishnaite text named the *Bhagavata Purana*. Mridul Krishna Shastri is attached to the

The same also applies to the monks associated with the Vaishnavite Swaminarayans who are popular primarily with the Gujarati community (which has a sizeable immigrant population in North America and England). Since the sixties, these overseas devotees have created a vast network of temples and an equally vast administrative structure that ultimately answers to the authority of the principal spiritual head of the Swaminarayans, Pramukh Swami. While Pramukh Swami has made numerous trips from India to visit his devotees in England, the main intermediaries between himself and his devotees have been other swamis who act under his authority. They are the individuals who have been traveling overseas since the early seventies to offer spiritual guidance to devotees and to delegate monks to maintain the community's overseas temples. The most obvious example is the Swaminarayan temple in London whose reputation as the largest Hindu temple outside India has now necessitated a permanent swami and temple staff to oversee its operations (Williams, 2001: 197–231).

There are gurus with worldwide followings who have never traveled overseas. The popular Asaram Bapu, for example, does have a substantial devotee base amongst the Gujarati and Sindhi community both within and outside the subcontinent, but apart from his one North American tour in the late eighties, he never again traveled outside India. He has concentrated his preaching efforts purely in India preferring that his foreign devotees come visit him even though they have the financial resources to finance his travels overseas. Another reason that gurus may not travel outside India is because they lack sufficient patronage. Vivekananda had built a substantial devotee base in the United States because his support was drawn from financially well-to-do members of middle- and upper-class American society, whose interest in spirituality fuelled their efforts to spread his message in North America. The very popular and visible yoga gurus, like Rajneesh and the Maharishi

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popular Banke Bihari in the Krishnaite pilgrimage center of Vrindavan. Apart from traveling in North and South America, he also has numerous cassettes of devotional songs that are released almost exclusively by a small recording company attached to Mridul Krishna's religious organization called the Sri Bhagwat Mission Trust. For the translation of Morari Bapu's *Ramayana*, see Morari Bapu, 1987. Rameshbhai Oza does not seem to have any English translations of his works, but his website has some English information on his theological outlook. See his website, http://www.sandipani.org. Mridul Krishna also seems to have no English translations of his work. His entire published work seems to be only in Hindi. See his website, http://www.mridulvrindaban.com. The recording company that carries his music is http://www.vipulmusic.com.

Mahesh Yogi, could not only bank upon disaffected members of the sixties generation to support their expansion plans in the West, but also upon the celebrity power of the Beatles or Hollywood movie stars to give them the much needed visibility to succeed outside India. Individuals like Pramukh Swami, Morari Bapu, or the Sevashram swamis, meanwhile, have drawn upon the support of their devotees within the Hindu diaspora who are willing to dedicate their time and financial resources to bring their gurus abroad. Smaller and lesser known gurus based in India simply do not have these types of resources. They have not been able to expand in India beyond the specific regions in India in which they are centered and, consequently, have no way of being able to translate that popularity abroad.

Other gurus, however, do not travel overseas to visit their devotees because they are orthodox brahmins whose movements are restricted by their observance of purity rules. The Shankaracharyas of Kanchi are conservative smarta brahmins who wield an enormous amount of religious and political influence across India, but they have never traveled overseas nor have they delegated authority to their disciples to travel abroad and interact with their devotees. One sees a similar trend with the members of the so-called Bhajana Sampradaya, which is popular in the states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. The gurus of the community are all orthodox brahmins whose principal form of spiritual discipline is group devotional singing (*namasankirtana*). Some of the important religious leaders in the community like Vittaldas Jaykrishna Deekshithar and Krishnapremi Deekshithar have never traveled overseas despite having devotees who live in North America and in the Gulf States.

V

How, then, is the guru-shishya relationship maintained if the guru always remains in India and does not send his disciples abroad? While monthly journals, videotapes and audio cassettes were once the principal means of communicating with their devotees, it is now principally through the use of the Internet and television. The Bhajana Sampradaya, for example, has a network of websites that include religious biographies, discourses, the travel schedules for their gurus, and full-length audio and

video recordings of their singing sessions.[13] The devotees of the Kanchi Shankaracharyas have done something similar for their gurus. Their site includes the complete history of the Kanchi monastery, photo and video galleries of their gurus, and fully downloadable e-books written by Chandrasekharendra Swamigal (1894–1994), the towering figure who ascended to the leadership of the monastery at the age of thirteen and remained its guiding force until his death in 1994.[14] Asaram Bapu also has a similar website to connect with his devotees, but reinforces his presence by buying time on two popular 24 hour religious channels based in India named Aastha and Sanskar.[15] Both stations are available on digital cable services in Europe, North America, and Asia and, consequently, provide a powerful medium for gurus who live in India to connect with their established devotees while at the same time reaching out to possible converts.

This is not to say that those gurus who do travel worldwide do not use the Internet and/or television to get their message across to the widest audience possible. Morari Bapu, for example, has his regular television spot on Aastha and a small website that focuses on providing his travel schedule and copious examples of his discourses on the *Ramayana* in text, audio and video format.[16] Morari Bapu's site is rather modest when it is compared to the website of his counterpart, Ramdev. Ramdev's claim that the practice of breath control (*pranayama*) can cure a wide variety of health conditions, from hypertension to hepatitis, has won him a huge following in England and North America where people regularly tune into his discourses on the Aastha network and purchase his DVDs. Ramdev's website does focus on his teachings, but also goes that extra step of creating an online store with a small currency converter where devotees can buy books, video material, and herbal medicines manufactured by Ramdev's Divya Yoga Sansthan organization, for the purpose of curing various physical ailments.[17]

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[13] See their websites http://www.bhajanasampradaya.com, http://www.vittaldas.com, http://www.swamiharidhosgiri.org, and http://www.srisrianna.org.

[14] See their website, http://www.kamakoti.org. The current head of the Kanchi monastery, Jayendra Saraswati, is currently accused of allegedly orchestrating the 2004 murder of a former devotee and critic of the monastery. To help rally support for his cause, his devotees started another website called http://www.kanchi-sathya.org.

[15] See his website, http://www.ashram.org. For the entire programming lineup for both Aastha and Sanskar, see http://www.aasthatv.com and http://www.sanskartv.info.

[16] See http://www.iiramii.net.

[17] See http://www.divyayoga.com.

Ramdev's site, however, is not as sophisticated as the website belonging to Anandmurti Gurumaa, a forty-one year old female guru from the state of Haryana, who has quickly built a strong devotee base among Hindus both within and outside India. Gurumaa's teachings are nothing new. She emphasizes the inner transformation of the individual through chanting and meditation techniques, but her real success lies in her ability to exploit modern technology to market herself successfully as a guru who embodies the perfect balance between modernity and tradition. Gurumaa's website makes no secret of how grounded she is in Hinduism. Her website underlines how she has dedicated her entire life to discoursing upon the spiritual and emotional benefits of meditation, chanting (*namasmarana*) and the singing of devotional songs (*bhajans*). At the same time, the site takes pains to stress she has been educated in an English medium school and is not afraid of addressing very contemporary issues ranging from sex and relationships to the status of women in society. Her website also underlines that she is more than willing to make herself as accessible as possible to her devotees. She has her own regular broadcast on Aastha and her website has an online meditation room and chatroom where she makes herself available for live chat sessions. Thus, Gurumaa has been enormously successful in creating two parallel religious communities. One community consists of her offline devotees who are able to physically attend her lectures and chanting sessions while the second one is her virtual religious community, which uses online chat and meditation to overcome the geographical distances that separate devotees both from Gurumaa and from each other.[18]

VI

Gurumaa, of course, is not the only female guru who has been able to successfully export her message abroad. Swami Chidavilasananda, Shree Ma, and Mother Meera are just some examples of female gurus who command a considerable following among both Indians and non-Indians.[19] The example, however, of Mata Amritanandamayi—or Ammachi as she is popularly known—is particularly striking. Ammachi

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[18] Gurumaa's website is http://www.gurumaa.com.

[19] For an excellent introduction to some of the different female gurus in India and the United States, see Pechilis, 2004.

comes from a low-caste fishing community in Kerala, but her religious teachings and philanthropic activities have transformed her into an internationally known humanitarian as well as into a miracle-working goddess who is quite literally worshipped by her adoring devotees across the globe.[20] The status that Ammachi enjoys as a goddess and perfect teacher who is beyond all distinctions of caste, creed and gender has enabled her to step outside the norms of traditional Hindu society. No longer encumbered by strict rules about gender interaction and ritual purity when she is on her world tours, Ammachi blesses her devotees by hugging and kissing them during public audiences, and she has been known to break rules of ritual purity by consecrating religious objects before they are installed in a temple by placing them on her lap. Ammachi has even raised the ire of orthodox brahmins in India by empowering her female renunciates to study sacred texts and allowing them to act as priests who are authorized to conduct temple rituals (Raj, 2005: 132–133, 136–138). In other words, Ammachi's world tours and her acceptance by the global community has allowed her to enjoy a type of visibility and freedom she would not receive in India as a low-caste woman. In doing so, Ammachi has been able to challenge traditional Hindu views about gender, ritual purity, and asceticism while still remaining firmly grounded in Hindu ritual and practice (Raj, 2005: 143).

Ma Jaya Sati Bhagawati, on the other hand, provides a rather strong contrast to Ammachi. Ma Jaya runs the Kashi ashram in Florida named after the pilgrimage center of Kashi (another name for Varanasi), which is said to grant instantaneous liberation for all those who die there. The ashram functions as a hospice for terminally ill AIDS patients, but it practices typical Hindu rituals such as bhajan singing and meditation and there are shrines to various Hindu gods and goddesses of which the two important deities for Ma Jaya are the monkey-god Hanuman and the goddess Kali. Although Ma Jaya is revered by many of her devotees as the living embodiment of the compassionate and loving Mother Goddess, she describes herself as a daughter of Kali, the servant of Hanuman, and a devotee of the famous North Indian guru Neem Karoli Baba (1900–1973) (Narayanan, 2004: 157). Ma Jaya, however, is an American-Jewish convert to Hinduism who is said

[20] For thorough analyses of Ammachi's movement, see Raj, 2004; 2005; Warrier, 2005.

to have experienced a number of visions after her contact with the American born guru Hilda Charlton (d. 1988) and her other Indian guru, Swami Nityananda (d. 1961). Ma Jaya's first full-fledged vision was of Jesus bearing the cross, which is why she describes herself as a "strange Hindu Jew who loves Christ" (Narayanan, 2004: 170). Thus, although the predominant orientation of the ashram is towards Hindu ritual, Ma Jaya refuses to situate herself firmly within Hinduism. Ma, instead, prefers to call her ashram an interfaith ashram.[21]

VII

The religious eclecticism of Ma Jaya underlines how the practice of Hinduism in the West has become somewhat removed from its place of origin. The Vedanta Society, founded in 1897 as the American branch of the Ramakrishna Order that Vivekananda founded in India, does situate itself firmly within the Hindu tradition by reiterating its commitment to Neo-Vedanta as a universal religion that was preached by both Ramakrishna and Vivekananda. The *Upanishads*, the Advaita works attributed to Shankara, and the works of Vivekananda are cited as some of the Society's sacred texts, but these Hindu elements are juxtaposed with the use of Christian terminology to describe the structural organization of the Society. The swamis who come from India to run the centers in North America are frequently called ministers, services are known as 'vespers', and the principal focus of sacred space is termed a chapel. The chapel will usually house images of Vivekananda, Ramakrishna, and his wife Sharada, but there are no images of Hindu gods or goddesses, including Ramakrishna's beloved Kali.[22]

The same could be said for the kriya yoga tradition, which Yogananda brought to the United States in the early decades of the twentieth century. The Bengali kriya tradition to which Yogananda belonged has many disciples who trace their lineages back to prominent figures such as Yogananda's guru, Yukteshvar Giri (1855–1936) and Yukteshvar's guru, Shyamacharan Lahiri (1828–1895). Thus, disciples acquired their knowledge of kriya through commentaries written in Bengali and by

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[21] See Ma Jaya's website at http://www.kashi.org.

[22] For this juxtaposition of terminology and traditions see some of the Society's websites at http://www.vedanta-newyork.org, and http://www.vedantasociety.net. For the website of the Ramakrishna Order's headquarters in Kolkata, see http://www.ramakrishna.org.

the traditional method of initiation from a qualified guru who would only pass on knowledge to those who were considered to be ready for spiritual instruction. This is not quite the case with the Self-Realization Fellowship (SRF) established by Yogananda in the United States. The Western disciples who took up the leadership of the SRF after Yogananda's demise have created an entirely different body of kriya literature, which espouses religious universalism and presents kriya yoga as an ancient religious system perfectly suited for modern day living. SRF literature and yoga centers link the practice of kriya to topics that range from physical and mental health to marriage counseling and sexual therapy, and transmit this knowledge either through retreats and seminars or through a seventy-two lesson correspondence course designed to help aspirants practice kriya on their own.[23]

Some might argue that kriya by correspondence, or the online marketing by gurus of their herbal medicines and multi-DVD or CD sets of lectures, is indicative of how Hinduism has now succumbed to the forces of the global marketplace. Gurus are now more like religious entrepreneurs peddling their beliefs in a global marketplace full of religious consumers who are looking for a wide variety of options out of which they can create their personal path to salvation. Hugh Urban calls this the "logic of late capitalism" (Urban, 2005: 182–185) while Gita Mehta views this as the triumph of American mass marketing in penetrating both Hinduism and Indian culture as a whole (Mehta, 1979: 105–106). There may be a certain truth to what Urban and Mehta are saying. The international success of large organizations like ISKCON, Siddha Yoga, or Transcendental Meditation has necessitated the formation of large-scale trusts and corporations to devise new ways to expand their existing devotee base in order to sustain their religious activities across the world. Even Ammachi has not been immune to these forces despite her status as a goddess and internationally renowned humanitarian. It is not at all lost upon her devotees that the Mata Amritanandamayi Trust generates large amounts of revenue from the sales of the highly popular Ammachi doll.

As noted earlier, however, from medieval India onwards, gurus have never had qualms about seeking the favor of political and economic elites in order to generate finances, which are then administered by

[23] For the mission statement and services offered by the SRF, see their website at http://www.yogananda-srf.org/aboutsrf/index.html.

religious trusts. The dynamic between religious groups in India, in other words, has always been driven by a dynamic of 'competitive spirituality' in which gurus have vied with each other for the support of both the general public and social elites.[24] Thus, what Urban and Mehta note in regards to contemporary gurus is not necessarily a recent development in Hinduism. The globalization of Hinduism has served to magnify and greatly complexify certain recurring themes that have been central to the history of gurus and their sampradayas—the themes of religious competition and the quest for continued religious patronage.

The globalization of Hinduism also raise another issue, which revolves around defining Hinduism and what constitutes Hindu identity. Can the members of organizations like Vedanta Society, ISKCON, and the SRF be called Hindus when their membership draws largely from individuals of non-Indian descent? Can an organization like the SRF or an individual like Ma Jaya be placed within Hinduism alongside the Swaminarayans and the Bhajana Sampradaya when their beliefs and practices seem to be more inspired by Hinduism than being shaped directly by the Indian cultural context from which Hinduism has emerged? Responses to these questions by Hindus both within and outside India have not been adequately studied and, consequently, it is very difficult to answer this question accurately or in any depth. Satguru Sivaya Subramuniyaswami, for example, is an American convert to Hinduism who runs the Shaiva Siddhanta Church in Hawaii, whose monks are all made up of American converts to the Shaiva Siddhanta tradition. The fact that Subramuniyaswami is not Indian seems to matter little to Hindus worldwide. Subramuniyaswami's monthly newspaper, *Hinduism Today*, has enjoyed the endorsement of numerous Hindu gurus in India and has made him a particular favorite of the Hindu right because his newspaper supports their campaign to protect Hinduism by uniting Hindus worldwide around a single religious identity.[25]

In a similar vein, ISKCON's spiritual leadership is made up largely of Western converts to Gaudiya Vaishnavism, but has gained wide acceptance among Indians as an important religious and cultural force for Hindus in India and abroad. ISKCON temples have become

[24] The term 'competitive spirituality' is used by Muzzafar Alam to describe the religious dynamics between the subcontinent's religious communities in Medieval India. See, Alam, 1989.

[25] For the newspaper's complete mission statement, see http://www.hinduismtoday.com/mission.shtml.

established presences at Krishnaite pilgrimage sites in Bengal and North India, while its Mumbai temple has been acknowledged for decades as an important patron of Indian music and dance. Even the government-run television network, Doordarshan, paid tribute to Prabhupada by airing a 104 episode television series in 1996 dramatizing his life. ISKCON's temples in North America have also become important for members of the Hindu community by serving as a focal point around which diaspora families can gather to preserve their religious traditions in a foreign land. Ma Jaya's Florida ashram and SRF, regardless of how inspired they may be by Hindu practice, are not oriented towards these types of activity. This, in turn, may possibly indicate that the ethnicity of gurus may not be as important for Hindus—especially for those in the diaspora—as opposed to whether or not they feel comfortable with a religious organization that enables them to feel that they can practice and preserve those traditions they identify as being grounded in Indian culture. This certainly does not mean that the more eclectic gurus who take Hinduism as one major source of inspiration for their teachings should be excluded from the scholarly study of Hinduism. They are an indication of just how much Hinduism has spread beyond the subcontinent's borders and is always being shaped and adapted according to the ever-changing socio-political and economic changes in which the tradition finds itself.

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GLOBALIZATION AND THE CONFLICT OF VALUES IN MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIETIES

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Introduction

One of the principal effects of contemporary radical Islamic movements is the creation of an image of a globalized Islam (Roy, 2002), increasingly disconnected from particular territories and from specific cultures, overcoming the traditional and historical divisions within the Muslim *ummah* (community). Globalized Islam tends to represent the unity within which differences are and have been accommodated, but which denies as false the notion of a particularistic and plural Islam. The *ummah* in this vision is a transnational community, an ideal-type of *homo islamicus* adaptable to any specific culture, because it functions as a system of beliefs that is able to reduce the social complexity of various environments. In this sense, global Islam is a 'deculturated' Islam (Roy, 2002). Combating both proximate (the political elites who tried to shape modern nation-states in the post-colonialist period, encouraging the functional differentiation between politics and religion) and distant (global *jihad* against West) (Sageman, 2005: 2) enemies, the Islamist movements strive to cancel socio-cultural and religious pluralism among Muslims with respect to non-Muslim minorities. Under the rubric of expelling the West from the Middle East, the actual aim is also to undermine and destroy the social capital of cultural and religious pluralism accumulated in the region over the centuries. In what follows, I elaborate on this thesis, beginning with a short reconstruction of this socio-religious pluralism, and then analysing the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims that result and the crisis of many non-Muslim communities in the region. This dramatic process represents an impoverishment, in both cultural and religious terms, of social capital.

The Socio-Religious Geography of Middle Eastern Societies

The geographic area conventionally known as the Middle East (in Arabic: *Mashreq*) covers a vast territory of seven million square kilometres where over 300 million people live (see Table 1). Sixteen nation-states (or 17, if we include the Palestinian Authority) are established therein, plus the embryonic state of Palestine, whose political fate is yet to be decided.

If we focus on certain macro-indicators to give a simple comparison of the various economic situations within the Middle East, a breakdown of the population data reveals great differences among the countries (see Table 2). A straightforward comparison of the data enables us to see how the area in question has a multitude of socio-economic and, in part, socio-cultural differences. Let us take, for example, Iran which has been governed since 1979 by a religious oligarchy that seeks to impose an Islamic model of society and state: here the fertility rate is the second lowest (Cyprus having the lowest); a sign of successful family

Table 1. *States, surface areas and population figures in the Middle East (updated to 2005)*

State	***Surface area in sq. km***	***Population***
Egypt	**1,050,000**	**77,500,000**
Iran	**1,650,000**	**77,200,000**
Turkey	**780,000**	**72,110,000**
Iraq	**437,000**	**27,000,000**
Saudi Arabia	**2,210,000**	**24,300,000**
Yemen	**528,000**	**21,000,000**
Syria	**185,000**	**19,100,000**
Israel	**20,700**	**6,900,000**
Jordan	**92,300**	**5,400,000**
Lebanon	**10,450**	**3,620,000**
United Arab Emirates	**82,800**	**4,500,000**
Oman	**212,000**	**2,600,000**
Kuwait	**17,800**	**2,540,000**
Qatar	**11,400**	**812,000**
Cyprus	**9,200**	**835,000**
Bahrain	**665**	**726,000**
Palestine	**?**	**1,400,000 (?)**
Total	**7,303,315**	**347,543,000**

(Source: World Bank, 2006)

Table 2. *The social differences in certain Middle Eastern countries (absolute and percentage values for 2000 and 2005)*

Country	Population growth (annual %)		Life expectancy at birth (total years)		Fertility rate		GNI per capita (current US$)	
	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005
Bahrain	1.5	1.9	73.9	74.7	2.6	2.4	10400	14300
Egypt	1.9	1.9	68.8	70.2	3.4	3.2	1400	1200
Iran	1.5	1.0	69.0	70.0	2.3	2.1	16700	27700
Jordan	2.0	2.6	70.1	71.2	3.8	3.4	1810	2500
Saudi Arabia	2.8	2.6	71.0	72.0	4.4	4.0	7800	11700
Qatar	4.5	4.5	73.0	74.0	4.5	4.5	data not available	
Oman	1.6	1.3	74.0	75.0	4.3	3.6	6600	9000
Lebanon	1.0	1.0	71.0	72.0	2.5	2.3	5060	6180
Turkey	1.7	1.3	68.1	70.2	2.6	2.2	2900	4700
Kuwait	3.9	3.0	76.2	77.1	2.7	2.5	16790	24000
Emirates	6.8	4.8	77.7	78.9	2.7	2.2	19700	23700
Cyprus	1.4	1.1	78.0	79.0	1.6	1.5	11700	16500
Israel	1.6	1.6	78.0	79.0	3.0	2.9	17000	18620
Syria	2.6	2.5	72.1	73.4	3.7	3.3	910	1360
Yemen	3.1	3.1	59.0	61.0	6.2	5.9	410	600

(Source: World Bank, 2006)

planning, widely accepted by the population for economic and cultural reasons. Generally speaking, the reproduction model varies according to the active role of women recognized by society, which tends to confirm the traditional role of women in the past, i.e. becoming wives and mothers. At the same time, it is interesting to note that there is a variation in per capita income which shows a sharp distinction between countries with a reasonable standard of economic performance (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Israel and Cyprus) and those that are still unable to provide even a minimum standard of living for the general population. An example is Egypt, where per capita income has fallen and the level of poverty has increased from 16.7% to 18.1% of the population between 2000 and 2005. Yemen is another example, but so are larger countries, such as Turkey or Syria, where the economic situation is far from flourishing. Oil wealth for many countries has represented a missed opportunity. The enormous revenues from petroleum exports have not consistently and evenly translated into the promotion of welfare and democracy. Instead of

Table 3. *Area, density and GDP per capita in OPEC Countries (2004)*

	Area (1000 sq km)	**Density (pop./sq km)**	**GDP per capita (in $)**
Algeria	2382	14	3113
Indonesia	1904	114	1290
Iran	1648	42	2863
Iraq	438	66	1063
Kuwait	18	163	27028
Libya	1760	3	6618
Nigeria	924	143	752
Qatar	11	75	45937
Saudi Arabia	2150	11	12931
Emirates	84	54	29367
Venezuela	916	29	5240

(Source: OPEC, 2005)

being used to improve the quality of life of ordinary people and move countries towards democratisation, these riches have remained in the control of political elites and their international partners. According to the recent OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) data, the differences among the mostly Middle Eastern member countries are increasing, resulting in sharply unequal development in the entire region (see Table 3).

If we consider the socio-cultural characteristics and political history of the Middle East, the comparison becomes something of a challenge to sociological intelligence. Alongside countries with a Muslim majority, we find others with social and religious pluralism, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Syria, together with others which are predominantly Greek Orthodox (Cyprus) or Jewish (Israel). In some countries, for example Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, there exist large Christian communities; whereas in others, such as Israel, Palestine, and Iraq, such communities are dwindling or dying out. Moreover, some of the nations listed above have populations that are homogeneous from the religious point of view (Iran, Saudi Arabia and, generally, the Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and Yemen), even within Islam; whereas in others, such as Iraq and Lebanon, the conflict between Shi'a and Sunni is at times harsh and violent. But the situation is even more complex. Where there is a Sunni majority, a Shi'a minority may be in a position of power (Syria). In countries such as Iran, limited forms of

tolerance are conceded to the Armenian and Christian Churches as well as the Jewish and small Zoroastrian communities, but the Baha'i community is severely repressed. The former are considered to be protected communities (*dhimmi*) according to the Islamic Law (*shari'*a); the latter are stigmatized as apostates. Finally, many different types of state exist. We have countries like the Republic of Turkey with its secular constitution (on a European Enlightenment model), with free competition among the political parties, albeit under the protection of the Army which traditionally guarantees the secular nature of the state. Turkey aside, for the most part, the states fall into two categories: patrimonial states (as in the case of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates of the Persian Gulf or nations governed by a family claiming direct descent from the prophet Muhammad, for example Jordan) with varying degrees of parliamentary or democratic control; and authoritarian nation states, governed by oligarchies that concede little to democracy (Egypt, Syria, Iraq until the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003). There are also intermediary positions: states controlled by a permanent power groups with forms of democratic participation or parliamentary representation, such as the Republic of Yemen, Lebanon and Iran. The latter, in fact, functions constitutionally and politically as a parliamentary regime with an Assembly (*Majles*) elected by popular (including women's) suffrage, although its powers are severely limited by the political and religious oligarchy, which gained power with the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. In the Palestinian territory, political participation is governed by formally democratic means and Hamas, the radical movement, gained power through regular elections in 2005.

The State of Israel requires separate consideration, not only because it is the only state where people of Jewish culture and religion constitute the backbone within a vast sea of countries with a Muslim majority, but also because, despite being a parliamentary democracy founded on rigorously proportional representation, it has yet to solve the dilemma of citizenship. Who is an Israeli citizen? Is it anyone who can claim descent from a Jewish mother, or is it anyone who resides in Israeli territory? Israel is a democracy which supports the coexistence of different religions (including Christianity and Islam), but it has had to face Muslim extremism seeking to lead the struggle for the independence of Palestine, thus creating a critical situation for Arab Christian and Muslim minorities residing in Israel (Lewis, 1991).

From the socio-religious viewpoint, therefore, the situation is varied, dynamic and rapidly changing. There are two ongoing trends: a) a reduction in religious pluralism and b) a struggle (an out-and-out struggle including both political action and violence) within the Muslim world to impose a sole model of Islam, a global Islam, which claims to be a religious, moral, judicial and political paradigm for the vast and composite *ummah* of Allah, a globalized paradigm which seeks to set aside the historical and cultural differences that Muslim civilization has known throughout history (Kepel, 2004). With this in mind, we intend to show that the current socio-religious conflicts in the Muslim world reflect tensions and dynamics of a broader nature, both in the process of nation-building, which is being constantly re-negotiated (as in the case of Lebanon and Iraq) and the rift which has formed in the post-colonial states of the Middle East between a modernizing political elite, on the one hand, and, on the other, the guardians of orthodox religious traditions who have never really accepted the idea of a functional separation between religion and politics (Arjomand, 1988; Keddie, 1983; Khosrokhawar, 1993; Roy, 1999; Safran, 1961; Zeghal, 1996).

The De-Differentiation of the Religious Field: The Crisis of the Christian Communities

To see how the socio-religious geography of the Middle East has changed, we need only look at the decline of the Christian communities (Courbage & Fargues, 1992). This is a powerful indicator of the reduction of pluralism, a process which began in the early 1970s. The presence of Christian and Jewish communities in the Muslim world, alongside other non-Muslim minorities, was a characteristic feature of the socio-religious field of Islam from the time of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates up to the Ottoman Empire. As a system of belief, Islam developed the principle of *umma wahida* (one community) in theological and judicial terms as defined in the Qur'an: "had God wished to, He would have created a sole community of believers; since He did not do so, it must be so that believers in one God, who are divided amongst themselves, may emulate one another in their faith and await the Day of Judgement for God to reveal why He did not wish all men to believe in the same manner" (V: 53/sura al-mahida).

Since the Qur'an expressly recognizes the fact that at least two communities of believers stem from the one God, namely Jews and Christians, the so-called Peoples of the Book, the Caliphs developed a judicial system which safeguarded religious minorities. It is true that these minorities were discriminated against socially, but they could at least continue to practise their faith and remain in their place of origin (Pace, 2004). This enabled such communities to survive in a society with a Muslim majority, despite the vicissitudes of history, often in peaceful co-existence. However, in the early 1950s, Jews living in the Mashreq and Maghreb began to migrate to the new State of Israel, not only by choice but also because of the clearly hostile attitude they felt toward them in the environment they had inhabited for many generations. The long cycle of Israeli-Palestinian wars has reinforced the combined effect of ethnic cleansing, on the one hand, and the spread of the idea of one people, one nation, on the other. In the twentieth century, this revival of the nationalistic slogan presented itself as a national-religious ideology. What is happening to the Christian communities today is of interest, since it gives rise to a cultural impoverishment of the pluralist society (from the religious viewpoint) which the Muslim world once possessed. The everyday co-existence of Muslims, Jews and Christians is still remembered by the common people in many Middle-Eastern countries. But it is now only a memory. The importance of other religions within the Muslim world is being constantly reduced and this process is taking place along with the rise of radical and traditionalist Islamic movements which seek a homogenous Islamic society, or at least a less heterogeneous one, imposed by political government. Let us therefore take a closer look at what is happening to the Christian communities.

In Jerusalem, to name somewhere highly symbolic at the crossroads of various religions and civilizations, there were approximately 31,000 Palestinian Christians in 1948 (about 20% of the population at the time). Today, only a few thousand have remained in a city which is constantly expanding (the present population is almost 800,000). Of the 80 shops within the walls of the old city of Jerusalem run by Armenians in 1967, only three or four remain in 2005 (Pinna, 2005: 59).

In 1995, there were seven million Christians living in the Middle East, or 9.2% of the overall population. At times they constituted a numerically significant minority, for example in Egypt, where a flourishing Coptic community still exists; or in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Palestine, where there is a considerable organized

Table 4. *The Christian Diaspora from Middle East Christians who emigrated as % of total Christian population (Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria)*

Religious confessions	**Percent emigrated**
Assyrian	54.6
Armenian	75.0
Melchite	52.4
Maronite	58.0 (mostly from Lebanon)
Syriac-Orthodox	53.6
Chaldean	19.8 (before the two Gulf Wars, from Iraq)
Syriac-Catholic	35.7
Coptic	8.3 (mostly from Egypt)

presence. In the space of one decade, this number of Christians has declined by 17%, with a decrease in all these countries. Many factors are to blame for this change. Some are long term, linked to the demographic decline of Christians compared to Muslims; to changes in the economic structure, which have limited commercial opportunities for all, including Christians; or to periodic instability consequent of wars or internal conflicts, so typical of the area in question.
Other factors are linked to modernity: the creation of post-colonial nation-states in the Middle East has, in fact, had an ambivalent effect. Many of those who had led the struggle for independence and formed the new nations—such as Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon—from the ashes of European colonialism, wished to set up non-confessional states. Until the 1970s, many people (not only Christians) saw the possibility of living in such a state as an opportunity to redefine the role of the non-Muslim minority, removing the special laws for protected communities—*dhimma* in Arabic and *millet* in Turkish—which could preserve their faith, but were actually treated like second-class citizens. At the same time, as we shall see, the crisis in the nationalist programme induced a kind of pincer movement, with *re-Islamization* from below on the one hand; and the increasing use by power elites, from the early 1980s on, of Islam as a resource for rebuilding political consensus on the other. This has brought about a general trend toward Islamization, which has in many cases induced a considerable exodus of Christians. Thanks to the research carried out by Valognes (1994: 151), we can see the magnitude of that diaspora (see Table 4).

The terrible impact of the conflicts which have tormented the area in question since the end of the Second World War goes some way to

explaining this haemorrhage. In 1975 alone, the civil war in Lebanon caused the departure of approximately 990,000 people, among whom 300,000 were Maronite Christians (Labaki, 1992: 609). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict provoked a massive exodus immediately after the first war in 1948, when 726,000 Palestinians, of whom at least 60,000 were of Christian faith, sought refuge in neighboring countries (Jordan, Syria and Egypt) or further afield. The figure has grown with every crisis in the years that followed. In the same way, after the first Gulf War in 1991, at least 50,000 Chaldean Catholics (of the approximately 400,000 belonging to the Chaldean Church) emigrated from Iraq to the United States. In the absence of reliable statistics, a further increase in emigration is more than likely after the most recent war. And the present civil strife between pro-Sunni and pro-Shi'a political factions is hardly likely to create calm and stable conditions for non-Muslims.

The specific case of the Coptic Church in Egypt provides ample material for a sociological analysis of the socio-religious changes taking place in the Mashreq (El Khawaga, 1996). The line taken by the Coptic Church under the leadership of the Patriarch Shenūda III, elected in 1971, is highly significant. He sought first of all to counter the risks connected with the twofold Islamization—from below and from above—by protesting against every attempt by successive governments to enshrine Muslim law or *Shari'a* in the state legal system (this took place during Sadat's reform, but was later cancelled by Mubarak). Secondly, to lend greater force to this protest, the Patriarchate sought to form a socio-political lobby to give itself more weight in the public debate. The aim of this strategy was to show public opinion and the government that discrimination against the Copts is tantamount to disregarding the historical roots of Egyptian national identity (and especially its plurality). Coptic indeed is the ancient language of Egypt written using the Greek alphabet: from the conversion of the Egyptians to Christianity in the third century until the Arab-Muslim conquest, this language was the national language. The sociological import of the Coptic community's actions lies in the social and political strategies it has developed to defend its identity against the process of Islamization, which has been under way in Egypt for several decades. There is a significant correlation between the modernization of Egyptian society and the emergence of a line of action which may be defined as follows: the Coptic Church is an active subject in public life for the sake of its own specificity and, at the same time, in order to affirm the national

role it intends to play, countering the risks of marginalization which the process of Islamization entails. The conflicts, which culminated in acts of violence (attacks by groups of Muslim extremists on Coptic people and places), have further convinced the pastors of the Coptic Church of the need to strengthen community identity. Thus, from 1980 to 1990, the Church organized itself into a political pressure group and also created a social service network, which is seen by the government as a useful grass-roots welfare system to compensate for the shortcomings of the state system.

The picture changes considerably when we come to examine the other significant Christian minority in the Middle East. The Lebanese Christians have always had—and continue to have—an important role in the politics of their country. A particularly significant part is played by the Maronites, who form two thirds of the total number of Christians in the Lebanon. They are affiliated to the Catholic Church of Syrian rite, and are so called because the Church claims Saint Maron as its founder; a hermit who spread Christianity in Syria and Lebanon in the fifth century. It should be remembered that the hallmark of Lebanon is that it is a pluri-religious society, where the various socio-religious identities (Muslim, Christian, and Druze) play a direct role in political life. In practice and in law, membership of a religious community is the basic, without being the sole, principle for individual identity and citizenship (Abou, 1984: 118). The importance of the Lebanese Christians cannot be underestimated: from among their ranks there has emerged in recent decades what might be called a new entrepreneurial middle class (the so-called *mutasarrifiyya*) (Shehadi, 1987; Zamir, 1985). Between 1975 and 1989, armed with this new economic and social force, the Lebanese Christians planned to enter the political field to fulfil a long-standing desire: the creation of a small Christian-Lebanese state. This project was finally done away with by the Tāʾif agreement in October 1989, which put an end to the Civil War and sketched out a pluri-confessional state that faithfully reflected a multi-religious society, well represented by the institution of the so-called presidential *troika* (three presidents who take it in turns to hold office representing the three religious communities: Christians, Muslims and Druze). In actual fact, the Lebanese socio-religious picture is far more complex and stratified, as can be seen from the following table:

Table 5. *Religious Confessions in Lebanon*

Denomination	**Doctrine**	**Liturgical language**	**Affiliations**
Maronite	Catholic	Syriac and Arabic	Antioch Patriarchate at Bkérké
Greek-Orthodox	Orthodox Chalcedonian	Greek and Arabic	Antioch Patriarchate at Bkérké
Melchite	Catholic	Greek and Arabic	Antioch Patriarchate at Bkérké
Armenian-Apostolic	Orthodox non-Chalcedonian	Armenian	See of Katholikos at Cilicia
Armenian-Catholic	Catholic	Armenian	Armenian-Catholic Patriarchate at Beirut
Syrian-Orthodox	Orthodox non-Chalcedonian	Syriac and Arabic	Antioch Patriarchate at Damascus
Syrian-Catholic	Catholic	Syriac and Arabic	Antioch Patriarchate at Beirut
Chaldean	Catholic	Syriac and Arabic	Patriarchate at Baghdad
Assyrian	Nestorian	Syriac	idem
Latin	Catholic	Latin and Arabic	Holy See of Rome
Evangelical	Protestant	Arabic	Diverse
Sunni Muslim	Muslim	Arabic	
Shi'a Muslim	Muslim	Arabic	
Druze	Druze	Arabic	Khalwat el Bayada
Alawi	Alawite	Arabic	
Ismaili	Shi'a	Arabic	Centres of Salamiyé and Bomay
Jewish	Jewish	Hebrew	

(Source: Labari, 1989: 168)

To have some idea of the size of the various communities in population terms, we report the following table provided by Himadeh (1943) and Labaki (1996):

Table 6. *Religious communities in Lebanon between 1922 and 1990 (% of total population)*

	1922	**1932**	**1943**	**1990**
Maronites	32.7	28.8	30.4	26.4
Greek-Orthodox	13.4	9.8	10.2	7.9
Melchites	7.0	5.9	5.9	6.8
Other Christians	2.1	6.8	6.2	1.8
Total Christians	55.1	51.2	52.7	42.9
Sunni	20.5	22.4	21.3	24.0
Shi'a	17.2	19.6	19.2	28.9
Druze*	7.2	6.8	6.9	4.0
Total Muslims	44.9	48.8	47.3	56.9

(* conventionally the Druze are classified as Muslims, although this sect has developed its own system of belief and practice which has very little in common with Islam)

This decrease in the Christian communities in the Middle East, along with the attempt by some of the larger ones (for example the Copts) to resist marginalization, may therefore be considered indicators of a broader process. It is as if the historical perimeters of the religious pluralism, which has characterized Middle Eastern society, were shrinking.

This has already happened on a large scale to the Jewish communities, which once flourished. The birth of the State of Israel has had a twofold effect: one of attraction (many Jews decided to join the new state); the other of repulsion (after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and especially after the Six Day War in 1967, many Jews found themselves expelled, from Syria, for example). Today, the most numerous Jewish communities are in Iran and Turkey, with a total of approximately 30,000 people. In Iran before the 1979 revolution, there were 100,000 Jews, mainly concentrated in Tehran and Shiraz. Little remains of the oldest Persian Jewish community in Ishfahan, which dates back twenty-five centuries. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran provides for a representative of the Jewish community to be elected to the *Majles* (Parliament). By contrast, the Iraqi Jewish community, which according to a UN estimate numbered 80,000 people at the formation of the modern state of Iraq, has virtually disappeared. By 1957 the figure had dropped to around two thousand, due to the departure of

many for Israel, and has fallen progressively until the present dramatic situation, with a small handful of about thirty people struggling to survive in a quarter of Baghdad, in Bataween.

As happens with the ebb and flow of the tide, the ebb of Christianity and Judaism in the Middle East, due to a combination of factors, exacerbated by the long, seemingly endless cycle of strife, has given way to the surging tide of re-Islamization, rising from the grass-roots of society and spreading to the political power structure, in countries such as Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Syria. Without doubt, the 240 million Muslims living in the various countries of the Middle East do not all agree on the relationship between religion and political action, or between modernization and the defence of one's cultural and religious identity. In other words, the decline of the religious pluralism which Muslim majority countries had known for centuries does not mean that the internal differences within the Muslim world have also diminished. Apart from the sharp differences which divide Shi'a and Sunni (and other sects, such as the Alawis and the Ismailis, to mention only the largest and most well-known), there are all the other divisions that, beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth century, have strengthened in the region as a result of modern political ideologies like nationalism, socialism, and pan-Arabism. Appealing to the cyclical concept of *nahda*, or renaissance, dramatic political, religious and cultural movements arose already from that time onward, ranging from revivalist to reformist to radical Islamist movements that tried to revive the religious tradition either by seeking to modernize Islam or as part of a radical critique of modernity, sometimes dreaming of returning to a state and society shaped integrally by *Shari'a* and modelled on the Medina of the Prophet Muhammad (Choueiri, 1990; Pace & Guolo, 2002).

In fact, internal pluralism is something of a euphemism since it refers not only to the historical divisions which Islam has known from its origins in the seventh century, but also to the new, highly conflictive differences that solidified during the formative period of the post-colonial states, conventionally fixed between 1928 and 1979. These conflicts continue up to the present in the form of a bitter contrast between two world views which may be summarized as follows: on the one hand, there are those who think it is possible to modernize and have open contacts with the rest of the world; on the other, there are those who feel that the only salvation for the people of the Middle East (and others, too) is the achievement of global Islam (Roy, 2002). Global

Islam compresses the cultural differences which history has established in the collective consciousness of entire generations, and finally restores a Muslim identity that is purified and pristine, unique and coherent, the premise for the re-building of a *global ummah*, and an alternative to the model proposed and imposed (at times by force) by the West.

Of the two dates in question, 1928 marks the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*) and 1979 the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The former was a grassroots movement that spread from Egypt to many other Muslim-majority countries (and even to some where Muslims are minorities, such as in Europe), but which has not achieved power. The latter achieved power in Iran and, in setting up the first modern Islamic state, was openly critical of the nation-state model that the post-colonial elites wished to bring about. There have been other attempts to re-found post-colonial states on an Islamic model, but up to now all have failed, often ending in bloodbaths and terror. Examples of this are the Sudan, torn apart by civil war, and Algeria, where the ISF (Islamic Salvation Front) attempted to achieve power democratically but was prevented by the Algerian army's *coup d'etat* in 1991. The army then went on to finish what has been called the eradication of fundamentalism from Algerian society, with all the ensuing violence and massacres. The most recent attempt was that of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan to set up a Muslim fundamentalist state, a rough and ready effort which proved anachronistic and authoritarian even before the arrival of "our boys" to demolish it by force of arms, following the bombing of the Twin Towers.

The various bloody conflicts which have taken place in the past few decades in many Middle Eastern countries have revealed that the two world views are now in open opposition. People are thus faced with a choice: they may opt for the *turban* of the new guardians of the faith who believe the time has come to re-establish the law of the Qur'an as the basis of society and the state; or they may choose the *helmet* worn by the modernizing elites who wield power with the help of the military and the police. Between these two ideological extremes, there exists a minority of people of 'reasonable' faith who are convinced that the reform of Islam cannot be delayed; that it should include historical and critical hermeneutics of the texts and holy sources, as well as an in-depth revision of Shari'a, which they believe is the outcome of a complex historical development rather than a divinely set legal code that can simply be applied.

The many contradictory positions in the socio-religious world of the Middle East, with its kaleidoscope of faiths, identities, cultures, political and religious movements, political formations, models of government and conflicting ideologies, make any attempt at *reductio ad unum* virtually impossible. Even our representation of polarized positions should be treated with due caution. The ideological and power conflict which is currently taking place in Middle Eastern countries is, in fact, the culmination of a number of tensions and contradictions which have intensified in the historically brief period since they have become independent sovereign states in their own right. Only sixty or seventy years have passed since the new political formations began their struggle to become independent nations: Iraq and Saudi Arabia were founded in 1932, Syria and Jordan in 1946, Lebanon in 1943, Kuwait in 1961, Yemen in 1967, and Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in 1971. Other states were established earlier, but often under the control of various European powers: for example, Iraq in 1921, Egypt in 1922, and Iran in 1925, all under the British Mandate or effective dominance (Fisk, 2005); whereas Syria (1920) and Lebanon (1920) were in the French sphere of influence.

This said, it is now important to understand the main changes which have occurred in these societies since the formation of the new national states, from both the socio-political and socio-religious viewpoints. These changes have produced profound rifts and crises, which may be seen as the underlying reasons for the polarization which divides people of Muslim faith and culture in the Middle East. Our interest, therefore, lies more in the examination of the endogenous reasons for the collapse of the social systems of Middle Eastern countries than in the exogenous ones, induced by international tension and the geo-political strategies of the great global powers as well as the small regional ones in the area in question (Ménoret, 2003).

Modernization and Global Islam: Social and Religious Conflicts

Let us focus our attention on two types of conflict. The first regards the social changes which took place in Middle Eastern countries roughly in the already discussed period from 1930 to 1980. In this period, and especially in the 1950s, elites imposed modernization *from above* with (sometimes unexpected) direct and indirect effects *from below*. Above

and below refer here to the fact that many Middle Eastern countries had in the past seen either colonial domination or a form of government founded on the principle of obedience to the *sovereign* or *colonel* in power.

The second type of conflict specifically involves the traditional aspect of the division of power between religion and politics. It should not be forgotten that the birth of modern Turkey in 1923 was marked by the express intention of its founder, Mustapha Kemal, to completely secularize the state, separating it completely from traditional institutions which governed the religious field. Moreover, in Egypt after 1950, Nasser sought to reduce the influence of the prestigious theological University of Al-Azhar, partly in line with the intellectual reformism which had arisen in the 1930s and 1940s (Zeghal, 1996).

Undoubtedly, one of the primary factors contributing to change in the first half of the twentieth century was urban migration from rural areas to the cities, some of which became veritable megalopolises. Apart from Cairo and Istanbul, which were already great capital cities (the former with its 15 million inhabitants and the latter with over 11 million), other cities also experienced rapid growth, including Tehran (8 million), Ankara (3.5 million), Damascus (over two million), Beirut (1.5 million), Riyadh (3.5 million), and San'a (1.5 million). The mass transfer of people from rural areas produced not only the chaotic growth of overcrowded suburbs, but also a deep cultural, religious and economic 'cleavage', to use Rokkan's term in his theory of modernization (Rokkan, 1999). The city made the gap between the semi-literate peasants and the urban classes even more pronounced, both as regards the urban middle class which existed even before the formation of the post-colonial states, and the new urbanized classes, with a higher educational level than previous generations. The effect that Gellner (1981) had already noted became more evident. Societies with a Muslim majority were, in fact, modernized by internal migratory pressure and the expansion of an urban economy and mentality. However, many found it hard to accept the fact that modernization upset the system of values of a religious tradition like Islam, which had been transmitted from generation to generation. Gellner writes:

> Only Islam survives as a serious faith pervading both a folk and a Great Tradition.... Its traditional internal differentiation into the folk and scholarly variants was actually helpful in effecting adjustment. The folk variant can be disavowed, blamed for cultural backwardness, or associated with the political machinations of colonial oppressors, whilst the *purer* variant

> can be identified all at once both with pristine origins and with a revived, glorious, modern future. The old Great Tradition became the folk version under modern conditions, which also made that folk far more numerous and far more weighty in the state. The old Great Tradition . . . helps that folk define itself against foreigners, against *westernized rules*, and against its own disavowed, backward rustic past. Thus in Islam, purification/modernisation on the one hand, and the reaffirmation of a putative old *local* identity on the other, can be done in one and the same language and set of symbols. (Gellner, 1981: 4–5)

These observations are correct, even though they attribute to Islam this simple dialectic between *above* and *below*, between the Great Tradition and popular religiosity. Islam is, in fact, a system of belief which, like other such systems, has seen the coexistence of various layers of belief, stemming from different traditions, pre-Islamic, Christian (such as the cult of saints) and Oriental. However, the distinction Gellner introduces enables us to see the basic socio-economic rift which has marked the past as well as, in part, the recent history of countries with a Muslim tradition: the rift between the city and the countryside. Only in recent times has the great shift of the rural population produced an inversion in the trend with highly significant social and economic consequences. Furthermore, to blame on internal divisions in Islam the failure to produce the pre-conditions or pre-requisites for launching the process of capital accumulation in Muslim countries is a highly problematic proposition. There are actually many examples of such countries which have succeeded in launching their economies, accepting the capitalist model of development while pursuing a path to modernization which is not necessarily that of the West (Eisenstadt, 2003). This is the case in Iran and Turkey, among the non-Arab countries, and similar processes may be noted in apparently more conservative countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.

The relatively rapid shift from a subsistence economy based on agriculture to new forms of industrial production (associated, in some cases, with the intensive extraction of oil) has caused both an increase in the tertiary sector (e.g. state bureaucracy, commerce and tourism, the spread of the professions) and the formation of new social classes (workers, businessmen and shopkeepers, technocrats and high-ranking bureaucrats trained either at military academies or within the apparatus of state, who often have direct control of the market and strategic economic sectors). This would account for the social and cultural turmoil which certain organized groups have filtered, interpreted and

criticized as a threat to an identity or a set of religious values attributable to Islam. The social and political protest movements which began in the late 1960s contested the model of society imposed by the ruling classes in countries such as Iran and Egypt. They realized that, in order to move the anonymous masses of the great cities, they had to use a language which touched the heartstrings of the people: the language of religious faith. It was evoked to serve as a new immediately comprehensible set of political semantics, which was, at the same time, capable of arousing strong emotions to mobilize political action. The politico-religious protest movements (which were first political and only later also religious) arose mostly in urban areas from 1979 to 1989. They were led by young university graduates (especially from natural science, medical, and engineering faculties) who began to mobilize the first activists in the suburbs of the great cities, university campuses and, sometimes, in the bazaars. They were by no means rural rebellions, but the product of urban modernization, and changes in the economy and social customs.

Historically, Islam was established in the cities: political and religious power resided there and around the seat of power there grew up the market (the *suq* or bazaar). However, in the Muslim world the city did not have the same function it did in Europe; the city elites did not succeed in changing the power and production relations which were deeply rooted in the country. As has been noted:

> The Maghreb or Middle Eastern city is not in a position of radical conflict with the rural or tribal world which surrounds it. On the contrary, it tends to establish links of continuity with the past, and even physical links between the urban and rural world, reconstructing within its walls networks of solidarity involving families, communities, or traditional tribes. The city… has thus ended up reflecting the fragmentation of ancient society. (Seurat, 1989: 207)

In other words, there is a big difference between the *communes* (self-governing cities) of medieval Europe and those of the Arab-Muslim world. It can be said of the former that "city air makes one free"; i.e. the city offers a relatively autonomous space for social and economic development on the strength of which there arose new social classes and organized forms of work and production (arts and crafts guilds), embryonic forms of civil society, relatively independent of political power. The Arab-Muslim city, on the other hand, as a prototype of ancient town-planning, interwoven with the history of Islam itself, has always suffered from one obvious limitation: the fact that economic and

productive organization was subject to political power and its needs (Labib, 1996).

This is perhaps why the recent great expansion of the cities has produced a deep social rift. In the past, the tension was between the city, as the center of power, and the countryside, the center of local powers, with which the former sought to reach a compromise or chose to enter into open conflict. Nowadays, however, social conflict is increasingly concentrated in the cities. Two scholars of contemporary urban dynamics have brought to light a special feature of this situation (Bustani & Fargues, 1990): many of those who arrive in the city follow the subtle thread of family ties which connects the new urban setting with the rural hinterland (the new arrival finds work through a relative who has preceded him/her or moves in with a brother or sister who had started the migratory chain). This creates a new social mix of urban lifestyles as well as reproducing the ties and mentality of the village community or the ethics of the clan. From the socio-cultural viewpoint, these new classes are 'halfway' between the city and the country. They are compelled to adapt to the new social order and the new economic rules which have gradually come into play over the past decades as the state has allowed greater room of manoeuvre to economic forces and the small and medium-sized firms which have sprung up almost everywhere. New economic elites have formed: a non-parasitical middle class, active in the world of business and production.

This social block, partially linked to state bureaucracy and the great productive conglomerates often controlled by military elites, would account for the drastic reduction in the role, status and economic significance of not only the classes traditionally linked to earnings from land and agriculture, but also the middle-class of civil servants formed under colonial domination. The rise of the new middle class and the parallel formation of a vast and diversified class of workers (factory workers, workers in service industries and commerce) mark the beginning of a process of real social change. And the rift between city and country symbolizes all the contradictions that this process entails.

Over the past twenty years, along with this urbanization, there has emerged a new generation of women who have completed their studies and avoided having the traditional role of wife and mother imposed on them. They are now attempting to enter the professions or the labour market in general, thus partially subverting the hierarchy of social roles. As well as the gender gap, there is also a generation gap

(Livi-Bacci, 1990; Leveau, 1993). For example, of 100 young people of both genders between the ages of 15 and 24 attending the high school at Rabat (admittedly, in Morocco), 63% never pray, let alone pray five times per day: only 9% observe this latter precept faithfully (Chekroun, 1990). More generally, young people tend not to feel part of the society formed by their parents' generation and try by various means to challenge authority, sometimes augmenting political protest through the discovery of a pure Islam, which is seen as the source of a cultural identity, as well as a religious one.

The city has thus become two things. On the one hand, it is a kind of transit camp, a place one passes through, for young people who were born and raised in an urban area because their parents had sought their fortunes in the great metropolis. These young people have been faced with the failure of their parents' hopes, hence their decision to try emigration. On the other hand, it is a place where all the social contradictions are represented; it is the scene of everyday routine poverty, discrimination, marginalization induced by widespread unemployment, as well as the vast gap between rich and poor, the centralized exploitation of resources, with wealth and well-being in the hands of the few, and so on. These are all signs of another failure: the failure of the new ruling class and economic elites, who have gained most from the process of economic modernization, to involve the younger generation or the less privileged urban classes in this new phase of expansion.

In a study carried out in the Maghreb (to date no similar studies are available for the Mashreq), the sociologist Moina Bennani-Chraibi (1997) investigated the younger generation in Morocco. The study reveals the growth of tension between attachment to the religious tradition and appreciation of modern (or perhaps, *westernized*) lifestyles in the urban centres which have seen the rise of youth protest movements. In the last few years, they have struggled against the rising unemployment and social marginalization which denies them the opportunity to find outlets for their education (schooling having spread considerably in the meantime). The author gives an accurate description of the mental and social state of young Moroccans:

> [investigating] urban youth is a privileged means for analysing the fragmentation and changes currently taking place in cities on the southern shores of the Mediterranean..... They operate in a place where Um Khaltum, Michael Jackson and the readers of the Qur'an compete for listening attention, where Islamic literature published in Cairo or Casablanca is on the shelf next to *Playboy* and *Femme Actuelle*. Liking a soap

> opera such as *Santa Barbara* does not stop them appreciating a religious *feuilleton*; putting on a pair of close-fitting jeans does not rule out the possibility of wearing a *jellaba* (a tunic-like Arab costume). Despite the classification which dress or behaviour would suggest, other signs show that we are dealing with a cultural *bricoleur,* engaged in constructing his or her own image. (Bennani-Chraibi, 1997: 173)

This picture also applies to many of the younger generation in the Mashreq, a sign of the discontinuity with their parents' generation. The division between generations manifests itself not so much in a return to the religion of the fathers, as in an expression of a subjective choice, halfway between being *born again* and the affirmation of a Muslim identity considered oppressed and threatened by the enemy within (the government, seen as corrupt and godless) as well as the enemy without, a vague notion of the West, generally identified with Israel and the USA. Within the generation conflict, women—and young women in particular—warrant special attention. One indicator of social change is the active role which women have played over the past thirty years. Even when they wear the veil (be it the simple *hijab* or the Persian *chador*), either because they are obliged to do so or of their own free will, they are not the same as before. They have not had the traditional roles of a patriarchal society thrust upon them. Their bodies are a battleground in the fight between reformers and restorers. In any case, veiled though they may be, there is no turning back. The education rate among women continues to grow; they enter the labour market (albeit with difficulty in some countries), play a role in public and political life, and have more say in marriage and family planning. In some countries, like Iran, they engage in theological studies and the hermeneutics of holy texts (Yavary-D'Hellencourt, 1998).

Conclusion

Middle Eastern society faces the new millennium full of contrasts. These may be summarized as the tension between the pressure of a widespread desire for change and participation in political life, on the one hand, and the fear of yielding to the temptation of resembling Western society, on the other. The real problem is how to become a democratic society without giving up one's roots in the Muslim religion. Paraphrasing the words of an eminent Iranian philosopher, Dariush Shayegan (1989), it can be said that the Middle East oscillates between

revolution and Islam. But when we speak of an Islamic revolution (as we do of Hindu or Buddhist revolutions nowadays) what do we mean? What do the people who live in the composite and pluralist societies of the Middle East mean by it? What is the significance given to this semantic pair? Which of the two words counts for more? 'Revolution' or 'Islam'?

The dilemma today is the same as it was at the beginning of Islamic reformism in the second half of the nineteenth century: Can Islam be entrusted with the task of making a world revolution to save the people oppressed by the West, thus sanctifying the revolution? Or, on the contrary, once the revolution is under way, would it not end up by historicizing the religion itself, transforming it, in a short time, into a political ideology and the ideological apparatus of the state? Thus, as Shayegan points out, by so doing, religion would fall into the trap of the cunningness of reason: in wishing to rise up against the West, it would itself become Westernized; in wishing to spiritualize the world, it would itself become secular; and in wishing to deny history, it would be completely sucked into the vortex of history.

In the Middle East today, each society oscillates, according to its own historical, social and political characteristics, between the temptation to cut loose from the West and place itself behind a shield of Islam, seen (or perhaps imagined) as a global faith which can stir different populations to rise up together, and the risk of impoverishing the cultural heritage of a great world religion, Islam. The many differences, even at a geo-political level, go to prove that the utopia of a global *umma* is as unachievable now as it was in the past. Be that as it may, the impoverishment of the social, cultural and religious pluralism in the Middle East represents a real danger not only for the Middle Eastern societies, but also for the relations between West and Middle East.

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Afe Adogame

Africa is one continent with several worlds, covering an area of around 30 million square kilometers, one-fifth of the earth's land mass, and including more than 50 countries. The 800 million plus people of Africa have evolved a cultural milieu which is a study in contrast and one with multiple dimensions. Africa is a vast continent characterized by complex cultural, religious, linguistic varieties as well as diverse historical experiences. It is home to innumerable ethnic and social groupings, some representing very large populations consisting of millions of people, others smaller groups of a few thousand. All these ethnic groups have cultures, each different from the other, but which together represent the mosaic of cultural diversity of Africa. Such ethnic and social groupings include the Ewe, Amhara, Ashanti, Bakongo, Bambara, Bemba, Berber, Bushmen/San, Chewa, Dogon, Fon, Fulani, Ibos, Kikuyu, Maasai, Mandinka, Pygmies, Samburu, Senufo, Tuareg, Wolof, Yoruba, and Zulu.

Sub-Saharan Africa, also labeled as Africa south of the Sahara or Tropical Africa, represents countries of predominantly black indigenous population that are not often considered within the geographical ambit of North Africa. There is perhaps no clear-cut defined geographical boundary between North and sub-Saharan Africa regions, owing to discontinuous and blurred break points between national boundaries, ecologies and ethnicities. Nevertheless, the sub-Saharan Africa context seems to have produced the most profound religious vitality, with interaction of the various indigenous religions with Christianity, Islam and other eastern- and western-related religious movements producing new religious constellations that have attracted more scholarly attention than anywhere else on the continent. North Africa has witnessed a longer, more ingrained history and imprint of Islam in a way that renders its interlocking with the indigenous religion less visible. The Islamic onslaught on the former Christian strongholds in North Africa has largely stripped it of much contemporary significance as a context for Christianity.

The perception of religion as a phenomenon completely separate from culture is not a suitable reflection of the embedded nature of 'religion' in African cultures. "The concept of religion is a sufficiently artificial or synthetic construct that its very creation is itself an implicit theorization of cultural realities" (Arnal, 2000: 22). Religion is variously conceptualized as a spiritual, epistemological and philosophical phenomenon. Beyond the typical focus on religion as a coterie of belief and ritual patterns, the treatment of religion as an epistemological phenomenon further helps to shed new light on studies of African cultures and societies. Religion viewed in this way allows for a deeper understanding of the complex interaction between Africans and non-Africans such as Europeans, an encounter largely based on frequently incompatible worldviews. As a category of analysis for the study of culture and society, religion is therefore quintessential to our understanding of African cultures in a global context. A proper grasp of the texture, shape and complexity of the different religious traditions improves our understanding of Africa and its religious culture in conditions of globality (Mbiti, 2002). It also points to the significance of religion in contextualizing Africa in the context of ongoing globalization processes. One important aspect of the interconnectedness between globalization and the religious cultures of sub-Saharan Africa lies in the fact that African religions both influence globalization and respond to the challenges and opportunities which globalization presents. On the one hand, African religions may be considered integral to the processes of globalization. They also assess the impact of globalization and global change on their modus operandi, their contemporary religious praxis and cosmologies; but at the same time avail themselves of the opportunity for self-repositioning within the global religious scene. Religious traditions have the capacity for self-reflexive critical thinking about globalization (Beckford, 2003).

The nexus between globalization, religion and culture in sub-Saharan Africa can partly be understood in terms of the legacy of colonial conquest and occupation, neocolonialism, and the introduction of Arab Islam and European Christianity. In actual fact, the trans-cultural encounter and exchange between Africa, Europe, the Americas and the Arab world has a long history that predates the fifteenth century and the era of the obnoxious human trafficking. Contacts between Europe and Africa in particular were constant throughout Europe's Antiquity, Middle Ages and the so-called Modern Age (Debrunner,

1997). European presence and interest in Africa through these periods have been largely mixed and split along the contours of commerce, politics and religion.

The global purview of African religions transcends the continent into the African diaspora. Contemporary 'African religion' is itself a product of globalization, for it is "less a single tradition than a sociological context in which the elements of a variety of indigenous religious experiences are combined with Islam and Christianity. All three of these dimensions—indigenous religion, Africanized Islam, and Africanized Christianity—are part of the interactive, globalized African religious experience" (Olupona, 2003: 78). The interface of religious cultures of sub-Saharan Africa with globality and globalization needs to be located against the backdrop of the interlocking relationship and mutual enhancement of the triple religious heritage rather than in any unilateral perspective. In other words, the growth and transformation of indigenous religion, Islam or Christianity can be better understood when considered within the locus of mutual religious interaction, competition and influence. These constellations have also produced new religious movements that are far from being identical with the triple religious heritage. Such new movements have appropriated symbols and employed religious imagery from one or the other religious tradition, giving them a novel interpretation and producing a new kind of religious creativity. The institutional stature, demographic mobility, and public visibility of these religious traditions in Africa and the African diaspora have shot them onto global religious maps of the universe. We map, very briefly, these religious developments below, particularly highlighting their interplay with globality and globalization. "In Africa, globalization has had a significant impact on traditions and cultural values, but at the same time African traditionalism retains a resiliency and adaptability that enables it to maintain cohesion both in non-Western environments and in the context of faiths such as Christianity and Islam" (Olupona, 2003: 79). Thus, African religions and cultures within the threshold of globality and globalization are characterized by their negotiation between continuity, change and transformation.

Indigenous Religions

African religions encompass the indigenous religions of the various African peoples and societies. They share common affinities in their religious ideas, rituals, and worldviews. Such themes as the belief in a transcendental reality—Supreme Being, divinities, spirits, ancestors, magic, sorcery and witchcraft are central. These beliefs and rituals constitute a distinctively African pattern of religious thought and action (Lawson, 1985). Some of these aspects, such as the idea and reality of a supernatural force, are common to non-African religions as well. The spread of Islam and Christianity saw the introduction of new religious ideas and practices into indigenous religions. The encounter transformed indigenous religious thought and practice but did not supplant it; indigenous religions preserved some of their beliefs and ritual practices but also adjusted to the new socio-cultural milieu. As a result of social and cultural change, some indigenous beliefs and rituals were either dropped or modified due to the impingement of European and Arab cultures, Christianity and Islam. The change also led to the revivification and revitalization of other aspects of the indigenous religion and culture. In many cases, Islam and Christianity became domesticated on the African soil. The contact produced new religious movements, with some appropriating indigenous symbols and giving them a new twist. African religion is itself a product of globalization as, in its widest sense, it now refers also to creativities within this triple religious heritage. These initiatives attest to the continuity of African worldviews and ritual cosmos in the midst of worldwide socio-cultural change (Olupona, 2000; Ray, 2000; Blakely, et al., 1994; Jules-Rosette, 1979).

With growing revitalization and internationalization of indigenous religions, many sub-Saharan peoples are beginning to appreciate their 'traditional' religions or engage in both 'indigenous' and other newer religions juxtaposingly. Indigenous peoples have experienced something of a religious revival and have become concerned with the preservation of their cultural and religious heritage. Communal rituals, ceremonies and festivals in commemoration of specific local divinities are becoming internationalized. The annual Osun-Oshogbo festival for the Yoruba Osun divinity has become an international event that attracts devotees and tourists from all parts of the world. This ritual has thus been transformed from an ethnic-based one, to one with international audience and participation. Indigenous religions have significantly influenced

world art, sculpture, painting and other cultural artifacts, which populate the world's famous museums, gallery, libraries, and art exhibitions. The commodification of indigenous art and religious objects is on the increase. European language vocabulary has been further enriched through loaned words, such as 'voodoo', from indigenous religions. Although usually dislocated from its 'religious' context, horticultural, culinary and medical knowledge has significant input from the indigenous African peoples and their epistemology.

The global dimension of indigenous religions is manifesting in varied forms. Most religions of sub-Sahara Africans have been introduced to new contexts through migration. The African diaspora, resulting from the trans-Atlantic slave trade, profoundly influenced the cultures of Brazil, Cuba, Haiti and the rest of the New World, partly leading to the development of African-derived religions such as the Santería (Lukumi, Macumba) in Cuba, the Candomblé Nago in Brazil, Vodun, Yoruba-Orisha traditions and other West African rooted traditions across the Americas. These religious forms are proliferating in the diasporic context, with the scope of practitioners and clientele widened multiethnically and multi-racially. As the various Yoruba-derived Orisha traditions in the West are assuming alternative forms of spirituality for Africans and a growing number of Americans and Europeans, this development is also leading to the importation of indigenous priests and diviners to the new context. Yoruba funerals reincorporate the dead as 'ancestors' in their London-centered community. Mama Lola, a Vodou priestess in Brooklyn, New York, is an interesting example of immigrant Vodou that emphasizes personal relationship with the spirit world (Brown, 1991). The growth of indigenous African religions in the US and Europe has been characterized by the proliferation of virtual-based religiosity in which most Orisha and Ifa priests exist, operate and communicate through their internet websites with old and new clientele as well as with the wider public. Quite interestingly, an internet browse of such religious-based websites would reveal faces of 'white' American or European rather than 'black' African people assuming the role of chief priests and founders of neo-indigenous religions such as Ifa and Orisha religions and other African-derived religions. This further informs the demographic shift from an autochthonous religion to a world, multiethnic conflagration. In this way, they cease to be religions in which people's membership is limited by birth to be traditions to which non-indigenes can convert.

Sub-Saharan Africa has served as a significant theatre for the dramatization of Islam and Christianity especially in the twentieth century. New religious ideas and practices followed the coming of the Arabs and Europeans. While Islam and Christianity, in their various forms, were carried to most of the African societies, they failed to eradicate the traditional religious thought and practices of those societies. Rather, the impingement of Islam and Christianity led on the one hand to the denigration of indigenous religions, culminating in their rejection and abandonment by some indigenous peoples. On the other hand, the encounter served as a catalyst for innovation and creativity thus portraying them as versions of African modernity. The Islamization and Christianization processes in the context of Africa can be clearly understood in their different phases of growth and development. A brief historical trajectory of Islam and Christianity in Africa will suffice here.

Islam

Islam penetrated sub-Saharan Africa in the eleventh century, long before the advent of European Christianity in the fifteenth century. Islam spread through North Africa by conquest, but the situation differed considerably in sub-Saharan Africa where it took on the insignia of trade and commerce. Islam vigorously pursued a conversion policy that became successful in several sub-Saharan countries over the centuries. Its spread to sub-Saharan Africa revealed its commercial and sometimes military outlook. The old caravan routes now carried Muslim merchants, teachers, and mystics who settled among the African peoples and states. Until about 1450, Islam provided the major external contact between sub-Saharan Africa and the world. The Islamization process also served to link sub-Saharan Africa more closely internally through trade, religion, and politics (Brenner, 1993; Rosander and Westerlund, 1997). West Africa, for example, experienced both the cultural influence of Islam and its own internal dynamic of state building and developments that produced, in some places, great artistic accomplishments. The formation of the powerful Western Sudanese states and empires, such as Mali, Ghana and Songhai, depended more on military power and dynastic alliances than on ethnic or cultural unity.

While West African kingdoms came under the influence of Islam from across the Sahara, another center of Islamic civilization was developing on the East African coast. Along that coast, a string of

Islamicized trading cities developed that reflected their cosmopolitan contacts with trading partners from Arabia, Persia, India, and China. The East African coast became increasingly incorporated into the Arab Muslim world, but even other parts of the continent reflected the power of Islamic thought and institutions. New linguistic cultures such as the Swahili, a synthesis of Arabic and Bantu languages, emerged. New centers of civilization and political power arose in several parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, prior to the introduction of Islam, there were many flourishing cultures. Dealing with those cultures made significant changes in Islam. It is often said that West Africa has a brand of Islam that is 'very African'. One distinctive feature of this Arabized Islam is the manner in which it was integrated into African cultural life. However, "the binary pairs of the local vs. imported; the Arab vs. African; the particular vs. universal, play a dominant role in the understanding of Islam in Africa. The history of these contrasting pairs is very old and persists" (Tayob, 2004: 242). Islam provided new influences and contacts without amalgamating African culture as a whole. The articulations of globalization have correspondingly triggered various manifestations of Islamic identities and new faces of Islamic revivalism in Africa (Brenner, 1993).

New religious, economic, and political patterns developed in relation to the Islamic surge, but great diversity remained. The dynamics of contemporary Muslim communities in sub-Saharan Africa could be expressed as "African Islam" and "Islam in Africa" (Rosander and Westerlund, 1997). The former refers to Muslim beliefs and practices that Africans have contextualized over the years, often under the guidance of Sufis, and the latter refers to the ideology of religious reform, usually articulated in the Islamist call for greater implementation of the *Sharia*. Islamic Sufi orders and movements such as the Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya, Ahmadiyya, Muridiyya, and Yan Izala emerged in sub-Saharan Africa, thus creating several Muslim identities. Muridiyya is claimed by its members as the first Brotherhood founded by a Cheikh from sub-Saharan Africa. Political Islam has also gained firm roots among Muslim communities and has become intricately connected to global discourses and networks. Muslims have transcended their local communities to form non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with a global view in mind. While drawing from local resources, many of these NGOs also solicit support from Muslim agencies and countries abroad. In the face of new, emerging global conditions, the reaction

of African Muslims through renewed efforts to maintain identity via Islamic *Shari'a* has sometimes generated severe religious tensions and crises especially in religiously pluralistic contexts such as Nigeria and Sudan. Local Islamic organizations have also proliferated, with many appropriating new media technologies to expand their ideologies as a global religion.

Overall, sub-Saharan Africa remained a varied and distinctive setting, parts of it drawn into new contacts with the growing world network. African Islam was spread to the diaspora through migration. Within the context of the historical African diaspora, enslaved Muslims from parts of Africa brought their religion to North America. Two of such religious groups that eventually emerged to challenge segregation in America and colonialism in Africa were the Moorish Science Temple (Timothy Drew) and the Nation of Islam (Wallace Fard, later known as Farrad Mohammed). Contemporary migration has brought many African Muslims to Europe and North America where they have joined other Muslim immigrants in furthering religious diversification of the host societies. For instance, Somalis, Sudanese and Senegalese Muslims have migrated to Europe and North America particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. Muridism, an integral part of the Sufi Order, has spread around the multi-sited migration network and evolved (Salzbrunn, 2004: 489). In these new host contexts, Islam plays a crucial role for immigrants as a repository of emotional and spiritual support. It represents an important source of social and cultural 'capital' for immigrants in a new environment. Mosques and religious community centers have been built or acquired as venues for corporate prayer rituals and other programs. The presence of religious references in public spaces is becoming more visible particularly in the US and Europe. Salzbrunn (2004) shows how the Murids managed to use the local administrative rules (like the access to public space for religious communities) and the specific symbols of belonging to the American citizenship (through the Proclamation of Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Day) in order to become a part of Harlem in New York. Apart from the erection of mosques, Muslim immigrants are also acquiring multi-purpose properties such as the 'House of Islam' of the Murid Islamic Community of America Inc. (MICA) in Harlem, New York. The multi-storey building houses a mosque, the Masjid Touba Islamic School for Children, and residential wings for its Cheikh, other dignitaries and visitors. Members perceive the 'House of Islam' as a symbol of Murids' hospitality and openness.

Generally, Muslim immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa share an identity and maintain some links with fellow Muslims in the new context. There are, however, noticeable tensions between them and Arab Muslims or those from North Africa and the Middle East. Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa appear marginal both within the specific context of the African Muslim immigrant community and the larger Islamic communities in diaspora. They constitute a minority of Muslims in Europe and the USA. Attempts to integrate into a wider, multicultural Islamic community present a challenge, such as that experienced in the central/community mosque often dominated by Muslims from North Africa, South Asia and the Middle East. The tensions and suspicions evoked by this feeling of under-representation, race, and lack of access to power sometimes lead to a tendency towards the privatization of religion. In this case, such disillusioned Muslims scorn Friday prayers (*Jumat*) and other communal services in favor of private prayer rituals; and also celebrate holidays or study the Qur'an within the confines of their private homes, where they can practice Islam on their own terms. Another contrast between these two communities is in the appropriation of Islamic practice and public visibility, particularly of women. For instance, the wearing of veils by women is most common among women of North African and Middle Eastern origin. Muslim women of sub-Saharan African origin (which largely excludes Somalis) are less likely to wear a veil, although some do wear scarves, which may sometimes have more of a cultural than religious significance.

A popular feature of Muslim immigrant groups, such as the Sufi Murid Brotherhood from sub-Saharan Africa, is their appropriation of various print and electronic media in the recruitment of new clientele, but also in the dissemination of their religious messages and ideologies. Christian communities in Africa and its diaspora, as we shall see below, have adopted similar evangelistic strategies, particularly with their use of new media technologies such as the Internet. Thus, the growth process of the triple religious heritage in Africa and the diaspora becomes intelligible in the light of mutual influence and exchange.

Christianity

The earliest known presence of Christianity in Africa is in Late Antiquity, the period from the first century onwards when North Africa was

an important location for the developing Christian tradition. Christianity had been firmly rooted in North Africa by the beginning of the fourth century (Kalu, 2005; Isichei, 1995). One inherent weakness of the Church, however, was its superficial penetration, as a Latinized brand of Christianity was devoid of features of an African Church. It failed to be a missionary church and to reach into the life of the indigenous peoples. The Church later traversed hard times in the encounter with expanding Islam, in the wake of which it was unable to gain inroads into the developing Muslim population. Although the Church established a significant presence in places such as Egypt and Ethiopia, the Church elsewhere in North Africa was insufficiently resilient to prevent its deterioration and subsequent demise during the eighth century.

Following this debut of Christianity in Africa was the second Christianization phase, which occurred several centuries later in sub-Saharan Africa (Kalu, 2005; Isichei, 1995; Hastings, 1994; 1979). The late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessed the activities of Portuguese Catholics in some African societies such as the Congo Kingdom in the Zambezi valley in Central Africa, the Warri and Benin Kingdoms of the Niger Delta area on the West African Coast, and the hitherto unpopulated islands of Cape Verde and São Tomé. As the Reformation Churches did not engage in a missionary enterprise to Africa prior to the Evangelical revival of the late 18th and 19th centuries, the Catholic missionaries from Portugal were alone in the task of introducing a few African societies and converting some 'natives' to Christianity. Aside from this religious activity, the Portuguese were not unmindful of the economic (i.e. trade in slaves) and political gains inherent in this venture. Church and State worked hand in hand to realize these possibilities. Wherever the Portuguese flag was hoisted, the Jesuits and other missionaries were close behind and established missions.

Protestantism had a strong foothold in Africa well before 1800, at the Cape, where the Dutch had formed a settlement already in 1652. Later in the century French Huguenots arrived and a number of the slaves were baptized. Organized Protestant missionary activity began in 1737 when Georg Schmidt of the Moravian Brethren came to South Africa, and the latter half of the eighteenth century witnessed the beginning of British missions in Africa. The period from the late eighteenth century onwards witnessed a remarkable proliferation of Protestant missionary societies, many of which later became profoundly interested in the business of 'spreading the gospel' to African shores. Some of the Protestant missionaries of the eighteenth century, like their Catholic predecessors,

played a role in the slave trade, collaborating with the traders in the business. In the context of the 18th and 19th century evangelical revival, however, the anti-slavery movement succeeded in bringing the full effect of the slave trade into the limelight. Moreover, by the late eighteenth century, the majority of Africans carried overseas into slavery had become core or nominal Christians. Many found Christianity a unifying and strengthening force, and thus played strategic roles in the anti-slavery campaigns as well as in the latter propagation of Christianity to their fellow Africans. When some of them later resettled in Africa, it was the freed African slaves who spearheaded the task of evangelization to their original homes. Notable among them were Samuel Ajayi Crowther, leader of the Yoruba Christians, the Christians of Buganda and Madagascar, the African Christians of Southern Africa, to mention a few. From the late 1780s on, Protestant Christianity would impinge upon Africa in a new and far more dynamic way.

The modern phase of the missionary enterprise in Africa began with the foundation of the Baptist Missionary Society (BMS) in 1792, the London Missionary Society (LMS) in 1795, and the Church Missionary Society (CMS) in 1799. The process continued with the establishment of the British and Foreign Bible Society (BFBS) in 1804, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) in 1810, the Leeds Methodist Missionary Society (LMMS) in 1813, the Basel Mission in 1815, and many others several years later. While most of these new Protestant mission societies differed considerably in their forms of organization, they were overwhelmingly evangelical in character. The missionary concerns of these bodies were not limited to the African continent, but international in scope, with each society mapping and developing a particular regional focus for actual mission work. At their inception, the evangelical missions demonstrated a high level of mutual cooperation. The story, however, turned sour in the mission field where there often existed an element of rivalry between some mission bodies. In the final analysis, these decades of missionary endeavor produced only a small number of African converts.

The Berlin Conference of 1884–5 began the heyday of European imperialism in Africa. This formalization of the European partition of Africa brought in its wake a dramatic expansion in the number of missionaries in Africa, missionaries who often supported the imperial ambitions of their compatriots. Mission and imperialism became widely understood as but 'two sides of the same coin'. The missionizing task became synonymous with the transplantation of western civilization.

The implication of this development was that African converts were taught to repudiate African culture in its entirety and assume a new status of, for instance, a 'Europeanized African'. This was the quandary that lay at the very core of the missionary enterprise. The question was: To what extent should an African adopt western civilization? To what extent should s/he abandon the African culture in order to embrace the 'white man's faith'? It was the attempt at reconciling these inherent contradictions within mission Christianity that manifested itself in a new phase of indigenous Christianity in Africa. Thus, the expansion of Christianity that took place in the twentieth century was largely the work of African evangelists.

The West African coast was the first breeding ground for the indigenous African Churches, just as it had fulfilled the same function for the mission churches earlier. The development of African indigenous or independent churches, however, has gone through three distinct phases. The earliest strand consisted of churches, mainly in West and South Africa, which, beginning in the late 19th century, broke from the existing mission churches owing to a number of irreconcilable issues. The points of contention with the mission churches were in all cases similar: rigid white (European) missionary control and domination, discrimination against local African agency, disputes over resources, a general feeling of marginalization among educated Africans, and effective apartheid policies (mainly in the South African context). Nigerian examples include the United Native African Church (1891) and the African Church (Bethel) (1901) that separated from the Anglicans, and the United African Methodist Church (1917) that left the Methodist church. Nearby, on the Gold Coast (today's Ghana), branches of the African Methodist Episcopal Church—Zion (1898), the Nationalist Baptist Church (1898), and the Nigritian Church (1907) established themselves. One notable feature of these churches, however, was that, in spite of the change in the mantle of church leadership, they were still tied to the apron strings of the mission churches in their liturgical and hierarchical structures. Some of them still depended largely on the parent churches for financial resources.

The next phase gave birth to more completely independent African indigenous churches (AICs) from the 1920s and 1930s onwards (Adogame and Jafta, 2005; Adogame, 2005c). These groups emerged under the initiative of African leaders and prophets outside the immediate context of mission churches. They include the Zionists in South Africa,

the Aladura in Nigeria, the Roho/Arathi in East Africa, and the Spirit or Spiritist movements in Ghana. They are also variously referred to as prophetic and healing churches. The most dramatic aspect of twentieth century Christianity in South, East and West Africa was in fact the growth of these prophetic churches. This category shares basic characteristics that helped to create a distinctly African brand of Christianity. The centrality of the Bible, prayers, healing, prophecy, visions and dreams, elaborate rituals, flexible modes of worship and un-stereotyped liturgy, and a charismatic leader (i.e. prophet or prophetess) are some of the basic features of these churches. They embrace a functional theology and their pragmatic approach to life and existential problems made them attractive to a great many Africans. Although they completely reject African traditional religious traditions as 'fetishist' and 'demonic', their belief systems and ritual structure nonetheless have clear affinities with the cosmology of the Africans. That is why they derive much of their membership not only from within the mainline churches, but also from other both Christian and non-Christian groups (namely Islam and African Traditional Religion).

In spite of the affinities that abound among the prophetic churches, it is important to note that each has its own religious dynamic. There are differences in specific doctrines and details of ritual acts and performance, just as there are in their histories of emergence. Their pattern of emergence is two-fold. The first are those that emerged from or had their nucleus as 'prayer bands' or 'fellowship groups' within the mainline church, but later severed to form an entirely independent group. In Nigeria, the Garrick Braide Movement was the earliest in this category. As early as 1916, it broke away from the Niger Delta Pastorate Church. Other churches that fall under this category include the Cherubim and Seraphim (1925), the Church of the Lord—Aladura (1930), the Christ Apostolic Church (1930). There is also the Musama Disco Christo Church (1922) in Ghana, the Nazarite Baptist Church (called Nazarites or ama-Nazaretha) founded by Isaiah Shembe (1911) in South Africa. The second category refers to those groups that did not emerge in conscious schism from an existing mainline church. They were founded through the visionary experience of a charismatic figure, and independently of any existing mission church. Typical examples are the Celestial Church of Christ founded by Samuel Bilewu Oschoffa (1947), the Harrist Churches by William Wade Harris (1922), and the Kimbaguist Churches by Simon Kimbangu (1921). Most of the

indigenous churches of both categories now belong to a continental ecumenical movement referred to as the 'Organisation of African Instituted Churches' (OAIC).

The most recent development within African Christianity is the emergence and increasing proliferation of Pentecostal (Charismatic)/Evangelical Churches, especially from the 1950s and 60s onwards. Over the last two decades Nigeria has experienced particularly extensive growth in this category. In an attempt to forge ecumenical links and cooperation among themselves, and with other churches, the majority of these Pentecostal churches have now come under the umbrella organization called the 'Pentecostal Fellowship Association of Nigeria' (PFAN). There have been two waves of Pentecostal movements, the indigenous Pentecostal groups such as the Redeemed Christian Church of God, the Deeper Life Bible Church, Church of God Mission International, Winners Chapel, Rhema Bible Church, Christ Chapel, Zoe Ministries, Latter Rain Assembly, the Household of God Fellowship; and those such as the Four Square Gospel Church, the Full Gospel Businessmen Fellowship International, Campus Crusade for Christ, Youth with a Mission, and Christ for all Nations, which exist as branches or missions of Pentecostal churches and organizations outside Africa. The former are largely independent and rely on hardly any external assistance, while many of the latter depend to a large extent on funds, literature, and sometimes personnel from their mission headquarters. The former have also embarked on transnational mission activities by planting branches in the U.S.A., Canada, Europe, and other parts of the world.

One underlying feature of the Pentecostal Churches is the emphasis on the need for a specific conversion experience, spiritual rebirth (born againism), and the manifestation of charismatic gifts such as speaking in tongues (glossolalia). Some are more or less 'holiness movements', more interested in religious experience than in rituals. There are those which are noted for the kind of 'prosperity gospel' they preach. This is becoming very popular especially among Nigerians and (white) South Africans. The 'gospel of prosperity' teaches that God is a rich God and intends his followers to prosper in all their endeavors in life. It promises a miraculous escape from poverty, unemployment, ill-health, lack of promotion, examination etc. One 'short-cut' to riches is thus by tithing and giving to the poor and less privileged. Some of these groups have assimilated ideas and features originating from American Pentecostalism. On the other hand, their commitment to the gospel of prosperity fits in well with certain values of the African traditional culture, where

elaborate religious rituals are performed in order to ensure prosperity, health, and protection against the malevolent forces. That is why Christian groups such as the Pentecostal churches, the Aladura or prophetic churches, which seek to address these day-to-day, existential problems, will continue to expand in contemporary Africa.

The AICs and the Pentecostal/Charismatic churches have also shaped African Christianity through their increasing involvement on the wider global stage. They have increasingly taken to proselytizing in North America and Europe, viewing the regions as 'new abodes' and promising 'mission fields' (Adogame, 2005a: 504). There are also groups existing as branches of mother churches headquartered in Africa; and others founded by African migrants in the diaspora. Examples include the Redeemed Christian Church of God, with headquarters in Nigeria; and the Kingsway International Christian Center in East London. Both have a huge African membership with few non-Africans. The Embassy of the Blessed Kingdom of God for All Nations in Kiev, Ukraine, is a typical example of an African-led church with a majority non-African membership. Such African religions are significant within the framework of globalization, owing to the unique expression of African Christianity they exhibit—a feature that could be described as their self-assertion and as the global preservation of their religious identity (Adogame, 2003). They constitute international ministries that have implications on a global scale. As part of an increasing phenomenon of what they term 'mission reversed' or 'remissionization of Christianity to a secularized West', these African churches have systematically set out to evangelize the world. Notions of globalization and globality are appropriated as theological and ideological constructs, and thus feature prominently in their mission statements and strategies, as well as sermon rhetoric—although these notions are used and understood differently. It is common to find churches defining themselves as 'global churches' and their mission as 'global tasks'.

African Diasporic Religions

African migration is a significant ingredient in and consequence of globalization (Adogame and Weisskoeppel, 2005). The mobility of this demographic group forms an integral part of the global phenomenon of international migration, serving as a viable instrument of religious and cultural expansion. The Western imperial expansionist agenda

generated new situations and circumstances that acted as a catalyst for diaspora formation. As a result, Africans from early on found themselves on the shores of other continents, Europe and the New World in particular, where they formed enclaves and communities. African diaspora is one theoretical construct to describe this global dispersal of indigenous African populations at different phases of world history. Gilroy contextualizes the voluntary and involuntary migration of Africans to Europe, Latin America and North America since the Age of Discovery through the idea of the 'Black Atlantic' (Gilroy, 1993). The breadth of African diaspora even transcends the popular geographical fixation on Europe and the New World and includes the Mediterranean and Arab worlds as well as the cross-migration within the African continent itself. Exploration, slave trade, colonialism, poverty, cultural exchange and ecological disasters all contributed to this African diaspora. The emergence of communities corresponds to the different waves of emigration. The earliest strata aggregated young, virile, able-bodied Africans mopped up in the obnoxious web of human trafficking and catapulted involuntarily to various metropolises in Europe, the Americas, and the Mediterranean and Arab geo-spaces. The survivors of this excruciating ordeal, their descendants, and slave remnants after nineteenth century abolition constituted the first African diaspora enclaves. Physical contact between Africa and the West increased in frequency in the nineteenth century. Decades-long agitation for overseas colonies as settlement areas, sources of raw materials, and markets for the manufactured goods preceded the colonial politics of the 1880s and the subsequent dissecting of Africa. Thus, a second coterie of African diaspora communities may be located in the wave of migrants that swelled as a consequence of the Berlin-Congo 1884/5 Conference's official partition of the African continent into artificial geographical zones of European influence, exploitation and expropriation. The Inter-war years (1914–1945) and its aftermath also brought about demographic shifts within and beyond Africa (Debrunner, 1997).

African religions were exported and transmitted into new geo-cultural contexts. For example, African slaves and migrants of diverse origins retained their religious symbolisms and worldviews. Their contact with other European and Native American religions from the 16th century onward resulted in a complex synthesis that produced African-derived religions such as Cuban Santería, Brazilian Candomblé, Haitian Voodoo, and Orisha and Ifa traditions. Some of them have transcended ethnic precincts. What used to be confined to geo-ethnic boundaries

is increasingly turning into proselytizing religions. For instance, Ifa priests and devotees now include Africans and non-Africans alike. Umbanda, the Afro-Brazilian religion, was a synthesis of religious elements from West Africa, South America, and Western Europe. This enabled Umbanda to embrace a wider following, while at the same time retaining much of its religious identity. The proliferation of these religions has helped bring about a spirit of nostalgia where people of African descent are charting new paths towards rediscovering their ancestral homelands in Africa. The African American community has been integral to the reshaping of the American religious mosaic. In the context of slavery and the racial discrimination witnessed by the historical African Diaspora in late 18th and early 19th centuries, America gave birth to a number of African-American Methodist, Baptist and Presbyterian denominations. The modern Pentecostal movement in the United States began in 1906 with William J. Seymour, a black holiness preacher.

Networks

Local and global religious networks are assuming importance for religions both in Africa and the diaspora (Adogame, 2003). The range and nature of these intra- and inter-religious networks include new ecumenical affiliations, pastoral exchanges, prayer networks, financial support, special events, and conferences. Religious and social ties among African migrants, and between migrant religions and their home context, have local and global implications. Some of these groups frequently organize programs that are local in nature but which have a global focus that links them with others worldwide. The increasing vigor geared towards charting and maintaining intra-religious networks is linked to religious, social, political as well as economic concerns. The motivations for joining or engaging in intra-religious networks are complex and vary. Most African churches see this tendency as a vital strategy for global mission and evangelism. Others undertake such processes as a necessary way of acquiring status improvement within the host society (Adogame, 2003: 24–41).

African religions in diaspora are increasingly appropriating new communication technologies in the transmission of their religious messages, particularly making their presence known on the World Wide Web. The religious websites have become a conscious strategy of self-insertion and

identification within global religious landscape. They also represent an alternative evangelistic medium to recruit new clientele. Although, these goals may appear somewhat ambitious and utopian to attain, yet the religious groups are demonstrating enthusiasm towards the realization of their global vision. The recourse by African religions in diaspora to new, alternative recruitment strategies is intricately tied to new, global socio-cultural realities. More personal modes of communication are systematically giving way to more impersonal modes such as computer websites and electronic mail. The urgency that these alternative modes demand in the western context is reflected in the fact that virtually all these websites have been established, developed and maintained in Europe, the USA or elsewhere outside Africa (Adogame, 2004a; 2005a).

Social Relevance

With the proliferation of African religions—indigenous religions, African Christianity and African Islam—in virtually all parts of the world, Africa has become fully part of a global cosmos in religious terms. For instance, African immigrant churches in western societies, particularly Europe, have assisted the renewed salience of Christianity (Adogame, 2004b). The relevance of African churches is not only located in the unique expression of African Christianity they exhibit, they also constitute international ministries and groups that have implications on a global scale. The significance of the 'exportation' of African churches, driven by a vision of winning converts, is that it offers a unique opportunity to analyze its impact at local levels such as in diaspora. African churches have yet to make remarkable incursions into the white populations. Largely responsible for this lack of a cross-cultural appeal are myriad contextual factors such as accommodation problems, language barriers, hostility of neighbors, poor economic base, fluid membership, status of churches in host contexts, and immigration regulations. The changing face and character of contemporary migration has occasioned new problems and challenges for African churches in diaspora. However, African churches in diaspora have made some inroads into the religious life of local mainstream churches. The influence exerted has resulted in joint worship services and programs as well as the "exchange of pulpits" (Adogame, 2005a: 508; 2003: 34). The liturgical revolution of the African churches and their display of charismatic propensities draw some attention from the local publics.

Many African churches are increasingly taking up extra-religious functions such as social welfare programs within the diaspora context (Adogame, 2004a; 2004b). Thus, their focus is not only the spiritual wealth of members but their social, material and psychological well-being as well. Beyond their church vicinity, they have taken up functions such as the regeneration and rehabilitation of drug-addicted youth in the society, of the socially displaced, underprivileged, refugees, and asylum seekers. African churches in diaspora today display a significant model of African Christianity in the way they organize themselves, with features emanating from both their new contexts as well as their African heritage. Their character and maturity are evident, as they have grown to acquire immense properties and real estate. For instance, the Embassy of God Church acquired between 15 and 51 hectares of land (total area: 140,000 square meters) in Kiev to erect a magnificent edifice for multi-religious purposes. The Redeemed Christian Church of God—North America recently acquired a multimillion-dollar property of over 400 hectares of land in Dallas, Texas for the construction of a Redemption Camp in the US similar to the Nigerian camp located on the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway. In London, the Kingsway International Christian Centre (KICC) plans "to build a 5,000-seater church building and a four floor office—a state-of-the-art facility to provide: 5,000 seats for worship, 1,000 place children's church, 600 place teenage church, a counseling and prayer center, class rooms for Bible School, 100 place nursery, 400 seater restaurant, a fully equipped gym, a place for the total healing of the total man and the total nation" (KICC, 2007). In many large cities such as London, New York, Hamburg, Paris, Cologne, Amsterdam, and Berlin erstwhile warehouses, abandoned church buildings, cinemas, disco halls and public houses have been acquired at huge financial costs. Some were procured out-right while others were leased or rented for several years.

There is a growing acquisition and renegotiation of space, whereby 'desecrated space' is acquired and resacralized for ritual ends. African churches have erected buildings of their own, and others leasing hotel premises have turned them into temporary ritual spaces pending the acquisition of a permanent place. Some churches have also acquired fleets of cars and buses that are either used by members for church official purposes, or for commercial purposes as hire/rentals. Business centers, lodging and accommodation, religious book centers, guidance and counseling units, recreation and rehabilitation centers, cyber-cafés and computer training centers, musical halls, video and audio cassette

shops, and shopping malls are also owned by these churches. The KICC and the Embassy of God are examples of African churches that have even proposed religious banks to "empower God's people economically, and promote the Kingdom of God" (Adogame, 2005a: 509). Such extra-religious activities no doubt have immense religious, social and economic import for the churches as well as for the immediate environment and communities in which they are located. This development suggests that some of these churches have come of age in this new cultural environment.

Mission-related churches in Africa have also acted in ways that put them on the global map. For example, the increasing popularity of the faith-healing ministry of the Zambian Catholic Archbishop Emmanuel Milingo has provoked anxiety at the Vatican and has social and theological implications for the Catholic Church globally because it demonstrates one of the ways in which contextualization and inculturation processes have taken place within African Catholicism. The anti-gay stance of the Anglican Church of Nigeria (the largest Anglican community outside of England) on the ordination of homosexual Bishops by the main Anglican body—as well as the blessing of same-sex unions in the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada—has drawn local and global attention. The character of African religions in conditions of globality will continue to be determined and shaped by how and to what extent they negotiate continuity, identity, and change.

In conclusion, the growth and global influence of each of the triple religious heritages of sub-Saharan Africa needs to be understood against the backdrop of mutual influence and exchange between the indigenous religions, Christianity and Islam at various historical epochs. On the other hand, this religious dynamism must also be located within religious, political, socio-economic interactions and developments outside the immediate context of Africa. The global stature of African Christianity is largely indicative of significant, contemporary shifts in the religious center of gravity of Christianity from the north to the southern hemisphere. Demographic considerations, the flavour and texture of contemporary African Christianity confirm this trend (Kalu, 2005). Nevertheless, a consideration of this religious development in Africa must be seen in terms of its relation and links with the global context, but also in how and to what extent it interrogates and negotiates wider external influences and global forces. In addition, the ways in which African diasporic religions of Indigenous, Christian and Islamic orientations are contributing to the enrichment, diversification

and pluralization of new geo-cultural and religious spaces becomes more and more significant. The diaspora setting provides a new space for the contestation, reinvention and shaping of these indigenous religious ethos, polity, rituals and worldviews in the face of globality.

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RELIGIONS IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

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Introduction

The religious landscape of Europe is central to discussions about the place of religion in contemporary world society. Among the reasons for this is that Europe has historically exerted the strongest influence, including in the religious realm, upon the rest of the world. This becomes evident when considering the worldwide expansion and 'globalization' of European Christianity in modern times. In addition, according to some theorists (Waters, 2002; Gunn, 2003), the 'globalization process' begins with the start of (Western) European colonialism and overseas expansion from the fifteenth century onwards. (Western) European modernity, including the nation-state, capitalist economy, science and technology, was gradually exported to the rest of world. It thus became instrumental in changing radically non-European societies and in creating the 'modern world system'. Yet in the long run this process was transformed through interaction and fusion with local cultures. In this regard, globalization should not be viewed as an extension of (Western) European modernity, based on a strictly Eurocentric perspective. The outcome was not the simple and unilateral Westernization of the globe, but the creation of various 'local modernities', which in turn affected (Western) European modernity as well (Beyer, 1994: 52–54). The globalization discourse should thus be distinguished from the modernization paradigm. Moreover, the globalization process accelerated after World War II and continues today. Around the world, people have become increasingly aware of the global system and its multiple consequences, including the emergence of common transnational patterns, especially in the areas of global polity, communication and economy.

This ongoing process also presents significant challenges for conventional religions, and may be leading to significant religious change, including in Europe as it also experiences more intense interaction with the rest of the world. This became evident again most recently in light of the so-called 'cartoon-conflict', itself in many ways reminiscent of

the Salman Rushdie affair of 1989. In this case, the September 2005 publication in the Danish daily, *Jyllands-Posten*, of twelve caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad set off heated anti-Western reaction from outraged Muslims worldwide, but also found substantial support among the Western press. For many Muslims, the cartoons were an act of ridicule and sacrilege that demonstrated Western disdain and insensitivity for Islam and the cultural and religious values of others. For many in the West, by contrast, it was a matter of freedom of speech and expression, a human right for which the Western world had struggled over many centuries. The conflict therefore appeared to express the persistent differences between the West and Islam, emphasizing their alleged and notorious incompatibility. From another perspective, however, the episode was less a matter of religio-cultural incompatibility, than it was about fundamental values. One wonders, for example, if equally strong reactions would not have been elicited from the West if one of its—not necessarily religious—'sacred values' had been parodied, values such as individual freedom or (gender) equality.

Such possibilities notwithstanding, the conflict made clear the contemporary global condition. First, European culture and religion are not alone in the world. What happens on this continent can have an immediate impact anywhere on the globe. Second, transnational bonds link European and non-European religious actors, especially through the relation between diaspora and homelands. The first reactions in the 'cartoon-conflict' came from the small Muslim immigrant minority in Denmark. Since these had little effect, Danish Muslims transferred the conflict to the Muslim heartlands outside Europe, with well-known violent consequences. In shifting the conflict from an initially local to a genuinely global one, the affair reverberated onto European religion and culture.

A thorough treatment of the impact of globalization on religions, church policies, religious minorities, and everyday religious beliefs and orientations in Europe is beyond the scope of a single paper. The burgeoning literature on the varied and complex religious landscape of Europe reflects its multifaceted nature. One can, however, single out certain determinative characteristics of the religious situation in contemporary Europe with regards to globalization. What follows represents an effort in this direction using regional and more systematic perspectives.

Christianity in Western Europe

An overview can begin by considering certain historical developments that lend the Western Europe of today several unique characteristics, vis-à-vis other parts of the world. If one notes that the continent was dominated by the Roman Catholic Church and then also by Protestant churches in the wake of the Reformation, this is not to claim that Europe is exclusively Christian and thus excludes other religions. Yet it would be misleading to deny that the current situation in Western Europe owes much to Christianity. What is perhaps unique for Western Europe is that its Christian establishment entered modern times in strong tension with other socio-cultural forces, including the state. The numerous efforts on the part of the latter to limit Christian societal influence have generally been subsumed under the notorious idea of 'secularization'. Yet, even though they have not disappeared completely, these centuries-old conflicts have lessened and take significantly different form today. Rather than being considered an obstacle to societal development, Christianity is now seen as a necessary and useful partner. For example, both the construction of a viable civil society and debates on bio-ethical issues have included Christianity as an important actor. Such a perspective would have been impossible during the Enlightenment. This change in orientation must be understood in light of the impact of the global environment, it having become more or less obvious that societal processes in Western Europe are not immune from global influences and that therefore religion should be treated from a global perspective. This, in turn, virtually ignores the concept of secularization, at least in its West European version.

It is not by accident that West European Christianity has been seeking a stronger public role in the last decades. There appears, in fact, to be a global trend towards so-called "public religions" (Casanova, 1994), which seek enhanced broad public responsibilities and refuse to accept societal marginalization. Although there are conflicts, these take a different form than in the past. Today, Christianity expresses its own, sometimes controversial, views but without seeking to dominate the public sphere or demand absolute allegiance. The churches have learned to accept the multiple and divergent voices of a pluralist context. As a result, its renewed public role is no longer perceived as a threat by other societal sectors. In this regard, it is not surprising that West European Christianity lacks strong fundamentalist movements (Davie,

2000a: 460–461), unlike the USA where the Christian Right remains quite significant (Beyer, 1994: 114–134).

Recent discussions about a common European constitution can illustrate this situation. One hotly debated issue concerned the allegedly Christian character of Europe, which many, including Christian churches, wanted explicitly mentioned in the preamble of this constitution. Such a plan met with the opposition of various secularist political actors and non-Christians in Europe. Despite Christian church solidarity and appeal for common action, the Christian response was rather weak and emanated mostly from Eastern Europe, the Polish Catholics in particular. Even Pope John Paul II, although supportive, did not seem to consider this issue that fundamental. As a result, the disagreement did not lead to worsened relations between the Christian churches and the European Union. In the end, the preamble of the European Constitution, ratified by all member states in 2004, made reference to the cultural, religious and humanistic heritage of Europe in an abstract way that allowed divergent interpretations.

But how do West European Christian churches react to the present global situation? To begin, the Roman Catholic Church has historically had its own tradition of 'globality' as expressed in the word itself: it claimed to be 'catholic', meaning universal. The conditions of globalization, however, have made it possible to be catholic or global in a new and literal sense. Following Casanova's (1997; 2001: 431–434) insightful analysis, during the Middle Ages, the Roman Catholic Church did have a supra-national function as seen, for instance, in the pan-European role of its religious orders. With the rise of the modern nation-states, however, its range of influence was limited considerably. From the nineteenth century onwards, it thus followed a more adaptive policy, initially making arrangements with particular nation-states, but then, after World War II, moving from the nation-state to the global, transnational level. It transformed into a global religious organization addressing all people regardless of religious affiliation, intervening publicly on numerous issues, both religious and non-religious. The new orientation became evident in the papal encyclicals that dealt not only with matters of faith, but also with secular issues affecting the world as a whole (e.g. human rights); through active papal interventions on issues of world peace, environment, social order and politics; and finally, through the public visibility of the Pope as the 'First Citizen' of an emerging global civil society. Here we have a religion which managed a transition from the nation-state to global society. Its religious leaders adopt and adapt

discourses on the global situation. Their aim is to reach all parts of the world and to make reality the traditional Roman Catholic claim *urbi et orbi* (cf. also Walsh, 2000). Furthermore, the often discussed possibility of electing a future Pope from a Third World country, or at least from outside Europe, manifests again the global awareness that permeates this church.

In this context, movements like the *Opus Dei* acquired a transnational dimension in that their networks and activities are no longer limited to Europe (Hervieu-Léger, 1997). This pertains equally to the globally projected philanthropic activities initiated by the Roman Catholic Church (Della Cava, 1997). The global dimension is also more than evident in official church documents, a notable instance being the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, issued in October 2004, wherein one finds frequent reference to the effects of the present global age on working conditions and the economy, wealth accumulation, local cultures, social inequalities, human rights, politics, and the environment. Globalization is seen as a challenge, and answers are formulated on the basis of the Christian tradition. Finally, the global age is central to the thinking of several Roman Catholic theologians, where the need for a 'new catholicity' to meet the challenges of globalization and postmodernity is emphasized (Schreiter, 1997). Particularly well-known in this regard is Hans Küng with his vision of a world-ethos and universal peace through peace among religions (Küng & Hoeren, 2002).

As concerns the Protestant churches in Western Europe, these entertain strong mutual ties with Protestants worldwide. Various international organizations support worldwide Protestantism through regular meetings and consultations. These include not only the World Council of Churches, but also denominational organizations like the Lutheran World Federation and the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. Protestant views on globalization vary. Some are highly critical of globalization in the form of neo-liberal ideologies that cause severe social problems, while others welcome globalization as an unprecedented opportunity for spreading the gospel throughout the world. Overall, Western European Protestants seem to be well aware that their traditional homelands are no longer the leading ones in the present global age. European Protestantism thus seems open for change and the end of Eurocentric dominance. In this respect the extent of their historical expansion and their thousands of denominations worldwide may offer Protestants a particular advantage. In addition, although the tension between their particular territories and their universal claims may lead

to Protestant churches being caught in the dialectic between the global and the local, unlike Protestants elsewhere (e.g. in the USA), Western European Protestants by and large seem to have avoided falling victim to the fundamentalist trends that sometimes emerge from this tension.

A significant change related to globalization that has also appeared recently in the Western European religious landscape concerns the rise of charismatic movements, including within mainline churches. Although more a non-European phenomenon today, charismatic revivalism has become a truly global movement (Casanova, 2001: 434–438; Davie, 2002: 79–83), becoming stronger in Europe as well. This religious movement resonates with the global spirit of the present age. It puts emphasis on charismatic gifts and personal freedom through the Holy Spirit. It is able to transcend traditional barriers, reaching people regardless of age, gender, class, ethnicity, language or nationality. It is also not bound by institutional structures and territorial constraints, fostering decentralized networks that are not attached to particular places. Such tendencies have been evident within the World Council of Churches as well as in the Protestant evangelization of Eastern Europe. And yet charismatic revivalism has also found its way into institutionally structured churches like the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches.

Another important aspect relates to the Ecumenical Movement, which has a strong tradition in Western Europe. Ecumenism seeks to overcome barriers between Christians and between Christians and non-Christians worldwide. It aims at a global community. Ecumenical initiatives have proliferated in recent decades. For example, the Lutheran World Federation and the Vatican signed a joint declaration on the doctrine of justification in 1999. The Conference of European Churches and the Council of European Bishops' Conferences signed the *Charta Oecumenica* in 2001. Its aim was to regulate the growing cooperation of churches in Europe and to avoid inter-Christian conflicts. Christian churches also collaborate in globally extended social action and welfare activities, and for these the European Union provides a useful frame and important resources. In addition, the World Council of Churches, with headquarters in Geneva, has been a center for global initiatives addressing environmental problems that affect the world as a whole (Beyer, 1994: 212–216).

Such developments should not, however, obscure the fact of West European Christian reactions against current global trends. One common concern is that ecumenical rapprochement may lead to an undesirable homogenization of religions and cultures. In this regard, for

example, the *European Values Survey* of 1990 showed that, among West European countries, higher levels of structural globalization correlated with higher degrees of religious unification and homogenization (Halman & Pettersson, 2003: 201, 202). Trends of this kind are precisely what cause negative reactions. As an illustration, some perceived the aforementioned rapprochement between Roman Catholics and Protestants as lessening their undeniable differences. Such peaceful coexistence and fruitful cooperation in many European countries (e.g. in Germany) can convey the impression that the churches are somehow similar and that their differences are minimal, an unwelcome conclusion for many. For this reason, the Roman Catholic Church has also undertaken measures to underscore its distinctiveness, for instance in official documents like *Dominus Jesus* in 2000 and *Ecclesia de Eucharistia* in 2003. These documents should be interpreted as defensive mechanisms against the unification spirit and policies fuelled by our global age.

Empirically and theoretically, however, it is amiss to argue that globalization means simply unification and homogenization. The opposite trend, namely diversity, plurality and individuality, is clearly part of the whole process. The *European Values Survey* of 1990 again provides illustration. This also revealed that the level of structural globalization in a country correlated positively with the prevalence of 'patchwork' religious belief systems in the population (Halman & Pettersson, 2003: 201, 202). The individualization of religious life and its freeing from institutional control are increasing in Western European Christianity (Hervieu-Léger, 1999: 157–200). As religion passes more and more through the filter of individual subjectivity, *à la carte* forms of Christianity, autonomous spiritualities, self-religions, and human potential movements cease to be out of the ordinary (Lambert, 2004). Such privatized forms of religiosity nonetheless do not undermine the pubic influence of religion. Both are religious responses to globalization (Beyer, 1994: 70–96).

Along with other aspects of religious life, this growing individualization is substantially encouraged by revolutionary developments in global communication technologies. In his respect the internet, a truly global and interactive medium accessible to most Western Europeans, is the most important. As is the case for most religions in the world, Western European Christianity is influenced by these developments and sees in these technologies the means to address people on a global scale (Davie, 2000b: 100–104). One example from among many would be the positive assessment of modern communications media that Pope John Paul II made in connection with World Communication Day

(Karaflogka, 2003: 195). Another example is the virtual chapel of the Elisabethkirche, a Protestant parish in Marburg (Germany), where visitors can engage in interactive online religious practises (Mayer, 2003: 43). There is, however, also some scepticism regarding the religious uses of the web, for instance, concerning online sacraments.

A final aspect relates to the creation of transnational (religious) spaces and communities. Although hardly a recent phenomenon, the global context significantly enhances transnationalism in the form of activities across cultural and other borders and the establishment of transnational networks. Regarding Western Europe, of particular note are the different relations of European-based Christian churches to their non-European peripheries. Although the former have been dominant for many centuries, new forms of global Christianity may now and in the future be playing a greater role as non-European forms of Christianity grow steadily in significance, innovation and appeal. In the present global situation, the periphery is influencing trends and may even dominate the core, a process that is not free of tension.

A classical example of such a reversal is the development of Liberation Theology in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. Intrinsically connected with the globalization process after World War II, this movement alarmed the Vatican, eventually leading to repressive measures in the 1980s. Although the movement has since lost momentum, it was an attempt to reformulate the Christian message and church structures (for instance, through the "Basic Ecclesial Communities") in a way that deviated from the conventional Eurocentric model (Beyer, 1994: 135–159). Its decline notwithstanding, as a response to global challenges Liberation Theology left a legacy in the Roman Catholic Church. The 'option for the poor' proclaimed by Liberation theologians has not lost its significance and could become relevant for other parts of the globe as well.

Orthodox Christianity in Eastern Europe

In Orthodox-dominated Eastern and especially South Eastern Europe, globalization has elicited different responses than in Western Europe, an understandable result given the different course that the two regions have followed especially since the High Middle Ages. Orthodox Christianity has its own particular historical orientation to the global, dating back to the Roman Empire and the Byzantine period. The Byzantine

universalistic concept of *Oecumene* referred at that time primarily to the 'known, inhabited world'. Although not identical with the modern notion of globality, it points to certain historical antecedents of the modern globalization process in the Hellenistic period and Graeco-Roman antiquity, ones that the Byzantine Empire sought to carry forward. The fall of Byzantium in 1453 and the subsequent nationalization of Orthodoxy in the national churches of various nation-states marked the end of the traditional 'Byzantine Commonwealth', and its universalistic orientation. These are today but a remnant of past glory, with one significant exception. The Patriarchate of Constantinople to some extent holds on to this historical ecumenicity, maintaining the title of 'Ecumenical' that was adopted under Patriarch John the Faster in the 6th century. Although contested by some Orthodox Christians of Slavic provenance, this institution is still considered the highest authority within the disparate Orthodox world of today, and it enjoys several unique privileges.

Of particular interest in today's globalized context, is the adjustment of this traditional ecumenical role by the current Patriarch, Bartholomew I. His public interventions on both religious and non-religious global issues have transformed the Patriarchate from a historical remnant of Byzantium into an active player in the contemporary global context. Particularly noteworthy are his interventions on environmental issues, earning him the nickname 'Green Patriarch'. Along with other activities such as the promotion of interfaith dialogue, these have enhanced Bartholomew's reputation worldwide, making him a highly respected religious leader contributing in his own way to a 'global civil religion'.

Of further note is the Patriarchate's position between the national and the transnational. Although currently in 'Greek hands', it does not thereby simply represent Greek national interests, a fact that repeated conflicts with the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Greece attest. Under Bartholomew, the Patriarchate has emphasized its status as a transnational religious actor able to transcend national divisions. It has shaped its policies in an attempt to address the challenges that a global trans-Orthodox and trans-religious context presents. Even though it hardly offers a ready solution to the problems of an Orthodox world beset with nationalistic divisions and dissensions, its orientation does show that even Orthodox churches rooted in a national tradition are nonetheless constrained to deal with global issues. Nationalist division

and trans-Orthodox unity thus manifest themselves at the same time, and this at various levels of thought and action.

Orthodox transnational relations play a particular role in this respect. As a consequence of successive waves of transnational migration, Orthodox Christianity now has a worldwide presence. The resulting interplay between core and periphery means, for instance, that, in the Greek Orthodox diaspora, there exists an uneasy tension between Eastern Orthodox universalism and secular, modern Greek transnational national identity. In recent years this has led to a discernible trend among Greeks abroad to separate the religious from the ethnic/national, a transformation that can be interpreted as a possibly increasing tendency towards the pre-national ecumenicity of Eastern Orthodoxy (Roudometof, 2000). The Russian Orthodox Church presents another example: in the post-Soviet era, the Moscow Patriarchate has emphasized its role as a transnational actor that also addresses numerous Russian Orthodox immigrants worldwide (Della Cava, 2001; Schmit, 2005).

As a whole, the Orthodox churches have demonstrated an ambiguous attitude to the globalization process. Two illustrations can be found in the official text, *Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church* of 2000, and the book on Orthodoxy and globalization written by the Greek Archbishop of Tirana and All Albania, Anastasios Yannoulatos (2003). Both these value positively some aspects of globalization, such as the internationalization of trade, technological development, and cooperation between states. Only their abuse and immoral instrumentalization are regarded critically as a detriment to humankind. The negative aspects of globalization, however, receive far more emphasis; in particular the homogenization of culture and the destruction of local communities, and the creation of transnational capitalist oligopolies, which exacerbate the ever-increasing gap between rich and poor. The tendency of globalization to de-nationalize Orthodox countries and de-sacralize national identities is looked upon with special concern. In most Eastern and South Eastern European countries, people generally still regard Orthodox Christianity to be fundamental to national identity. Many Orthodox also think that their rich religious and cultural heritage can help 'humanize' globalization and overcome its deadlocks. In that context, it is noteworthy that these Orthodox discourses use a somewhat different notion of globalization, one that owes more to universality and catholicity as understood in Orthodox ecclesiology, for instance, in the idea of the church as a transnational community of love.

Orthodox thinkers often see the negative consequences of globalization in terms of recent historical events, above all what they regard as American and Western European imposition of a 'new world order' following the collapse of Communism. Many, particularly Serbs, interpreted the wars in Yugoslavia during the 1990s in this light, seeing the part played by the European Union in the disintegration of Yugoslavia as an onslaught against Orthodox ethno-national identities (Buchenau, 2005). These events thereby led to the resurgence of religiously motivated nationalism and the reassertion of the idea that the West posed a threat to the East. Many Orthodox also see the corrosive effects of globalization in terms of the religious infiltration of post-communist Eastern and South Eastern Europe countries where they claim to have historical rights. The spread of transnational and American-based Protestant denominations in the Russian Federation after 1990 thus exemplified the negative effects of the global interdependence and the potential loss of local religious identities. When the Russian law on freedom of conscience and religious associations/organizations of 1997 imposed restrictions on foreign religious movements, many Russians regarded negative Western reaction as supporting a global religious order with no respect for local specificities (Agadjanian & Rousselet, 2005). It is in this context that many Orthodox strongly criticize the Ecumenical Movement, leading some Orthodox churches, such as the Bulgarian in 1998, to formally distance themselves from it.

Despite these widespread fears, the Orthodox churches cannot really reject participation in the global system. First, their many dependencies abroad, including in Western Europe, make continuing transnational ties absolutely necessary. Although tensions between Orthodox homelands and diasporas are not unusual, there is also fruitful interaction. Orthodox diasporas are usually more tuned to global perspectives and develop corresponding strategies that can benefit the homelands. Second, the predominantly Orthodox nation-states are themselves clearly tied into the global system in almost every respect, especially politically and economically. These secular states do not share the Orthodox fears as such. They try to mitigate Orthodox reactions while encouraging the churches to adopt a global orientation. They also want to limit and control the authority and public role of Orthodox churches and leaders. The relation between the two is therefore not without tension, as the 2000 church-state conflict in Greece over the exclusion of religious affiliation from personal identity cards clearly showed. These problems notwithstanding, politicians generally acknowledge the transnational

dimensions of Orthodoxy and try to benefit from them. A case in point is the "Inter-Parliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy", a political organization founded in 1994 on the initiative of the Greek Parliament and made up of members of various parliaments representing Orthodox populations. Third, Orthodox Christianity is far from the stagnant, anti-modern, and tradition-bound religion that widespread but outdated prejudice makes it out to be. Like any other religion, Orthodox Christianity is changing as it responds to global challenges, albeit in its own way. Thus, for example, the current revolution in global communications has reached traditional bastions of Orthodoxy like the Mount Athos monasteries. Where previously even electricity was scarce, one now finds internet facilities and mobile telecommunications. Then there is the case of the so-called "cyber-monk", Sava, an Orthodox Serbian monk known for his defence of the Serbian cause in the 1990s using the internet and his e-mail news service (Clark, 2000: 92–93). In addition, within the European Union, Orthodox churches collaborate with other Christian churches and non-religious actors and are clearly playing a part in the emerging common European culture. The Orthodox are increasingly aware of the global appeal and significance of the European Union and, in recent years, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Patriarchate of Moscow, and the Orthodox Church of Greece, have each opened their own bureau in Brussels.

Non-Christian Europe

The issue of non-Christian Europe is still very much under debate, basically because of the widespread idea that Europe, and therefore the European Union, are fundamentally Christian in character. And indeed, the founders of the "European Economic Community" in the 1950s considered it to have clear Christian underpinnings. This attitude denies neither the historical nor contemporary existence of non-Christian religions in Europe—it just considers them unimportant for forging a common European identity. Today, however, this view has become highly controversial in light of the new immigrants and the transnational connections of European religions.

Among non-Christian religions in Europe, Judaism, which numbers about three million today, represents a special case. Historically, Jews have lived in diaspora and thus have been far more prone to develop a transnational consciousness and to think of their ethno-religious com-

munity in more than local terms. Aspects of transnational Jewish life have also played a catalytic role in the emergence of a common European culture; various Jewish thinkers who promote openness to other religions are becoming increasingly influential today (Cohn-Sherbok, 2000). Yet the historical tensions between Christians and Jews in both Eastern and Western Europe, featuring multiple traumatic experiences culminating in the Holocaust, have thus far not given way to more fruitful exchanges between them. And it remains to be seen whether Jewish efforts can in the long run contribute to overcoming Christian Eurocentrism.

In recent decades, however, the major challenge to a Christian Europe has come from Islam and the gradual emergence of an increasingly visible 'European Islam' (Malik, 2004). The history of Islam's relation to Western Europe is a long one. Only in the later twentieth century, however, as a consequence of the immigration mostly of Turkish, Maghrebi, and South Asian Muslims, have Muslims become a significant and permanent segment of the population. Muslim migration to Western Europe dates from the period of Western colonialism, but intensified after World War II when thousands of Muslim *Gastarbeiter* were imported to help in post-war reconstruction and rapid economic expansion. Towards the end of the century, the phenomenon took a dramatic turn as thousands of Muslim refugees, asylum seekers and other migrants sought safe haven and opportunity in the European Union.

Islam also constitutes a challenge for Eastern and South Eastern Europe, albeit in a different way. The Muslims of Russia have been there for centuries. Living mainly in the Volga-Urals, the North Caucasus, and Central Russia, they now number over fourteen million. The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina are also indigenous, and their great suffering during the 1992–1995 war rendered their claim to a European Muslim identity even stronger. Then, in addition to the Muslim Albanians, the Muslim majority in Kosovo is pressuring the international community to grant them some form of autonomy in or from Orthodox Serbia. Finally, the controversy over the admission of Muslim Turkey to the 'Christian Club' of the European Union further shows the complexity of the question of a European Islam.

For the staunch defenders of a Christian Europe, Islam is an alien religion/civilization that needs to be kept out of (Western) Europe. They argue that Islam is incompatible with European norms and modern democratic standards. Issues such as the role of religion in

public life and the women's headscarf are said to show this fundamental incompatibility. They further claim that the combination of direct contact with Western culture with continued ties to the more conservative homelands exacerbates Islamic extremism (e.g. the 2005 London underground bombers and their connection to Pakistan). In this atmosphere, most European governments now treat this situation as a serious public problem. And many, including the "Conference of European Churches" (2004), see fundamental problems with accepting Turkey into the European Union.

There is, however, also a considerable body of European opinion that takes the opposite view, warning of the dangers of 'essentializing' Islam as an immutable, trans-historical entity. While not ignoring the potential for Islamic extremism, this position emphasizes how a minority religion like Islam adapts to host societies while also seeking equal treatment in the name of democratic principles and universal human rights. It points to the fact that the very diverse orientations of especially second- and third-generation Muslims in Europe are generally not incompatible with European norms (Husain & O'Brien, 2000), and that therefore one cannot exclude them from European culture just because they are Muslims.

Irrespective of which position one takes, important for the present argument is that both European culture and transnational Islamic forces are helping to shape European Islam. A world religion like Islam today adopts de-territorialized forms as a transnational and global imagined community, here the wider Muslim *ummah.* But it also particularizes in more specific, equally transnational, forms such as 'Euro-Islam'. This, in turn, exhibits its own internal variety and is far from unified and homogeneous (Amiraux, 2004). Immigrants maintain transnational social networks that include their respective homelands, and these connections can be reinforcing or conflicted. Thus, for example, in post-communist Russia, transnational Islam has been instrumental in creating an Islamic revival, but not without tension between local, ethnically based Sufism and a transnational Wahhabism bent on 'cleansing' Islam of local ethnic accretions (Yemelianova, 2000).

In Europe, both Muslim modernists and extremists maintain manifold connections with supportive co-believers outside Europe. Through global means of communication from satellite television to the internet, they create their own virtual communities. One finds not only the Qur'an or Hadith online, but also *fatwas* issued by cyber-muftis (Bunt, 2003; Mandaville, 2003). The new media foster inner-Islamic diversity and a

'civil society' that lessens traditional religious authorities (Eickelman & Anderson, 1999). Islamic radicals also use the internet to spread fundamentalist ideas such as the call for an Islamic *jihad* (Lohlker, 2002). These developments render Islam global, while at the same time making adjustment to particular environments possible. Local influences make European Islam quite heterogeneous; hence, for example, the differences between the British and the German Islam. Yet transnational networks also seek to homogenize national differences.

Empirical studies among young Muslims in Europe have shown that they form their religious expressions in quite individual ways (Tietze, 2001). And contrary to various studies and predictions, Hoffmann (1990) argues that young Muslims in Europe usually develop a healthy, adaptable self-identity, in spite of the challenge of reconciling different religious and cultural backgrounds. Hybrid identities prove to function quite well in given settings, and therefore Europeans should think twice before assuming a fundamental incongruity between Islamic and Western values. All in all, the new media and increased physical mobility allow members of the broader Muslim diaspora to coexist both in virtual and real spaces.

The other major non-Christian challenge comes from the numerous religions of non-European origin that have more recently spread in Europe through migration and mission. These include forms of Asian religions such as Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism, and Chinese popular religion; African traditional religions; and a great variety of 'New Religious Movements' (NRMs). Their presence has even led to talk of the "reverse colonization" of Europe (Giddens, 2003: 16) or the "Easternization of the West" (Campbell, 1999). Although it has been a mixed blessing for these religions (Beckford, 2004: 258–261), the context of globalization has also provided them with new opportunities.

First, some of these religious movements are clearly universal in orientation and organization. The Baha'i faith, for instance, exhibits an explicitly global awareness and promotes cosmopolitan values (Warburg, 1999). In this group would also fall the Church of Scientology, the Unification Church of Reverend Sun Myung Moon, the Buddhist Soka Gakkai International, and Transcendental Meditation. All overtly seek to transcend national boundaries, featuring global networks of communication that tie Europe more easily and closely into the rest of the world. They thus manifest the increasing awareness of the global human condition and a concomitant global spirituality. Yet often they convey their putatively universalistic values through particularistic ideologies,

thereby constructing their own global visions without necessarily subscribing to the idea of globalization (Beckford, 2004: 255–258).

Second, the spread of such religious movements in Europe along with various new Christian sectarian variants like the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Latter Day Saints (Mormons), or the Seventh-day Adventists, means a considerable widening of Europe's religious repertoire. This greater religious offering also encourages believers to incorporate new elements, for example, New Age perspectives or holistic therapies, into their received worldviews and practices. In both Eastern and Western Europe (Pollack, 2003), Christians are increasingly engaging in such "bricolage" or re-composition of religious meaning as part of a larger transformation of symbolic universes that is occurring under the impact of globalization.

Third, however, these minority religions can face legal and other state regulatory barriers to the recognition of their rights and equal treatment in both Eastern and Western Europe (Beckford, 1998; Lucas & Robbins, 2004: 25–148). In some countries, the barriers reflect a fear that certain religious groups might be involved in illegal practices. Other countries have liberalized their 'religious markets', opening them to new religions. In either case, accentuated by the globalization process, the spread of these religious alternatives often leads to tension and conflict. In countries with established churches, the transition to a religiously more pluralistic society can evoke resistance on the part of those churches. Such has been the case with Orthodox churches in Greece and in Russia, for instance (Shterin, 2004). In other cases, such as that of France, the constitutional guarantee of *laïcité* prevents the unrestricted acceptance of new religions, especially their presence in the public sphere. Here new religious movements and Islam are particularly affected. Moreover, religious freedom occasionally becomes a contentious issue between Europe and other parts of the world, notably the United States. Thus, in 2002 the Council of Europe published a report, entitled "Religion and Change in Central and Eastern Europe". This document advocated the protection of the collective rights of minorities, but not a total freedom of individual religion (Beckford, 2003: 144). Unlike the United States, Europeans often wish to strike a balance between a free 'religious market' and the historic religious identity of a given country.

The Uneasy, Yet Gradual Overcoming of Christian Eurocentrism

In light of the above, it is arguable that what has been happening in Europe in the context of globalization is the uneasy, yet gradual overcoming of Christian Eurocentrism. Although this process has been going on for some time, it intensified in the latter part of the twentieth century, particularly in light of post-colonial studies, which offered a different evaluation of the rise and global colonial expansion of the West. In these discourses, religion itself appears as a rather European category with Christian underpinnings, one that has become global in the context of colonialism. Political actors have also begun to move beyond Christian Eurocentrism towards a multi-cultural and multi-religious Europe, the aforementioned debate around the explicit mention of Christianity in the new European Constitution being a clear example. On the other hand, however, islamophobia is widespread in Europe, especially after the September 11 attacks in the USA and those later in Madrid and London.

Historically speaking, Christianity has played a decisive role in the formation of Europe. This development culminated in the genesis of West European modernity after the advent of Protestantism. Davie (2000b) has ingeniously described how these and other factors are currently affecting (Western) Europe's 'religious memory', but notes that, in the context of its ongoing reconstruction, Christianity evidently no longer serves as the model for global religiosity (see Beyer in this volume). Instead, within a global perspective, (Western) Europe now appears as the exception rather than the rule. From a global empirical standpoint, for example, it is in Europe that the idea of secularization as a linear and deterministic process originated and it is only here that it can be said to apply, not throughout the globe. As a result, in recent decades considerable scepticism has arisen regarding the worldwide application of the secularization theory (Berger, 1999; Davie, 2002: 1–26). The persistent vitality of the American 'religious market' and worldwide instances of religious resurgence contradict the older thesis of a universal pattern of religious evolution modelled on the (Western) European experience. By extension, the same pertains to the allegedly necessary connection between modernization (often understood as Westernization) and secularization. Newer theories of 'multiple modernities' now postulate that the two need not go hand in hand at all (Davie, 2002: 153–159). The idea that Western Europe has followed a different development than

the rest of the world is, of course, not new. It was a cornerstone of Max Weber's comparative-historical sociology of religion. After falling into oblivion for a time, it has, however, recently regained popularity in modified form, primarily as Europeans have become more aware of the socio-historical particularities of their continent in comparison to the rest of the globe, in religious as in other matters.

Overcoming Christian Eurocentrism is also connected to the fact that Christianity itself has now become so truly global that it is more and more difficult to conceive it in exclusively European terms. Although Europe was the heartland of Christianity for many centuries and is still an important region in this regard, non-European Christianities appear to be setting the trend for the future. From the global perspective, the most significant Christian developments appear elsewhere, for example, the global expansion of Pentecostalism and Charismatic communities, especially in Latin America (Martin, 1990; Davie, 2002: 54–83; Freston, in this volume); or "indigenous forms of Christianity" like the African Independent Churches (Davie, 2002: 95–102; Wickeri, 2004; Adogame in this volume) and forms of popular Catholicism around the globe (see the special issue of *Social Compass* 45/4, December 1998). The fastest growing Protestant congregations are in South Korea (Davie, 2002: 124–135). Research shows an overall major shift of Christianity's most dynamic forces from the North to the South (Johnson & Chung, 2004). Although these global Christianities are far from uniform, their significance in relation to European Christianity is rapidly increasing, a fact that will likely generate tensions in the future, not least as Europe more and more finds itself as the 'receiver' of missions from other parts of the world, rather than as the 'sender' as in the past.

Finally, this shift away from Eurocentrism is taking place as religion in Europe and elsewhere comes to be taken more seriously as an important factor in the public sphere, no longer as a marginal phenomenon at best. To a large extent, the rise of so-called 'public religions' since the 1980s, has caused Europeans, who previously harbored a vision of inevitable secularization, to reconsider the entire question. In this context, the September 11 attacks loom large as a critical event, causing leading intellectuals like Jürgen Habermas (2001) to suggest that the West think self-critically about its previous attitudes to religions in general. For the sake of future world order, one has thus to treat religions as serious discussion partners and abandon the old prejudices and stereotypes.

Concluding Remarks

The foregoing has provided an overview of the religious situation in Europe under conditions of globalization, and has hopefully made clear that one-sided and deterministic explanations regarding religious change are not adequate. In fact two seemingly contradictory perspectives seem to apply at the same time. Some see tension, conflict, and division as characteristic of the globalization process as it unfolds even further. Others more optimistically suggest that such tensions and conflicts are evidence of a transitional stage on the way to what will eventually be an integrated global society featuring novel religious regimes. Yet various case studies seem to show that these two orientations are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Therefore the understanding of globalization must itself be 'global' in the sense of holistic, seeking to grasp an evolving social reality in all its multi-dimensionality. Globalization involves both positive/liberal and negative/conservative responses; both are integral parts of an ongoing process. As the religions of the world are inevitably incorporated into global processes, they are responding in a variety of ways (Juergensmeyer, 2003). In its specificity, the religious situation in Europe offers support for this argument.

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LATIN AMERICA: THE ‘OTHER CHRISTENDOM’, PLURALISM AND GLOBALIZATION

Paul Freston

Discussions of religion and globalization, and more broadly of religion in the contemporary world, cannot fail to be enriched by greater attention to Latin America. This singular region is very relevant to large questions regarding globalization and religion.

One such question is that of possible futures for religion in globalizing times. The dichotomous ‘relativism versus fundamentalism’ model needs to be nuanced by attention to ‘hybridity’ and ‘peaceful conversionism’, both of which are flourishing in Latin America.

Secondly, the debate about religion and modernity needs to be more global. This debate has been dominated by discussion of Europe and North America, which is only justified if one imagines a single model of modernity with a lead society (either Europe or North America, with the other becoming an ‘exception’ needing explanation). Attempts to go beyond are often limited to a consideration of Islam. It is time to incorporate other regions of the global south into these debates.

Thirdly, it is not just a question of talking more about other religions, but also of talking more about Christianity outside the developed West. Christianity is now located mainly in the global south (Latin America, Africa, Asia, the Pacific), distant from power and wealth, and it spreads largely as an autonomous social movement and as a ‘globalization from below’.

In all these discussions, Latin America will loom increasingly large. It is virtually the only traditionally Christian area outside those (Europe and North America) which have provided the main contending paradigms for relating religion and modernity. It is the major traditionally Christian region in the global south, sharing many socio-economic characteristics with newly-Christianized regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and the Pacific, and with non-Christian regions of Asia. More than that, Latin America can now claim to be the heartland of Christianity. It has more Catholics than any other region, and also more pentecostals. Its influence on world Christianity and beyond (through missions) will surely grow, especially as it has advantages over Africa in this respect

(a sounder economic base, stronger institutions, a foot in the Enlightenment). However, its religious field is also fast-changing, resulting mainly in more pluralism within Christianity (new forms of pentecostalism; new initiatives within Catholicism) but also in growing pluralism beyond it (notably a steep rise in those who claim 'no religion').

Within Latin America, Brazil occupies a central place as having the largest number of Catholics, the largest community of pentecostals, and the second-largest community of practising Protestants in the world. The ebullient religious world of this member of the 'BRIC' countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) which are expected to transform the global economic map in the next generation needs a larger place in the discussions mentioned above.

Within our discussion, a certain emphasis will be given to pentecostalism. In a sense, 'pentecostalism' is shorthand for the emerging religious model of Latin America, a model which includes more than pentecostals but of which they have been the main creators. I shall thus look at pentecostalism's trajectory and its implications for the future of the region and for debates on secularization. We should also remember that Latin American religion, with pentecostalism in the vanguard, is increasingly exported to Europe and North America via missions and diaspora churches. It is no longer wise to talk about 'American evangelicalism' or 'American Catholicism' without taking Latinos into account; and it is at least worth asking whether there might be implications in the emerging Latin American model for Latin Europe.

Latin American Christianity in Global Context

The three most globalized religions (in numbers, geographical spread and social influence) are currently Islam, Catholicism and pentecostalism. Latin America is now the heartland of the latter two. Both traditions of Western Christianity (Catholic and Protestant, the latter overwhelmingly in its pentecostal form), have come to be major influences on Latin America. The globalization of Christianity may end up relativizing the Catholic/Protestant divide and creating new divisions, but in Latin America that divide remains central. In fact, it is one of the last remaining areas of significant Catholic/Protestant tension.

If this distinguishes Latin America from both the developed West today and the newly-Christianized areas of Africa and the Pacific, it is also different from the Reformations of sixteenth-century Europe and

from the denominational model which the United States established at its inception. Within global Christianity, Latin America occupies a unique position as a traditional part of Western Christendom which is not (yet?) going through very significant secularization or de-Christianization, but undergoing a unique process of Christian pluralization *from within* (i.e. not significantly stimulated by missionaries or immigrants) and *from the bottom up* (i.e. not by top-down national Reformations).

Latin America was born under the sign of Christendom, the territorial and monopolistic conception of a Christian world. Being the fruit of the early (Iberian) expansion of the Western Christian world, its relationship with Christendom is closer even than in Europe itself, and certainly closer than in the later (British, Dutch, French) imperial expansion when state and church are less closely linked. In Latin America, the religious motifs in colonization (however sincerely held), allied to the fact that the colonizers either dominated numerically or at least retained political control after independence, meant that the Christendom model left a huge imprint.

But Latin America has also been a Christendom that was precariously evangelized and poorly served in terms of clergy and Catholic organizational structure. If evangelical movements can be defined (as does Walls, 1994: 311) as revolts against the imperfections of Christendom, then their recent growth in Latin America (considering pentecostalism as a sub-species of evangelicalism) fits into that, unlike their growth in Africa and Asia (except for the Philippines). But the difference is that Latin America is a Catholic Christendom being penetrated directly by voluntarist evangelicalism without going through a Protestant 'national reformation' first, or indeed through a sizeable process of de-Christianization. This is different from the northern European model which went from Catholic Christendom to national reformation, followed by the growth of evangelicalism in free churches and in pietistic movements within the state church. It is also different from the southern European model in which Catholicism remains hegemonic in the religious field (though creating a substantial anti-religious sector) and all forms of Protestantism essentially fail; and the US model of plural colonization and denominationalism as the solution to church-state relations.

Will Latin America simply be the last part of the old Christendom to secularize (even later, perhaps, than the US)? If secularization is structurally determined by modernity, that is obviously the case, and the current explosion of pentecostal churches and of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal must be a temporary effervescence. If, however, secularization

is culturally contingent, one of several possible 'modernities', then factors such as the differential impact of the Enlightenment on Latin American society (largely confined to elites), the current reassertion of indigenous peoples (especially in the Andean and Mayan regions) and the deep grassroots penetration by pentecostal and Catholic charismatic spirituality might pull Latin America in a different direction from that of Latin Europe, whatever the economic future of the region.

If in most of the developing world religious evolution is still tangled in the traumas of decolonization (and often a religious resurgence a generation after liberation), Latin America's time-frame is different. In one sense, it was decolonized nearly 200 years ago, and has since enjoyed stable nation-states and firm national identities. In another sense, internal decolonization of indigenous peoples is only now happening (if at all). There are as yet no real Latin American equivalents of the African Independent Churches.

Yet Latin America is a unique site for globalizing the US-European debate on religion and modernity, since it is the major region in which Western Christianity (still vibrant among the native-born population and not just among immigrants and ethnic minorities) meets poverty and geopolitical humiliation.

Globalization and the Major Latin American Religions

The idea of 'multiple modernities' (Eisenstadt, 2000) challenges the assumption that modernizing societies are convergent and that either Europe or North America are 'lead societies'. And global Christianity shows us it is not just a case of other parts of the world being different because they have different religions (as in Gellner's [1992] idea of 'Islamic exceptionalism'). We need to do justice not only to other religions but also to non-Western Christianity. It is not clear how we should think of a religion that is truly global and deterritorialized (and especially one like Protestantism that has no Rome or Mecca). Should we think in terms of territorially-based models (secularization theory for Europe; rational choice for the US; etc.), or of different models for different religions? But what about religions (such as Protestantism) that have globalized not mainly through diasporas (an 'uprooted territoriality'), as is the case with Islam, but through conversion processes that massively transcend ethnicity?

A key thinker in this regard is José Casanova. The impasse in Western debates, he says, is due to linking secularization to modernization rather than to patterns of fusion between churches, states and nations, which in Europe have led to a 'secularist' self-understanding as 'normal'. However, globalization undermines territorially-based national religion, with its monopolistic claims which parallel those of the nation-state. Under globalization new forms emerge or are strengthened in all world religions, at individual, group and societal levels. Individual mysticism, always an option for elites and religious virtuosi, becomes more generally available (reaching at least the middle classes in Latin America); at the group level, there are expanded possibilities for voluntary associations on the 'denominational' model; and transnational churches, freed from territorial constraints, reappear as globalized imagined communities. Thus Catholicism re-emerges as a transnational religious regime, progressively gaining control over national churches. In 1999, the Pope consecrated Guadalupe as Virgin of all the Americas and urged bishops to cease viewing themselves as national hierarchies. And while Catholicism attempts to maximize the spaces offered by globalization to a transnational religion with a centralized structure, its upstart rival in Latin America, pentecostalism, exemplifies the response of a decentralized religion with no territorial roots. As the first case of a deterritorialized global culture, pentecostalism's relationship to the local is paradoxical: unlike the Catholic pattern of condescending tolerance and the historical Protestant attitude of rational disenchantment, pentecostals engage in 'spiritual warfare' with the culture and in so doing prove how locally rooted they really are (Casanova, 2001; 2006).

Latin America also encourages us to ponder 'third options' regarding the future of religion in a globalizing world. Besides the relativizing reaction and the fundamentalist reaction, there is also the conversionist reaction to globalization. Peaceful conversionism is a plausible (and frequent) way of resolving the 'crisis' of identity of a shrinking world. Indeed, it fits well with the greater seriousness which often accompanies the transformation of religion towards an achieved identity. Conversionism places pentecostalism in a different relationship to global cultural processes from either pan-religious ecumenism (tending to global homogeneity) or fundamentalism (tending to irreducible pockets of anti-pluralism). As generally a non-traditional religion spreading by conversion, pentecostalism's interests are usually the opposite of those of a reactive fundamentalism. Pluralism and cultural diffuseness are advantageous for it; indeed, it probably flourishes best in a world that

is *tranquilly religious*, rather than one that is either *secularized* or *defensively religious*.

If a 'shrinking' world brings more need to think about coexistence, it also helps people see real differences beyond superficial similarities, and even perceive 'best options'. Between the extremes of relativization and demonization, a range of third options appear. The classic Latin American response, building on a tradition of synthetic heterodoxies at the popular level, is described by Vásquez and Marquardt (2003: 80): a flourishing of hybrid religious forms and practices. But overlapping with this, while also introducing significant modification, is the conversionist response exemplified by pentecostalism.

Latin American pentecostalism is a major example of a religious globalization which is conversionist rather than diasporic. The establishment of pentecostal churches by Latino immigrants to the United States is a case of diasporic globalization; but the growth of pentecostalism in the Latin American homeland is a conversionist globalization, with very different political and cultural implications.

Latin American Catholicism: Global Importance and Local Crisis

Latin America was an export of a particular incarnation of the European Christendom model, characterized by the triumphalism of the Iberian *reconquista* and by the caesaropapist rule of the church by the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. In a region made Catholic by conquest and the Inquisition, royal patronage kept the church on a shoestring and impeded the development of an indigenous clergy. With few priests, formal practice was always low and 'popular' Catholicism was lay-run and often heterodox.

Yet it put down such deep roots that for long after the formal 'deregulation of the religious market' (in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries) there was little overt abandonment of the Church. Partly, this is due to the constitution of the population. Anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro divides Latin Americans into three categories. The Witness Peoples are the modern representatives of the ancient civilisations, represented by countries where the Amerindian element is greatest: Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala and to some extent Mexico. The New Peoples are a mix of ethnic matrixes. Chile and Paraguay mix European and Amerindian elements; the African element is added

in Brazil and Colombia. The Transplanted Peoples are overwhelmingly of European immigrants. Argentina and Uruguay are the main examples, but southern Brazil is also included (Ribeiro, 1983: 58). At decolonization, criollo (native-born white) elites took power and often still hold it. There is thus little chance of taking refuge in a pre-modern non-Western culture. For the New and Transplanted Peoples especially, their whole history is linked to Western expansion, experienced largely as frustration.

Ironically, Latin America has become the heartland of Catholicism at the time that its hegemony there has been eroded. Although it gave the world liberation theology and the Base Ecclesial Communities, these have been in decline since the 1980s. Within Catholicism, the most vital movement now is the Charismatic Renewal. And the official Catholic project is the New Evangelization, which aims not at a Christian social order through concordats or Christian parties, and still less at a left-wing revolution, but at an evangelization of culture through penetration of civil society. But recent analyses (e.g. Hagopian, 2005) are pessimistic about the Church's capacity to do that, especially in view of its weakening vitality as a religion of personal salvation among Latin Americans.

That is the Catholic dilemma. A centralized global religion can easily develop a global project, but finds it harder to regain vitality as a lay religion of salvation in a time of increasing pluralism. For Vásquez and Marquardt (2003: 84), the New Evangelization is a 'glocalization', a cooptation of the local by the universal church, a reaffirmation of hierarchical authority which is hard to reconcile with fervent lay initiative. In addition, democratization since the 1980s has displaced the Church from its role as chief critic of authoritarian states. With democracy, both civil society and the religious field have fragmented. Democracy and religious pluralism reinforce each other as challenges to the Church's position (Hagopian, 2005).

Yet, with the de-Christianization and low birth rates of Europe, Latin American Catholicism has increased in importance. The largest Catholic populations in the world are in Brazil and Mexico. South America now has more Catholics than Europe. But the latter continent has six times as many parishes and five times as many priests. And the situation is worsening: there were 4726 Catholics per priest in South America in 1950, and 7081 in 2000. This is largely due to the steep decline in priests from Europe, which the rise in the number of Latin American seminarians has been unable to offset (Froehle & Gautier, 2003: 82).

This institutional weakness is one of the reasons for the fall in the percentage of Latin Americans who call themselves Catholic. The traditional Catholic claim to be an essential part of Latin American identity has lost plausibility as pluralism has increased and Protestantism (especially in its pentecostal forms) has become deep-rooted. In many countries, Afro-Latin American religions (far from limited to blacks) or revived indigenous Amerindian religions also attract followers, while the main new phenomenon among the middle-class is esoterical and non-institutional.

The New Latin American Religious Field

Vásquez and Marquardt (2003) characterize the new Latin American model as an interplay of (continued Catholic) institutional dominance, pluralism and hybridity. Chilean sociologist Cristián Parker (2004; 2005) emphasizes the growth of 'believers in my own way' and a diffuse 'neo-magic', as well as the continued prevalence of 'popular religion'. We need, he says, to jettison the 'modernizing paradigm' in order to perceive the 'different logic' of popular religion, gestated in a dialectic with official religion and expressing needs and hopes to which the latter does not adequately respond. The 'non-practitioner' in Latin America is almost always a 'religious dissident', a 'popular practitioner'. Even in the mega-cities, the lower classes still have a magic and mythical thought pattern, negating 'developmentalist' theses regarding the inevitable decline of religion as well as challenging the idea of the 'Catholic substratum' as the basis for authentic Latin American culture (Parker, 1993: 392). Other authors such as Davie (2002: 54) and Martin (1990: 279) have stressed how the region used to mirror Latin Europe but has now shifted somewhat in the direction of the United States, led by pentecostals' rejection of syncretism in favor of a pluralistic model of the religious field, and of minority status in favor of equality for all religions before the state.

In comparative terms, the World Values Surveys show Latin America as a region of high religious belief, 'traditional values' and moderate practice. In Brazil in 1995, 99% believed in God. All Latin American countries researched except Uruguay come in the 'traditional values' cluster rather than the 'secular-rational values' cluster. In attendance at religious services, countries range from fairly high (Colombia, Peru, just above the US), through moderate (Brazil, Argentina, Chile), to low

(Uruguay, just below Britain). As for long-term trends, while Argentina declined from 31% weekly attendance in 1981 to 25% in 2001, Mexico went from 54% in 1981 to 55% in 2001 (Norris & Inglehart, 2004: 74, 90, 101, 239).

The degree of pluralism varies considerably (from high in Brazil to low in Colombia), with no apparent correlation with practice as the market model of religion would suggest. In Brazil, conversion (from one religion to another, or to 'no religion') is now similar to the US (26% compared to 29%, according to the 2006 Pew Survey [*Spirit and Power*, hereinafter S&P, 2006: 125]). Peaceful conversionism, one of the possible religious corollaries to 'multiple modernities', is flourishing in Latin America.

The Rise (and Crisis?) of Pentecostalism

In this context Protestantism has risen to prominence, marked by a strongly 'oppositional' identity in relation to Catholicism. Historical Protestantism (as the first mission churches are known) remained distant from the masses; Protestantism only became numerically successful with the advent of pentecostalism. By the 1950s, Brazilian and Chilean pentecostalism were growing rapidly, and by the 1980s the phenomenon was virtually region-wide. Although in a very few countries the religious 'second force' may be 'no religion', in most of the region it is now pentecostalism.

Pentecostalism today is organized in a huge number of denominations, a few of which originated abroad while the majority were homegrown. In the late twentieth century, pentecostalism also made considerable headway among Amerindian peoples. It is too early to say what new ecclesiastical and doctrinal forms may emerge from this adoption by indigenous peoples. It seems to reflect a vision of autonomy in a globalizing world, rejecting both assimilation into national society and the assumption that indigenous cultures can be sealed off (Martin, 2002: 119).

Although few countries have recent census data on religion, we can estimate Protestants to be in the region of about 12% of the population (perhaps 60 million), of whom two-thirds are pentecostals. In Latin America, pentecostalism is the Protestant mainstream. Cities such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Santiago are world capitals of pentecostalism.

In Brazil, the 2000 census showed 15.5% Protestant; growth in the 1990s had been especially fast. But the highest percentage is probably in Guatemala (between 20 and 30%), although growth there may have stagnated since the early 1990s. At the other end of the scale, Uruguay is probably still only around 5%. David Martin (1990: 59) gives as a rule of thumb that Protestant growth has been higher where the Catholic Church was politically weakened by liberalism in the nineteenth century but the culture remained unsecularized. Generally speaking, Latin American Protestantism is highly practised, fast-growing and organized in a plethora of nationally-run and even nationally-created denominations.

Nevertheless, some authors (Cleary, 2004; Bowen, 1996) speak of a crisis of pentecostalism. The symptoms are flattening growth curves, lack of regular attendance and considerable 'apostasy'. Evidence is adduced from Guatemala and Chile (Cleary), Mexico (Bowen) and Costa Rica (Gómez, 1996). The conclusion is that, while Catholicism has difficulty keeping a high percentage of nominal untutored adherents once changing religion has become socially acceptable, pentecostalism is too demanding morally and socially. It is too much a virtuoso religion to become a mass phenomenon, and will remain a vibrant but smallish minority.

This is a plausible prediction, to which one can add a loss of prestige once pentecostalism's limited ability to effect societal (as distinct from personal) transformation is realized. Nevertheless, the symptoms mentioned can be questioned empirically. Growth curves have flattened in some countries but in others they are still sharply upward, with the result that regionwide growth seems as strong as ever. While Chilean pentecostals do seem less practising, other countries show very high rates of weekly practice (86% in Brazil [S&P, 2006: 132]). Finally, 'apostasy' has to be measured against overall growth rates, and it can be merely a stage (usually in early adulthood) before a later return.

Brazil: The Pentecostal Capital of the World

Concentration on Brazil is justified not merely because it contains probably half of all Latin American pentecostals, but also because its statistics on religion are more plentiful and reliable than for any other country in the region (possibly excepting Chile). Brazil is the largest Catholic country in the world, and also the world capital of spiritism.

Less well-known is the fact that it may now have the second-largest community of practising Protestants in the world, and almost certainly the largest community of pentecostals.

In the 2000 census 15.5% of Brazilians (26 million) proclaimed themselves Protestant; 18 million of those are in pentecostal churches (10.4% of the population). Catholics were 73.6% (down by 10% in only nine years) and 'non-religious' were 7.3%. In the 2006 Pew survey (carried out only in urban areas), Catholics were 57%, Protestants 21% and 'non-religious' 8%.

The social and geographical characteristics of the Brazilian Protestant community give it an importance beyond its demographic percentage. In Greater Rio de Janeiro, by the early 1990s, 37 of the 52 largest denominations were of Brazilian origin (Fernandes, 1992). Protestantism (and especially pentecostalism) is disproportionately of the poor, the less educated and darker-skinned. It is stronger in the cities than in the countryside (whereas the Catholic Church is disproportionately rural); and women are heavily over-represented. In the shanty-towns, where the state is absent, evangelical churches are often the only organizations (apart from organized crime).

On census evidence, the growth rate for Protestants as a percentage of the population was between 20% and 33% per decade from 1890 to 1990. This fairly constant rate was shattered in the 1990–2000 period, when Protestantism grew by 75%. In the same period, Catholicism lost ten percentage points (down to 73%). In the state of Rio de Janeiro only 57% declared themselves Catholic; there, the absolute number of Catholics has been falling since 1980 and there are now more Protestants than Catholics attending church weekly.

The expansion of pentecostalism has been fastest in "the most dynamic spaces in terms of the economy and of migratory movements" (Jacob et al., 2003: 39), i.e., in the metropolitan areas of the South-East and the agricultural frontiers of the North and Centre-West. In metropolitan regions, pentecostals are located heavily in the poor periphery, forming a circle surrounding the more Catholic (and prosperous) municipality at the centre; hence the unkind jibe that "the Catholic Church opted for the poor but the poor opted for the pentecostals". Jacob et al. attribute this not just to poverty but to the virtual absence of the state or the Catholic Church on the peripheries. While pentecostals are less than 5% in the more central areas of São Paulo, they are as much as 30% on the periphery.

Brazil: The Catholic Reaction

While pentecostals have not been the only beneficiaries of the decline in Catholic allegiance, it is clear to the church hierarchy that that is where the main challenge lies. What was previously a culturally determined identity ("if you are Brazilian you are Catholic") has become an identity to be chosen and affirmed. There is a nucleus of active Catholics who participate in movements or pastorals; but there are also a large number of Catholics (22% in one survey) who attend services in other religions. In another survey, the institutionally correct answer ("I believe in Jesus Christ, Mary and the teachings of the Catholic Church") received only 36% of preferences from Catholics, slightly behind the generically Christian affirmation "I believe in Jesus Christ and his teachings". The same poll discovered that 35% of Catholics believe in the spiritist doctrine of reincarnation and 15% in the Afro-Brazilian spiritual entities called orixás. Yet 84% of Catholics (and even 27% of non-Catholics) regard the Church as having high credibility (Martins, 2002); perhaps a base for an ongoing role as a 'vicarious' institution on the European model! Yet, in the face of fast-growing religious competitors (something the European state churches do not face), Brazilian Catholicism cannot serenely limit itself to such functions, which would soon be undermined by the numerical growth of pentecostal 'sects', some of whom would be more than happy to share in public roles alongside the Catholics (while they dream of dislodging them totally). The Catholic Church cannot idly contemplate the erosion of its numerical base. Its stronghold is the interior of the backward North-East, where rural poverty has retained strong links with traditional popular devotion. Yet, precisely in the North-East, whose percentage of Protestants is way below the national average, Protestant growth was fastest in the 1990s.

Catholics now are disproportionately rural, male, elderly and white; the women, traditionally more devout and now also more free to choose their mode of devotion, are disproportionately pentecostal, as are the young, the darker-skinned and the more urban. A 1994 survey of 'Catholic ecclesial communities' (not to be confused with Ecclesial Base Communities, which came to only about 30% of those) found that of the 100,000 such communities, two-thirds were rural; this in a country now 75% urban (Valle & Pitta, 1994: 26).

From the early 1990s there has been considerable discussion by the hierarchy regarding how to react to the advance of pentecostalism. While progressives favoured an injection of spirituality into the Base

Communities, the National Bishops Council made proposals which link a return to some pre-Vatican II practices with selective imitation of pentecostal methods. The latter include investment in the media and incentive to the Catholic Charismatic Renewal. But mentality and structure do not make the task easy. The heritage of a national church makes it difficult to lunge wholeheartedly into competition. Territorialism and clericalism slow the Church down, especially in the fluid spaces of the urban peripheries and agricultural frontiers. In any case, institutional resources are scarce, with ratios of people to priests and to parishes worsening in recent decades.

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal is increasingly relied upon to halt pentecostal advance, yet evidence suggests it does that more successfully among the middle-class. Estimated now at 8–10 million adherents, the Renewal combines pentecostal phenomena with distinctively Catholic emphases such as the Virgin Mary, thus allowing Catholicism not only to present its own pentecostal version but also (by promoting a 're-affiliation' to the religion of one's birth) to survive in a model of competitive pluralism in which religion is more and more a conscious individual choice.

In the 2006 Pew survey, just over 30% of all urban Brazilians claimed some connection with the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (S&P, 2006: 73). This figure, totally unsupported by empirical studies of the Renewal itself, suggests that 'Catholic charismatic' is becoming a default answer for many non-practising Catholics, assimilating it to a pattern of more or less heterodox popular Catholicism. Since most of these supposed charismatics must be non-attenders, it seems that the positive image of the Renewal (probably linked to the immense popularity of some 'singing priests') is being massively appropriated, but without the attendant beliefs and practices which might galvanize the Church and prevent its numerical erosion.

Pentecostalization or Secularization on the Brazilian Peripheries?

While Protestants dream of dislodging Catholic religious hegemony, others (especially in academia) have celebrated the arrival of religious pluralism in Brazil. Spiritism, Afro-Brazilian religions (far from limited to blacks), Judaism, Buddhism, new Japanese religions, Islam, Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, neo-esoterical groups galore can all be found. Yet

still others stress that all these categories add up to only 3% of the population. Virtually 90% are still Christian; and most of the rest (7%) come under the census category of 'no religion'. This category was a mere 1% in 1980, and has grown in tandem with the pentecostal explosion. Furthermore, its geographical distribution is remarkably similar to that of pentecostalism. The main differences are that, firstly, the 'non-religious' grew very rapidly in the 1980s and somewhat less so in the 1990s (the opposite to the pentecostal pattern); and secondly, that they include a well-off and highly-educated segment which is lacking in pentecostalism. Yet overall, the 'non-religious' are concentrated in the same urban peripheries (and rural frontiers) as the pentecostals, among the young and darker-skinned. Yet (a third and key difference), they are overwhelmingly male, whereas pentecostals are predominantly female. 'No religion' is, perhaps, the male equivalent of pentecostalism among unemployed and precariously employed young people. Might it therefore be a temporary option, a luxury of young unattached and underemployed males which is later replaced by pentecostal domesticity, rather than a new tendency which will work its way through the age cohorts? All surveys put the number of true religious non-believers at little more than 1%, so it seems the phenomenon has more to do with the weakening of religious institutions.

Interestingly, 43% of 'non-religious' persons believe in the devil, virtually the same percentage as Catholics (*Veja*, 16 Dec. 2001)! Pentecostals believe much more in the devil (above 80%), and this may be functional for their success in the dramatic circumstances of the urban peripheries. Birman and Leite describe how Catholicism in Brazil adapted to the beliefs and practices of Amerindians, Africans, Portuguese heretics and exiled criminals, in which formal dogma co-existed with strong devotion to the saints and belief in magic and witchcraft. This was the basis of an ethical order in which good and evil were not clearly defined, exclusive affirmations of identity were avoided and religious syncretism was practised. But this status quo is now under serious threat from pentecostalism which refuses to accept the status of a minority syncretic religion under the protection of a broad and powerful Catholic identity, in the way that the Afro-Brazilian possession cults did. Pentecostals do battle against all other spiritual beings, practising exorcism and demanding exclusive individual dedication and genuine pluralism in the public sphere. Meanwhile, in recent decades urban violence (often drug-related) has worsened dramatically and seems to demand a less conciliatory strategy. How, ask Birman and Leite, can one live

pacifically with such perceived emanations of the devil? In the field of violence, certain religious interpretations have lost credibility and others (especially pentecostal ones) have become more plausible. The Catholic Church is perceived as at best helpless to deal with the causes of urban violence, and at worst as conniving with them. Pentecostal pastors, on the other hand, are widely regarded as possessing much more power than Catholic priests. They interrupt the flow of violence with the word of God and with rituals of exorcism. Indeed, exorcism has become one of the most significant methods of dealing with evil in the shanty-towns (Birman & Leite, 2000).

In addition, Corten (2006) suggests that the transition from state violence (during the Latin American military regimes of the 1960s to 1980s) to privatized violence today further encouraged a change of religion. While Corten may underestimate the extent to which the lower classes have always suffered privatized violence, he is right that the transnational and hierarchical Catholic Church was better at combatting state violence, whereas the individual transformative power of pentecostalism does better against privatized violence. Significantly, while 80% of Brazilian pentecostals claim to have witnessed or experienced evil spirits being driven out of a person, only 30% of Catholic charismatics make the same claim (S&P, 2006: 138); this reflects the Church's severe restriction on such activities, which leaves its charismatics holding a theology which they cannot fully act upon.

Pentecostalism is the first mass religion in Latin America to definitively reject the Catholic institutional hegemony over the religious field. It breaks with the traditional Brazilian 'syncretic' model and proposes a pluralist alternative. The former model is a hierarchical syncretism which combines non-exclusiveness with acceptance of Catholic institutional hegemony. For example, Candomblé (the main Afro-Brazilian religion) is often called a 'body without a head' because the head is in Catholicism. But pentecostalism is a totally autonomous popular religion, the first mass religion in Latin America to consciously break with the institutional force-field of the Catholic Church. (The fact that some Brazilian religions operate in the 'hierarchical syncretism' mode rather than the 'competitive pluralism' mode means that they are under-represented in the Census, which does not allow 'double affiliations'. The Afro-Brazilian religions such as Candomblé and Umbanda are much more influential than their numbers in the census would indicate. Nevertheless, their decline in census figures since 1980 has undermined

the hopes of some intellectuals in the 1970s who hailed Umbanda as a truly Brazilian religious amalgam destined to rival pentecostalism.)

If that is pentecostalism's relationship to Catholicism, what is its relationship to Brazil's third 'religious' force, the 'non-religious'? Some see 'no religion' as the eventual haven of many converts to pentecostalism, thus making pentecostalism a stage on the way to secularization. One famous progressive bishop claimed that the pentecostal 'sects' have external funding (a largely unsubstantiated accusation) because within a few generations "people will get tired of the sects and will be more open to materialism, favouring the interests of First World countries". However, survey evidence suggests that (at least so far) there is far more conversion from 'no religion' to pentecostalism than vice versa. A survey of the city of São Paulo in 1995 (Prandi, 1996) revealed that 26% of the population had changed religion at some time. Pentecostalism is by far the greatest beneficiary. Brazil is one of the countries where pentecostalism grows fastest; in the 2006 Pew survey, 62% of pentecostals were converts, a percentage exceeded only in the Philippines (79%). The São Paulo survey also tells us where those changing religion were coming from. In comparison to their current size in the population (which is the important criterion), the most volatile category of all is that of 'no religion'.

What about direct interaction between the two fastest-growing categories, pentecostalism and 'no religion'? The São Paulo survey suggests that the number of people going from 'no religion' to pentecostalism (about 1.5% of the population) is three times greater than the number going in the opposite direction. In other words, there is (as yet anyway) no evidence for regarding pentecostalism as a staging-post on the way to secularization (in the sense of declining individual religious adherence).

Of course, the absolute numbers of those converting from 'no religion' to pentecostalism are too small to constitute a serious challenge to the secularization thesis. In Brazil, there simply are not enough 'non-religious' people available for that. Nevertheless, since most Catholics are non-practising, their conversion to pentecostalism nearly always means at least a significant *intensification* of religiosity. Pentecostalism is nothing if not intense religion: in the depth of feeling expected, in commitment of time and resources, in intensity of community participation, in dedication to proselytism and in transformation of life patterns.

Furthermore, the sum of such conversions and the reactions to them signify a growing 'pentecostalization' of the broader religious field.

Velho (2000) talks of the hegemonic national ideology (both popular and erudite) which considers 'mixture' as typically Brazilian. But the growth of pentecostalism, he adds, has had some success in denaturalizing Catholicism and the religious complex which it benevolently headed (which I have described as 'hierarchical syncretism'). A resulting pentecostalization of the religious field is seen not only in the Catholic Charismatic Renewal but also in a reaction against the 'ideology of syncretism' in some Afro-Brazilian religious groups, in which real or imaginary African roots are now stressed and the identification with Catholic saints is repudiated.

The Brazilian Case in Latin American Context

The data on Chile, despite some particularities, points in the same general direction as that on Brazil. In the 2002 census, Catholics (declining fast) were 70%, Protestants were 15.1% and 'non-religious' were 8.3%. As in Brazil, only about half of the Chileans who leave Catholicism become Protestant. However, Protestantism in Chile is even more associated with social class than in Brazil. There is a marked social and educational ceiling, which may partly contribute to the relative crisis of Chilean pentecostalism, especially as higher education is expanding rapidly (Parker, 2005). In addition, only 39% of pentecostals are converts (S&P, 2006: 127), a low proportion by Latin American standards.

Guatemala is usually considered to have the highest percentage of Protestants in Latin America, but good data is sparse. From the 2006 Pew survey (which gave 48% Catholic, 34% Protestant and 15% unaffiliated), the 'no religion to pentecostalism' trajectory (as in Brazil and Chile) seems more common than the opposite.

Apart from Brazil and Chile, only Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Bolivia have fairly recent census information on religion. The Nicaraguan census of 1995 reported 73% Catholic, 15% Protestant and 8.5% unaffiliated; a remarkably similar result to Brazil and Chile but with a very different trajectory behind it (much of the Protestant growth having been during the Sandinista period). Bolivia, the second most heavily indigenous country in Latin America (behind Guatemala), has had rapid Protestant growth in recent decades: in the 2001 census Catholics were 78%, Protestants 16%, 'other Christian religions' 3% and 'no religion' only 2.5%. The indigenous factor also appears in Mexico; although nationally the 2000 census revealed 87.9% Catholic, 5.2% Protestant

and 3.5% 'non-religious', the Protestant percentage among indigenous people is twice as high as the national average. Finally, in the 1993 census in Peru, Catholics were 88.9%, Protestants 7.2%, other religions 2.5% and 'non-religious' 1.4%; again, some highly indigenous regions are well above the national average of Protestants.

The Future of Religion in Brazil

The religious future of Brazil in the short-term is likely to depend on three factors: i) the decline of Catholicism, although unlikely to be completely eroded due to its solid nucleus; ii) the growth of pentecostalism (and Protestantism in general), but gaining only one in every two people who leave Catholicism; and iii) the pulverization of the rest of the religious field. On current trends there could never be a Protestant majority in the population. And if, as seems probable, the Catholic Church manages to make itself more attractive in a diverse way, it is hard to imagine it falling below 40%, which would put a ceiling of about 35% on Protestant aspirations. But a third scenario would locate a Protestant ceiling below that, determined not just by Catholic performance but by scars to its own reputation (scandals, authoritarian leadership, unfulfilled promises, poor political image). Studying Chile in the 1960s, D'Epinay (1970: 76) said that, due to its social composition, pentecostalism's potential clientele was large but not unlimited. Today, we must be more cautious; pentecostalism shows versatility in crossing social boundaries. Martin (1991) prefers to talk of a religious limit: due to its aspect of protest, pentecostal growth has a built-in decelerator, slowing down when there is little left to protest about.

Internal evolution could also affect pentecostalism's ability to continue growing. A survey of a Catholic popular festival in northern Brazil showed that a quarter of the participants claimed to be Protestants. This would be the Brazilian tradition of non-exclusive practice reasserting itself, assimilating pentecostalism into Brazilian tradition rather than transforming that tradition. But this needs greater investigation. It may just be that occasional attenders at pentecostal services or watchers of pentecostal media feel freer now to profess a link which is still, from the pentecostal angle, incomplete. Pentecostal churches have to work in a popular context in which hedging one's bets and plural practice are common, and in which pentecostalism is a more and more visible and accepted player, which means there will be an ever larger margin of

people involved at some level in pentecostalism while still immersed in their traditional plural practice. At the level of their own doctrine and discipline, however, the pentecostal churches do not respect Catholic institutional hegemony or accept plural affiliation, a significant break with previous tradition.

The religious future of Brazil is likely to include a revitalized Catholicism retaining a large percentage of the population, with a vast and fragmented Protestant field, and a sizeable sector of non-Christian religions and 'non-religious'. Population growth is now slowing, migrations are diminishing and urban growth is going more to medium-sized cities, all of which favors the capacity of Catholicism to react.

The Religious Future of Latin America

This chapter has concentrated largely on transformations of the religious field. Other dimensions of Latin American religion in a globalizing world have received little discussion (e.g. the public sphere of Latin American countries; the Latin American diaspora; and religious 'exporters' from the region [on which, see Freston, 2000; 2004]).

While Latin America has 42% of the world's Catholics, it has only 15% of its priests. Though the region has become more important for the Catholic world, its institutional weakness has hindered an adequate reaction to pentecostal advance.

The probable future in the region is of a Protestant peak, followed by a Catholic revival (including 'evangelical' forms) and then a settling to a long-term religious pluralism with Catholic numerical plurality and residual social and political privilege. The Catholic Church is being slowly transformed, despite its territorial structure which makes it hard to follow demographic changes, and its clericalism which inhibits lay initiatives and creates cognitive distance from the masses.

There is no reason to expect a single pattern to emerge throughout Latin America. Rather, we can expect significant variations in a Latin America which is still relatively homogeneous from its Iberian colonization and Catholic heritage. The other side of that relative homogeneity is that there may be a demonstration-effect of Protestant growth in some parts of the region on the relatively weaker parts.

The novelty of Latin America, in global terms, is that a Catholic monopoly is being eroded by Protestantism *from the bottom up*. This is no 'Reformation' on the lines of sixteenth-century Europe, but an

inherently unstable transformation whose line of maximum advance will vary significantly from country to country.

A recent work on global Catholicism comments that the region has become the key place of encounter with pentecostalism. "In countries [such as the United States] where the Church has long existed side by side with evangelical Protestants in an open, pluralist setting, Catholics have developed particularly strong forms of local parish life, commitment to practice and participation, and a sense of stewardship and relatively high church giving. In other words, the Church has learned from the strengths characteristic of these other Christian traditions" (Froehle & Gautier, 2003: 132). Probably inevitably, Catholicism suffered losses in Latin America once real competition began. But that is only a first phase, not the final word. Indeed, it could be argued that, through the pentecostals, the Charismatic Renewal and the Base Communities (as different as they are), the Latin American masses are being Christianized in a way they never needed to be when the Spanish and Portuguese crowns guaranteed protection from competition but also kept the Church on a shoestring.

Implications for Global Debates on Models of Religion and Modernity

Discussion of an area outside the developed West (the seat for the reigning models of religion and modernity), and of a grassroots and fissiparous phenomenon such as pentecostalism, highlights our uncertainty about what happens to a religion that becomes truly global and deterritorialized.

David Martin says that a quarter of a century ago he wondered why the voluntary denominations had not taken off in Latin America as in the USA, and concluded that it must be too similar to Latin Europe. But now, he wonders why the burgeoning denominations of Latin America have not taken off in Latin Europe (cited in Davie, 2002: 82). In fact, Latin America was similar to Latin Europe mainly in its small Protestantism, but it had mostly avoided the Catholic-secularist confrontations of southern Europe. Now, it is developing a diversity which is mainly Catholic-pentecostal-'non-religious', but it is a 'no religion' without the militancy of Latin European secularism.

Martin (1990: 294) raises another question regarding the 'interim diversion theory' of pentecostalism. If pentecostalism advances plural-

ism in Latin America, it represents a variant of the North American model in which differentiation separates church from state, territory and local community, and exhibits a partnership between voluntary denominations and modernity. But the North American model also includes a later partial shift from evangelicalism to liberalism, which might imply that Latin American pentecostalism belongs to a phase in modernization and will later decline as its devotees better themselves and go to school. Or, asks Martin, is that trajectory itself historically contingent and local?

I do not think there is any necessary trajectory to liberalism in Latin American pentecostalism. The Enlightenment context is weaker; congregational demands will remain paramount in church life; and in any case, people are sometimes able to learn from history.

What about 'vicariousness' as a model for the future of Latin America? Considered by Davie (2002; 2006) to be a key component of the European model, vicarious religion is performed by an active minority on behalf of a much larger number who (implicitly at least) approve. It derives from a particular history and the notion of a state church (or its successor) as a public utility rather than a private organization.

All Latin American countries have the heritage of a state church. But if vicariousness is probably no more than a phase even in Europe (Davie herself thinks it will not last much beyond mid-century), in Latin America it is less than that. Vicariousness does not only depend on a historical heritage but also on a low level of current religious demand. As Casanova (2006) says, once individuals in Europe lose faith in their national churches, they largely do not look for alternative salvation religions, since they have become ideologically convinced of the secularization paradigm that to be modern is to be secular. But Latin America has never 'bought into' the secularization thesis to anything like that extent, and its flourishing competitive pluralism makes the sedate exercise of a vicarious role an impossibility. The tendency is for Latin American Catholicism to try to invoke a vicarious role when possible, but combined with a more participatory mode to prevent its own base eroding disastrously. Similarly, if Latin American religion ever began to have a sizeable influence on Latin Europe, vicariousness would be one of its first victims.

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